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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines efforts by the British Foreign Office between 
1945 and 1949 to establish an international, yet British-led, regional 
system in South-East Asia, initially on the economic level but 
eventually Including political and defence cooperation as well. Part 1 
looks at vain efforts by the Foreign Office in 1945 to use South East 
Asia Command (SEAC) under Lord Mountbatten as the basis for an 
international regional commission. It then examines the Foreign Office's 
appointment in 1946 of Lord Killearn as Special Commissioner in 
Singapore, and it highlights British hopes that the Special Commission, 
which organised international action against the acute shortage of rice 
in the region, would one day become the nucleus for a wider regional 
organisation. Part 2 looks at the impact of Asian nationalism on British 
regional policies. By February 1947, the Foreign Office contemplated the 
eventual inclusion of India and of other fledgling Asian states in its 
regional plans. Part 3 shows the subsequent decline of the Special 
Commission after London's decision on financial grounds to merge the 
organisation with the office of the Malayan Governor-General. It also 
examines competition by Australia, India and the UN in trying to take 
the lead on regional cooperation, and it shows how British policies were 
negatively affected by the hardline policies of France and the 
Netherlands in their respective South-East Asian colonies. Part 4 looks 
at the revival of British regional plans towards the end of 1948 
following the Malayan Emergency. The Foreign Office convinced the rest 
of Whitehall of trying to organise regional cooperation as a means of 
containing communism in South-East Asia. At the same time, it launched a 
diplomatic offensive to secure Asian cooperation and American financial 
backing for its regional plans. The thesis ends in November 1949 with 
the Cabinet's adoption of regional cooperation as official British 
policy, paving the way for the Colombo Conference in January 1950 and 
the subsequent Colombo Plan. One of the recurring themes of the thesis 
is the conflict between the Foreign Office and the Colonial Office over 
regional policies; another one is the Foreign Office's shift from 
colonial cooperation concepts to the idea of cooperating primarily with 
the new Asian states.
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I NT R OD U CT I ON
In October 1949, the Attlee government endorsed a Cabinet paper 
which made the creation of a regional association in South-East Asia an 
official aim in British foreign policy (1) The decision paved the
way for the Colombo Conference in January 1950 and Asia's first 
international economic development scheme, the Colombo Plan, which 
eventually included some 23 Asian and Western countries. When research 
for this thesis first began at the Public Record Office in London, the
original intention was to trace Britain's policy of regional cooperation
from 1949 until the Geneva Conference on Indochina in 1954, covering the 
Colombo Plan as well as the AHZUS and SEATO defence pacts. However, it 
was soon clear that a more comprehensive study including the origins of 
Britain's regional policies was required. After further research into 
the immediate postwar period, it emerged that the story behind the 1949 
paper on regional cooperation was indeed intriguing. Its origins lay in 
the Anglo-American wartime debate on the future of colonial empires, and 
it was determined by the fundamental changes in postwar Asia, such as 
Indian independence in 1947 and the beginning of the Cold War. The topic 
of my thesis was consequently changed to trace the origins and 
development of British regional policies between 1945 and 1949.
The notion of a regional association in South-East Asia first 
appeared in a Cabinet paper in December 1944. At the time, the British
Colonial Office was considering the establishment of a world-wide system
of international regional commissions in colonial territories. South-
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East Asia too was seen as an area where a colonial commission could 
eventually be established. The Colonial Office had developed Its 
proposals as an alternative to American demands for the international 
supervision of the European colonies after the war. However, it dropped 
its plans after the Yalta Conference in February 1945, for reasons 
already outlined by Vllliam Roger Louis in his book.Imperialism at Bay.
This thesis picks up the thread in the second half of 1945, when 
the British Foreign Office presented new regional proposals, confined, 
this time, to South-East Asia. The department's somewhat vague idea was 
to use the British-led South East Asia Command (SEAC) under Lord Louis 
Mountbatten as the basis for an international organisation in South-East 
Asia that could be linked to a British Minister Resident in Singapore. 
Immediately after the war, SEAC was in temporary control of Thailand as 
well as the British, French and Dutch colonies in the region. By 
implication, the Foreign Office hoped that a regional organisation would 
maintain a maximum degree of British Influence in the area after the 
return to civilian rule. Though the Foreign Office failed in 1945 to 
convince the rest of Whitehall of its South-East Asian plans, it was to 
pursue the regional idea throughout the following years.
Until the 1949 Cabinet paper, the consolidation and expansion of 
Britain's international influence in South-East Asia remained the major 
aim underlying the Foreign Office's policy of regional cooperation. 
Initially, there would be economic and political collaboration under 
British guidance. In the long run, this would lead to a regional defence 
arrangement. However, while these ultimate aims remained, the means
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considered to achieve them underwent some fundamental changes. In 
reaction to the rapid political developments that were occurring in both 
South-East Asia and on the subcontinent, the Foreign Office streamlined 
its regional plans.
The department's plans were principally affected by three 
historical factors. First, there was the dual nature of Britain's 
postwar task in South-East Asia. In 1945, Britain found herself in 
control of far greater parts of South-East Asia than originally 
intended, as SEAC's boundaries of command were widely extended 
coinciding with the sudden Japanese surrender. Yet Britain was ill- 
prepared for the task of postwar administration. Apart from the volatile 
political problems arising in Burma, Indochina and Indonesia, the 
British had serious problems in supplying sufficient foodstuffs to the 
area. Due to a world-wide shortage of rice, the whole of South-East Asia 
in February 1946 was threatened by famine.
Initially, the Foreign Office regarded SEAC's territorial 
enlargement as an opportunity for the extension of British Influence in 
the postwar period: it was hoped that a regional successor organisation 
to SEAC might enable Britain to continue influencing the policies of the 
other colonial powers, and that it would provide for the restoration of 
British prewar influence in Thailand. After the Foreign Office's failure 
to convince its sister departments in London of its ambitious regional 
plans, the rice crisis in February 1946 offered a new opportunity for 
the implementation of a more moderate regional scheme. Lord Killearn was 
sent to Singapore as Special Commissioner to coordinate action against
- l i ­
the regional shortage of food. He soon organised regular meetings of 
international liaison officers, working closely with the International 
Food Boards in Washington, which were responsible for allocating rice to 
South-East Asia. Killearn*s Special Commission was thus providing for 
cooperation on a technical level, and the Foreign Office hoped that it 
would one day become the centre of a wider regional organisation.
The second factor affecting the Foreign Office's regional plans was 
the rapid advance of Asian nationalism in South and South-East Asia 
after the war which culminated in the transfer of power in India in 
August 1947. Under its impact the Foreign Office enlarged the 
geographical scope of its planned regional scheme, aiming to include the 
fledgling states in the subcontinent in a British-led regional system 
with its centre in Singapore. The outbreak of the internationally 
unpopular war in Indochina, as well as French requests for British arms 
deliveries in January 1947 (only weeks before Attlee's announcement on a 
British withdrawal from India), served as a catalyst for the formulation 
of the Foreign Office's new regional concept. However, the further 
effect of Asian nationalism was to encourage the idea in Asia of 
establishing exclusively Asian regional alignments. This goal was first 
pursued by India during the 1947 Asian Relations Conference. In its 
wake, the United Nations and Australia too emerged as competitors to 
Britain, vying for the lead in organising regional cooperation. Despite 
the redefinition of the Foreign Office's regional policies at the 
beginning of 1947, Asian nationalism thus had a detrimental effect on 
the department's plans.
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The third factor determining the Foreign Office's regional policies
was the shift of the Cold Var to South-East Asia in 1948. After the
Malayan emergency and mounting communist victories in China, the 
department revived its by now flagging regional plans. Regional 
cooperation became one of the Foreign Office's prime strategies in 
containing communism. The new regional policy aimed at uniting the Asian 
countries in an anti-communist front under Britain's discreet 
leadership. A start would be made through the Commonwealth, and American 
aid was to give the incentive for regional unity. Since London was
becoming despe^rate for an International initiative that could turn the 
tide in Asia, the Cabinet accepted the Foreign Office's plans and in 
October 1949 turned regional cooperation into official British policy.
In addition to these three key factors, the Foreign Office's
regional policies were influenced by a number of problems closer to 
home. Britain's increasing financial weakness for example determined 
Whitehall's decision to merge the Special Commission and the office of 
the Kalayan Governor-General by the spring of 1948. Linking Britain's 
regional food coordinating activities to the colonial authorities in 
Malaya greatly diminished the prospects for turning the Special 
Commission Cor its amalgamted successor) into a wider regional 
organisation. Another problem was drawing the line between Anglo-French- 
Dutch cooperation in Europe, where Western Union and NATO were being 
established, and European collaboration in South-East Asia. Dutch and 
French policies in Indonesia and Indochina were highly unpopular in 
India, and if Britain appeared to be siding with the other colonial 
powers she risked forfeiting Delhi's participation in her regional
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plans. On the other hand, public condemnation of French and Dutch 
hardline policies might well have jeopardised the prospects for 
cooperation in Western Europe.
Finally, differences with the Colonial Office over South-East Aslan 
regionalism at times hampered the Foreign Office's policies. After the 
failure of its wartime plans, the Colonial Office was more cautious than 
its sister department, fearing that regional cooperation would lead to 
international and in particular American interference in Europe's South- 
East Aslan colonies. Colonial officials also resented the Foreign 
Office's apparent efforts to impinge on the Colonial Office's* 
traditional sphere of responsibility and to try and dictate British 
policies in South-East Asia. Interdepartmental rivalry receded after the 
merger in Singapore in 1948. However, some differences over regional 
policies remained at least until the end of 1949.
As already indicated, regional cooperation was very much a Foreign 
Office policy after 1945. Within the department, it was Esler Denlng, 
Mountbatten's political adviser during the war and subsequently 
Assistant Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, who was the leading 
architect of British regional policies. The regional idea originated 
with him in 1945; he also seems to have been the main author of the 1949 
Cabinet paper on South-East Asia. Lord Killearn too had considerable 
impact on Foreign Office plans for South-East Asia. He was enthusiastic 
about the idea of a Singapore-centred regional arrangement that might 
eventually include East, South and South-East Asia. His was also the 
idea of progressing empirically from technical to wider regional
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cooperation through his Special Commission. Britain's Foreign Secretary, 
Ernest Bevln, was less Involved in the formulation of his department's 
regional plans. However, at times he too played a crucial role. It was 
at his initiative that the government went ahead with Lord Killearn's 
appointment as Special Commissioner after the extent of the rice crisis 
had become fully apparent in February 1946. In 1948 and 1949 he was also 
instrumental in carrying his department's regional policies through the 
Cabinet. However, his own ideas on regional cooperation were sometimes 
inconsistent with those of his department. During the 1946 Commonwealth 
Prime Ministers' Meeting, for example, Bevin suggested turning the 
Special Commission into a proper regional commission that would include 
Australia. This was done without previous departmental consultation and 
caused great confusion at both the Foreign and the Colonial Office. 
Another example was Bevln'6 reference to the resources of the European 
colonies in his speech on Western Union in January 1948. It led to Asian 
accusations of a European conspiracy in South-East Asia and contradicted 
Foreign Office plans for cooperation with the new Asian states.
Throughout the period under consideration, regional issues came up 
at two Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Meetings, during international 
negotiations on the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East 
(ECAFE), in British talks with the Dutch and the French, and during 
Anglo-American negotiations on South-East Asia. Despite this, little was 
publicly known at the time about the details of Britain's regional 
plans. Since the opening of the British archives, however, the Foreign 
Office's ambitious regional plans can be explored in their full depth. 
This thesis is therefore based first and foremost on British primary
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sources kept at the Public Record Office In Kew, London. The most 
important of these are undoubtedly the documents within the Foreign 
Office's General Far Eastern series. Extensive use has also been made of 
individual South-East Asian country files of the Foreign Office. 
Furthermore, the relevant papers of the Colonial Office's International 
Relations Department, and of the Dominions Office (later Commonwealth 
Relations Office) have been taken into full account. Many quotes have 
also been taken from official and ministerial Cabinet committees dealing 
with South-East Asia, and from the Chiefs of Staff's papers. Further 
primary sources include the Killearn diaries (Oxford), the Mountbatten 
Papers (Southampton) and the MacDonald Papers (Durham). Some papers kept 
at the India Office Library and Records (IOLR) were also used.
Of the printed sources available, the Foreign Relations of the 
United States series (FRUS) was of immense value for 1948 and 1949. For 
1945, some use could be made of the latest volumes of the Documents on 
British Policy Overseas series, while for 1946/47 the document series 
Burma - The Struggle for Independence as well as India - The transfer of 
Power were of interest. So far as oral history is concerned, it is most 
unfortunate that officials like Esler Dening, Lord Killearn, Malcolm 
MacDonald or Lord Louis Mountbatten are no longer alive. However, a 
number of Foreign Office and Colonial Office officials were interviewed, 
and I am grateful for their comments and advice.
In contrast to the vast amounts of primary sources now available on 
South-East Asia, the literature on British postwar policies in the 
region is still comparatively scarce. Though the Anglo-American wartime
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debate on South-East Asia has been covered by Louis's Imperialism at Bay 
and Christopher Thorne's Allies of a Kind, a comprehensive study of 
British policies In postwar South-East Asia, comparable perhaps to 
Louis's other great book, The British Empire in the Kiddle East, 1945- 
1951, is still awaited. Standard works on British foreign policy after 
the war, such as Alan Bullock's Ernest Bevln - Foreign Secretary 
unfortunately pay comparatively little attention to South-East Asia, a 
reflection perhaps of the scarcity of South-East Asian material in the 
Bevin papers at the Public Record Office. However, individual 
territories like Malaya have been examined in great detail by historians 
such as A.J.Stockwe11 and Anthony Short. Peter Dennis's recent book 
Troubled days of peace - Mountbatten and South East Asia Command, 1945-
1946 covers the British postwar involvement in Indochina and Indonesia.
A less critical analysis of Britain's role in Indochina is offered in
Peter M. Dunn's book The First Vietnam Var. On Britain's involvement in
Indonesia there is also Robert J. KacMahon's excellent Colonialism and 
Cold Var - the United States and the Struggle for Indonesian 
Independence; his account of British policies virtually ends, however, 
with the withdrawal of the last British troops in November 1946.
So far as Anglo-American relations in South-East Asia are 
concerned, the most interesting book of the last years is undoubtedly 
Andrew J. Rotter's The Path to Vietnam - Origins of the American 
Commitment to Southeast Asia, which begins in 1948/49 and highlights the 
link between South-East Asia and the economic recovery of Western Europe 
and Japan. On American policy there is also Gary R. Hess's The United 
States' Emergence as a Southeast Asian Power, 1940-1950. This thesis has
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also benefited from recent articles on India, for example those by Anita 
Inder Singh, from Moore' s book Escape from Empire on Britain and Indian 
independence, as well as from Roger Buckley's superb Occupation 
Diplomacy on Allied policies in postwar Japan. Two historians have so 
far dealt with British regional policies in South-East Asia. Ritchie 
Ovendale's article on Britain, the United States and the Cold Var in 
South-East Asia, 1949-1950 and his book The English-Speaking Alliance 
were a source of inspiration for this thesis. Hicholas Tar ling's two 
articles on the creation of the Special Commission and on the origins of 
the Colombo Plan included extensive documentary evidence.
Despite this, there has not yet been a comprehensive treatment of 
British regional policies in South-East Asia between 1945 and 1949. This 
thesis attempts to fill the gap. In my recent article Britain, the 1947 
Asian Delations Conference, and regional co-operation in South-East 
Asia, I first outlined some of the themes underlying the issue of 
regional cooperation in the postwar period. The present study now 
follows in detail the regional debate in Whitehall and in Singapore, and 
it examines the international factors that were affecting British 
regional plans. It ends with the Cabinet papers on regional cooperation 
in October 1949. Ho attempt is made, however, to cover the Colombo 
Conference and the subsequent establishment of the Colombo Flan. This 
will have to be the subject of a further historical study, centring on 
the implementation of Britain's regional policies in the 1950's.
Finally, a word on the terminology used in this thesis. In line 
with modern historiography, Thailand rather than Siam is employed.
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Equally, Indonesia refers to the Dutch East Indies after September 1945. 
However, rather than speaking of only Vietnam, the term Indochina has 
sometimes been used In reference to all the French colonies in South- 
East Asia, which included Laos and Cambodia. The term South-East Asia 
has been the cause of some confusion: it only came into fashion after 
the creation of SEAC in 1943 and it originally included Burma, Thailand, 
Indochina, Malaya (including Singapore and Forth Borneo) and Indonesia. 
By 1949, in line with Britain's growing interest in regional cooperation 
with the United States, Vashington's former colony, the Philippines, was 
added. This slightly broader definition of South-East Asia is indeed in 
line with the one applied in this thesis. It should be noted though that 
in 1949 some British officials were beginning to include South Asia 
(i.e. India, Ceylon, Pakistan, Hepal, Tibet and Afghanistan) in the 
definition of South-East Asia, reflecting the British tendency towards a 
Singapore rather than Delhi-centred view of South and South-East Asia. 
Further confusion is caused by the term Far East. At the time, it could 
describe anything from East Asia (i.e. China, Mongolia, Manchuria, Korea 
and Japan) to the whole of South, South-East and East Asia. The term Far 
East has consequently been avoided unless part of a direct or indirect 
quote.
Notes
(1) The paper, CAB (49) 207, is still classified. However, FO minutes 
show that it consisted of two planning papers drafted by the Permanent 
Under-Secretary's Committee: PUSC(32), 28 July 1949, 'The United Kingdom 
in South-East Asia and the Far East'; and PUSC(53), 20 August 1949, 
'Regional Co-operation in South-East Asia and the Far East'. Both can be 
found in FO 371, 76030, F 17397.
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PART I 
THE P OSTWAR C H A L L E N G E
Two months before the end of the Second Vorld Var in Asia, 
Britain's ideas on the future of South-East Asia, which to a large 
degree was still under Japanese occupation, were still vague. Whitehall 
had done considerable work on the future of individual British 
territories like Burma and Malaya, but little on the International set­
up of the region after the war. The Colonial Office had only recently 
shelved a grand scheme for international cooperation in colonial 
territories, while the Foreign Office was only slowly awaking to the 
need for international planning in East and South-East Asia.
The unexpected Japanese surrender in August 1945 radically altered 
London's outlook. Suddenly, Britain found herself in control of most of 
South-East, as the responsibility of Lord Mountbatten*s South East Asia 
Command (SEAC) was extended to Thailand, Indonesia and southern 
Indochina, all territories which had previously been the responsibility 
of the United States. The British soon found themselves up against a 
host of political, economic as well as military problems in South-East 
Asia. Despite this, the situation promised opportunities for the 
extension of British influence. To cope with the task of postwar 
administration and to cement British influence in the region, the 
Foreign Office consequently suggested establishing a regional 
organisation in South-East Asia in succession to SEAC. The organisation
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would be linked to a British Minister Resident in Singapore who would 
also be in charge of coordinating British colonial, defence and foreign 
policies in South-East Asia. The plan implied a continuation of 
Britain's postwar hegemony in South-East Asia after the return of the 
French and the Dutch, who had initially to rely on Britain to reimpose 
their rule.
The first part of this thesis examines the origins of the Foreign 
Office's regional plans, focusing initially on the state of South-East 
Asian planning in London prior to the Japanese surrender. It then looks 
at Foreign Office proposals for South-East Asia and follows the regional 
debate in Whitehall until the appointment of Lord Killearn as Special 
Commissioner in Singapore in February 1946. Finally, there is an 
appreciation of Killearn's Special Commission between 1946 and 1948.
-  21 -
1. THE STATE OF BRITISH PLA N N I N G  FOR 
SO U T H - E A S T  ASIA IN 1945
1.1. BURMA AND MALAYA
At the time of the German surrender in May 1945, plans for the 
postwar organisation of Britain's South-East Asian territories were 
beginning to crystallize. However, London didn't regard the issue as 
being of outstanding urgency: though the Allies were confident of their 
eventual victory over Japan, they expected the war to continue at least 
until the spring of 1946. American forces under General KacArthur's 
South Vest Pacific Area Command (SVPA) had retaken Manila in March 1945 
after a successful campaign of 'island hopping* in the Pacific, which 
was to culminate in the capture of Okinawa in the middle of June. At the 
same time, a number of fire-bombing raids on Japanese cities and 
Industrial centres carried out by American long-range bombers had caused 
wide-spread devastation, proving that Japan now faced almost complete 
destruction.(1) In South-East Asia too the Allies were on the offensive. 
British and Indian troops belonging to Mountbatten*s South East Asia 
Command (SEAC) had recaptured the Burmese capital of Rangoon in early 
May, and the invasion of Malaya (Operation 'Zipper') was planned for the 
end of August. However, though Japan's industrial output as well as her 
navy and air force were seriously affected by the Allied war effort, the 
Japanese army was still strong and determined to fight to the death in 
order to prevent an Invasion of its homeland. The American Chiefs of 
Staff, none the less, believed that only a successful invasion could
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force Japan into surrender, and had set 1 March 1946 as the date for an 
Invasion of the main Japanese island of Honshu.(2)
British postwar planners dealing with South-East Asia, advised that 
the war would continue for quite some time, went about their work at a 
leisurely pace. Because of SEAC's recent victories, the future of Burma 
was the most urgent problem, and planning for that country was in its 
most advanced state. In May 1945, a government White Paper stated that 
it was London's ultimate aim to grant Burma self-government and dominion 
status. However, the paper also proposed to give the British Governor of 
Burma sweeping powers for an interim period of three years, overruling 
the provisions of the 1935 Government of Burma Act which had given a 
Burmese electorate and national politicians a limited say in Burmese 
government. It was argued that a transitional period was required to 
restore Burma's economic and social life following the Japanese 
occupation.(3) However, critics of the White Paper argued_that all that 
the British were interested in was the restoration of their commercial 
Interests in the country. As will be seen, the attempted implementation 
of the policies outlined in the paper was to result in a massive 
disobedience campaign by Burmese nationalists in 1946.
Coinciding with the Burma White Paper, planning for the postwar 
constitution of Malaya was entering its final stages. In 1943, the 
Malayan Planning Unit (MPU) had been established under General Ralph 
Hone to prepare a constitutional reform of the Malayan territories. 
Though theoretically responsible to the War Office, the MPU was staffed 
by colonial personnel and was supervised by the Colonial Office's
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Eastern Department headed by Sir Edward Gent.(4) In the following two 
years, the MPU had worked out drafts for a new constitutional scheme to 
replace the prewar system, when there had existed the four protected 
Federated Malay States and the five protected Unfederated States, where 
British rule had been inhibited by the earlier treaties with the Malayan 
chiefs and sultans, as well as the directly ruled Colony of the Straits 
Settlement.
The MPU's postwar plans suggested that the Malayan States, together 
with Penang and Malacca, would be merged in a single British colony, the 
Malayan Union. This would require new treaties with the Malay sultans 
who would surrender part of their sovereignty to the crown. The British 
would then be in a position to create a unitary state embracing the 
whole Malayan peninsula with a citizen-scheme applicable to Malays, 
Chinese and Indians alike. The Malayan Union would furthermore prepare 
Malaya for eventual self-rule.(5) Though Singapore would remain a 
separate colony, a Governor-General would be appointed with direct 
control over the British administrations in the area, who would 
coordinate policy throughout the Malayan Union, Singapore as well as 
Borneo. The MPU's recommendations had been provisionally approved by the 
Var Office on 31 May 1944, albeit on the grounds that no early publicity 
should be given to the scheme.(6)
Apart from its work on the constitutional reorganisation of Malaya, 
the Colonial Office had also been involved in drafting plans for 
international cooperation in South-East Asia after the reestablishment 
of European colonial rule. The plans were part of a world-wide scheme
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for international cooperation in colonial areas through a system of 
regional commissions involving the colonial powers as well as interested 
outside powers. Though the Colonial Office had been forced to drop its 
policy at the beginning of 1945, its work and experiences were to be 
crucial for the department's views during the postwar debate on South- 
East Asian regionalism. The Colonial Office's wartime plans therefore 
have to be further elucidated.
1.2. THE COLONIAL OFFICE AND REGIONAL COOPERATION 
IN COLONIAL TERRITORIES, 1943-1945
The Colonial Office originally developed its idea of establishing a 
world-wide system of regional colonial commissions in response to 
American wartime demands for the international supervision of colonial 
territories in the postwar world. In March 1943, Washington sent a draft 
paper titled declaration on 'National Independence' to London. The 
American paper suggested that all colonial powers should accept 
responsibility for preparing their territories for self-government and 
eventual independence, while collaborating through international 
regional commissions. Secondly, an international trusteeship 
administration should be set up in order to prepare dependent peoples 
for independence. London regarded the two points as completely 
unacceptable: the two emotive terms were independence and international 
supervision, the latter being implicit in the American understanding of 
International trusteeship.(7) To regain the iniative in the colonial 
debate, the British decided to make a unilateral statement lest the
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Americans tried to force unacceptable commitments.(8) The Colonial 
Secretary, Oliver Stanley, told the House of Commons on 13 July 1943 
that it was Britain's policy to keep the sole responsibility for her 
colonies. At the same time, cooperation with neighbouring and friendly 
nations was not only desirable but indeed essential - problems of 
security, transport, economics and health which were transcending 
political boundaries could only be solved in cooperation. He therefore 
had in mind
'...the possibility of establishing certain Commissions for 
certain regions. These Commissions would comprise not only the 
States with Colonial Territories in the region, but also other 
States which have in the region a major strategic or economic 
interest. Vhile each State would remain responsible for the 
administration of its own territory, such a Commission would 
provide effective and permanent machinery for consultation and 
collaboration so that the States concerned might work together 
to promote the well-being of the Colonial territories. An 
important consideration in designing the machinery of each 
Commission will be to give to the people of the Colonial 
territories in the region an opportunity to be associated with 
its work... In this way it would be possible to have 
international co-operation which consisted of something more 
than theoretical discussion but would be able to grapple with 
realities and get down to the solution of individual problems'.
Asked by an XP which regions the Colonial Secretary had in mind, Stanley 
would not commit himself to any particular parts of the colonial 
empire.(9>
Stanley's statement was a tactical move to publicly dissipate the 
American initiative on colonial policy. It picked up the least Important 
part of the American proposal, namely the creation of regional bodies in 
colonial areas, yet dropped the idea of International supervision and 
colonial independence which was at the centre of the American
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declaration. Stanley's regional commissions would nominally involve the 
United States in European colonial affairs while the colonial powers 
would remain in complete control of colonial developments. A precedent 
for a regional commission in fact existed in the Anglo-American 
Caribbean Commission. This organisation had recently been established 
after Britain had allowed the United States to lease a number of air and 
naval bases in her Caribbean dependencies, and it was meant to provide 
for bilateral cooperation on the economic and social development of the 
British and American posessions in the Caribbean.(10) However, the 
commission was merely a consultative body without executive functions 
dealing with general economic, social welfare and health matters.(11) 
Its scope thus prevented the two member countries from becoming too 
closely involved in one another's colonial affairs.
It is doubtful whether Stanley would ever have followed up his 
regional ideas if it had not been for renewed international pressure for 
the international supervision of colonial territories. In January 1944 
Australia and Hew Zealand picked up the regional idea in a bilateral 
agreement in which the two countries effectively demanded a greater say 
in international planning for the postwar world. The agreement included 
proposals for the creation of a South Seas regional commission on which 
Australia, Few Zealand, Great Britain, the United States and France 
would be represented. The commission would have advisory powers, 
enabling it to recommend arrangements for the participation of natives 
in colonial administration, with a view to promoting the ultimate aim of 
self-government. It would also advise on economic development, on the 
coordination of health and medical services and on education. The
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Australian-Hew Zealand suggestions were 'based on the doctrine of 
trusteeship', the term so disliked in London.(12)
The Australian-Hew Zealand agreement forced Stanley to formulate 
his regional ideas in greater detail. Stanley opposed new American plans 
for a central international commission with supervisory powers for 
colonial territories. Instead, he suggested to the Cabinet to 'make the 
idea of international regional associations our main contribution to the 
solution of Colonial questions'. The commissions he had in mind would 
have no executive functions, and there would be ’opportunities for 
participation by the people of the region’ without obliging Britain 
for some particular form of association. Defence would be excluded from 
the commissions' scope. Suitable regions might be the Caribbean (where 
an Anglo-American commission already existed), Africa, the South Vest 
Pacific and South-East Asia.(13)
By the end of 1944, the Colonial Office incorporated Stanley's 
ideas in a major policy paper entitled 'International Aspects of 
Colonial Policy'. The paper was drafted by Hilton Poynton and Kenneth 
Robinson within the Colonial Office's International Relations 
Department, and it was meant to serve as a basis for discussions with 
Washington on the question of trusteeship and the future of the mandated 
territories which Britain and France had taken over from the Ottoman 
Empire and Germany after the First World War. 'International Aspects of 
Colonial Policy' proposed to scrap the mandates and turn them into 
proper colonies. At the same time, a new colonial system would be 
established - based on international cooperation through regional
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commissions and through 'functional bodies', dealing mainly with social 
subjects, which would be attached to the new world organisation (namely 
the UE). These regional commissions would deal with social and economic 
problems of common interest, such as health control, movement of labour 
and agriculture. Unlike American and Australian schemes, the commissions 
would be consultative bodies without executive or supervisory powers. 
They would not concern themselves with the constitutional relationship 
between a colony and its parent state, effectively leaving the question 
of self-government and eventual independence for the respective colonial 
power to decide. The paper saw as possible regions for regional 
commissions the Caribbean, the South Pacific, South-East Asia, Vest 
Africa and Central, Eastern and Southern Africa.(14)
Though the Var Cabinet endorsed the Colonial Office's paper in 
principle, it soon became apparent that Stanley's ambitious colonial 
scheme would never be implemented as neither the dominions nor the 
United States were willing to replace the mandates system with the new 
regional commissions plan.(15) Furthermore, Churchill during the Yalta 
Conference unwittingly accepted a 'trusteeship formula' worked out by 
the American Secretary of State, Edward Stettinius. (16) The Yalta 
Protocol also implied that the future of the mandates would be discussed 
at the forthcoming San Francisco Conference on the new world 
organisation. An angry Oliver Stanley, whose department had not been 
represented at Yalta, stressed in March 1945 that the policy outlined in 
'International Aspects of Colonial Policy' had originally been intended 
to be discussed with the United States alone, after agreement with the 
dominions. As the original argument for the abolition of the mandates
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had been a plan which applied to the whole colonial empire, Stanley 
argued that it would now mean 'throwing the whole Colonial Empire open 
to discussion by this motley assembly Cthe UN], a procedure which I 
should regard as hazardous in extreme'.(17) In other words, proposing 
the mandates' replacement by the Colonial Office's regional cooperation 
scheme now meant discussing the future of the whole British Empire in a 
potentially hostile international forum. Following Stanley's initiative, 
the (ministerial) Armistice and Post-Var Committee subsequently decided 
to accept the continuance of the mandatory system and to withdraw 
'International Aspects of Colonial Policy', though the dominions would 
have to be told that London still favoured regional commissions but did 
not wish to confuse them with the discussions on the mandates 
system. (18)
Though the Colonial Office was disappointed about the failure of 
its regional cooperation plans, it could feel relieved- in so far as 
South-East Asia was concerned. Of all the potential areas under 
consideration, South-East Asia had from the outset been regarded as the 
region least suitable for a colonial commission. Before the war, the 
only Institutional form of international cooperation between the South- 
East Asian territories had existed within the framework of the League of 
Nations. The League's Health Organisation had maintained an Eastern 
Bureau in Singapore for the centralized exchange of epidemological 
information. The League also provided for a certain amount of political 
coordination concerning opium smoking. Finally, the International 
Regulations Agreement on Tin and Rubber had offered the governments and 
chief producers in the area 'scope for consultation and
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coordination'. (19) In preparing for wider regional cooperation after the 
war, the Colonial Office found it a major problem that South-East Asia 
was still under Japanese occupation, and that detailed planning was 
impossible before a Japanese withdrawal. Another problem was that South- 
East Asia was prone to outside interference. The region had much greater 
wealth than the other areas under discussion, possessing rubber and tin 
and an enormous population of around 120 million people; consequently 
the United States, Australia, China, India and possibly even Russia 
would be outside powers with major strategic or economic interests in 
the region. A Colonial Office paper for the Cabinet therefore suggested 
in April 1944 that any detailed discussions on regional commissions in 
South-East Asia before the area's reoccupation would be impracticable. 
Britain might even want to indicate that South-East Asia was unsuitable 
for a regional commission.(20)
The Foreign Office's Research Department (F.O.R.D.) pointed out a 
further difference between South-East Asia and other colonial regions. 
In the South Pacific, the problem was one of colonial administration, 
whereas the situation in South-East Asia was complicated by the 
existence of actually independent or emerging native states and by 
Chinese claims likely to be brought forward on behalf of their immigrant 
communities in colonial territories. A South-East Asian regional 
organisation should therefore not be conceived primarily as a colonial 
system, but as a 'grouping for co-ordination of economic policies based 
on the very large common interest of all the countries in the region as 
producers of important raw materials for the world market'. This would
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ensure the inclusion in the organisation of states who would not wish to 
come in if the region was seen as a grouping of colonies.(21)
The Colonial Office was divided over the F.O.R.D. paper (which they
realised did not represent official Foreign Office opinion). One
official, Benson, was particularly critical of a passage which referred
to the possible supervision of the colonial powers by outside powers:
the Foreign Office, he complained, was 'riddled with the heresy of
t'
international supervision ... It will ne^d a great deal of watchfulness 
on our part if it is not once more to rear its insidious head'. Benson
added that the basis of Stanley's speech in July 1943 had been the 'co­
ordination of policies based on common interests' - it therefore made no 
difference whether the participants in a regional organisation were
colonial governments or independent governments.(22) S.Caine on the 
other hand believed the Foreign Office had a point. Unlike the South 
Pacific's 'small, primitive and weak communities', South-East Asia was 
made up in the main of communities which were either independent states 
or ' which it would not be an absurdity to expect to develop into
national independent states within the foreseeable future'. The 
representatives of the South-East Asian territories would therefore 
expect a much more substantial voice than those in the South Pacific. At 
the same time, Caine disagreed with the Foreign Office over the economic 
responsibilities of a regional authority. So far as rubber was 
concerned, account would have to be taken of synthetic production, and 
in tin, other producers such as Bolivia, Nigeria and Congo would have to 
be considered. The only commodity which could usefully be considered on 
a regional basis was rice.(23)
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Following the F.O.R.D. paper, the Colonial Office prepared its own 
draft on regional cooperation. A first version of the Colonial Office 
paper included the security and defence of South-East Asia in the scope 
of a regional commission. The organisation would also control rubber and 
tin prices, to prevent 'cutthroat competition' between the two 
commodities' chief producers. However, the paper's final version omitted 
references to defence and price control, arguing that useful issues 
covered by a regional council in South-East Asia would be research into 
the improvement of tin, rubber and agricultural production generally; 
immigration and emigration control between areas with labour surpluses
preservation and protection of the area's distinctive fauna. The paper's 
proposals meant that a regional commission would have been left without 
anything of real substance to deal with. (24) The Colonial Office 
subsequently stuck to the policy of rendering the proposed colonial 
commissions as harmless as possible. In September 1944 Hilton Poynton 
told a French official in Washington that the purposes of regional 
commissions would mainly be economic and social, excluding defence and 
security functions. The emphasis should be on collaboration and 
consultation on practical issues, 'not supervision and 
"inquisition'" .(25)
Finally, there existed the membership problem of a South-East Asian 
regional commission. Would Burma, Ceylon and Hong Kong be considered 
part of the region, and should outside powers like the United States, 
Australia, China, India as well as the Soviet Union all become 
members?(26) A particular problem was whether India should be an outside
fisheries development and research, and finally the
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member, or whether the subcontinent should be considered part of the 
South-East Asian region. The issue of Ii^L^n participation was raised in 
1944 by Sir Maurice Gwyer, a retired Chief Justice on the Indian Federal 
Court, who sent his observations on postwar security to the India Office 
which passed it on to the Colonial Office. Gwyer predicted that after 
the war both Russia and China would emerge as the two dominant 
continental powers in Asia, and that India, after achieving autonomy, 
would be left vulnerable for some time and create a power vacuum in the 
Indian Ocean. Gwyer therefore proposed the creation of an Anglo-Indian 
defence council for the Indian Ocean which might also include 
neighbouring countries such as Ceylon, Burma, the Netherlands East 
Indies (Indonesia) [and presumably also Malaya]. He also suggested a 
political and economic council either parallel to, or as part ofpthe 
suggested defence council in the Indian Ocean.(27)
However, Colonial Office officials saw the area outlined by Gwyer 
as unsuitable for economic and political cooperation. Malaya and the
Netherlands East Indies fitted into a different geographical region, and 
Ceylon was unlikely to enter a political and economic council dominated 
by India. Nor was the time ripe to make a declaration on a defence 
council in the Indian Ocean. Rolleston, a Colonial Office defence
expert, also doubted that the Indian Ocean would be a natural unit for
defence.(28) Stanley accordingly told the Secretary of State for India,
Leo| Amery, that whatever the views of the services departments on the 
suitability of the Indian Ocean as a strategic unit, it certainly was 
not a natural economic or political unit.(29)
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Despite the many difficulties and uncertainties tied to the 
question of regional cooperation in South-East Asia, the Colonial Office 
included the region in its proposals from December 1944, not least to 
present the Americans with a coherent new policy applicable to all 
colonial territories around the worldf After stressing the consultative 
nature of regional commissions, 'International Aspects of Colonial 
Policy* stated reluctantly that South-East Asia too 'seems to be an area 
suitable eventually for the establishment of a Regional Commission, 
though clearly it is impracti cable to make any progress with the 
formulation of regional organisation while the area is still in enemy 
occupation.' The membership of a South-East Asian commission would 
include the United Kingdom with its Malayan territories, Singapore, 
North Borneo and Hong Kong; the Netherlands with the Netherlands East 
Indies [Indonesia]; Portugal with Timor; France with Indochina; the 
United States with the Philippines; Thailand as an independent state 
within the region; as well as Australia, China and India as interested 
outside countries.(30)
Stanley's subsequent decision to abandon his world-wide colonial 
scheme following the Yalta Conference relieved the Colonial Office of 
having to draw up regional plans for South-East Asia, plans which the 
department had always regarded as impracticable in the near future. As 
will be seen, the Colonial Office's aversion to South-East Asian 
regionalism was to increase further in the following year. When at the 
end of 1945 the Foreign Office came up with new ideas for regional 
cooperation in South-East Asia, the Colonial Office would object on 
similar lines as it had argued against a regional commission in 1944,
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stressing, amongst other arguments, that further time was needed to 
correctly assess South-East Asia's confused state of affairs after the 
war, and that a regional commission would inevitably lead to American 
interference in South-East Asia at a time when the European powers were 
trying to reestablish their control.
1.3 REGIONAL DEFENCE
While the Colonial Office had thus considered and dropped
suggestions for cooperation on economic and social problems in South-
East Asia, British military experts had been making separate plans for
postwar defence cooperation in South-East Asia. Like the Colonial 
Office's scheme, their proposals were put on ice in the course of 1945. 
However, as the defence proposals were to be revived in the following 
year in connection with Commonwealth talks on South-East Asia, they too 
have to be taken into consideration.
Plans for defence cooperation in South-East Asia originated with 
the Post-Hostilities Planning Staff (PHP), a special military planning 
unit established by the Chiefs of Staff during the war in order to 
assess Britain's world-wide defence requirements following the end of 
hostilities. (31) By the spring of 1945, the PHP had drafted
comprehensive recommendations for the postwar defence of British 
interests around the world. The PHP assumed that the Soviet Union was 
the most likely adversary in any future war in Europe, the Kiddle East 
or the Far East. In East Asia, a revived Japan was seen as the second
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most likely adversary. A PHP paper from June 1945 on 'The Security of 
the British Empire' therefore proposed the creation of a number of 
regional defensive systems around the world, including primarily 
Britain, the United States and in some cases the Vest European 
countries. So far as South-East Asia and the Pacific was concerned, the 
paper argued that a threat by the Soviet Union to British interests was 
remote. Despite this, the paper suggested that Britain, France, the 
Netherlands and Thailand should cooperate in regional measures for the 
defence of South-East Asia. There should also be a system of forward 
naval and air bases in the Pacific in cooperation with the United States 
and China.(32)
However, the PHP's world-wide recommendations, including South-East 
Asia, failed to convince the Chiefs of Staff or the Foreign Office. 
Neither shared the PHP's view of the Soviet Union as the most likely
adversary in a future war. The paper was consequently referred to the
(newly created) Joint Planning Staff (JPS) as strategic background 
material.(33) The PHP itself was dissolved a few months later. Thus, no
plans for the international defence and security of South-East Asia
existed at the time of the Japanese surrender to which the Chiefs of 
Staff let alone the British government were committed. It was only in 
the climate of the emerging Cold Var in 1946 that some of the PHP's 
recommendations were to be recalled.
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1.4 THE FOREIGN OFFICE AND SOUTH-EAST ASIA
Compared to the Colonial Office, the Foreign Office was lagging far 
behind in its planning for the future of South-East Asia. However, 
the Foreign Office was slowly awaking to the fact that the war against 
Japan was drawing to a close, and that the postwar order of East and 
South-East Asia required greater attention. At the instigation of 
Foreign Office officials in London and on the spot, the department 
eventually increased its Far Eastern staff and developed more 
forthcoming ideas for the future of South-East Asia.
Like the other departments at Whitehall, Foreign Office ideas on 
the future of South-East Asia were based largely on the assumption that 
the colonial powers would continue after the war where they had left off 
in 1942. The department failed to grasp that the European defeat by 
Japan at the beginning of the war had fundamentally shaken the basis of 
colonial rule in Asia. So far as non-British territories were concerned, 
the Foreign Office's ideas were based on the belief that Dutch and 
French rule would be restored in their respective colonies. Regarding 
Indonesia, the British, as well as the Dutch and the Americans, were 
almost completely unaware of the extent of the nationalist fervour that 
the Japanese had fostered in the country.(34) Britain's commitment to 
the re-imposition of Dutch rule found expression in an agreement with 
the Dutch which gave the latter wide-ranging powers for the 
administration of civil affairs following the re-occupation of Sumatra, 
an area which since 1943 had been part of SEAC's command sphere. (35) 
British ideas about Indochina were equally based on misapprehension.
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During the war, the British Prime Minister Vinston Churchill had opposed 
plans by the American President Franklin D. Roosevelt to put Indochina 
under international trusteeship. The Foreign Office believed in ’the 
colonial powers sticking together in the Far East'(36), and twice in 
1944 the Var Cabinet had endorsed proposals by the British Foreign
Secretary Anthony Eden that France should be allowed to return to 
Indochina.(37) However, as in the case of Indonesia the British were
largely unaware of the strength of the nationalist forces in Indochina.
So far as Thailand was concerned, the Foreign Office was
effectively aiming to re-establish Britain's dominant prewar position, 
though it admitted that the Thai question was by no Mans
straigjt^orward. A paper by the Official Far Eastern Committee pointed 
out in July 1945 that the Thais, under Japanese pressure, had flung
themselves into the arms of Japan in 1941, and that they were in a state 
of war with Britain. The Americans, on the other hand, did not regard 
themselves at war with Thailand, and they were bound to sympathize with 
the new Thai government that had succeeded the collaborationist
government of Luang Pibul from 1941. Despite this, the paper recommended
pressurizing the Thais into an agreement with Britain which provided for
y*
the delivery of 1,5 million tons of free rice from Thailand. Futhermore,
k
Thailand was to be forced into a close defence relationship with
Britain, allowing the latter to deploy troops in Thailand during times
of war.(38)
Most of the Foreign Office's plans for individual South-East Asian 
territories failed to appreciate the new realities in South-East Asia.
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They al6o didn't take into account the possible extension of SEAC*s 
boundaries. Furthermore, virtually no plans existed for the future of 
South-East Asia as a whole, such as had been considered by the Colonial 
Office at the end of 1944. Reasons for this paucity of postwar planning 
at the Foreign Office dated back to the department's limited Interest in 
South-East Asia prior to the Japanese invasion. As the Foreign Office 
lamented in 1946, South-East Asia, before the war, had been regarded as 
an 'unimportant and little-known area', and only the war had 
demonstrated its political, economic and strategic importance.39 During 
the war, Eden had continued to neglect South-East Asian affairs over 
Europe, and had allowed the Foreign Office's Far Eastern machinery to 
deteriorate. As one historian has argued, Churchill and his ministerial 
colleagues suffered from an unfortunate inability to consider the nature 
of the postwar international situation in Asia.(40)
A few months before the Japanese surrender, British officials in 
London were becoming increasingly concerned about future policies in 
East and South-East Asia. In June 1945, the head of the Foreign Office's 
Far Eastern Department, J.C. Sterndale Bennett, brought the lack of Far 
Eastern planning to the attention of the Foreign Office. His initiative 
was to result in a bureaucratic shake-up in London and gave the Foreign 
Office the incentive to play a more active role in South-East Asia. It 
also paved the way for a Foreign Office initiative for the establishment 
of an international organisation in South-East Asia. In an extensive 
memorandum, Sterndale Bennett warned that 'big problems' were looming up 
and that the end of the war in Europe as well as the advent of a new 
British government made it an appropriate moment to overhaul the
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machinery for dealing with the Far East. Existing machinery, both in the 
Foreign Office and interdepartmentally, was quite Inadequate: upon his 
return to Far Eastern work in August 1944, he had found a small 
department organised to deal only with current work, and while some 
research had been done regarding a Far Eastern settlement with Japan, no 
actual policy planning had been possible. The Reconstruction Department 
of the Foreign Office had been expected to deal with this, but had had 
no Far Eastern staff, with the result that 'literally no machinery 
existed for Far Eastern planning'. He criticised that the Foreign Office 
saw the Far Eastern war as a sideshow: diplomatic issues involving
Russia and the United States were dealt with on a 'hand to mouth basis' 
with little regard to Britain's main Far Eastern interests or her 
relations with the dominions. At the higher level of the Foreign Office, 
no one had given attention to the Far East, and at international 
conferences vital decisions had been taken without members of the Far 
Eastern Department being available for consultation.
On the interdepartmental level too all was not right. Though the 
Official Far Eastern Committee had recently been revived, Sterndale
Bennett pointed at a continuing tendency to 'watertight departments'. 
While the Foreign Office consulted the India, Burma and Colonial Offices 
on foreign affairs problems with potential repercussions in their 
spheres, the converse was not always true, and plans for the future of
Burma, Malaya and Hong Kong were prepared without Foreign Office
participation. Sterndale Bennett believed the Foreign Office required a 
more comprehensive machinery to deal with questions such as the future 
of China, the Japanese settlement and the satisfaction of Russian
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claims, as well as the more Immediate problems of relief, 
rehabilitation, economic recovery and population movements. He suggested 
a Minister of State or a Parliamentary Under-Secretary be appointed to 
ensure the coordination of Far Eastern foreign and colonial policies; 
alternatively there could be a small ministerial committee superimposed 
on the Far Eastern Committee. Vithin the Foreign Office, the Far Eastern 
Department should be enlarged and split into three subdivisions, while 
special planning units should be set up for Japan, China and
Thailand.(41)
Sterndale Bennett's memorandum had a significant impact on
Whitehall, and the Foreign Office Immediately decided to set up a 
Civilian Planning Unit for Japan.(42) Though he failed to secure the
appointment of a Minister of State in London who would deal with East
and South-East Asia, his initiative paved the way later on that year for 
a ministerial Far Eastern Committee and a special Far Eastern Section 
attached to the Industrial and Economic Planning Staff. (The Far Eastern 
Ministerial Committee was merged into the Overseas Reconstruction 
Committee in December 1945) Last but not least, the Foreign Office's Far 
Eastern Department was provided with additional staff and divided into 
three sections, one dealing with Japan and the Pacific, one with China 
and one with South-East Asia (including Thailand, Indochina, Indonesia 
and Fepal). In the following years, a separate department was created 
for South-East Asia.
Sterndale Bennett's Initiative also caught the attention of the new 
Labour Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, who assumed office on 27 July
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1945. Bevin showed much greater Interest In East and South-East Aslan 
affairs than his predecessor, and he was particularly concerned about 
the insufficient interdepartmental coordination of Britain's policies in 
the area. Despite the recent changes at Whitehall, Bevin complained in 
November that the newly appointed committees were only concerned with 
Individual Far Eastern questions. He therefore proposed a conference of 
British officials and ministers to discuss overall Far Eastern policies 
and organisation.(43) Though Bevin's conference never materialized due 
to difficulties in bringing back representatives from abroad and because 
of his own overburdened timetable(44), he had nevertheless alerted 
ministers and officials to the urgency of East and South-East Asian 
problems.
1.5 THE PROPOSAL FOR A BRITISH MINISTER RESIDENT IN 
SOUTH-EAST ASIA
Coinciding with Sterndale Bennett'6 reform plans in Whitehall, 
Mountbatten's Political Adviser, Esler Denlng, was visiting London for 
political consultations. He brought with him suggestions for a 
reorganisation of SEAC's political machinery. Host importantly, he 
proposed the appointment of a minister or official of high standing who 
would be based in South-East Asia and would deal with the coordination 
of British policies in the region. His ideas formed the basis for his 
later proposals, following the Japanese surrender, for the establishment 
of a civilian organisation in South-East Asia which would relieve SEAC 
of some of its non-military duties in the postwar period, and which
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could form the nucleus for an international organisation in South-East 
Asia after the return to civilian rule.
Before examining Dening's proposals in detail, his position at SEAC 
has to be explained. He was a Foreign Office appointee charged with 
advising the Supreme Allied Commander on political questions relating to 
foreign territories such as Japan, Thailand and Indochina as well as on 
political warfare. Though being regarded as a senior staff officer 
technically responsible to Kountbatten, Dening's position at SEAC was 
strengthened through his maintenance of Independent cypher 
communications with the Foreign Office. The Foreign Office (and to a 
lesser degree the Colonial Office) in fact largely relied on Dening to 
make its voice heard at SEAC's headquarters in Kandy, Ceylon; the only 
other channel was through the Chiefs of Staff in London. In 1945, after 
more than eighteen months in office, Dening claimed to have created for 
himself a position of considerable influence and Independence, being the 
only political adviser at SEAC dealing with South-East Asia as a 
whole.(45) Despite this, his relationship with Kountbatten was not 
always the best, and the latter sometimes tended to Ignore Dening's 
advice.
During his visit to London in June 1945, Dening proposed an 
overhaul of the political machinery in South-East Asia. His proposals 
were inspired by his difficult task of working for both Kountbatten and 
the Foreign Office, and he stressed in a departmental memorandum that it 
was 'questionable whether this situation, whereby the Political Adviser 
virtually serves two masters, should be allowed to continue'. Matters
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were further complicated by the lack of consultation between the Supreme 
Commander and the Burma and India Offices, by the non-existence of
Colonial Office representation at SEAC, and by the fact that political 
questions tended to be referred to the Chiefs of Staff (COS) rather than 
the political departments in London. The Supreme Allied Command itself 
was overburdened with the increasing speed of military developments, and 
SEAC, theoretically responsible to both the British and the American 
governments, should not be put in the situation of having to take sides 
when the two governments' policies differed, i.e. in colonial 
territories. In order to relieve SEAC of some of its political as well
as economic duties, Dening suggested two alternative courses of action:
1. To detach the Political Adviser from SEAC, thus making 
him directly responsible to London, and giving him more 
staff in order to advise Mountbatten not only on foreign 
affairs but also on political, economic and financial
matters, regardless of the department involved.
2. To appoint a Minister of State for South-East Asia, an 
idea previously discussed by the Foreign and India Offices 
in 1943 when SEAC was about to be set up.
The objective of the new appointment, Dening explained, was to
coordinate the views and needs of British territories:
'Before this war British territories east of Suez tended to be 
governed largely on parochial lines...unfamiliar with each 
other's problems, and still less with the problems of non- 
British territories in the Far East...That such a state of 
affairs was both strategically and politically undesirable was 
proved by subsequent events when Japan delivered her attack.
To-day there is a danger that, with the preoccupations of 
reconstruction and rehabilitation ... we shall drift once more 
into the same position as before the outbreak of hostilities.'
Dening therefore argued that, on the precedent of the Middle East and 
the Mediterranean, the best solution would be the appointment of a
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Minister of State in South-East Asia reporting to the Cabinet, who would 
coordinate the views and needs of British territories concerned, and 
relate them to developments in foreign territories.(46)
Dening's memorandum also referred to recommendations made by Duff 
Cooper in 1941, who as Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster had been 
dispatched to the Far East (i.e. East and South-East Asia). At the time 
Cooper had suggested the appointment of a Commissioner-General for the 
Far East who would link the War Cabinet with the military and civilian 
officials in the area. Though receiving instructions from ministers 
concerned, the new appointment was to have the power, if necessary, to 
make decisions without prior consultation, and to assume responsibility 
for certain diplomatic and political activities hitherto performed by 
the Commanders-in-Chief in China and the Far East. In the event of war, 
the Commissioner-General was to establish a Far Eastern war council.(47) 
Though his proposals were never fully Implemented, Cooper had 
temporarily been appointed Resident Minister with Cabinet rank in 
Singapore following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 8 December 
1941; his powers, however, were much more limited than he had originally 
recommended. (48)
In 1945, the Foreign Office still regarded Cooper's plans as 
impracticable, not least because of their wide geographical scope. 
However, the department approved of Dening's new recommendations since 
they were limited to South-East Asia; Sterndale Bennett was confident 
that he could also win the other departments' approval for either of 
Dening's suggestions before submitting the matter to the Cabinet.(49)
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Dening soon returned to SEAC, but copies of his memorandum were sent to 
the Colonial, India, Burma and Dominions Offices and to the services' 
departments at the end of July. In an accompanying letter, the Deputy 
Under-Secretary of State at the Foreign Office, Sir Orrne Sargent, 
further explained that 'it would be most desirable to have in S.E.A.C. 
some political authority of high standing to undertake local 
centralisation and coordination of matters affecting more than one 
Department', while relieving the Supreme Commander of a great deal of 
non-military work. Sargent therefore favoured the appointment of a 
Minister of State, possibly after the recapture of Singapore.(50)
Whitehall's response to the Foreign Office initiative was mixed. 
The India, Burma and Dominions Offices and the Air Ministry gave their 
consent to either of Denlngs alternative proposals, the Dominions Office 
mentioning that the dominions might themselves find it convenient to 
appoint political representatives to such a coordinating authority.(51) 
Only the War Office fully opposed Dening's plans, arguing that after a 
Japanese surrender the tendency would be to bring the British 
territories within SEAC back under the direct control of the appropriate 
departments in Whitehall. (52)
The Colonial Office was in two minds about Dening's proposals. 
Before his return to South-East Asia, Dening explained his ideas to 
colonial officials in London, arguing that Mountbatten tended to send 
telegrams to the Chiefs of Staff which were primarily political and had 
only the 'flimsiest strategic significance'. A Minister Resident would 
relieve the Supreme Allied Commander of the burden of political
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decisions, though he admitted that Mountbatten's objections to the 
scheme could be expected. Edward Gent, the head of the Colonial Office's 
Eastern Department, refused to commit himself to either proposal; for 
the time being, Dening agreed to hold a watching brief for the Colonial 
Office at SEAC. <53) Initially, the Colonial Office was tempted by 
Dening's suggestions as they promised to give the department an early 
foothold in South-East Asia. H.T.Bourdillon believed that the Colonial 
Office had everything to gain from the appointment of a Minister 
Resident as long as adequate colonial staff was provided. Complaints 
about Mountbatten were not new - Air Marshal Philip Joubert had already 
voiced disquiet at the Supreme Commander's tendency 'to take political 
decisions of a sweeping and perilous nature', and had independently 
advocated proposals similar to Dening's.(54)
However, Gent opposed a ministerial appointment, minuting that the
Colonial Office had itself in mind 'the appointment of a "Governor-
General'' with direct powers over the British authorities in Malaya,
Singapore, North Borneo and Sarawak', an appointment which had been
provisionally approved by the War Cabinet in 1944. Gent therefore
believed that all that was required was the appointment of a Political
Adviser in SEAC who was of greater weight than Dening, and who was
directly responsible to London; fresh decisions could be made at a later
date, for example after the recapture of Singapore:
'Quite possibly there may be no appropriate place for a 
Resident Minister and, equally possible, there may be need for 
a detached Political Adviser to continue with the "Governor- 
General" at Singapore after the S.E.Asia Command has ceased to 
exist as an allied military command. (55)
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Gent's objections to a Minister of State in South-East Asia 
convinced the Permanent Under-Secretary of State at the Colonial Office, 
Sir George Gater, and the new Labour Colonial Secretary, George Hall. 
The latter was seeking Cabinet confirmation for the provisionally
approved plans for the development of Malaya, including the appointment 
of a Governor-General with direct powers over British authorities in 
Malaya, Singapore, Forth Borneo and Sarawak. As Gater explained to his 
officials:
'If there should prove to be need for a stronger political 
representation in South East Asia Command it could be met at 
any rate by designating the person who would be appointed 
Governor-General at the end of the military period so that he
could be associated as an adviser with the Supreme
Commander'. (56 >
In his official reply to the Foreign Office, Gater accordingly only 
gave his consent to the more moderate option of making the Political 
Adviser responsible to London where he would deal directly with the 
Foreign Office regarding foreign affairs, and through the Foreign Office 
with other departments regarding their respective spheres. He stressed 
that once civil government was re-established there might be an
appropriate place for the Foreign Office's political adviser to be 
attached to the staff of the Colonial Office's Governor-General.(57)
The Colonial Office's reply made it clear that the appointment of a 
Minister Resident conflicted with the department's plans for Malaya. A 
superior ministerial appointment might have had the power to overrule 
Colonial Office decisions and determine colonial policies; it would 
certainly have upstaged a Malayan Governor-General. It is obvious that
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after years of intensive planning, the Colonial Office didn't want its 
new constitutional scheme for Malaya to be spoilt by the Foreign Office 
which had entered the South-East Asian scene belatedly and ill-prepared. 
The Colonial Office was eager to regain and consolidate its dominant 
pre-war position in South-East Asia: it therefore suggested that, rather 
than a Minister Resident, merely a more powerful political adviser 
should be appointed to SEAC who in the long run could be Integrated into 
the Malayan Governor-General's staff. Gater's response also shed light 
on the previous lack of interdepartmental coordination. Until recently, 
the Foreign Office had taken little interest in the future of South-East 
Asia, and the Colonial Office had deemed it unnecessary fully to reveal 
its Malayan plans. In fact, even colonial officials like Bourdillon 
seemed to have been unaware of the full details of the planned Malayan 
Union. The secrecy surrounding the Malayan Union plans was now 
backfiring in the form of Foreign Office proposals which implied a 
reduction of Colonial Office power in postwar South-East Asia in favour 
of a more centralized interdepartmental appointment.
Gater's letter arrived at the Foreign Office shortly after Japan 
had announced her surrender. As a result, the whole issue of South-East 
Asia's postwar administration took on a new urgency, and in the 
following months negotiations between the Foreign Office and the 
Colonial Office on the proposed South-East Asian appointment were to 
develop with unprecedented fervour. The issue soon became linked to the 
larger question of whether an international organisation should be set 
up in South-East Asia after the return of the European powers. The 
Foreign Office, for its part, was thinking about the establishment of a
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regional commission, possibly under the aegis of the proposed Minister 
Resident. The Colonial Office opposed the Foreign Office's ideas partly 
because of its own negative experiences with the issue of regional 
commissions at the beginning of the year. However, a further reason was 
its resentment of the Foreign Office's intrusion into the wider affairs 
of South-East Asia. The Colonial Office's response to the Foreign Office 
in the closing days of the war foreshadowed the two departments' 
differences over the international organisation of South-East Asia that 
were to be a dominant feature of the immediate postwar years.
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2. THE O R I G I N S  OF THE S P E C I A L  C O M M I S S I O N
2.1. THE DILEMMA OF PEACE IN SOUTH-EAST ASIA
On 14 August 1945, following the dropping of atomic bombs on 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan announced her surrender to the allies. The 
end of the war took most of Britain by complete surprise, since the 
atomic bomb had been kept a secret until it completely destroyed 
Hiroshima on 6 August 1945. Mountbatten had only learnt of the bomb's 
existence at the end of July 1945 while visiting Berlin for the Potsdam 
Conference. It was then that Churchill had told him to prepare for a 
Japanese surrender in the second half of August. Cl) Also in Potsdam, 
Mountbatten had been told of a highly important decision on the
SEAC's operational responsibility had included Burma, Malaya, Singapore 
and the northern Indonesian island of Sumatra. The American and British 
Chiefs of Staff now agreed to transfer the rest of Indonesia from the 
American-led South Vest Pacific Area Command (SVPA) to SEAC. 
Mountbatten's command also was to include the southern half of 
Indochina, and its responsibility for Thailand was confirmed. (2) The 
decision took into account Britain's desire to re-establish her prewar 
position in South-East Asia, and it allowed the Americans to further 
concentrate on their drive against Japan.(3)
operational boundaries of his command. Since its in 1943,
Mountbatten subsequently informed his headquarters in Kandy of 
SEAC's imminent boundary changes. He also pointed out that an early
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surrender by Japan was possible and could certainly be expected in
1945.(4) Mountbatten returned to SEAC's headquarters the day Japan 
announced her surrender, deciding that priority would be given to the 
recapture of the rest of Burma, Malaya and Singapore, followed by Saigon 
in Indochina, Bangkok in Thailand, Batavia (Jakarta) and Sourabaya in 
Java, Hong Kong and the remaining territories. However, an order by 
General MacArthur, who had been designated Supreme Allied Commander for 
the Allied Powers, ruled that no landings or reoccupation of Japanese 
held territory could be made before the main surrender documents had 
been signed in Tokyo on 2 September. On the same day, SEAC's boundaries 
would be officially extended.(5) The order delayed the reoccupation of 
Singapore until 5 September. On 8 September, the first British troops 
were flown into Saigon and parachuted into Java near Batavia.
It has been argued that Mountbatten, while in Potsdam, believed his 
additional geographical responsibility would not unduly stretch SEAC's 
resources. (6) If this had really been his conviction, he would soon 
awaken to the fact that economically, politically as well as militarily 
SEAC was facing formidable problems. SEAC's official postwar task was to 
enforce the surrender of and disarm approx. 740,000 Japanese troops in 
South-East Asia before their eventual return to Japan, and to restore 
law and order in the re-occupied territories. It was also in charge of 
recovering approx. 125,000 Allied prisoners-of-war and internees in the 
area, some of which were held in remote jungle camps. To fulfil his task 
Mountbatten had at his disposal a total of about 1,3 million troops of 
whom some 350,000 were Initially deployed. However, his fleet consisted 
of only 120 warships and his air force of only 50 RAF squadrons(7) - a
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small force considering the vast geographical extension of his command.
At the same time, there was pressure from home to further scale down
SEAC's strength; the PYTHOE repatriation scheme, introduced at the end
of 1944, had already reduced the time that British soldiers had to serve
in the Far East from five years to three years and eight months. (8)
SEAC's resources were stretched to their limits, and one wonders what
would have happened if the Japanese had refused to obey Allied orders in
defiance of their country's official surrender. In the event, the
Japanese showed themselves cooperative and Mountbatten decided to
maintain their chain of command. This allowed SEAC to use Japanese
troops for its purposes - even months after the surrender the British
often had to rely on the Japanese for the purpose of policing the
recaptured territories. As Mountbatten reflected on his postwar task in
a television interview in the 1970's:
'Suddenly, I found myself responsible as the Supreme Commander 
for an enormous area of the globe, with a distance of 6000 
miles across it ...with 128 million starving and rather 
rebellious people who had just been liberated, with 123 000 
prisoners of war and internees, many of whom were dying, ... 
and at the very beginning I had some 700 000 Japanese 
soldiers, sailors and airmen, to take the surrender, disarm, put 
into prison camps, awaiting transportation back. Even looking 
at that it sounds a big problem, but I had no idea what I 
really was in for - what I really was in for was trying to 
reestablish civilization and rule of law and order throughout 
this vast part of the world. Ve didn't even know what the 
conditions were going to be, I had no staff really trained or 
qualified to help me in this task, except some professional 
civil affairs officers from various countries whose one idea 
was to go back and carry on where they left off three or four 
years ago.'(9)
Apart from the limited military means at its disposal, SEAC was 
ill-prepared for South-East Asia's economic and political problems. 
During the war Japan had drained the economies of the occupied South-
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East Asian territories to support her war efforts. At the same time, the
Japanese had fostered fledgling nationalist movements to secure the
collaboration of parts of the population. Burma was the first territory 
where in 1945 Mountbatten was confronted with the new brand of
nationalism in the region. Before the war, nationalist sentiment had 
been stronger in Burma than anywhere else in South-East Asia. After 
occupying the country in 1942 the Japanese had tried to exploit Burmese 
nationalism for their own purposes, by establishing the Burma Defence 
Army under the command of the Burmese leader Aung San, and by declaring 
the country's 'independence' in 1943.(10) However, following clandestine 
negotiations with British forces Aung San's troops had swopped sides in 
March 1945 and had engaged the Japanese in guerilla warfare. As a
result, advancing British forces under General Slim had been able to 
recapture Rangoon before the beginning of the monsoon rains. Aung San's 
involvement in the recapture of Rangoon constituted a dilemma for the 
British. On the one hand they were committed, under the Burma Vhite 
Paper, to re-establish direct British rule for a transitional period. On 
the other hand, demands for self-government and independence by the 
nationalist movement behind Aung San, organised in the Anti-Fascist 
People's Freedom League (AFPFL), could not be ignored. Mountbatten 
sensed that open conflict with the Burmese nationalists would make Burma 
untenable. In May, he recognized the Burma Rational Army, renamed 
Burmese Patriotic Forces, as a British ally. In September an agreement 
was signed with the AFPFL providing for the creation of a Burmese army 
out of the Burmese Patriotic Forces.(11)
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However, while Mountbatten temporarily succeeded in appeasing
Burmese nationalism (before the return to civil government in
October brought matters to a head), open conflict broke out in other 
parts of South-East Asia. In Indonesia as well the Japanese had fostered 
nationalist movements to increase local cooperation with the Japanese 
war effort. On 17 August 1945, the Indonesian leader Sukarno used the 
opportunity of the Japanese surrender to proclaim an independent
Indonesian Republic. In the following weeks, Indonesian nationalists,
many of whom had previously received paramilitary training from the 
Japanese, seized arms from the now passive Japanese troops and gained 
control of large parts of Java and Sumatra. The consolidation of the 
Indonesian Republic was made possible by the delayed arrival of British 
forces caused by MacArthur's ruling not to begin with the re-occupation 
before the surrender ceremony in Tokyo. When British forces first 
reached Batavia in the middle of September, they were also too weak to 
force the Indonesian Republic into surrender. In Jovember 1945, a fierce 
battle for the control of Surabaya eventually won by the British showed 
the fanaticism and determination of the Indonesian nationalists, and it 
finally convinced Mountbatten that a British military campaign to 
restore Dutch rule was out of the question.(12)
It slowly dawned on the British that they had failed to anticipate
the full strength of South-East Asian nationalism. As Dening wrote to
Sterndale Bennett at the beginning of October:
'These Independence movements in Asia must be treated with
sympathy and understanding. Otherwise they will become really 
serious. As I have indicated, they are half-baked and treated
the proper way they should not be very terrifying. But treated
the wrong way, they may well, in the end, spell the end of
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Europe in Asia... Let us therefore stand no nonsense from the 
French or the Dutch.'(13)
However, while SEAC was militarily unable, as well as politically 
unwilling, to put an end to the Indonesian Republic, British forces were 
crucial to the re-establishment of French power in the south of 
Indochina. After the Japanese surrender, the leader of the communist 
dominated Viet Minh, Ho Chi Minh, had on 2 September in Hanoi proclaimed 
the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV). The DRV's main power base was 
to be in the northern province of Tonkin where it was tolerated by the 
Chinese occupational armies until the return of the French in the spring 
of 1946. In the south, however, it was the British who were charged with 
disarming the Japanese and with restoring law and order. The commander 
of the British occupation^ forces, Major General Douglas D. Gracey, 
openly sympathized with the French whose local troops and authorities 
had been interned by the Japanese in March 1945 following years of 
uneasy collaboration. Soon after his arrival in Saigon on 13 September 
1945, Gracey declared a state of siege and distributed arms to the few 
thousand freed French troops. Overstepping his instructions, Gracey
organised a coup d'dtat on 23 September: his British and Indian troops 
arrested the surprised Viet Minh authorities in Saigon's public
buildings and re-installed the French. In the following month, British
forces became actively involved in fighting with the Viet Minh for the
control of Saigon and the surrounding areas, an episode which one 
historian has called 'The First Vietnam War'.(14) The bulk of new French 
forces under General Philippe Leclerc arrived in October, and the French 
re-occupation of Saigon and large parts of Cochin-China was completed by
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February 1946. The British forces withdrew and in March Gracey 
officially transferred his authority to the French.
2.2. ESLER DENING, SEAC AND REGIONAL COOPERATION IN 
SOUTH-EAST ASIA
Vhile it would take several months before the gravity of South-East 
Asia's political situation would fully sink in in London, Whitehall was 
immediately alerted to the economic problems that SEAC was up against. 
It soon became apparent that South-East Asia's agricultural economy lay 
in ruins as a result of the Japanese occupation. Traditional rice 
producing countries like Burma, Indochina and to a lesser degree 
Thailand had all suffered from serious neglect and mismanagement under 
the Japanese, and there existed hardly any stocks of rice or other 
foodstuffs in the area. In addition to the shortage of food supplies, 
there was a lack of clothing and consumer goods, of coal and machinery 
as well as of fertilizers. Planting had decreased and transport was 
disintegrating. The Japanese supply system - never very efficient - 
broke down completely at the time of the surrender. As a result, the 
population in many of SEAC's territories was soon to be threatened by 
famine.(15) Since the shortage of rice was not confined to South-East 
Asia, the Combined Food Board in Washington, responsible for world-wide 
food allocations during and immediately after the war, was in no 
position to provide large-scale imports either.(16)
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SEAC was completely unprepared for the task of postwar relief. It 
was a military command geared for a gradual advance into Malaya, 
Thailand and Sumatra. Its supply plans were drawn up months in advance 
and could not be changed at short notice due to the worldwide lack of 
shipping space. Furthermore, existing stocks were completely 
insufficient for meeting South-East Asia's food demands. Another problem 
was the lack of transport facilities. Mountbatten had a fleet of only 
130 cargo ships, too little to keep up the flow of supplies to and 
within the enlarged theatre. Things were made worse by the fact that the 
turn-round of ships was usually delayed by the lack of port equipment
and the shortage of labour. SEAC's inadequate shipping resources were
further strained by the need to transport Indian coal supplies to South- 
East Asia; the letter's coal production was seriously reduced as a 
result of the war. All this had the effect that surplus stocks of rice, 
which existed for example in Thailand, were extremely difficult to 
transport to deficit areas.(17) Last but not least, SEAC had hardly any 
qualified staff to deal with the civil administration of the re-occupied 
territories, or with the economic rehabilitation of South-East Asia.
The first British official to point out the lack of civil affairs 
experts at SEAC was Mountbatten's political adviser, Esler Dening. 
Immediately after learning of a possible surrender by Japan, Dening 
warned the Foreign Office that SEAC's military machine was 'only 
equipped to undertake the limited task of re-occupation and prevention 
of disease and unrest'. Yet everything depended on how Britain coped 
with its task of postwar administration:
'By the creation of the South East Asia Command, which is
predominantly British, we assumed responsibility for the areas
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contained within its boundaries. That is all to the good
provided we discharge that responsibility. If we do, then we 
stand a fair chance of restoring British prestige in a part of 
the world where it had sunk to a very low ebb. If we do not,
then I should expect that, as the years roll on, the peoples of
the Far East will tend to look less and less to Britain and 
more and more to any Power which is in a position to afford 
them strategic, political and economic security. This will 
affect our relations with other European Powers with 
possessions in the Far East; it will loosen our ties with
Australia and Hew Zealand and affect our relations with China 
and the United States.'(18)
Dening's letter was an indication that he was thinking of using
SEAC as a means of promoting British power in South-East Asia. His exact
ideas were never expressed in one comprehensive paper. However, taken
together Dening's various proposals in the summer of 1945 provide a
clear picture of the policies he wanted Britain to pursue. In the centre
of his plans were his proposals for the coordination of British policies
in the region. As he had argued in June, he feared that British
territories east of Suez would drift back into their pre-war state of
'parochialism' which he held partly responsible for the Allied defeat in
1942. Hence his proposal for the appointment of a Minister Resident in
charge of political coordination. In July, Dening further indicated in a
letter to Mountbatten that non-British territories might also be
included in the scope of the new appointment:
'Politically, strategically and economically we must surely in 
future regard South East Asia as a unit, and not as a 
collection of isolated parishes. If some civil organisation 
over and above the local governments is not created, I do not 
know how we are going to preserve the spirit which has been 
created by this Command of one great area in which boundaries 
are only incidental to the main purpose. That area, to my mind, 
embraces India, Ceylon, Burma, Siam, F.I.C., Malaya and the 
H.E.I., while its influence should extend to S. China through 
Hong Kong.'(19)
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The sudden extension of SEAC's boundaries at the end of the war 
made the creation of such a civil organisation above the local 
governments more realistic. For despite its apparent weaknesses, SEAC 
was the first organisation ever to administer the whole of South-East 
Asia, including British, French and Dutch territories as well as 
independent Thailand. In fact, SEAC can be called the first regional 
organisation in peacetime South-East Asia, and Dening was tempted by the 
idea of continuing it as a non-military organisation under Britain's 
lead after the return to civilian rule.
A few days after the Japanese surrender Dening sent a telegram to
London in which he demanded the immediate appointment of two financial
and economic advisers to SEAC. (20) He also told the Foreign Office that
he was thinking of a 'coordinating agency' in South-East Asia which
would deal with economic questions such as rice distribution, inflation
or price fixing. Without such an agency, Dening argued,
'...there will be no overall economy which I believe to be 
necessary to future prosperity of South East Asia, and we shall 
find ourselves drifting back to bad days when a number of 
political entities existed in this region with no consciousness 
of, or interest in, the problems of their neighbours, and no 
coordination of their economy or security'. (21)
In September, Dening further wrote to Sterndale Bennett:
'I am all for the setting up of local civil administrations as 
soon as possible. At the same time I have not altered my view 
that it would be a pity to split up once more into isolated 
parishes, and some organisation should, I think, be preserved 
which will preserve the unity of purpose engendered by the 
war. Regional economy and regional security are, at any rate, 
essentials, and the more we can break down political barriers 
at this stage the better. You may consider this a counsel of 
perfection, but it will be only too easy, if we do nothing now,
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to drift back to the old ways. They may have been alright for 
their day, but that time is past.'(22)
Taken together, Dening's various proposals amounted to a scheme
providing for international cooperation in both South and South-East
Asia under the leadership of a British Minister Resident. British
officers at SEAC were apparently thinking on similar lines. According to
the Var Office, there was enthusiastic support among top SEAC officials
for a scheme which would make the maximum political use of the command
under the lead of Mountbatten. (23) At the Foreign Office Sterndale
Bennett concluded;
'If the scheme were properly handled S.E.A.C. might become the 
nucleus for a consultative regional commission in South East 
Asia which has long been one of our tentative objectives.'
However, due regard would have to be jffa} paid to the susceptibilities of 
foreign countries, as it might appear that Britain was trying to attempt 
fastening her control over French and Dutch territories; so far as 
Thailand was concerned it would also 'revive American suspicions of our 
wish to reduce that country to a kind of subject State'. In the early 
stages the scheme would therefore have to apply to British territories, 
Indonesia, Indochina and Thailand only.(24)
Sterndale Bennett's comments highlighted one key aspect of Dening's 
and other officers' proposals. The creation of a civilian successor 
organisation to SEAC, linked probably to a British Minister Resident, 
implied the continuation in the postwar years of Britain's factual 
hegemony in South-East Asia under SEAC. Though the proposed organisation
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was to serve the economic revival and development of South-East Asia 
there is no doubt that Dening also saw it as a potential tool for 
British great power interests in Asia. It was this aspect of Dening's 
proposal which would have made the concurrence of France and the 
Netherlands in such a British dominated regional scheme questionable, 
despite the two countries' weakness in 1945 and their reliance on 
British support in South-East Asia.
Despite these potential pitfalls, the Foreign Office generally 
supported the idea of promoting regional cooperation in South-East Asia. 
However, before launching an international initiative in this direction, 
the department had to try and convince the rest of Whitehall to back 
Dening's proposal. His telegram of 23 August demanding a regional 
coordinating agency was therefore circulated to the Official Far Eastern 
Committee, which Immediately agreed to the appointment of two specialist 
advisers to SEAC. It also Invited the Foreign Office, in consultation 
with other departments, to make recommendations on the creation of 
economic machinery in SEAC. (25) After consultation between the Foreign 
Office and the Var Office (26), responsibility for organising the 
interdepartmental discussion on economic coordination was passed on to 
the chairman of the Official Committee for Supply of Liberated Areas 
(S. L.A.(0)), McGregor, of the Ministry of Production.
Dening's telegram from 23 August had effectively revived the issue 
of regional cooperation which had been dormant since the failure of the 
Colonial Office's world-wide plans earlier in the year. As Sterndale 
Bennett pointed out to Bevin on 9 October, three issues were now under
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consideration. First, there was the question of whether a Minister of
State or merely a high and independent government official should be
appointed in South-East Asia, as SEAC was unprepared for dealing with
the political and economic problems arising in the area. The second
point was the serious supply problems in SEAC and the need for some
better coordinating machinery. Thirdly, unless action was taken, there
was the tendency of the various territories to 'drop back into more or
less water-tight compartments', though
'The existence of South East Asia Command does provide an 
opportunity for working on a regional basis and perhaps for 
laying the foundation of some kind of regional organisation 
when the immediate military tasks of South East Asia Command 
are over'.
So far as the first point was concerned, Sterndale Bennett added 
that the appointment of a Minister of State might be difficult to 
reconcile with the responsibilities of the Supreme Commander and 
subsequently with the new governments; nevertheless, a panel of experts 
on financial, political, economic and supply questions would have to be 
provided.(27) Orme Sargent, however, still favoured the appointment of a 
Minister of State. (28)
A decision on the first of the three issues was made by a meeting 
of Cabinet ministers on 18 October. The meeting acknowledged that the 
political machinery for dealing with political matters in SEAC urgently 
needed to be strengthened. However, there were signs that Mountbatten 
did not favour the apointment of a Minister Resident and that such an 
appointment would be embarrassing to the Indian Viceroy and to the 
Governor of Burma. In view of these objections, the meeting decided
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instead on the appointment of an official of ambassadorial status, 
responsible to the Foreign Office, who would deal with political 
questions in the non-British territories and who could achieve further 
coordination in consultation with the Indian Viceroy and the Governor of 
Burma. Concerning the supply situation in South-East Asia and the 
region's future economic organisation, it was generally accepted that a 
coordinating machinery for economic and supply matters was needed. 
However, the meeting left it to the departments to discuss whether this 
machinery would be under the supervision of the proposed high 
official.(29)
The decision against a ministerial appointment in South-East Asia 
was the direct result of opposition by local officials such as 
Mountbatten, the Governor of Burma and the Indian Viceroy who resented 
interference by a politician dispatched by London. Furthermore, Colonial 
Office objections to an appointment superior to the Malayan Governor- 
General seem to have been a major consideration. The decision implied 
that Britain's colonial authorities would continue to maintain a high 
degree of autonomy and that political coordination would be provided 
primarily by London, not by a ministerial authority on the spot. The 
ruling came as a disappointment to the Foreign Office, which had 
apparently hoped to use a ministerial appointment as a means of 
increasing its influence in South-East Asia. Despite this, the 
alternative decision in favour of a new diplomatic appointment in South- 
East Asia was an improvement compared to the prewar years, giving the 
Foreign Office a further foothold in the region and allowing it to make 
its voice^/ with the colonial authorities. In addition, the new
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appointment provided an opportunity for the Foreign Office to assume 
some regional economic responsibilites - so long as the new post would 
be linked to the economic machinery envisaged by the ministerial 
meeting. In the long run, this could be the basis for a wider regional 
scheme in South-East Asia.
2.3. THE REGIONAL DEBATE AT WHITEHALL, OCTOBER 1945 
UNTIL JANUARY 1946
After the decision in favour of a new Foreign Office post in
Singapore, the interdepartmental debate began to shift away from the
question of political coordination to the issue of regional cooperation.
On 22 October an interdepartmental meeting at the Ministry of Production
discussed South-East Asia's economic organisation. According to an
account by the Colonial Office, Sterndale Bennett demanded 'guidance
from the Departments concerned of the desirability from the economic
point of view, of setting up some machinery for co-operation as between
the territories at present Included in S.E.A.C.' The Colonial Office
representative, Mayle, left the meeting under the impression that there
were no prospects for creating new regional machinery, since supply
problems were covered by existing machinery in SEAC, London and
Washington. The same applied to the long term:
'In the absence of the common purpose created by the war, 
there seems to be little prospect of getting agreement to 
machinery for co-operation as between the various countries 
concerned at the moment. The prospects to this question are, in 
fact, much too poor to justify our diverting time and resources 
urgently required for rehabilitation of our territories. My own 
view is that it will be time enough to consider this question 
of co-operative machinery in about two years when we and the
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other territories concerned will have had a chance to 
rehabilitate ourselves.'(30)
However, the meeting's chairman from the Ministry of Production, 
McGregor, was under the opposite impression. After the meeting, he 
circulated a paper outlining a tentative plan for an international 
Advisory Supply Council for South-East Asia, composed of high-ranking 
officials, and with a secretariat in charge of the dally work. The 
council would deal with issues such as colonial economic policies, short 
term rehabilitation and price control of the region's commodities (i.e. 
rubber, tin and rice).(31) The Colonial Office was surprised by 
McGregor's paper, arguing that the meeting on 22 October had reached no 
agreement on any aspect of long-term economic cooperation. One official, 
Davies, questioned whether the time was right to set up a regional 
machinery:
'Vhile fully appreciating the advantages of regional economic 
co-operation ... it is not the most propitious moment for 
proposing a regional body providing for co-ordination and co­
operation in respect of economic matters on a regional basis.
If the proposals are put forward now, they might be met with 
some suspicion on the ground that we are trying to take 
advantage of our military position in the Far East ... it would 
be preferable to defer the matter until the countries concerned 
have had an opportunity of carrying out some measure of 
rehabilitation, and the political situation is more settled. Ve 
would suggest that the question should be deferred for, say, a 
year, and reviewed at the end of that time in the light of the 
then conditions.'
Regarding the regional council proposed in McGregor's paper, Davies 
further critisized that there was no reason why SEAC should be taken as 
a nucleus for a regional economic council, as the command's boundaries 
were determined by reasons other than economic. However, the question of
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regional cooperation might be reconsidered at a later time, when supply 
questions weren't looming so high. An organisation might then be 
considered on the lines of the Anglo-American Caribbean Commission, 
which also dealt with problems other than economic ones.(32)
The Colonial Office had thus expressed its opposition to any plans 
for regional economic cooperation in the near future. As Mayle had 
pointed out, the resources of Britain's South-East Asian colonies were 
scarce and the Colonial Office did not Intend to share them with their 
non-British neighbours. Furthermore, regional cooperation would be made 
difficult by Britain's problems with Indonesia and Thailand, and there 
was a chance that other countries would be highly suspicious of British 
intentions behind a regional scheme. If a regional organisation were 
eventually created, the Colonial Office was thinking of a body similar 
to the Caribbean Commission which had only token economic and political 
powers. However, the Ministry of Production wouldn't give up easily, 
circulating a revised paper which again stressed the need for economic 
collaboration. It was supported by the Board of Trade.(33)
The Foreign Office too continued to lobby for some form of regional 
cooperation in South-East Asia. It was felt that a small beginning in 
SEAC might develop into the kind of regional consultative commission 
whose encouragement was in Britain's long-term Interests. The department 
was particularly keen on linking such a commission to its new 
appointment in South-East Asia: according to a departmental memorandum 
by Sterndale Bennett, the question was now whether the planned Foreign 
Office post would be given responsibilities for the coordination not
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only of foreign affairs but of general political, economic and financial 
questions in the area as well. The problem was, however, that the 
Colonial and Burma Offices would oppose anything which looked like 
impinging on the prerogatives of the governors of the various British 
territories.(34) Sterndale Bennett subsequently drafted a directive 
which stated that the new appointment would promote and encourage 
general political and economic coordination and that he would preside 
over a regional economic advisory council with headquarters in 
Singapore.(35)
The issue came up at an interdepartmental meeting on 19 November 
which considered the future responsibilities of the Foreign Office's new 
post. The meeting agreed that the title of the appointment would be 
Special Commissioner and that his headquarters would be in Singapore. He 
would neither concern himself with the internal problems of the British 
territories in South-East Asia nor would there be any derogation from 
Mountbatten's authority. It was also agreed that for the time being the 
Governor of Malaya and, when appointed, the Governor-General of Malaya 
would be the King's principal representative in Singapore. The duration 
of the appointment was left for further consideration.(36)
However, no agreement could be reached on the Special 
Commissioner's economic responsibilities. Sterndale Bennett's draft 
directive was criticized by the head of the Colonial Office, Sir George 
Gater, as well as by the head of the Treasury, Sir Edward Bridges. The 
latter apparently wanted to avoid additional financial commitments in 
connection with the new post and suggested leaving the proposed regional
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committee for consideration by the Special Commissioner upon his arrival 
in Singapore. So far as economic coordination and cooperation in general 
was concerned, representatives from the Ministries of Supply and of Food 
further argued that 1 raw materials from South East Asia were wanted by 
the rest of the world and only to a small extent by the territories 
themselves*. Trade would also be with the outside world and the scope 
for interchange was not great. As a result of these objections, 
consideration of the Special Commissioner's economic functions was 
postponed to a later date.(37)
Despite this set-back to the Foreign Office's South-East Asian 
plans, further reports on SEAC's inadequate economic organisation 
strengthened the department's hand. In the middle of December, Dening 
repeated his demand for a civil organisation in South-East Asia which 
would relieve SEAC of some of its non-military duties and meet the 
overall requirements of the region. There were many matters that a 
military command should not be dealing with, such as the allocation of 
Indian textiles to South-East Asian territories. This was more for a 
civilian prganisation which would be equipped with a staff trained in 
international affairs, in economic and financial matters as well as in 
civil government. It would also be able to assess civilian in relation 
to military requirements, especially since there was a strong feeling in 
Malaya that the latter were receiving undue preference. As most 
territories in South-East Asia had been liberated without having to 
undergo the horrors of battle, the populations were expecting an earlier 
return to normalcy. The result was growing unrest and discontent. The 
proposed organisation would thus relieve the military command of much
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work, all^eviate the position more quickly and remove the suspicion of
neglect, coordinate the area's requirements so as to ensure equitable
distribution and deal with political developments of more than a local
significance. As in his earlier representations, Dening also saw use for
such an organisation beyond the immediate postwar period:
'Burma, Malaya, Siam, Indo-China and the Netherlands Indies 
were all completely parochial in their outlook before the war 
and we had no organisation which was capable of surveying the 
scene as a whole and of making appropriate recommendations to 
H.M.G., while in Vhitehall reports from these areas were 
canalised with the Foreign Office, as the case might be, so 
that there again there was no comprehensive picture. I think we 
should avoid doing that in the future. In London I understand 
that the necessary machinery has been set up. Out here I do 
not consider that a military command can fill the bill.'
Dening added that links should be made between such a 'clearing house' 
and Australia, New Zealand, China and India.(38)
Inspired by Dening, the Foreign Office took the opportunity of an 
interdepartmental meeting on 18 December to press for a link between 
regional cooperation and its new appointment. According to the official 
account, it was suggested that regional cooperation could be useful in 
matters concerning supply, distribution and pest control. Though no 
final decisions were made on the issue of regional cooperation itself, 
the meeting decided that the Special Commissioner should be invited to 
make recommendations on
1) whether the existing machinery in South East Asia was sufficient to 
deal with^ economic questions,
2) what arrangements should be made for the period immediately after 
control had been handed over to civil governments.
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3) whether now or in the period immediately after the handover to civil 
authorities, the foundations could be laid of a long-term organisation 
for regional cooperation.(39)
The Foreign Office had completely steamrollered its opposition 
during the meeting. Though the Colonial Office representative, Davies, 
disagreed with the need for regional cooperation, he was at the same 
time totally unaware of the Special Commissioner's proposed appointment. 
Davies subsequently explained to his department that 'all the others 
present regarded the matter Cof regional collaboration) as intimately 
connected with the appointment of a Special Commissioner in the Far 
East'. Consequently, he 'did not feel it possible to dissent from the 
unanimous view taken by the others present at the meeting that a 
paragraph should be added to the terms of reference of the Special 
Commissioner, asking him to advise on this question', especially since 
Davies was given to infer that Gater had 'definitely contemplated the 
possibility of this being done'.(40)
Gater, in fact, vehemently objected to the meeting's decision, and 
asked Kenneth Robinson, the Colonial Office's leading expert on regional 
commissions, to comment. Like Davies, Robinson hadn't before heard of 
plans for the Special Commissioner. In a long departmental minute 
Robinson warned of the 'dangers involved in Regional Commissions'. While 
the Colonial Office was in general agreement that South-East Asia was an 
area suitable for regional commissions, the present situation underlined 
in the most acute form all the problems which were considered in 
Stanley's paper on 'International Aspects of Colonial Policy'.
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Regionalism would be used by the Americans and the two Pacific dominions
to undermine the position of the colonial powers, assisted by China, and
probably by India and Russia. Because of this, the French were already
highly suspicious of all these regional proposals:
'All the difficulties in connection with the attempt to combine 
with the Regional Commission some form of "international 
accountability" including the supervision of progress towards 
an independence to be decided on an internationally prescribed 
timetable would inevitably come to the fore in the present 
circumstances in S.E.Asia'.
So far as the economic side was concerned, Robinson argued that 
worldwide, not regional cooperation was required, and that it would be 
difficult to demarcate the field of an economic organisation (dealing 
for example with price control) after the disappearance of supply 
problems. Robinson concluded that while regional cooperation was of 
vital importance in raising the standard of living throughout the area, 
proposals for cooperation should not be considered without realising the 
wider political Issues involved, particularly the 'Colonial 
Question'.(41)
Robinson's reservations against regional schemes in South-East Asia 
were the same that the Colonial Office had voiced after the Yalta 
Conference in February 1945. Regional cooperation bore in it the danger 
of international interference in colonial territories. This danger was 
increased by the current political troubles in the South-East Asian 
territories. In a letter to the War Office Gater therefore expressed
instructions any reference to long-term organisation for international
serious doubts about including in the
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regional co-operation. This issue involved many problems of a political 
character, in particular the question of the relationship between such 
regional machinery with the United Nations Organisation.(42)
While London was considering Robinson's objections to regional 
cooperation, the men on the spot had eventually got wind of the Colonial 
Office's plans for Malaya.(43) As Denlng telexed to London on 5 January 
1946, Mountbatten, Dening, MacMichael and Hone had concluded that 
instead of a Malayan Governor-General there was need for an overall 
civilian organisation to coordinate British domestic and foreign policy 
in the region and to act as a clearing house for the resolution of 
regional problems which were at the same time of concern to individual 
British territories. The functions of the head of such an organisation 
would be that of an umpire, coordinator and perhaps adjugator rather 
than of an executive officer. His authority would furthermore derive 
from the Cabinet, and he might one day maintain links with any United 
Rations office's in the region.(44) Dening added in a second telegram 
ten days later on that the appointment of two high officials would be 
wrong, and that a Governor General's mind would 'naturally be influenced 
towards colonial problems only as opposed to problems of the whole area 
of South-East Asia'.(45)
However, Dening's comments arrived too late to make any difference, 
as the Cabinet had already decided against the appointment of a Minister 
Resident. Even the Foreign Office had come round to the view that it 
would be more practicable, if less ambitious, to make the Special 
Commissioner responsible to the Foreign Secretary, and to keep him out
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of inter-Malayan affairs.(46) The Foreign Office also seemed to be 
pleased to have its own regional official in South-East Asia. 
Nevertheless, Dening1 s telegrams encouraged the Foreign Office not to 
relent on the Special Commissioner's economic directive. Though there 
was a risk of delaying the new appointment if its draft directive wasn't 
soon cleared, Vilson-Young argued that the Foreign Office should not for 
the sake of speed agree to the restrictions on the Special
Commissioner's terms of reference suggested by the Colonial Office.(47)
The matter was consequently referred to the Permanent Under­
secretary at the Foreign Office, Alexander Cadogan, who told Gater in a 
letter of 10 January that some civil organisation was needed to meet the 
overall requirements of South-East Asia. The value of regional
cooperation had been accepted by the Colonial Office in other parts of 
the world and some form of regional organisation would help to increase 
the wealth and welfare of the region and its inhabitants. The Foreign 
Office had a particular interest in regional developments since South- 
East Asia comprised, apart from Thailand, 'colonial territories with the 
mother-countries of which it is our general policy to develop the 
closest community of interests.' Cadogan therefore saw a good case for 
having the problem investigated by the Special Commissioner who would 
merely make recommendations. As a compromise on the Special
Commissioner's terms of reference, Cadogan now proposed that the new
appointment should be invited to recommend not whether a regional 
organisation was desirable, but whether consideration should be given to 
inter-territorial cooperation in economic and welfare matters.(48)
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The Colonial Office regarded the proposed revision of the Special
Commissioner's terms of reference as an improvement. However, Gater was
still not convinced that the point should be included. Though it was
Britain's general policy to develop the closest ties with the parent
states of the colonial territories in South-East Asia, Gater had 'very
clear indications of the sensitivity and suspicion with which the French
view any form of regional co-operation involving their Colonies
especially if any outside powers such as the United States or, in this
case, China are to participate'. There were good prospects for
appropriate ad hoc collaboration with the French and with other colonial
powers, but the inclusion of non-colonial powers as contemplated by
Stanley in 1943 was fraught with great difficulty. Furthermore,
relations with the Dutch in the Hetherlands East Indies were uneasy, and
the situation in Indonesia and to a lesser extent Indochina were being
used by 'anti-imperialist' elements in the United States and elsewhere
to support the case for international intervention in the area:
'If proposals for anything in the nature of a regional 
commission in this area became public they would have little 
chance of survival between the pressure of outside powers to 
secure membership of the proposed Commission and the fear of 
Colonial Powers such as the French that the activities of those 
Powers would be directed towards weakening the connection of 
the Colonial territories in the area with their parent states'.
Gater added that there had been considerable changes since Stanley's 
advocacy of regional commissions as part of a general scheme to justify 
the abolition of the mandates system. The new British government had not 
yet considered how far they wished to pursue the policy of regional 
commissions. Any instructions to the Special Commissioner on the subject
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should therefore be deferred until after the views of Hinisters had been 
secured.(49)
However, the Foreign Office was far from satisfied with Gater's
reply, Sterndale Bennett complaining that the Colonial Office had been
'very obstructive' about the Special Commissioner's.terms of reference:
'Their fears about regional commissions may have some
substance, but this letter gives no real argument why the 
Special Commissioner should not be asked to consider the
question of regional cooperation in economic matters and to
make recommendations about it.'(50)
Thus, three different lines of thought on regional cooperation
prevailed at the end of January 1946. The first group were the 
traditionalists for example at the Ministry of Supply who saw no need 
for any kind of regional cooperation in South-East Asia. They believed 
that the prewar pattern of trade between a colony and the metropolitan 
power should be resumed, and inter-regional trade discouraged. By 
implication, economic development and welfare of the colonies was of
secondary importance. However, this group was in the minority. The
second group, namely the Colonial Office, principally agreed that 
economic collaboration was important for South-East Asian prosperity and 
social welfare. However, colonial planners feared at the same time that 
the establishment of a regional commission would lead to outside
interference in the South-East Asian colonies, for example by the United 
States. Furthermore, they expected that any regional proposals tabled by 
Britain would be regarded with suspicion by France and the Netherlands. 
So far as colonial officials in charge of Malayan affairs were
concerned, they were also disinclined to spare the colony's limited
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resources for the economic reconstruction of neighbouring foreign 
territories while there was still a shortage of food and goods. Of equal 
importance was the Colonial Office's objection to a link between 
regional cooperation and the Foreign Office's new appointment. From the 
outset, Colonial Office officials had regarded the Foreign Office's 
plans with suspicion, and feared that a Special Commissioner with 
economic responsibilities would tresspass on the grounds of the 
Governor-General.
The third group consisted of the promoters of regional cooperation. 
Officials at the Ministry of Production were enthusiastic about greater 
inter-regional exchange and the control of commodity prices by an 
international organisation. The Foreign Office too believed in the short 
and long-term economic benefits for South-East Asia's war-shattered 
economy. However, the department was primarily interested in the 
political opportunities that a regional scheme might offer both to 
Britain and to itself. After the rejection of a Minister Resident, 
Foreign Office officials in London consequently tried to include 
responsibility for regional cooperation in the Special Commissioner's 
directive. When the Colonial Office objected to any new regional 
machinery, the Foreign Office's minimal aim was to keep the regional 
option open for the future and to instruct the Special Commissioner to 
comment on the issue.
Within the third group, some differences existed between officials 
in South-East Asia and in London about the extent and timing of a 
regional iniative. Dening did not intend to involve the United States in
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any regional arrangement, whereas Foreign Office officials in London 
were prepared to include the Americans as well. Furthermore Dening, who 
was not fully aware of the developments at Whitehall, was adamant that 
the proposed organisation should be linked with or even headed by a 
British official or minister responsible to the Cabinet. The Foreign 
Office, on the other hand, accepted the ministerial decision that the 
new post would be responsible merely to the Foreign Secretary. Dening 
also kept pressing for the immediate establishment of a civil 
organisation in order to relieve SEAC of its non-military 
responsibilities. The Foreign Office, on the other hand, came to realise 
by the end of January that a regional organisation was a long-term plan. 
What mattered most was that any future developments towards regional 
cooperation in South-East Asia would be linked to the Special 
Commissioner. As will be seen next, the Foreign Office would eventually 
get its way on this point, after the full gravity of the food situation 
in South-East Asia had become apparent.
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3. THE S P E C IA L  C O M M I S S I O N  IN S I N G A P O R E
3.1 THE RICE CRISIS
The Foreign Office was by the end of January 1946 becoming 
increasingly impatient about its planned new appointment in Singapore. 
More than five months had passed since the reoccupation of Malaya. 
Moreover, Dening's relations with Mountbatten were at an all-time low
after a row over SEAC's Far East Publicity Division. Mountbatten was
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incensed that Dening had complained to j Foreign Office about the 
division's activities in Indonesia without previously consulting him. 
Though the intervention of the Foreign Secretary prevented Dening from 
resigning over the issue, it was clear that he would soon have to be 
transferred.(1) Unless the Special Commissioner would soon be appointed, 
Dening's departure would leave the Foreign Office unrepresented at aj| 
time when SEAC was handing over to civil governments in the various 
territories.(1)
As a Foreign Office memorandum pointed out at the end of January, 
SEAC, which provided a previously non-existing link between the South- 
East Asian territories, was dwindling. The tendency of the individual 
territories would now be to pursue their individual courses without much 
regard to or knowledge of each others problems, yet there would be 'many 
problems of common concern to some if not all of the territories in the 
area. ' It was particularly in the sphere of foreign affairs that the 
area had to be treated as a whole. It would be advantageous to have
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someone who would keep track of racial questions in the area, such as 
Chinese penetration, and who would 'watch the tendencies of the 
nationalist movements which the war with Japan has let loose'. 
Furthermore, someone was needed to report on regional economic 
developments affecting foreign affairs and the economies of the 
individual British territories in the area. These would in fact be the 
main functions of the Special Commissioner.(3)
Unexpectedly, the South-East Asian rice crisis strengthened the 
Foreign Office's case. On 31 January, the Cabinet was alerted to the 
fact that the world-wide shortage of food had become critical. During 
talks in Washington in January 1946, the Minister of Food had learnt 
that the world production of grains had been overestimated and that a 
shortage of 5 million tons of wheat could be expected. Furthermore, a 
shortage of rice, the major foodstuff in South-East Asia, was imminent: 
The estimated supply of 3.1 million tons was 0.7 million tons below the 
expected world demand of 3.8 million tons (excluding Japan's 
requirements of 1 million tons).(4) Due to the shortage of wheat, rice 
could not be replaced by other crops.
The rice shortage was a direct result of the Japanese occupation of 
South-East Asia. During the war the Japanese had forced the territories 
under their control to aim for economic self-sufficiency, with the 
result that the production of exporting countries, such as Indochina, 
Burma and Thailand, had been scaled down while Importing countries like 
Indonesia and Malaya had been hit by starvation. Indochinese exports 
were the worst affected, and they were suffering further from the
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fighting between French forces and the Viet Minh in the rice producing 
south of the country. Indochina's exports had fallen from 1.3 million 
tons before the war to 0.1 million after the war, and at the end of 1945 
the Chinese controlled north of Indochina was affected by famine. 
Thailand was the only one of South-East Asia's traditional rice 
producers whose capacity had remained intact because she had been spared 
the destruction of the war.
Upon learning of the food crisis, the Cabinet immediately decided
to set up a ministerial Committee for Vorld Food Supplies to monitor the 
situation at the highest level. So far as the shortage of rice was 
concerned, ministers grudgingly decided to modify claims for free rice
from Thailand.(5) On 1 January Britain had signed a peace treaty with
Thailand in which the latter promised the free delivery of 1,5 million 
tons of rice. However, hardly any rice had been forthcoming since 
Thailand's rice trade was controlled by Chinese merchants who were busy 
selling on the black market.(6) The Cabinet now hoped that the 
postponement of its reparations demands would increase the supply of 
Thai rice.(7)
As a further measure against the rice crisis, Bevin suggested after 
the Cabinet meeting that the new Special Commissioner should be charged 
with coordinating South-East Asian food supplies. His choice for the new 
post was Lord Killearn, the British ambassador in Egypt. Attlee agreed 
and on 3 February Bevin sent a telegram to Killearn, offering him the 
two year appointment as Special Commissioner in South-East Asia. The 
telegram stressed the gravity of the food situation and the need for
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someone who could 'coordinate the efforts of Governors and other agents 
in the area'. Though Killearn's political directive had been approved, 
his exact economic functions were still to be defined.(8)
Killearn was completely surprised by Bevin's offer, but after two 
days of hesitation decided to accept.(9) He was in. his mid sixties and 
realised that it was either Singapore or retirement. However, he 
insisted from the outset that his authority would be clearly defined, as 
it was his experience that coordination without authority rarely 
succeeded, and since he didn't want to become 'merely another and 
glorified Middle East Officer'. (10) He also asked for the appointment of 
a sufficient number of experts to deal with the food crisis. On 11 
February, Bevin announced Killearn's appointment to the Cabinet. Recent 
difficulties over the supply of rice in South-East Asia had illustrated 
the need for a single high-ranking British representative to watch 
Britain's interests throughout the whole area: it was therefore urgently 
necessary that the Special Commissioner took up his duties without 
delay.(11) The gravity of the situation was further highlighted when on 
the same day the General Assembly of the United Nations urged all 
governments to take immediate and drastic action against the world-wide 
shortage of food.(12)
London took the rice crisis extremely seriously. In the following 
days, an official committee on South-East Asian food supplies was 
appointed under the chairmanship of Lord Nathan, a junior minister. Its 
directive was to increase food and rice supplies in South-East Asia and 
to coordinate actions of the Special Commissioner and of the ministries
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concerned with food problems and related economic questions in South- 
East Asia.(13) Killearn arrived in London on 15 February for political 
consultations and briefings on the food situation.(14) Three days later 
his appointment was announced to the press.(15) He arrived in Singapore 
in the middle of March.(16)
Killearn wasn't the first choice as Special Commissioner. 
Originally, the Foreign Office had been looking for someone outside the 
department, in order to make the new appointment more acceptable to the 
rest of Whitehall. Potential candidates included Sir Harold MacMichael, 
an experienced colonial official who was preoccupied with renegotiating 
the Malayan treaties prior to the Malayan Union, and Malcolm MacDonald, 
High Commissioner in Canada who was already designed to become Governor- 
General of Malaya.(17) At the last moment, Lord Killearn was chosen from 
within the Foreign Office. Killearn had considerable experience of the 
Far East and had served as British Minister to China between 1926 and 
1933 when he had re-negotiated the 'unequal treaties' with China.(18) 
Since 1934, first as High Commissioner and then as ambassador in Cairo, 
Killearn had been one of the true powers behind the Egyptian throne - 
indeed 'one of the last great Proconsuls' as one historian has described 
him. (19) During the war, he had gained experience in Middle Eastern 
supply questions; this made him suitable for dealing with the task of 
rice distribution in South-East Asia. Furthermore, Killearn's diplomatic 
and political standing promised to give the Foreign Office's new post 
enough weight to be able to compete with the local British governors, 
and to promote British power throughout the region.
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Killearn*s transfer from Cairo coincided with a reassessment of 
British policies in Egypt following the latter*s request to revise the 
1936 treaty relations with Britain. (20) His departure gave London 
greater flexibility in negotiating with Egypt. However, partly because 
of Killearn*s reputation as an old-style imperialist, British press
reaction to his new appointment was mixed. Though the Sunday Times saw 
the new Singapore post as proof of the British government's recognition 
that utmost efforts were needed to avoid disaster through famine in 
Asia, it also suggested that Killearn, at 65, was too old for such a 
difficult job in Singapore's enervating climate. (21) More critical 
voices argued that Killearn was not only too old, but also out of touch 
with public opinion in Britain, and that his appointment was dangerous 
in an area where change was so rapid that it would test the
understanding of even the most sympathetic mind.(22)
The Special Commissioner's terms of reference were eventually
approved on 27 February. He was responsible to the Foreign Secretary,
and would advise the government on foreign affairs in the area of 
Ceylon, Burma, Thailand, Indochina, Malaya, Borneo and Indonesia. His 
appointment would not interfere with British governors and service 
commanders. He would give guidance to SACSEA on foreign affairs and 
would maintain contacts with British governors in the area, with the 
British minister in Thailand, as well as with representatives of the 
Dominions at Singapore. Finally, he would direct the activities of the 
Foreign Service officers in the area, except for Thailand, and would 
contact foreign administrations after the restoration of civil
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administration. The British government would keep him informed of 
approved policy affecting his work. (23)
A supplementary letter, the drafting of which had been the subject 
of a phenomenal amount of interdepartmental bickering, dealt with the 
economic aspect of Killearn's appointment. The letter constituted a 
remarkably worded compromise on the question of regional cooperation 
following the deliberations between the Colonial and the Foreign Office 
in January. It pointed out that it was not yet clear whether there was a 
continued need for the coordination of economic administration, such as 
the control of imports, transport and shipping, procurement and 
distribution of rice and coal and the care of refugees, as had been 
provided by SEAC. The Special Commissioner was therefore Invited to make 
recommendations on whether the existing machinery in South-East Asia was 
sufficient to deal with the economic questions arising and what 
arrangements should be made for the period immediately after the 
military authorities had transferred their responsibilities. Finally, 
Killearn was asked to make recommendations on regional collaboration, 
even though his recommendations would be examined in the light of new 
developments in the government's policy on this subject.(24)
Killearn's directive on food, however, was not completed before the 
middle of March. It gave the Special Commissioner special authority and 
responsibility in regard to food and related matters, in order to make 
certain that all possible steps were taken to alleviate the food crisis 
in South East Asia. He was also asked to take India's needs into account 
and to maintain close contact with the Indian Government and the
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Dominions. In the directive, Killearn was encouraged to contact the 
French and Dutch authorities in South-East Asia whenever it appeared 
desirable to do so, and to invite them to cooperate in matters relating 
to food supply. He was to endeavour to secure agreement between British 
and Foreign authorities on the adoption of measures designed to 
alleviate the food crisis.(25)
The rice crisis thus functioned as a catalyst for the Special 
Commissioner's appointment, and it allowed the Foreign Office to 
overcome Colonial Office resistance against turning the Special 
Commissioner into more than just a diplomatic outpost in Singapore. 
Apart from advising on regional cooperation and on foreign affairs, 
Killearn would also be actively involved in South-East Aslan economic 
developments, by tackling the shortage of rice in the area. Compared to 
Dening's initial demand for a British Minister Resident in charge of a 
civil successor organisation to SEAC, the Special Commissioner's terms 
of reference may have been disappointing to the Foreign Office. However, 
it is doubtful whether the department could have achieved anything more. 
So far as regional cooperation was concerned, the Colonial Office's 
international experts had argued successfully that neither France nor 
the Netherlands were likely to accept a regional organisation based on 
SEAC, while a regional commission of the kind suggested by Stanley 
during the war would lead to outside interference in the South-East 
Asian territories. The Foreign Office consequently had to scale down its 
regional plans and agree that they would have to be long term.
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However, the problem was one of regional diplomacy as much as of 
interdepartmental rivalry. The Colonial Office was highly suspicious of 
the Foreign Office's intentions in South-East Asia. It regarded the 
Special Commissioner as a serious rival to its own top appointment, the 
Governor-General of Malaya, Malcolm MacDonald, who arrived in Singapore 
in May. As J.J.Paskin minuted in April, the interests of the British 
colonies in the area were 'prejudiced by the unfortunate fact that 
Lord Killearn has not only had a flying start [over] the Governor 
General' but that he had also been instructed to advise on economic and 
social cooperation between the different territories. The economic and 
social interests of Britain's territories in the area, he maintained, 
were entirely the function of the Governor-General.(26) The Colonial 
Office was simply not prepared to be ridden roughshot over by the 
Foreign Office newcomers. It was to take until 1949 before the Foreign 
Office could gain the upper hand in the debate on regional cooperation. 
Its eventual success depended partly on the work of the Special 
Commission between 1946 and 1948 which will briefly be outlined in the 
following section.
3,2 THE WORK OF THE SPECIAL COMMISSION, 1946-1948
Lord Killearn acted as Special Commissioner in South-East Asia for 
two years until 21 March 1948. His post was subsequently merged with the 
office of the Malayan Governor-General, Malcolm MacDonald, who took over 
the combined posts with the new title of Commissi oner-General on 1 May 
1948. Though the Special Commissioner was the Foreign Office's most
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prestigious appointment in South-East Asia, his responsibilities for the 
coordination of British foreign policy were restricted to advising 
either the Foreign Office or Britain's diplomatic representatives in 
South-East Asia on political questions, without being able to overrule 
them. Despite such limited powers, Killearn tried hard to create for 
himself a truly 'special' position in South-East Asia. During his term 
in office, the Special Commissioner travelled to China, Indochina, 
Thailand, the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, Indonesia and most 
British territories in the region, where he discussed political issues 
as well as regional economic problems with national governments or the 
local colonial authorities. Killearn's diplomatic standing was further 
enhanced by the fact that he took over Lord Inverchapel's mediating role 
between the Dutch and the Indonesian republicans in August 1946, helping 
to negotiate the Linggadjati Agreement from March 1947.
Vhile Killearn's influence on the conduct of British foreign policy 
was thus considerable, his powers in the field of coordinating British 
foreign, colonial and defence policies in the region was much more 
limited. Instead of the ministerial appointment originally suggested by 
Dening, a system of interdepartmental committees was set up in Singapore 
in 1946. In its centre was the British Defence Committee, South-East 
Asia (later on styled British Defence Committee, Far East) which 
included the Supreme Allied Commander, the Malayan Governor-General 
Malcolm MacDonald, and the Special Commissioner. After the termination 
of SEAC at the end of November 1946, the Supreme Allied Commander was 
replaced by the three services' commanders-in-chief in South-East Asia. 
At times, the committee meetings were also attended by the local British
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governors who, much to Killearn's dismay, attempted to become permanent 
members of the committee. The Defence Committee dealt with issues 
affecting more than one department such as the troubles in Indonesia, 
the future command organisation in the Far East or Britain's strategic 
cooperation with Australia. It also made joint recommendations to London 
on major policy questions, including the issue of regional cooperation.
The South-East Asian Defence Committee thus provided the framework
for the coordination of British policies in South-East Asia. Despite
this, inter-departmental cooperation on the spot remained difficult, and
there was a definite trend towards the prewar 'parochialism' of local
British authorities. As Killearn pointed out in his final report to the
Foreign Office in 1948:
'Vith the return of civil administration and commercial 
machinery to British territories, and the withdrawal of British 
forces from foreign territories, there was a serious danger 
that the unification and co-ordination which had been possible 
owing to that control would rapidly be dissipated'.
In the long term, he added, there was the danger of returning to the 
prewar system, which had proved so faulty under the strain of war; while 
in the short term disaster threatened in the form of famine in South- 
East Asia.
'It was under the shadow of this threat that I faced the task 
of devising methods of co-ordination by agreement to take the 
place of co-ordination by control*. (27)
Initially, Killearn's main problem was resentment against his 
office by some of the British colonial authorities in the region. As he 
found out in Rangoon during his initial trip to Singapore, the Governor
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of Burma, Reginald Dorman-Smith, was 'highly suspicious and Inclined to
be critical of the whole Idea of my mission'.(28) Killearn reflected in
his diary at the beginning of 1947:
'On April 1st the administration passed back to colonial 
government. It was from then that our real trouble started. It 
is an open secret that the Colonial Office fought tooth and 
nail to prevent the setting up of the Special Commission. They 
felt, not unnaturally, that this was an outside authority, 
barging into their territory, and apart from that the Colonial 
Office have never been distinguished for their length of 
breadth of view. And as a result there is no doubt that the 
whole setting up of this organisation was from the very 
beginning the object of their most complete and utter 
suspicion. So far as Gimfson the Governor of Singapore was 
concerned, this was soon dissipated... Vith Gent up at Kuala 
Lumpur the situation was not so happy... I think he was 
determined from the moment he got here that he was going to 
be the sort of autocrat of Malaya, including at the back of his 
mind Singapore too... there were times when our relations were 
not the most cordial. That I am glad to say has been gradually 
modified during the year... but Gent remains very much the 
black-hatted Vhitehall type, and I don't think has ever had 
much experience of the rough and tumble of local 
adm inistrat ion...' (29 >
On the other hand, Killearn had the support of both Mountbatten and 
the Governor-General of Malaya, Malcolm MacDonald. Immediately after the 
war, Mountbatten had opposed Dening's idea of a Minister Resident in 
South-East Asia, apparently fearing to be upstaged by such an 
appointment. The ministerial decision in October 1945 against this plan 
had in fact been based on Mountbatten's opposition.(30) However, by 
January 1946, Mountbatten had changed his mind, now supporting a 
Minister Resident.(31) In March, Mountbatten met Killearn in India, the 
latter en route to Singapore. Mountbatten now claimed that he had been 
the driving force behind the Special Commissioner. As Killearn recorded 
in his diary:
'I am relieved to find that it was mainly he [Mountbatten] who 
was responsible for the appointment of a Special Commissioner
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in South East Asia, and that far from being annoyed or in any 
way hurt by my arrival, on the contrary he is most responsive, 
friendly and extremely helpful.'(32)
In April, Mountbatten repeated this view during a conference of 
regional British authorities in South-East Asia, Killearn subsequently 
noting:
'Vhat he (Mountbatten] had really wanted was a Minister of 
Cabinet rank, but the authorities at home had funked that and 
the result was a curious compromise involving several 
supermen, perhaps even too many of them. For instance a 
Governor-General of Malaya as well as a Special Commissioner.
He still did not understand why his original proposal had not 
been accepted...'(33)
Whatever the reasons behind Mountbatten's ambivalent attitude
towards a Minister Resident in South-East Asia, what mattered to
Killearn was that the Supreme Allied Commander eventually decided to
give him his full support. As Killearn recorded in 1947:
'The job here has been a very odd one, it started by being very 
uphill work, we started from scratch with practically no staff 
whatever, that was alright as long as Malaya and this area was 
being run by the Military, for with them we got on like a 
house on fire from the start, especially with Dicky Mountbatten 
himself. We certainly could not have had fuller or more 
wholehearted support from the very outset from Boy Browning as 
Chief of Staff and from Jack Denning who was the Chief 
Administrative Officer... we could not have begun to do our job 
if the aforesaid military had not helped us out in every 
direction.'(34)
Killearn's relationship with the new Governor-General, Malcolm 
MacDonald, who arrived in May 1946, also proved to be a good one. 
Initially, the two had differences over who was going to reside in the 
Sultan of Johore's palace in Bukit Serene, which unquestionably was the 
grandest residence in and around Singapore. Killearn won the argument
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and MacDonald had to establish his residence in Penang. Despite this,
the two remained on good terms: they developed the habit of discussing
informally most of the important political issues, Including some purely
colonial or foreign policy questions, and they would usually find a
consensus if recommendations for London were required. As Killearn
recorded in his diary, he had known KacDonald for years before his
appointment, enabling the two men to start off on a basis of old
friendship and trust:
'Vhat might have been a very difficult relationship has on the 
contrary proved an extraordinarily useful and helpful 
partnership. Of course there are small points, when it is not 
always easy to split the difference between his domain and 
mine...but so long as Malcolm is here, personally I think he 
and I together should be able to make quite a good hand of 
running British policy in this part of the world.'(35)
Finally, a word on Killearn's food task. Throughout 1946, the food 
situation in South-East Asia continued to be serious. The prospects for 
the production of rice in Burma, Thailand and Indochina in 1946 were 2 
million tons as opposed to 6 million tons annually before the war. At 
the same time, the demand for rice by traditional importing countries
such as India, China, Malaya and Indonesia had grown significantly
because of the increase in their population. To ensure equal and fair 
distribution of the existing rice supplies, Killearn soon assumed
Mountbatten's responsibility for distributing rice supplies in South- 
East Asia allocated by the Combined Food Board in Vashington, 
(superseded in June 1946 by the 'International Emergency Food Council' 
(IEFC)).(36) As promised by Attlee and Bevin, Killearn was also provided 
with the necessary staff of food and technical experts and 
administrators. By April 1947, the Special Commission consisted of
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approximately 500 staff. Most importantly, the Special Commission had 
the support of Lord Nathan's Rice Committee in London, which was doing a 
lot of the coordinating work for the Singapore office, for example by 
working out the movements of transport ships at a time of international 
shipping shortage.(37)
As a first measure in March 1946, Killearn organised a conference 
of food experts in South-East Asia, followed by a high-level conference 
of British representatives in the area. During these conferences initial 
plans were made to increase production, and to control the consumption 
of foodstuffs.(38) The two food conferences were succeeded by regular 
monthly meetings in Singapore attended by British as well as foreign 
representatives who were acting as liaison officers. By the beginning of 
1948, the membership of these so-called Monthly Liaison Officers' 
Meetings had grown significantly and Included representatives from 
Burma, Ceylon, the Federation of Malaya, Hong Kong, India, North Borneo, 
Sarawak, Singapore, Indonesia, Indochina and Thailand. There were also 
unofficial observers representing China, the Philippines and the United 
States.
In fact, KiHearn's Liaison Officers' Meetings soon became his 
chief international instrument in dealing with short-term food problems 
in South-East Asia. The meetings' main aim was to agree on the fair 
distribution of the available rice supplies in South East Asia allocated 
by the IEFC.: to ensure close collaboration, the IEFC in October 1946 
appointed a subcommittee in Singapore whose members regularly attended, 
and subsequently either endorsed or amended shipping programmes decided
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at the Special Commission*s regional meetings. Furthermore, in addition 
to rice distribution the Liaison Officers' Meetings would also discuss 
'every problem connected with food which might confront any of the 
territories at any time' . (39)
The main reason why non-British territories regularly sent 
delegates to Killearn's rice and food meetings was the simple fact that 
only the Special Commission's Economic Department, together with the 
Rice Committee in London, had the administrative machinery to prepare 
shipping and distribution programmes, and to implement them once they 
were agreed by the Liaison Officers Meetings and the IEFC sub-committee. 
The Special Commission's economic staff consisted of a large number of 
economic experts, and by the end of 1947 included a head of the 
department, who also advised Killearn on economic matters, an economic 
secretary, advisers on agriculture, fisheries, food, nutrition and 
statistics, three assistants dealing with cereals and rice, edible oils 
and coal, as well as shipping respectively, and a head of the Economic 
Intelligence Section. These officers were assisted by a large number of 
clerical staff.
To give an example of the work of the Special Commission's Economic 
Department, it was the job of the rice and cereals assistant to 
determine how far the rice available from South-East Asian sources in 
any given month would permit £to fulfil the allocations from these 
sources. If required, temporary switches from one territory to another 
to meet 'spot critical conditions' were then arranged by common 
agreement during the monthly Liaison Officers' Meetings which was
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virtually identical with the IEFC sub-Committee meeting immediately 
afterwards. After a programme had been agreed, the shipping assistant, 
another important expert, would ensure the programme's fulfilment, and 
he would circulate weekly situation reports to all those concerned. Coal 
was another area covered by the Special Commission's economic staff, 
which negotiated with the Indian government, the Supreme Allied 
Commander in Japan and, by liaison, with the London Coal Committee.(40)
In addition to the immediate problem of rice distribution, the 
Special Commission's Economic Department also tried to deal with the 
long-term task of increasing the food production in South-East Asia. 
Apart from encouraging the cultivation of rice fields, for example in 
traditional importing countries, a number of regional conferences were 
held in Singapore dealing with special subjects. These conferences, like 
the Liaison Officers' Meetings, were attended by representatives from 
British as well as foreign territories. The first such event was a 
nutrition Conference in May 1946 'to discuss ways and means of improving 
and supplementing the diet of the local populations on a scientific 
basis, and to prepare for assimilation of alternative foodstuffs in the 
event of a breakdown in rice supplies'. This was followed by the South- 
East Asia Fisheries Conference in January 1947 which had the object of 
increasing the yield of food from the sea. One administrative result of 
this meeting was the despatch of a fisheries officer from the United 
Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation to the Special Commission. 
Furthermore, in August 1947 a Social Velfare Conference was held 
followed by a Statistical Conference in January 1948.(41)
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Throughout Killearn's term in office, questions were asked about
the Special Commission's success in dealing with the rice crises in 
South-East Asia. In the Kalayan press, for example, the Special
Commission's activities were seldom mentioned except in moments of rice 
shortage, and then usually in accents less than kind. 'Killearn's Empty 
Talk Does Hot Help to Relieve Rice Shortage' was not an untypical 
headline, and only the Straits Times in Singapore would draw attention 
to the difficulties faced by the commission. (42) As Killearn wrote in 
his diary at the beginning of 1947, his commission had inevitably come 
in for many kicks over the food shortage, 'but there was a moment when 
some of the gutter press went well beyond their limits of decent 
criticism - the main offender was the editor of the notorious Singapore 
Free Press, a most objectionable little bounder'. While local papers 
were critical of the continuing shortage of food, Conservative HPs in 
London complained about the high costs of the Special Commission. Within 
months, the Special Commission had inflated itself from 20 to about 300 
staff, costing the British taxpayer over £ 150,000 per year. As will be
seen later on, the Special Commission's high maintenance costs convinced
Whitehall in April 1947 to merge the Special Commission with the 
Governor General's office by 1948.
Despite the criticism of continuing food shortages and of 
Killearn's extravagant set-up in Singapore, it seems that without the 
equal rice distribution ensured by the Special Commission the food 
situation in some parts of South-East Asia might have deteriorated 
towards the point of famine. According to Killearn's final report to the 
Foreign Office, at least, it was 'touch and go' throughout 1946 whether
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the small rations on which the populations in the deficit areas existed 
could be maintained. In October 1946, only 55 percent of the estimated 
available rice actually materialised. In 1947, the situation was never 
as critical, but rations in the recipient territories 'remained at a 
level scarcely high enough to avoid starvation and serious malnutrition 
for the poorer sections of the community who had not the means to buy 
extra rice in the black market'. Killearn thus concluded that on the 
economic side
'...the achievements of the Special Commission may be summed up 
in the statement that famine was averted and that most has 
been made of every means towards the production and
distribution of foodstuffs'.(43)
The Foreign Office generally accepted Killearn's conclusion.
Because of its key role in organising International action against 
the food crisis, the Special Commission soon moved into the centre of 
the Foreign Office's plans for regional cooperation. The Special 
Commission in fact constituted the first non-military regional
organisation in South-East Asia. Though the organisation was British 
funded and staffed, its Liaison Officers' Meetings under British
chairmanship provided for regional cooperation on the technical level.
To ensure harmony between the attending representatives, the meetings 
strictly avoided political issues. According to British diplomats, 
decisions were made unanimously and no voting was ever necessary.(44) 
However, both Killearn and the Foreign Office hoped that one day the 
organisation could be extended into a proper regional commission, 
providing for regional cooperation on economic as well as political and
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defence Issues under the leadership of Britain. As Killearn wrote in his
diary in January 1947, the system of monthly Liaison Officers' Meetings
was proving to be extremely valuable and had the advantage of 'setting
the example of how supplies of communal interest to the whole region can
profitably be handled'. He added:
'Vhat one hopes is gradually to proceed from subject to subject 
until all these adjacent territories form the habit of acting 
together to discuss and plan regarding their various problems 
of mutual interest. My deliberate intention is that gradually 
this system shall lead up into the realm of International 
politics, and from that into the most important sphere of all, 
namely regional defence.'(45)
From the outset, Killearn's regional ideas and initiatives had 
considerable impact on the Foreign Office. In April 1946, the Special 
Commissioner sent a telegram to London which reported on a meeting of 
British regional authorities following a food conference of British 
representatives. During the meeting, Killearn had stated that he 
regarded South-East Asia as an essential strategic bastion of the 
Commonwealth. Mountbatten had agreed, urging the necessity of 
coordinating thinking and action in terms of the area as a whole. The 
ensuing general discussion had furthermore emphasized the importance of 
carrying the Dutch, French and Thais along with the British. The hope of 
general collaboration with the United States had also been 
expressed.(46) Though Killearn's regional ideas were still in their 
infancy, his telegram indicated his interest in international action in 
South-East Asia. A few days after Killearn's message, the first 
Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Meeting since the end of the war began in 
London. Ernest Bevin used the occasion to bring the existence of the
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Special Commission to the attention of the attending delegates. He also 
linked it to the issue of South-East Asian defence.
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4. REGIONAL COOPERATION AND REGIONAL DEFENCE: THE
1946 COMMONWEALTH PRIME MINISTERS' MEETING:
4.1 SOUTH-EAST ASIA AND COMMONWEALTH DEFENCE
Prior to the announcement to the Cabinet that a rice crisis was 
imminent in South-East Asia, Ernest Bevin had played only a minor part 
in the promotion of the Foreign Office's regional plans. However, after 
securing the appointment of Lord Killearn as Special Commissioner, and 
following the latter's first conference of British officials in South- 
East Asia, the Foreign Secretary decided to take the regional issue one 
step further. During the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Meeting at the 
end of April 1946, he suggested to Australia and Mew Zealand using the 
Special Commission for South-East Asia's joint economic development. His 
offer, however, was vaguely worded and had not been cleared with the 
departments at Whitehall: it therefore appears that there was more to it 
than just economic cooperation. Though the relevant documents are not 
yet available, all evidence in fact suggests that Bevin's initiative was 
linked to plans for regional defence cooperation drafted by the British 
Chiefs of Staff (COS). Before examining the debate on regional 
cooperation during the Prime Ministers' Meeting, the issue of South-East 
Aslan defence therefore has to be further highlighted.
It will be recalled that immediately before the Japanese surrender 
the Chiefs of Staff had put on ice recommendations by the Post- 
Hostilities Planning Staff (PHP) for a world-wide network of regional
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defence systems against the Soviet Union. In the second half of 1945, 
however, Anglo-Soviet relations in Europe and the Kiddle East were 
worsening, inducing the COS to re-examine their world-wide defence 
strategies. The new analysis took into account Britain's dwindling 
financial resources and her shortage of manpower; it was concluded that 
the dominions would have to take a greater share in the defence of the 
empire.
In February 1946 the British military's new thinking was expressed 
in a Joint Planning Staff (JPS) contribution to an interdepartmental 
paper on British policy in the Far East. So far as South-East Asia was 
concerned, the paper effectively revived the analysis of the PHP that a 
direct threat to British interests in the region was most likely to come 
from the Soviet Union, with possibly China, Japan, or both under her 
control. The JPS paper therefore proposed the establishment of two 
defensive systems: The first would be a series of forward air and naval 
bases in the Pacific running from Hong Kong via Formosa, the 
Philippines, the Marshall and Midway Islands to the Aleutians. They 
would be held by Commonwealth countries and/or the United States. The 
second system would be in South-East Asia and the South Vest-Pacific. 
Here, Britain, Australia and New Zealand, in cooperation with France and 
the Netherlands, would maintain an alternative system of bases along a 
general line from Indochina, which had special Importance for the 
defence of South-East Asia, through Samoa, the Celebes, the Admiralty 
and Solomon Islands and Fiji.(1) The paper's main difference to the 
PHP's proposals from 1945 was the inclusion of Australia and New Zealand 
in the regional defence of South-East Asia.
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The strategic analysis of the JPS formed the background to 
proposals which the COS distributed to Commonwealth Prime Ministers 
immediately before the Commonwealth Meeting in April. One paper, titled 
* Strategic Position of the Commonwealth', argued that recent 
developments indicated that Russia was the most likely potential enemy 
of the British Commonwealth, far more dangerous than a revived Germany. 
She appeared to be extending her influence to further strategic areas by 
all means short of war. Should a conflict with Russia occur, American 
participation on Britain's side would be vital. Based on these 
assumptions, the Chiefs of Staff had worked out a global analysis of the 
Commonwealth's strategic position. It differentiated between four main 
'support areas' on which the security of the Commonwealth depended:
a) The United Kingdom,
b) The Forth and South American continent,
c) Africa south of the Sahara including East Africa and
d) Australia and Mew Zealand.
Whether India would remain a support area as in the last war was 
uncertain, nor was it clear whether she was to remain a single political 
unit or even a member of the Commonwealth. To ensure the security of the 
Commonwealth, the Chiefs of Staff argued that it was essential to have 
enough 'depth' in front of these four support areas before the start of 
a conflict, winning time for mobilisation and for American resources to 
be brought in. Furthermore, Russia had to be denied the acquisition in 
peacetime of large additional resources of man-power and war potential. 
Finally, as a deterrent to the Soviet Union, bases for long-range air 
attacks on Russia would have to be established. The paper concluded that 
the most important areas for the maintenance of strategic air bases and
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'defence in depth' were Western Europe and the Middle East, where 
Russian pressure was already evident. Next came India and South-East 
Asia, where Russian pressure could be expected.(2)
A further COS paper circulated before the beginning of the
conference went on to demand greater political and military
participation of the Commonwealth in the defence of these strategic
areas. It was argued that:
'As ranges of weapons and means of movement [develop], the 
maintenance of our position in the Mediterranean and Middle 
East becomes of more direct concern to South Africa, and that 
in South-East Asia to Australia and New Zealand'.
While in some areas political and economic action was required to 
prevent a potential enemy from gaining a dominating position, in others 
the actual presence of military forces would be necessary. As this 
principle developed, it seemed reasonable that other members besides the 
United Kingdom should contribute to the effort required to maintain 
positions in these areas. Concluding, the Chiefs of Staff demanded that 
each member of the Commonwealth should:
a) accept responsibility for the development of their main support 
area and the strategic Zone around it,
b) accept the principle of joint responsibility for the protection 
of lines of communication between main support areas and
c) agree that it is in their strategic interest to assist both 
politically and militarily in maintaining the position in those 
protective areas which directly affected the security of their 
territory and communications.(3)
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In short, South-East Asia was regarded as Australia's and New Zealand's 
protective area and as a main communication line for the Commonwealth. 
The two dominions were therefore asked to contribute to the region's 
defence.
4.2 BEVIN'S ECONOMIC BAIT
London must have been aware of the fact that both Australia and New 
Zealand would be reluctant to commit themselves to the defence of South- 
East Asia, not least because of the financial cost Involved. It 
therefore appears that Bevin, who as Foreign Secretary knew of the 
Chiefs of Staff's plans, decided to sweeten the bitter pill. In return 
for an antipodean defence commitment to South-East Asia, suggested by 
the COS, he offered Australia and New Zealand a greater share in the 
region's market. At the same time, the two dominions would be given a 
greater political say through the medium of the Special Commission.
Bevin launched his regional initiative in his introductory speech 
to the Prime Ministers' Meeting on 23 April 1946. He began by describing 
the 'rising tide of nationalism' as the dominant political factor in 
South-East Asia. As the people of the area were becoming better educated 
they realised the extent to which the Vest had in the past drawn from 
their resources which might have improved their own standards of living. 
However, Bevin postulated, the people of the British Commonwealth were 
now prepared to help the people of this area to develop their economy 
and raise their living standards. Later on in the meeting Bevin
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explained what he had in mind: South-East Asia had great resources while 
the general standard of living was low; the raising of this would be to 
everyone's benefit. Vith an eye on the delegations from Australia and 
New Zealand, Bevin stressed that many countries were concerned with this 
area, that there existed a 'vast and untapped' market and that a 
coordinated effort in this area would be to the 'common advantage'. 
Getting to the point, Bevin proposed that Singapore and the headquarters 
of Lord Killearn's organisation were the focus around which Britain, 
Australia, New Zealand and India could build up the development of the 
whole area. The new organisation, he hoped, would provide the meeting 
point for certain practical purposes, and could form a binding link 
between the different parts of the Empire. So far, Killearn's 
organisation was primarily concerned with food supplies, but further 
useful work could be done in the field of nutrition, broadcasting and 
publicity services as well as the coordination of shipping. Bevin 
therefore proposed that the opportunity should be taken to discuss fully 
the possibility of developing the new organisation.(4)
To determine the motives behind Bevin's speech, he should first of 
all be taken at face value. There is little doubt that Bevin was 
genuinely concerned about the low standard of living in South-East Asia, 
and that he was interested in a new relationship with South-East Asia's 
indigenous population.(5) One of the motives behind his speech was 
therefore unquestionably the hope of improving the regional standard of 
living through the provision of Australian consumer goods which Britain 
could not provide. On the other hand, circumstancial evidence suggests 
that Bevin was trying to lure Australia and New Zealand into a defence
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commitment to South-East Asia, by offering the two countries greater 
access to the region's markets (and implicitly raw materials), and a 
political say through the medium of the Special Commission. Though the 
relevant records are not available, there is little doubt that Bevin's 
proposals for economic cooperation were linked to the Chiefs of Staff's 
defence proposals which were to be discussed in an off-the-record 
meeting on the day of Bevin's speech. (6) Apparently, the economic 
advantages that Bevin's proposals might have given to Australia and New 
Zealand were intended to compensate for the two countries' expenditure 
emanating from an involvement in South-East Asian defence.
Bevin's initiative played on Australian economic ambitions in 
South-East Asia. Prior to the war, Australia for example had had
extensive tin mining interests in Thailand, but had been unable to
i
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resume them. (7) The Australian Foreign Minister, Dr.H.V.Evatt, welcomed 
Bevin*s emphasis on the need for better economic standards in South-East 
Asia, which he saw as important from the point of view of both security 
and welfare. He also saw great possibilities in the idea of closer 
association for regional purposes, and he suggested that in studying the 
subject earlier proposals made by Australia and New Zealand for the 
establishment of a regional commission in the Pacific should be 
included. Bevin agreed(8); the issue of regional cooperation in colonial 
areas was thus back on the international agenda.
However, while the Australians favoured Bevin's economic 
initiative, the two dominions flatly rejected the Chiefs of Staff's 
defence proposals. During the conference's fourth meeting the Australian
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Prime Minister J.B.Chi^fley stated that his country naturally accepted
primary responsibility for her own security and that she was willing to
make a greater contribution to the common defence of the British
Commonwealth than before the war. However:
'The proposal to extend her responsibility to include co­
ordination of defence measures throughout the strategic zone of 
which she was the centre would require a careful examination.
She might well find that it was beyond her capacity in men and 
financial resources. Mr. Chifley said that he must also make 
the fullest reservations in regard to proposals which implied 
that Australia should accept special responsibilities in South- 
East Asia.'(9)
Canberra was reluctant to become financially or politically 
involved in the defence of Britain's South-East Asian colonies. It 
disagreed with the British Chiefs of Staff's assessment of a worldwide 
Soviet threat (10), and refused to accept that South-East Asia was 
threatened from the outside. Chi^fley also suggested that he regarded 
the acceptance of the defence commitments demanded by the Chiefs of 
Staff as an impingement on the Commonwealth governments' 
sovereignty.(11) Attlee had not anticipated this response and showed 
himself 'struck' by Chi^fley's comment that strategic requirements must 
be considered in relation to man-power and financial resources. That 
certainly was the case with the United Kingdom as she had very heavy 
overseas commitments at the time which were a great strain on her 
resources. (12) Despite Attlee's protestations, however, the British 
defence initiative failed.
While the Australians refused to commit themselves to the defence 
of South-East Asia, they upheld their interest in Bevin's proposals for
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economic cooperation. On 27 April Chi circulated a memorandum which
suggested the immediate establishment of a South Seas Regional 
commission for the promotion of welfare and the advancement of native 
peoples in the Pacific area in cooperation with Great Britain, a 
proposal dating back to Australian and New Zealand initiatives in 1944.
that consideration had been given in the past to a South-East Asian 
commission, including Australia amd New Zealand as well as the United 
Kingdom, the United States, the Netherlands and other interested 
countries, which would give at least some attention to air 
communications and the allocation and disposal of vital raw materials 
besides the more strictly welfare aspects such as health, nutrition and 
social and political developments. (13) Though stopping short of 
demanding the creation of a South-East Asian regional organisation 
straight away, the Australians had called Bevin's bluff. As a result of
Asian regional cooperation more clearly. It also had to decide whether 
to agree with the proposal for a regional commission in the Pacific.
4,3 COMPROMISE AT WHITEHALL
Chi^fley's initiative presented Whitehall with some serious 
problems. For one, Bevin had failed to clear his initiative on regional 
cooperation with either the Foreign, Colonial or Dominions Office prior 
to the Prime Ministers' Meeting. As civilian departments the three 
offices were also unaware of the defence proposals by the Chiefs of
So far as South-East Asia was concerned, memorandum recalled
London was now forced to define its line on South-East
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Staff which had triggered Bevin's initiative. At the same time, Bevin 
was no longer available for consultation, as he had left London for the 
Council of Foreign Ministers in Paris after the opening of the Prime 
Ministers' Conference. The urgent question was now how to react to
comment on regional cooperation in expectation of a ministerial 
decision, there had been no further discussions on the subject at either 
the Cabinet or the interdepartmental level. A meeting between the three 
departments, attended also by representatives from the Burma Office and 
the Cabinet Office, was therefore hastily arranged after the Colonial 
Office received the minutes of the Prime Ministers' first session.(14)
Before the meeting, the head of the Foreign Office's South East 
Asia Department, Richard Allen, who appeared to be as surprised by 
Bevin's initiative as the Colonial Office, explained to the Colonial 
Office that his department was hoping to use Killearn's organisation as 
a centre for cooperation with the dominions. The best course would be to 
inform the dominion representatives of how Killearn's organisation was 
being developed and to what extent the dominions could usefully develop 
their own collaboration with it - over and above already existing 
cooperation.(15) The Colonial Office, however, did not share the Foreign 
Office's enthusiasm for cooperation through the Special Commission. It 
feared the Foreign Office was inclined to overlook the strong views of 
the dominions on the question of regional commissions and therefore 
underestimated the problems involved.(16)
paper. Since Killearn had been instructed in February to
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The Colonial Office's International Relations Department
subsequently drafted a departmental memorandum which defined the
Colonial Office's line on regional organisation in both South-East Asia
and the South-Vest Pacific. The paper agreed that Britain should
indicate her willingness in principle to establish a regional commission
in the South-Vest Pacific with advisory and consultative functions. So
far as South-East Asia was concerned, however, the memo's authors were
more cautious. Though acknowledging that there was 'a consensus of
opinion that some form of regional collaboration in economic and social
welfare matters is desirable in South-East Asia', the paper gave
priority to the recovery of the South-East Asian territories from the
effects of the Japanese occupation. Further difficult issues had arisen
through the clash between insurgent nationalism and the restoration of
the French and Dutch colonial systems, creating a delicate position for
some time to be. The memo therefore argued that:
'It is unlikely that in such a situation anything but harm 
would be done by the creation of an international body such as 
a Regional Commission1.
However, the paper added:
'The promotion of regional collaboration in this area should be 
recognised as an important eventual aim of British policy.'
For the time being, some specific ad hoc measures of cooperation should 
be developed by Killearn's organisation. If at a later stage it was 
decided to set up a regional commission, a considerable amount of expert 
technical advice would already have been provided under British 
auspices.
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Australian and New Zealand interests, the memo further argued, were 
not as direct in South-East Asia as in the South-Vest Pacific. However, 
the fall of Singapore in 1942 had increased their indirect interests in 
the region, and Australia had recently shown interest^ in the economy of 
Thailand. The two dominions should therefore be more closely associated 
with regional collaboration in South-East Asia, and the ongoing Prime 
Ministers' Meeting should consider the countries' closer association 
with Killearn's organisation. However, the memo insisted at the same 
time that it should not be Killearn's organisation which would 
eventually develop into a regional commission. The major interest of 
Britain in the Far East arose out of the British colonial dependencies 
which should not be 'sacrificed to diplomatic convenience'. It would 
therefore be more appropriate for any regional coordination in this area 
to fall within the scope of the Malayan Governor-General rather than of 
an additional special representative of the UK. Finally, the paper 
repeated the old warning of possible international supervision through 
regional commissions. For domestic reasons, the United States might well 
press for regional commissions to be established under the aegis of the 
United Nations and that they should report to it. This, the paper 
concluded, should clearly be avoided.(17)
Officials at the Colonial Office generally supported the 
memorandum's cautious support for regional collaboration at a future 
date. However, Paskin from the Eastern Department added that particular 
difficulties were bound to arise with Chinese minorities because of the 
likely inclusion of China in a South-East Asian regional commission. He 
also feared that the United States with her interests in Malayan rubber
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would demand to be represented, and he would be surprised If Russia 
didn't demand representation as well. Paskin and other officials also 
saw the Foreign Office's Special Commission as a threat, Paskln minuting 
that:
'One of the main problems facing the Colonial Office is that of 
taking whatever steps are now open to us to prevent the 
Special Commissioner arrogating to himself functions which 
should be more properly performed by the Governor General.'(18)
While the Colonial Office was thus gearing itself for a clash with 
the Foreign Office over regional cooperation, it turned out that a 
compromise could be found much more easily than expected. The 
interdepartmental meeting on 2 May approved of the suggested 
establishment of a regional commission in the South-Vest Pacific area. 
There was also consensus that in South-East Asia a regional commission 
could hardly be suitable for the time being in view of the abnormal and 
disturbed conditions there. Killearn's organisation, it was further 
agreed, could be seen as the first step towards the eventual 
constitution of a regional commission once South-East Asia had settled 
down to more peaceful and prosperous conditions. However, it was left 
open whether the Special Commissioner or the Governor-General would 
ultimately be Britain's representative on a regional commission. In the 
absence of the Foreign Secretary, a brief was drafted on the lines of 
the meeting's conclusions for the use of the Colonial Secretary during 
the Prime Ministers' Meeting.(19)
During the meeting, Allen failed to follow up Bevin's ambitious 
proposals to use the Special Commission for the joint economic
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development of South-East Asia. It seems that after the Australian 
refusal to contribute to the defence of South-East Asia Bevin had 
decided to withdraw his regional economic bait, and that he had 
instructed the Foreign Office accordingly. Allen was therefore satisfied 
with the Colonial Office's agreement that regional cooperation was 
desirable in principle, though at a later date. A further reason for the 
Foreign Office's reservation was that the Australian proposals now under 
consideration went much further than Bevin's suggestions, as they 
envisaged United States membership in a regional commission.
The Colonial Secretary, George Hall, clarified Britain's line 
during a Commonwealth meeting on 3 May. He stressed that he would be 
'extremely ready to see a regional commission established in the South 
Seas, and he suggested that the details should be discussed between the 
officials of the three Governments'. Other countries, such as the 
Netherlands and France might be invited to Join in at _a later date. 
However:
'Turning to South-East Asia, Mr .Hall said that he thought that 
it would certainly in the future be desirable to have a 
regional organisation of the same type there, but he doubted
whether the time was ripe for the formal constitution of such
a body at present, Civil government had only recently been 
resumed throughout the area and a great deal of reorganisation 
was required. Lord Killearn had been appointed recently as 
Special Commissioner for the area: his primary responsibility
at the moment would be in regard to food supplies, but his
organisation might provide the nucleus round which a more 
formal organisation could later develop. He thought that it 
would be very useful if the Australian and New Zealand 
Governments could attach liaison officers - either permanently 
or from time to time as occasion demanded - to Lord Killearn's 
staff, and he asked Dominion Ministers to consider this 
suggestion.'(20)
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The British had thus committed themselves to the establishment of a 
regional commission in the South-Vest Pacific. From the Colonial
Office's point of view, conditions for such a body were much more 
favourable in this area than in South-East Asia. All the territories in 
the South-Vest Pacific were governed by colonial powers, while the 
indigenous cultures were at a much lower level of political and economic 
development than those of South-East Asia. Regional cooperation would be 
limited to politically safe issues such as welfare or health, and there 
were no independence movements which might demand representation. 
Another factor influencing London's decision seems to have been an 
understanding between Britain, Australia and New Zealand on defence 
cooperation in the South-Vest Pacific. A few days before Hall's
statement, the three countries had agreed in principle on the 
establishment of regional arrangements for the maintenance of peace and 
security in the Pacific, possibly including the United States.(21) There 
is little doubt that progress towards Pacific defence cooperation 
induced Britain to accept the two dominions' demands for a regional 
commission in the South-Vest Pacific.
Evatt welcomed Hall's proposal. After further international
negotiations in the following months, Britain, Australia, New Zealand, 
France, the Netherlands and the United States agreed on 6 February 1947 
to establish the South Pacific Commission. The organisation was to be a 
consultative and advisory body affecting the economic and social 
development of colonial territories. It included a Research Council and 
a South Pacific Conference with an advisory council.(22)
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The conference's outcome for South-East Asia was less spectacular. 
Though Hall had endorsed the principle of regional cooperation in South- 
East Asia, he had refused to establish a regional commission in the near 
future. The conference's only visible achievement was the dispatch of an 
Australian liaison officer to the Special Commission in the following 
month. However, the new appointment overlapped with the work of the 
Australian (Trade) Commissioner in Singapore, Claude Massey, who was
already attending all important meetings convened by the Supreme
Commander or the Special Commissioner. (23) To put an end to the
confusion, it was subsequently decided that the new post would combine 
the functions of political adviser to the Australian Commissioner and of 
Special Liaison Officer with the Special Commissioner. (24) In September, 
following a stop-over by Evatt in Singapore, the Defence Committee in 
London furthermore agreed that the Australian Commissioner in Singapore 
would regularly be invited to the meetings of the British Defence
Committee in South-East Asia.(25)
Despite the conference'6 limited outcome on South-East Asia, the 
meetings had revealed Australian ambitions in the region. Though 
Canberra refused to commit itself militarily to what it considered the 
defence of British colonial interests, it nevertheless demanded a 
greater political and economic say in the area. London recognised this 
and agreed to step up low-level cooperation with the Australians in 
Singapore. At the same time, Hall had made it clear that Britain 
intended to remain in the forefront of South-East Asian regional 
development. If and when the time was ripe, London, not Canberra, would 
take the initiative towards a regional scheme in the area.
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However, the Australians weren't to be put off and they continued 
to manifest their interest in South-East Asian regional cooperation 
which had first come to the fore during the Prime Ministers' Meeting. In 
February 1947, for example, Evatt called for an international conference 
on South-East Asia in Canberra. Though his plans never materialized, 
partly because of British discouragement, Australian regional 
initiatives remained a thorn in the side of British diplomats, who were 
not prepared to let their antipodean junior partner assume the lead in 
South-East Asian regional developments.
In the sphere of South-East Asian defence cooperation as well the
Australians continued to be a problem for the British. The failure of
the British initiative during the 1946 Prime Minister^* Meeting 
demonstrated that despite the experience of the last war neither 
Australia nor New Zealand were prepared to commit themselves to South- 
East Asian defence. This was partly because they didn't regard the
Soviet Union as a potential aggressor in South-East Asia, and partly
e
because they feared a British impingment on their sovereignty and
A.
because of the burden on the Australian taxpayer. Despite Australia's 
reluctance, Britain continued to pressurize the two dominions into a 
regional defence commitment. Under the pressure of the Cold Var in 
South-East Asia, London eventually succeeded. At the end of 1948,
Britain, Australia and New Zealand secretly concluded the ANZAM treaty, 
an informal agreement which coordinated defence planning by the three 
countries in the South-East Asian area.(26)
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In addition to the conference's significance for Anglo-Australian 
relations in South-East Asia, the Prime Ministers' Meeting introduced a 
new theme to the Foreign Office's plans for regional cooperation. In his 
Introductory speech, Bevin had stated that nationalism was the single 
most important factor in Asia. More importantly, Whitehall agreed in the 
course of the conference to postpone plans for regional cooperation 
because of disturbances caused by the nationalist uprisings in Indonesia 
and Indochina. The conference in fact marked a turning point for the 
Foreign Office which in the future was to take the development towards 
Asian independence into account when drafting further plans for regional 
cooperation. Prior to the conference, the Foreign Office had been 
thinking in terms of cooperation primarily with the colonial powers, 
also involving outside powers like Australia and the United States. In 
the wake of the conference, and under the pressure of events in both 
South and South-East Asia, the Foreign Office was beginning to plan for 
regional cooperation in a postcolonial Asia.
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PART I I
NA T I O N A L I S M
The time-period between spring 1946 and February 1947 was in many 
ways a key date for the development of British policies in Asia. It was 
then that London was coming to feel the full force of the nationalist 
movements in both South and South-East Asia. While in the immediate 
post-war period Indonesia and Indochina had presented the greatest 
problems, Britain was now feeling the pinch in her own territories as 
well. The second part of this thesis will show how growing Asian 
nationalism and the trend towards national independence changed the 
concepts underlying the Foreign Office's policy of regional cooperation. 
It also shows how the outbreak of war in Indochina served as a catalyst 
for the re-definition of London's regional policies in South-East Asia.
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5. FO R E I G N  O FFICE R E A S S E S S M E N T S  OF R E G I O N A L  
C O O P E R A T I O N
5.1 ASIA'S NEW POLITICAL SPIRIT;
THE CASES OF BURMA # MALAYA AND INDIA
Several months before the British arrival in Indonesia and 
Indochina in 1945, Britain had in Burma first encountered Asia's new 
nationalist spirit. During the period of military administration, 
Mountbatten had been able to compromise with Aung San, the most 
prominent nationalist leader in Burma, who commanded great popular 
support because of his role in the defeat of Japan. However, after the 
return to civilian rule in October 1945 Anglo-Burmese relations 
deteriorated rapidly. The new British governor of Burma, Reginald 
Dorman-Smith, insisted that prior to self-government there would be a 
transitional period during which he would have sweeping emergency 
powers. An executive council including Burmese membership would have 
advisory functions only. Aung San and other Burmese nationalist leaders 
within the Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League (AFPFL) opposed the 
plan, arguing that a transitional period would allow British business to 
regain its dominant position in the country and thus slow down Burma's 
development towards independence.
The subsequent failure to include the AFPFL in the executive 
council resulted in mass demsontrations against the government in 
January 1946. In the following months the situation further
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deteriorated. There were clashes between the police and remnants of the 
Burmese guerilla forces, while Burma's economic situation declined. Vhen 
the situation threatened to get out of hand, London intervened, and 
Dorman-Smith was recalled on 14 June. After further strikes in 
September, the new British governor, Sir Hubert Ranee, decided to
appoint five AFPFL/to important posts in the executive council which was 
also given enlarged powers. Aung San was appointed as the council's vice
Attlee announced on 20 December 1946 that he would enter into 
constitutional talks with a Burmese delegation in London. Attlee agreed 
that Burma would be given independence within the next year. In the 
event, power was transferred in January 1948. (1)
In Britain's other main South-East Asian possession, Malaya, the 
British were also encountering resistance to their postwar policies. 
Though there existed no indigenous movement towards national 
independence, opposition developed within the Malay community against 
the Malayan Union scheme. In October 1945, the Colonial Office had sent 
Harold MacMichael to renegotiate the prewar treaties with the Malay 
rulers. Unprepared, and fearing that their often collaborationist role 
during the Japanese occupation might come under scrutiny, they all 
signed the papers presented to them. However, after details of the 
planned Malayan Union were released in a British Vhite Paper, a storm 
broke loose. In the spring of 1946, the once politically apathetic Malay 
community organised protests against the new scheme. Their main 
criticism was the proposed Malayan citizenship which would grant equal 
political rights to Malaya's Chinese, Indian and Malay communities. The
rs
president. After further Burmese pressure and demands for
-  131 -
Malays feared an erosion of their political privileges, previously 
guaranteed by Britain, in favour of the economically dominant Chinese. 
Malay protests culminated in a boycott by the Malay leaders of Sir 
Edward Gent's inauguration ceremony as Governor of the Malayan Union on 
1 April, and of MacDonald's appointment as Governor-General for 
Singapore, Malaya and the British territories in Borneo on 22 May 1946. 
In the meantime, Malay opposition was organised in a political party, 
the United Malay National Organisation (UMNO) under the leadership of 
Dato Onn bin Ja'afar. The party demanded the annulment of the MacMichael 
treaties and the replacement of the Malayan Union by a federal 
constitution.(2)
The culmination of protests against the Malayan Union and demands 
for Burmese independence coincided with crucial Anglo-Indian 
negotiations on Indian self-government and eventual independence. After 
the 'Quit India' campaign of the Hindu dominated Indian National 
Congress during the war, the new British Labour government lacked the 
stomach to put up with a new civil disobedience campaign on the 
subcontinent. (3) It was also morally committed to Indian 
independence(4), albeit within the Commonwealth and with strong economic 
an^d military ties to Britain. (5) Between February and June 1946 a 
British Cabinet mission was sent to India to find a constitutional 
formula which would satisfy Hindu and Muslim leaders as well as Britain. 
No agreement could be found; the leader of the Indian Muslim League, 
Mohammad All Jinnah, insisted on the territorial integrity of a planned 
Muslim dominated Pakistan, while the Congress insisted on an all-Indian 
government.
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In the end, the Cabinet mission put forward its own complicated 
proposals for a three-tier government of a Union of India. After initial 
opposition by both Congress and Muslim League, the proposal led to the 
creation of the Hindu-dominated Indian Interim Government on 2 September 
1946, under the premiership of Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru. The Muslim 
League maintained its oppos[tion, and its 'day of direct action' 
triggered gruesome communal killings in Calcutta in the middle of 
August. A chain of further communal killings followed in the next year 
throughout the country. By October 1946, the Cabinet's India Committee 
was considering an early withdrawal, and in December Attlee was thinking 
of appointing Lord Louis Mountbatten as viceroy to negotiate the 
transfer of power. (6) On 20 February 1947, Attlee announced Britain's 
intention to withdraw from India within the next 18 months. In the 
event, power was transferred to India and Pakistan in August 1947.
5.2 INDIA AND BRITISH PLANNING FOR SOUTH-EAST ASIA.
Events in India and Burma had a considerable impact on the Foreign 
Office's plans for regional cooperation. During and immediately after 
the war British regional plans had been based on cooperation primarily 
with France, the Netherlands, Thailand, Australia and possibly the 
United States. The increasing prospect of Indian and Burmese self- 
government if not independence in 1946 now raised the question of 
whether the two countries should also be included in a South-East Asian 
regional scheme. There was the further question of whether Asian 
membership could be aligned with that of France and the Netherlands.
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The question of India's participation In South-East Asian regional 
developments was raised by J.P.Stent, a Foreign Office official and 
former civil servant in India, who was inspired by Killearn's report on 
the recent conference of British officials in the Far East. In a paper 
titled 'The Forthcoming Situation in Asia' Stent described India as 
'the key to the whole situation in the Far East'. In the course of the 
next few months, he predicted, India would be offered independent self- 
government, within or outside the Commonwealth, after which it would be 
impossible to resist demands for a similar status in Burma and Ceylon. 
Once all three had become independent, he could not see how the French 
and Dutch governments would resist similar demands from Indonesia and 
Indochina, while Britain would be pressed to give greater independence 
to the Malayan Union. The United States, Stent added, were already
pledged to give independence to the Philippines in 1946, and he 
predicted that it would be in the next twelve to eighteen months that 
Eastern Asia would cease to be a vast area of colonial territories. The 
new states would demand admittance to the United Nations where, in 
taking concerted action, they would have a considerable voice: taken as 
a whole, he pointed out, the Asian countries possessed some of the 
world's most important supplies of raw materials and a considerable 
industrial potential while providing an enormous market for the goods 
produced by Western industry. At the same time, Stent warned that the 
Soviet Union would not be slow to exploit the situation in her own 
interest. Everything would therefore have to be done to keep India
within the Commonwealth and the Western democratic system. The smaller
states were likely to follow her lead.
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However, Stent feared that Indian sentiments might be hostile to
the British connection. Vhat was needed, Stent therefore argued, was a
British 'overture of friendly cooperation on a basis of equality'. There
was an 'urgent need for a greater measure of coordination and
interchange of views on foreign policy not only among the countries of
South East Asia but between them and India as well'. As a first measure,
it was vital for Britain to increase the coordination of her policies in
Asia. In the past, he criticized, the Colonial Office had pursued its
proposals without reference to what was happening in India, while the
Foreign Office had little knowledge of what was going on either in India
or the Colonies. Vould it not be possible to hold regular conferences on
Killearn's excellent initiative and include in them representatives of
India, Hong Kong and perhaps our representatives from China, Stent
asked. Eventually, Stent expected 'the logic of geography and common
interest' would lead to some sort of close association between India,
Burma, Ceylon, Malaya, Indonesia' and probably Indochina. For the time
being, however, Stent believed that the future of half the world's
population depended on the way that Britain played her cards:
'Vith India and South East Asia securely within the sphere of 
influence of the British Commonwealth and the U.S.A. communism 
on the Russian pattern is much less likely to make headway in 
the Far East proper. If India and South East Asia are 
completely cut off from their Western protectors they will be 
an easy prey to the spread of totalitarian democracy on the 
Russian model'. (7)
Stent's vision of rapid decolonisation in Asia and his assessment 
of India's future role in South-East Asia made a considerable impression 
at Whitehall. At the Foreign Office, Allen found little to disagree with 
in Stent's memorandum, regarding it as an excellent summary of the
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'present Immensely Interesting possibilities in India and South East
Asia'. He even suggested printing the paper and sending it to British
colonial and diplomatic authorities in the Far East. Allen added that
Stent had made it clear that India was the key to the whole situation in
southern Asia and that its eventual independence would accelerate the
independence or dominion status of Burma and Ceylon, as well as the
setting up of more or less independent states in Indonesia, Indochina,
the Philippines and Korea. India would be the leading partner in this
new group (of independent Asian states), and her post-independence
course was therefore of capital importance. Allen could 'warmly endorse
all that is said about the importance of coordination between these
territories, where there was a complete lack of it before'. Furthermore:
'As regards some closer association between India, Burma, 
Ceylon, Malaya, Indonesia and Indo-China, which Mr. Stent also 
favours, we have in a sense already advanced a step along this 
path...the Colonial Secretary stated at the Meeting of Prime 
Ministers on May 3rd that it would certainly be desirable in 
the future to have a Regional Commission in South East Asia 
(i.e. in the countries at present covered by Lord -Killearn 
which do not include India) and, while it was doubtful whether 
the time was ripe for such a body...Killearn's organisation
might provide the nucleus from which this more formal 
organisation might develop later. One of the important truths 
which emerges from Mr. Stent's memorandum is that any such
Regional Commission would be meaningless unless it included 
representatives of an independent India*.(8)
Other Foreign Office officials were equally sympathetic. V.J.Hasler 
saw 'a good deal of meat' in Stent's memorandum. It could probably help 
the 'process of education' in the other departments, and it was on the 
same lines that the Foreign Secretary was thinking on. (9) Indeed, Bevin 
told the British ambassador in China, R.S.Stevenson, in June that so far 
as foreign affairs were concerned he did not wish to deal with the Asian
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countries one by one; their interests were so closely bound that it was 
essential to treat the area as a whole in formulating British policy. 
Eventually, the Special Commissioner's coordinating functions should 
embrace the whole of the Far East, including China and India. Bevin also 
had in mind the appointment at a later date of a Minister of State or 
similar official who could undertake these wider powers and advise the 
government on general policy in that part of the world.(10)
However, Hasler's idea of educating the other departments at 
Whitehall proved difficult. At the Colonial Office, only one official, 
J.S.Bennett (not to be confused with Sterndale Bennett who was no longer 
with the Foreign Office's Far Eastern department), agreed with Stent, 
pointing out that a good deal of what Stent was saying had already been 
accepted as doctrine. A reply should therefore be sent to the Foreign 
Office appreciating the influence that post-Independence India was 
likely to play in South-East Asia. Bennett added that, for the relative 
weakness of France and Holland, Britain might well find herself in a few 
years the only colonial administration in South East Asia. Indonesia and 
Vietnam were 'moving rapidly towards independence or at least 
substantial autonomy within larger units. Independence in the British 
territories is still envisaged only as a distant goal'. The Colonial 
Office should therefore express full agreement with the principle of 
regional coordination, both on the spot and in London.(11)
Bennett was apparently unaware of the recent debates between the 
Colonial Office and Foreign Office on both international regional 
cooperation and on coordination between the British authorities in
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South-East Asia. Contrary to Stent, H.T.Bourdillon could 'not find much
value in Mr. Stent's memorandum', arguing that political coordination
was fully sufficient, both in London and in the Far East. Bourdillon
complained that Stent
'...contends that we require a regional organisation which will 
co-ordinate British policy throughout the East including India 
(not to mention China). This, surely, is regionalism gone mad.
A regional approach to the problems of an area is an excellent 
and necessary thing when the parts of an area are sufficiently 
closelv connected, geographically, politically and 
economjjmically... South East Asia, taken by itself, is such an 
area-.Tsut the area which Mr. Stent has in mind (and which 
includes, on his own admission, half the population of the
world) is hopelessly vast for this kind of treatment'.
Bourdillon therefore suggested sending a brief reply to the Foreign
Office which explained that colonial policy in the Far East had always
been the subject of close consultation, and that any wider attempt at
*
coordination was bound to break down.(12) Bourdillon's line found the 
sujjort of all other colonial Officials who were commenting on Stent's 
memorandum. (13)
in the run-up to the Special Commission, the Colonial Office
was unwilling to give way on the issue of political coordination - . .
Sihff i j
perhaps suspecting a sinister Foreign Office plot to assume itsy^for 
Britain's Far Eastern territories.(14) On regional cooperation as well, 
the Colonial Office was not prepared to be drawn into what looked like a 
Foreign Office experiment. As Bourdillon stated in a draft reply to the 
Foreign Office, Stent's views on regional organisation were too 
ambitious, since the inclusion of India, China and South-East Asia in 
one region seemed scarcely practical. Bourdillon did accept, however,
-  138 -
that South-East Asia proper was an area which could ultimately benefit 
from regional treatment. However, though India, Burma and possibly
Australia would have representatives on a regional organisation, they 
would not be considered to be part of the area itself. For the time 
being, the draft letter concluded, the formation of a regional body 
would have to await the stabilization of conditions in the Dutch and 
French territories before it could usefully carry out its work in the 
field of agriculture, health, veterinary, science and the like.(15) In 
the event, the Colonial Office never despatched its reply since the 
Foreign Office failed to press the issue.
The Colonial Office minutes showed that the department's scepticism 
about the Foreign Office's regional plans remained unchanged. It was 
also reluctant to involve India in the affairs of South-East Asia.
J. S.Bennett alone continued to favour the Foreign Office's regional ideas. 
It seems that it was only at his instigation that the Colonial Office 
agreed during a meeting of the Far Eastern Official Committee in August 
that Killearn should be allowed to convene regular conferences in
Singapore, to which representatives from foreign territories could be 
invited too.(16)
The India Office was also critical of Stent's regional ideas, 
though approaching the issue from a different angle than the Colonial 
Office. As E.P.Donaldson pointed out, Stent seemed to discuss the
situation from the standpoint of an Indian government that was rather 
more receptive to overtures from the British government than was likely 
to be the case. Nehru had for some time entertained the idea of holding
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in India a 'Pan-Asiatic Conference', to which representatives from 
nationalist movements in Burma, Malaya, Indochina and Indonesia would be 
invited in order to condemn Vestern imperialism, while demonstrating the 
solidarity of Asians in working towards immediate independence under 
Indian leadership. Donaldson therefore doubted whether the Indian 
leadership would respond to Britain offering them a share in the 
coordinating machinery represented by Killearn's organisation at 
Singapore, viewing such an attempt to bring India within the orbit of 
Commonwealth policy with suspicion. He also doubted whether the fear of 
communism on the Russian pattern would outweigh emotional sympathy with 
fellow Asians who were seen to be 'struggling to free themselves' from 
European tutelage. Instead, Donaldson concluded, Britain should appeal 
to the self-interest of the new India by offering her to be brought into 
a regional defence system in South-East Asia, including the United 
States and Great Britain, which would assure the Indian government of 
security against maritime aggression in the Bay of Bengal.(17)
After the interdepartmental compromise during the Prime Ministers' 
Meeting, Stent's memorandum thus invoked new disagreement on the issue 
of regional cooperation. While the Foreign Office strongly believed in 
linking an autonomous or even independent India to the Special 
Commission and including the country in Britain's long term regional 
plans, the Colonial Office wanted to prevent India from meddling in 
South-East Asian affairs. The India Office, on the other hand, expected 
that the Indian nationalist leaders would in any case refuse to be drawn 
into a British regional scheme in South-East Asia. In addition, a number 
of questions remained unanswered. Though the departments agreed on the
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principle of regional cooperation, the timing of a British initiative 
was still undecided. Another open question was which of the countries 
inside South-East Asia would eventually be included. In particular, how 
would the two other colonial powers fit into a regional scheme that 
included newly independent countries?
5.3 LORD KILLEARN'S REGIONAL PLANS
While Whitehall was discussing India's future role in South-East 
Asian regional politics, Lord Killearn in Singapore was beginning to 
develop his own ideas on regional cooperation. Like some Foreign Office 
officials in London, Killearn saw a link between the coordination of 
British policies in South-East Asia and a wider regional scheme 
involving also foreign territories. In this he found the support of 
Mount batten. During a private talk in May, for example, both men were 
worried lest 'Colonial Office mentality should once more come to 
dominate in this vitally important area'.(18) As Killearn told the new 
Malayan Governor-General, Malcolm MacDonald, upon his arrival in 
Singapore on 21 May, South-East Asia's foreign, colonial and strategic 
affairs were closely linked. Britain's problems in the area should 
therefore be solved on a unified basis. Killearn subsequently noted in 
his diary :
'God forbid that we should drop back into our pre-war mistakes 
and especially into the parochial mood in which matters had 
been handled in those days'. (19)
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Killearn also strongly believed in greater international
cooperation in South-East and East Asia. During a visit to Bangkok at
the end of April, for example, Killearn told the Thai Prime Minister
Pridi Phanomyong how the whole of South-East Asia should be 'some sort
of bastion of civilisation':
'I told him [Pridi] how, after the April Food Conference, we had 
talks with the Governors of the surrounding areas, and also 
with our people from French Indochina and the Dutch East 
Indies. It seemed to me vitally important that some form of 
political consolidation, of course nothing to do with 
territorial questions, should be set in train. ... He said that 
he entirely agreed and would be more than ready to play 
up.'(20)
Killearn also mentioned his ideas to a Dutch official, Van Byland,
telling him in June that he had in mind
'...something really big and constructive in regard to South 
East Asia. He (Van By land) only had to look at the map to see 
what I meant...there was the whole stretch of South-East Asia 
territories strung out in a circle from Siam through Burma,
French Indochina, Malaya and Dutch East Indies right up to and 
including jthe Philippines. I did not pretend to have 
crystallized my thought...but daily it seemed clearer to me that 
something really big would come of it to be set in train by 
the building up of all areas to form a valuable part of a new 
scheme of world security.'
Killearn admitted that all this was still quite vague in his mind - it 
was his personal idea and he did not know how it would strike London. 
But he hoped that the Dutch and the Indonesians would end their 
difficulties, because the Dutch East Indies would have to play an 
important part in this constructive work lying ahead.(21)
Killearn's ideas for regional cooperation also included outside 
powers interested in South-East Asia. During a visit to China at the
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beginning of June, Killearn told Chiang Kai Shek of hie 'pet idea of a
bastion of stability in South-East Asia and, God willing, in the Far
East'.(22) After his return to Singapore, the Special Commissioner also
told two (reportedly unappreciative) Australian visitors to Singapore,
Senator Grant and the newspaper magnate Sir Keith Murdoch, that
Australia would have to play a much more important role in the area -
regarding foodstuffs as well as the political and defence spheres. The
Australian Commissioner in Singapore, Claude Massey, was more receptive.
During a discussion on 18 July, for example, Killearn spoke of 'the big
idea, getting all the interested regions here jointly into consultation,
with a view to a discussion of the future world lay-out.' Killearn also
explained that he had to proceed somewhat delicately, as he had to be
careful not to 'tramp on people's toes or to rouse foreign suspicion'.
However, Killearn was optimistic that
'... by persistently sowing seeds here and there, we should 
slowly but gradually achieve some progress. The idea of course 
was that sooner or later we should all meet here in Singapore, 
to discuss our mutual problems, including representatives from 
French Indochina and the Dutch East Indies. Also quite possibly 
America, owing to her special status in the Philippines. Massey 
said he was well aware of this scheme, of which he personally 
approved most heartily. But he agreed that it was a matter 
that must be approached most delicately.(23)
Killearn also tried to win over Whitehall for his ideas. On 17 June 
he telexed his 'Survey of co-ordination within the territories of South 
East Asia' to London which had the backing of Mountbatten and MacDonald. 
To begin with, Killearn argued that South-East Asia would 'continue to 
be a bastion of vital political, strategic and economic importance to 
the British Commonwealth' . Thailand, France and the Netherlands had 
territorial stakes in the area, while Australia, New Zealand and India
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were interested neighbours. Furthermore, China and the United States 
were intimately concerned, and the Soviet Union might become active 
within the area in the future. The area was facing a number of potential 
threats, such as the collapse of law and order, the troubles in 
Indonesia and difficulties with nationalist movements as well the ethnic 
Chinese living there. Even if none of these contingencies arose, 
Killearn recommended a coordinated approach to the area's problems. Vhat 
happened in one part of the area was of interest to all other parts, and 
a 'reversion to the pre-war system of handling these problems in water­
tight compartments and penny packets would be a fatal step'. Killearn 
therefore suggested closest cooperation between the Governor-General, 
Malaya, the Special Commissioner and the Supreme Allied Commander. In 
addition, a Defence Committee should be set up that comprised these 
three top British authorities in South-East Asia and which could 
occasionally be attended by local British governors, by the service 
chiefs and by representatives from the dominions as well as foreign 
countries. Furthermore:
'In matters of Colonial Administration co-operation should be 
encouraged between Great Britain and other colonial Powers in 
the Far East, and, for this purpose, the Governor-General will, 
by arrangements with and through the Special Commissioner, 
keep in touch with the principal administrative authorities in 
the foreign territories concerned.'
Finally, Killearn suggested that periodical meetings be held under the 
Special Commissioner's chairmanship which would discuss problems of 
mutual concern. These meetings might also be attended by British 
representatives in foreign territories or by foreign representatives 
themselves.(24) As a result of his telegram, London subsequently gave
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Killearn the green light to conduct his international Liaison Officers' 
Meetings on food. (See previous chapter on the work of the Special 
Commission).
Killearn, unaware of the debate that the Stent memorandum had
sparked off in London, had based his survey on the. traditional concept
of colonial cooperation in South-East Asia. When two months later a
French official, M.Clarac, for the first time attended a Liaison
Officers' Meetings, Killearn used the opportunity to test French
willingness for greater local cooperation. According to a subsequent
report to the Foreign Office, Killearn privately otlined his idea of
building up empirically 'a close liaison, working and planning together
step by step as opportunity offered'. (25) In his diary Killearn further
noted that he explained to Clarac his
'... dream of fuller consultation and cooperation to our mutual 
advantage amongst all regional authorities within the South 
East Asia area. This of course must essentially include French 
Indochina. Then of course there was the perpetual problem of 
the present disorder in the Netherlands East Indies. Our 
preoccupation ... was not solely the general desire to see law 
and order reestablished but also from the wider and higher 
angle to have a peaceful area which must so essentially fall 
within any big scheme of regional coordination.'(26)
Clarac seemed to be receptive, and Killearn later on reflected:'
I feel that this talk with Clarac should be very useful, and I 
was particularly pleased to be able to sell my idea of a 
regional collaboration and consultation. I never miss a chance 
of trying to sow the seeds of that long-term dream,'(27)
Killearn's talk with Clarac soon showed some unexpected results. 
Apparently, Clarac reported his conversation with Killearn on the
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latter's 'grand scheme of local coordination, consultation and all the 
rest of it' to the French French High Commissioner in Indochina, Admiral 
Thierry D'Argenlieu, who then informed Paris. One week later the Special 
Commissioner was invited to visit Saigon for a meeting with 
D'Argenlieu.(28) Though Killearn was prevented from travelling because 
of a foot injury, his deputy Michael Wright visited Saigon between 4 and 
6 September 1946 for talks with the French officials. The visit stood at 
the outset of a series of high-level talks on Anglo-French cooperation 
in South-East Asia. Initially, the Foreign Office favoured a 
strengthening of relations between the two countries in South-East Asia. 
However, as the next chapter will show, London soon realised that open 
collaboration with the French in Indochina conflicted with its interest 
in cooperation with an independent India.
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6. C O L O N I A L  C O O P E R A T I O N  PUT TO THE TEST; 
THE CASE OF INDOCHINA
6,1 FRENCH OVERTURES, SEPTEMBER - NOVEMBER 1946
When Michael Vright visited Saigon at the beginning of September 
1 9 4 ^  he found the French authorities in an 'extremely friendly and co­
operative frame of mind' . According to Vright, they felt they owed 
largely to Britain the initial re-establishment of their position in 
Indochina and fully realised the interdependence of British and French 
interests in South-East Asia and elsewhere.(1)
Both Vright and the Foreign Office were in fact unaware that following 
General Gracey's key role in re-establishing French power in Indochina 
after the war, Britain continued to sustain the French position in 
South-East Asia through large-scale arms deliveries. Following a secret 
agreement between Paris and the British Admiralty, British ships were 
providing logistic support for French supplies to Indochina. The 
agreement was crucial for the continuing flow of French arms and 
equipment to Indochina, particularly as there existed a worldwide 
scarcity of shipping space. In addition to providing transport 
facilities, the Admiralty was furthermore involved in the covert sale of 
ammunition for French warships of British origin used in South-East 
Asia. (2) This was apparently in line with a British agreement from 
September 1945 to arm and equip a French Far Eastern force. (3) Though 
London never disclosed the exact amount of arms and ammunition supplied
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to French forces in Indochina, Bevin admitted to Parliament in February 
1947 that British forces in Indochina had handed over a certain amount 
of war material when they were being replaced by French forces a few 
months after the war.(4) One month later, the Minister of State at the 
Foreign Office, Hector McNeil, would not completely deny a report by the 
French news agency, Agence France Press^  that Britain had in the past 16 
months sent £ 17,5 million worth of military equipment directly to
French forces in Indochina.(5)
Despite this, the French had since Gracey's departure shown little 
enthusiasm for cooperation with the local British authorities in South- 
East Asia. So far as trade was concerned, the French administration in 
Indochina soon resumed its pre-war habit of discriminating against 
foreign banks and enterprises. A Foreign Office memorandum pointed out 
in January 1947 that despite reports of a new pro-British mood in Saigon 
and Paris resulting from the 'the tactful way in which the situation in 
Southern Indo-China was handled (under the able leadership of General 
Gracey)', it did not appear that 'the French authorities contemplate 
throwing open the Indo-Chinese market to foreign trade at the present 
moment' .(6) Originally, Saigon had been equally difficult about 
cooperation in fighting the rice crisis. As Killearn reported to the 
Foreign Office in October 1946, Indochinese rice exports were essential 
to overcome the food shortage in South-East Asia. However, French 
administrators were initially highly suspicious of the Special 
Commission and of the International Emergency Food Council in Washington 
(formerly Combined Food Boards) behind it and in July 1946 had 
completely dried up rice supplies from Indochina - at a time when the
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food situation in South-East Asia was particularly serious because of 
difficulties in procuring rice from South America and China. Killearn 
later on concluded that the French had been stubborn and had not 
received any instructions from Paris.(7)
However, Wright's visit improved relations between Singapore and 
Saigon. During a meeting with Admiral d'Argenlieu amd Clarac, Wright 
stressed the need for improved cooperation between the neighbourly and 
friendly countries in South-East Asia: a beginning had already been made 
through the monthly meetings of food liaison officers. The political and 
economic states of affairs in Malaya and French Indochina interreacted, 
and their security was linked. Though it might be too ambitious to 
consider regional defence in the full sense of the word, a common 
approach with France towards security and other problems was desired - 
there was for example the Important question of the common use of 
airfields. Rather than coming to formal agreements, Wright suggested to 
•proceed empirically', as Killearn liked to put it, and to 'build up 
prospects of working and planning together step by step as opportunity 
offered'.(8)
D'Argenlieu agreed to the empirical approach to cooperation between 
the British and French authorities. He would continue sending 
representatives to the monthly liaison meetings and further hoped to 
discuss cooperation on information and publicity matters. He also agreed 
to the importance of the common use of airfields, and was prepared to go 
as far as the British wished in cooperating with their defence 
committee. In defence and other matters, he pointed out, while at some
-  150 -
stage it might be desirable to set up some formal regional machinery 
under the UN, progress could meanwhile be made on an informal basis. He 
would be responsive to any British suggestions. When Vright mentioned 
that the shortage of rice had reached a point where labour and civil 
unrest was in the offing, d'Argenlieu suggested further talks between 
experts. He appreciated the impact of famine on the political situation: 
communism was after all the greatest danger, and failure to improve 
material conditions would play straight into the hands of the 
communists.(9) As a sign of French good will d'Argenlieu subsequently 
sent 8000 tons of emergency rice deliveries to Singapore.(10)
Killearn was extremely pleased with Vright's visit, as he believed
that cooperation with France should be at the heart of Britain's
regional policies. He had his doubts though about the Dutch, and he told
the Foreign Office in October:
'It is difficult to avoid comparisons between our sister 
colonial Powers in South-East Asia; the difference in quality 
of men of breadth of outlook, and in attitude towards
ourselves, between the French and the Dutch is very striking,
Mr .Vright spoke in Saigon of our common interests with French 
Indo-China, political, economic, defence and strategic; and 
propounded the doctrine which I had instilled into M.Clarac 
when he visited Singapore in August of building up empirically 
a close liaison, working and planning together step by step as 
opportunity offered. Admiral d'Argenlieu said he fully and 
emphatically agreed with this view, and wished to take steps 
at once. (11)
The question arises as to the reasons for the cooperative mood of 
the French authorities in Indochina. There are two plausible 
explanations. For one, it seems that the French were hoping for British 
support in regaining territories in the west of Cambodia and Laos that
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In 1941 they had lost to Thailand by Japanese award. The second and more 
important factor seems to have been the deteriorating internal situation 
in Indochina. During the Chinese occupation, the communist dominated 
Viet Minh had consolidated its power in the north of Vietnam and had 
gained control of the government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam 
(DRV). However, in March 1946 French troops had started to arrive in 
Haiphong under an agreement with the Chinese, the last Chinese troops 
leaving the country in June. To avoid war between French and Viet Minh 
forces at a time when neither side was fully prepared, a compromise 
agreement had been reached on 6 March. Under the terms of the Ho-, 
Sainteny agreement France formally recognised the DRV as a free state 
with its own government, parliament, army and finances, yet as part of 
the Indochinese Federation and within the French Union. The Vietnamese 
in return accepted the stationing of French garrisons in the northern 
province of Tonkin.
However, in the following months fundamental differences over the 
status of the DRV had come to the surface, as France merely intended to 
rule with native support rather than cede any real autonomy to the 
nationalists.(12) A second problem was the status of Cochin-China in the 
south which the Viet Minh insisted belonged to Vietnam but which 
d'Argenlieu, who was opposed to the March agreement, had in June 
unilaterally declared a free state. Subsequent French-Vietnamese talks 
in Fontainebleau near Paris failed to find a compromise on either the 
issue of Vietnamese sovereignty or on the status of Cochin-China. After 
the departure of the Vietnamese delegation only a modus vivendi was 
signed between the French Overseas Minister, Marios Moutet, and the
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Vietnamese leader Ho Chi Minh, on an Indochinese monetary and customs 
union.(13)
There is little doubt that the main reason for Saigon's overtures
to Singapore at the end of August was the hope of securing Britain's
diplomatic and possibly even military support in the event of a showdown
with the Viet Minh. For both the French and the Viet Minh were
effectively preparing for war - despite the negotiations in France. By
the end of 1946 the Viet Minh had an estimated 100,000 men and women
under arms and it controlled large parts of the countryside in Tonkin
and Cochin-china. French troops in their Tonkinese strongholds were 
little more than 20,000.(14)
Shortly after Wright's visit to Saigon, d'Argenlieu returned to 
Paris where he informed his superiors of his talks with Vright. As a 
result, the French approached London on the issue of bilateral
cooperation in South-East Asia. In a talk with Esler Dening, LeRoy of 
the French embassy in London mentioned Wright's visit to Singapore. 
LeRoy suggested that in addition to the monthly food conferences and 
consultation through normal diplomatic channels, there might be an 
additional interchange of visits and views between the territories 
facing the problems of reconstruction after the Japanese occupation. His
i
enquiry was purely tenative, he assured, and he was aware that several 
Whitehall departments were concerned; he would nevertheless be grateful 
to learn in due course whether London was receptive to his suggestions.
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6.2 CONFLICTING PRIORITIES: EUROPEAN OR ASIAN
COOPERATION?
LeRoy's approach revived the interdepartmental debate on regional 
cooperation in South-East Asia. This time the question was not of Indian 
participation, but how France and Indochina fitted into British plans. 
As Dening pointed out to the Colonial and Burma Offices, he had 
refrained from commenting during the meeting with LeRoy, realising that 
Britain's colonial governments had to be consulted first. The problem, 
Dening thought, was that 'at a time when nationalism is running high in 
most areas in South East Asia, a visit by French officials to say 
Rangoon, Singapore or Kuala Lumpur might not be welcome'. On the other 
hand, if discussions were explicitly limited to economic and 
reconstruction questions, he expected no great harm to result: since
France had manifested a desire for it, the Foreign Office did 'not wish 
to discourage the French from friendly cooperation'.(15)
The French initiative followed talks between France and Britain on 
bilateral economic collaboration in Europe which in September had helped 
to improve the flagging relations between the two countries. (16) Anglo- 
French cooperation played an important role in Bevin's plans for a 
British-led Vest European grouping.(17) A few months later, Paris and 
London were to negotiate a bilateral defence treaty in Europe as a 
result of the Vest's growing conflict with the Soviet Union.(18) In view 
of France's growing importance for British policies in Europe, it wasn't 
surprising that the Foreign Office's Vestern Department welcomed Paris's 
South-East Asian initiative. Furthermore, as one official pointed out in
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November, 'we have been doing our best to promote Anglo-French 
cooperation in the colonial field...we are of course entirely in favour 
of any step forward on the thorny path of Anglo-French colonial 
cooperation'.(19) The Burma Office, however, took the opposite view. 
F.V.H.Smith pointed out that French colonialism was unpopular in Asian 
nationalist circles. He was therefore not convinced of the political 
wisdom of closer collaboration with French Indochina. After all, any 
official contacts by French visitors to Burma would have to be made 
primarily with the Burmese political leader holding the office of 
counsellor to the Governor in respect of External Affairs.(20)
Subsequent events in Indochina strengthened the Burma Office's
case. On 23 November a dispute over Haiphong's customs control escalated
and led to a French naval bombardment of the city which killed at least
6000 people. On 19 December Viet Minh forces retaliated and attacked the
French garrisons in Hanoi and other parts of Tonkin. On 20 December Ho
Chi Minh called for a nation-wide people's war against French
colonialism. (21) Though the outbreak of war in Indochina failed to
attract the same international attention as the Dutch police action in
Indonesia six months later on, it still roused considerable resentment
K
in India and Burma. Sarat Chadra Bose, a member of the All India
k
Congress Committee, urged patriotic Indians to fight side by side with 
the Vietnamese as part of Asia's struggle against Western domination. 
Furthermore, a leading member of the All India Trade Onion Congress 
subsequently called for a boycott of French ships at India ports, and at 
the end of January 1947 a violent demonstration in Calcutta resulted in 
500 arrests and 19 people being injured. Nehru took a more cautious line
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on Indochina. Firstly, he seemed to be apprehensive about Ho Chi Minh's 
communist affiliations.(22) Another reason for his relative restraint 
was his interest in maintaining good relations with France in order to 
negotiate the incorporation into India of the French colonial enclaves 
along the Indian coast; Franco-Indian talks on the issue were in fact to 
begin soon after the transfer of power.(23) However, under the pressure 
of public opinion he announced on 18 February that French operational 
and combat aircraft were no longer allowed to fly over Indian 
airspace.(24)
It took some time for the significance of the war in Indochina to 
sink in in London. At the beginning of January, the Colonial Office 
discussed Anglo-French cooperation in South-East Asia with MacDonald who 
was visiting London. The meeting principally favoured closer 
collaboration with the French authorities on technical problems, though 
political issues would have to be left out for the time being. 
Cooperation would have to be part of a regional system and should be 
dealt with in Singapore by Killearn and MacDonald. The Foreign Office 
was told that for the time being it would perhaps be better to postpone 
action until relations between the French and the Vietnam Republic had 
become clearer. (25) However, the Burma Office maintained its opposition 
to closer contacts with the French authorities in Indochina. The current 
political situation in Burma was very delicate, and recent 
correspondence about the passage of French military aircraft through 
Burmese airspace had further emphasised the unpopularity in Burma of 
French policy in Indochina. The Burmese Governor therefore felt it
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inopportune to pursue the French proposal for highlevel visits to 
British territories.(26)
The question of Anglo-Frech cooperation in South-East Asia took on 
a new meaning when France made an urgent request for British arms 
supplies to Indochina. Only one month after the fighting had begun, 
French troops were short of weapons and ammunition and on 24 January 
1947 the French Military Mission in Singapore approached the 
headquarters of Allied Land Forces in South East Asia (ALFSEA) for the 
supply of large quantities of arms (and ammunition) from British stocks 
in Singapore. Killearn, who until recently had been a leading 
protagonist of closer relations with Saigon, now urged caution: a
similar situation had previously arisen in Java where only by great luck 
the British had managed to prevent the Indonesians from making an issue 
of British arms supplies to the Dutch. In view of obvious political 
repercussions Killearn therefore disliked the prospect of 'laying 
ourselves open to the charge of supporting the French by supplies from 
Singapore'. Preferably, supplies should come from Europe, though even 
this might land Britain in extremely deep waters.(27)
Following the French request London's debate on long-term Anglo- 
French collaboration in South-East Asia was superseded by the more 
urgent question of whether Britain should openly support the French war 
in Indochina, taking into account that large-scale arms deliveries to 
Indochina could not be kept secret. Arguments for and against arms 
shipments were clearly cut: On the one hand there was the impending 
alliance with France in Western Europe, as well as Anglo-French
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rapproachment In South-East Asia which favoured meeting France's 
demands. Open British support for the French war effort would be proof 
of Britain's genuine desire for closer relations with France. Refusing 
the French offer might jeopardise the Anglo-French alliance in Europe.
Burma were moving closer towards self-government, and London was keen on 
maintaining good relations with the Indian Interim Government and with 
Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru. In view of Indian and Burmese 
condemnation of the French war in Indochina, arms shipments might have 
alienated Asian opinion and jeopardised Britain's prestige on the 
subcontinent. There was the further danger that Britain might herself be 
drawn into the hostilities in Indochina. To a degree, Britain's response 
to the French request was a choice between the prerogatives of her Asian 
and European policies.
Foreign Office opinion on the issue was divided. The British 
ambassador in Paris, Duff Cooper, wanted to meet the French demands in 
full. He argued that it was in Britain's interest for France to restore 
order in Indochina, as a prolongation of the Indochinese situation would 
afford a 'stimulus to elements in our Far Eastern and other dependent 
territories hostile to all European control'. A further important reason 
was the forthcoming conclusion of an alliance with France.(28) However, 
Cooper failed to convince officials in London. Gordon Vhitteridge from 
the Far Eastern department acknowledged that it was desirable to help 
France at this moment when an Anglo-French alliance was in the offing, 
and when contacts with the French authorities in Indochina were being 
developed as part of British plans for regional cooperation in the whole
Britain's Asian interests. India and
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of South-East Asia. However, he also believed the French were pulling 
against the tide with their policy in Indochina: the future was with the 
native people not only in Indochina but throughout the Far East. Britain 
therefore had to be careful not to stultify her policy towards India, 
Burma, Malaya and Indonesia by openly supporting France in Indochina. 
Furthermore, Britain had already been embarrassed by French requests for 
air passage for operational aircraft through Burma and India, both 
countries in which strong feeling had been aroused by French action in 
Indochina; direct British supplies for the French would now inevitably 
lead to a great outcry, and the subsequent closing of these air routes. 
Britain was under no obligation to continue supplying portions of French 
forces with arms. Arms were therefore to be supplied only to 
metropolitan France and Holland, even at the risk of upsetting the 
French. Open support of a colonial power in a struggle against an 
independence movement would gravely affect Britain's position in the Far 
East. Vhitteridge therefore suggested that as an excuse the War Office 
should inform the French that no arms or amunition could be spared from 
Singapore, but that metropolitan France could be supplied from surplus 
stocks elsewhere. As a gesture of goodwill, the Treasury might also be 
asked not to insist on payment in advance.(29)
At the Foreign Office's Western department Hoynehan agreed with 
Vhitteridge's conclusions. It was unfortunate that the whole issue had 
cropped up at this moment when Anglo-French relations on the spot were 
developing satisfactorily, and when an alliance was under consideration. 
Turning down the French request would no doubt lead to hostile criticism 
in France, but it would be a great deal less than the criticism that
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would be provoked not only in India and the Far East, but in Britain as 
well if France were supplied with stocks from Singapore. In the long
run, Anglo-French relations would indeed suffer more if London took
a
action which might start an outcry aginst French policy in the Far East.
A
Moynehan added that:
'French policy towards some of their dependent territories is 
not in line with our own views. Vhile we have every desire to 
work as closely as possible with the French in all these 
colonial matters we must not let the French, or indeed our own 
Embassy in Paris, think that the conclusion of the Alliance
will necessarily mean that the French will be able to count on
our support in their dealings with their dependent territories, 
regardless of the merits of the case'.(30)
Dening subsequently summed up the department's views in a 
memorandum for Orme Sargent, the Permanent Under-Secretary at the 
Foreign Office. According to Dening, the Foreign Office's telegrams and 
minutes
'..bring out clearly the difficulties with which we are faced.
If we turn down the French altogether, this is bound to have 
an adverse effect on our relations at a time when we are 
hoping to conclude an alliance. On the other hand, we do NOT 
wish the French or anyone else to suppose that we necessarily 
support their policy in their Colonial Dependencies.'(31)
The French made a further approach on the subject of British arms 
deliveries at the beginning of February. This time the British embassy 
in Paris was contacted about the supply of ammunition from Singapore 
stockpiles, which had long been the subject of secret negotiations, to 
be used by French warships of British origin operating in Indochina. (32) 
For the Foreign Office, this was 'the first inkling that we have had 
that the Admiralty were engaged in shipping ammunition to the French in 
the Far East'. As Vhitteridge learnt from the Admiralty, the latest
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order had come from Paris some three months ago but had not been
fulfilled 'because the French found our price too high and have been
arguing about it ever since' . The Admiralty now wanted to know from the
Foreign Office whether deliveries from Singapore could go ahead.
Vhitteridge stressed in a departmental minute that
'In view of the urgency of the matter, we cannot wait to see 
whether the French Govt, is in fact about to embark on a new 
and conciliatory policy towards the Viet Nam [Viet Minh], and I 
suggest therefore, that we should now tell the Admiralty what 
we have already unofficially told the Var Office, that we are 
opposed to direct supply to the French in the Far East, but 
would have no objection if similar ammunition were supplied to 
metropolitan France'. (33)
The issue was now referred to the highest political level. Dening
explained the problem in a draft memo to the Prime Minister and
personally dissented from the rest of the Far Eastern Department,
arguing that, at the moment of establishing an alliance, French demands
should be met in full. France was suspicious of British indifference to
French colonial interests, a frame of mind which dated back to events in
the Middle East during the war when Britain more or less compelled the
French to grant independence to Syria and the Lebanon, and which had
been revived by differing policies over the economy and future of
Germany. On the other hand, Dening recognised that ' we have to be
careful that we do not run into trouble through supplying arms to the
French from Singapore'; a decision was thus required 'as to whether we
&
should supply the French from Singapore in the interst of Anglo-French 
friendship, or whether in the light of possible repercussions in the 
Asiatic territories we should only agree to supply arms and ammunition 
to metropolitan France from this country*.(34)
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The Prime Minister himself made the final decision. During a staff 
conference on 11 February 1947 Attlee ruled that 'we ought not to ship 
military supplies to the French from Singapore but that there was no 
objection to our doing so from the United Kingdom' . (35) His decision has 
to be seen in the light of his policy on India. On 20 February, only 
nine days after his ruling on war material for Indochina, Attlee 
announced Britain's intention to transfer power in India within the 
following 18 months. Britain was of course deeply interested in
maintaining a close relationship with an independent India in the 
sectors of both foreign affairs and defence - either through the
Commonwealth or a special treaty.(36) At such a crucial moment for
Anglo-Indian relations open support for the French war effort in 
Indochina might well have wiped out the political credit that Britain 
was likely to gain in the subcontinent by announcing her withdrawal from 
India.
At the same time, London did not want to openly offend the French 
immediately before the signing of a bilateral defence treaty. Paris was 
therefore told that Singapore stocks represented local operational
reserves which could not be spared, but that the Services departments 
would do their best to meet French demands from the British mainland (to 
metropolitan France) as soon as possible. (37) In March, the Minister of 
State at the Foreign Office, Hector McNeil, told Parliament that no aid 
specifically designed for Indochina had been given to the French armed
forces.(38) He did not mention, however, that London had imposed a
factQji|. embargo on direct arms deliveries to Indochiha in order to 
prevent Britain from being associated with or becoming involved in the
unpopular war in the country. The refusal to disclose the embargo to 
Parliament contrasted with Bevin's later announcement following the 
Dutch police action in July 1947 that the government had prohibited the
public disclosure and much harsher terms of the Indonesian embargo were 
a reflection of both the greater furore that the Dutch police action was 
causing throughout the world, and of the Netherland' s low status of 
power compared to France. As J.E.D. Street from South-East Asia 
Department warned later on in 1947, if Britain's public attitude 
contained even an implied criticism of French policy in Indochina, 'we 
should lose much, if not all, the goodwill which France bears us and 
which, in the condition of Europe at the moment, is so vital a 
factor'.(39) Britain had fewer scruples about the Dutch.
Though Britain refused to publicly condemn the French war against
the Viet Minh, the debate on the urgent question of arms deliveries to
€
Indochina had a profound ^rffeet on the Foreign Office's plans for 
regional cooperation. While the Stent memorandum had made Foreign Office 
officials aware of the fact that an independent India would have to be 
included in a South-East Asian regional system, it now became apparent 
that Anglo-French cooperation in South-East Asia might well be 
incompatible with Anglo-Indian cooperation. France had previously been 
in the centre of British regional plans in South-East Asia. Because of 
her hardline colonial policies she was now becoming a liability in Asia. 
As will be seen next, the question of British arms deliveries to 
Indochina inspired the Foreign Office to overhaul its regional 
strategies.
supply of war material directly
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7. THE LIM I T S  OF C O L O N I A L  C O O P E R A T I O N  IN 
S O U T H - E A S T  ASIA, 1947
7.1 FOREIGN OFFICE STOCKTAKING: THE DEVELOPMENT OF
A NEW REGIONAL POLICY FOR SOUTH-EAST ASIA
Coinciding with the debate on British arms deliveries to Indochina, 
Far Eastern experts at the Foreign Office were compiling a number of 
papers on British interests and policies in the Far East. The papers 
were intended as background material for the Foreign Secretary during a 
forthcoming Council of Foreign Ministers meeting in Moscow in March. 
Though the papers' conclusions were never endorsed as official policy, 
they nevertheless expressed the thinking of a majority of Foreign Office 
officials dealing with South-East Asia. The papers' conclusions
completely redefined Britain's traditional regional strategies in South- 
East Asia.
A first introductory paper titled 'Stock-Taking Memorandum - Far 
East', argued that since the Japanese surrender the situation in the Far 
East, from India to the Pacific, had been dominated by three main
factors:
'(1) the fact that we were defeated by Japan and lost
considerable British territory in the early stages of the war 
and that the Far East in general considers us to have played a 
relatively minor role in defeating Japan;
(2) the predominant part played by the United States in the 
war against Japan, and the leadership she has now assumed in 
Far Eastern affairs, particularly north of the tropic of cancer;
(3) the tide of nationalism which prevades the whole area, and 
which received great impetus as a result of the war.'
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All these factors, the paper continued, had adversely affected 
Britain's position in the Far East. Before the war, Britain's actions 
had been regarded as right and accepted, whereas now she had to prove 
the rightness of her case. The paper subsequently turned to India which 
it believed would probably become a foreign power in the not very 
distant future. Burma, it went on, would at best become an independent 
entity within the British Commonwealth. This would have a profound 
effect upon the British position in the Far East; a consideration of her 
possible relationship with these two territories was therefore required. 
Turning to China, the paper pointed out that the United States had 
virtually replaced Britain in her pre-war role, relieving her of 
benefits but also of many burdens. A serious threat to Britain in this 
area would arise only if the Soviet Union ever replaced the United 
States as the dominant foreign power. Meanwhile, the British would have 
to keep a commercial foothold in China until better days to come. In 
Japan as well, Britain would have to restore her trade and cultural 
Influences.
However, despite the loss of influence in India and China, the 
paper still regarded British influence in South-East Asia as strong. The 
area represented an important link in the strategic chain of 
Commonwealth defence, and even in South-East Asia's non-British 
territories Britain's leadership was tacitly, if not publicly, 
recognized. Though the political troubles in Indochina and Indonesia 
rendered close collaboration difficult for the moment, the paper argued 
that
'... it should not prove impossible in the course of the next
few years to build up a regional system, with Singapore as its
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centre, which should not only strengthen the political ties 
between the territories concerned and facilitate a defensive 
strategy, but also prove of considerable economic and financial 
benefit to the United Kingdom. This is an area from which we 
may hope to derive products with soft currency (e.g. sugar, 
vegetable oils, tea and coffee) which may enable us to cut down 
our purchases from hard currency areas.'
South-East Asia, the paper concluded, was thus an area to which Britain 
should devote close attention, and where she should make every effort to 
improve her position.(1)
A second paper, entitled 'British policy in South East Asia', took
a closer look at British policies and interests in individual South-East
Asian territories. In Thailand, it was Britain's main interest to
promote stability and the development of democratic institutions in
order to guard against ultra-nationalist governments like the one before
the war, which by experience tended to discriminate against Western
interests. Thailand's liberal elements therefore needed to be
strengthened so as to ensure that
'(a) in the event of any conflict in the area our relations 
with Siam shall be so close that we shall have no difficulty 
in integrating her into our defence system for the whole area, 
and
(b) [to ensure] the development and maintenance of British 
trading interests there.'
The situation in Indochina was more difficult. Britain's 
'cooperative attitude' after the war, when she 'did nothing to hamper 
French efforts to re-establish their sovereignty' was much appreciated 
both locally and in Paris. However, the outbreak of hostilities in 
December and the continuing struggle between the French and the 'Vietnam
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Republic* had put Britain in an awkward predicament in view of her close 
relations with France and of the sympathies of the Burmese and Indian 
populations with the Vietnamese nationalists. Furthermore, there had 
been little progress in the commercial sector. British hopes that the 
French government would follow a more liberal economic policy and that 
Britain could extend her commercial influence in Indochina had met with 
little success. The paper recommended that Britain should promote any 
arrangements which provided for real long-term stability in Indochina; 
France should therefore resume talks with either the Viet Minh or the 
two nationalist parties. Almost prophesying the Geneva settlement of 
1954, the paper argued that at worst 'it should be possible for the 
French to concentrate their forces and administration in Indo-China 
south of Parallel 16* while allowing the territories north of Parallel 
16* to develop into an autonomous buffer state between themselves and 
China.'(2)
Prospects for the extension of British interests were most
promising in Indonesia. The paper pointed out that after her direct
involvement in postwar Indonesia, Britain still had considerable
political influence in the country:
'Britain's prestige stands high there today. Ve came as a 
victorious power (unlike the Dutch) and we went when our tasks 
were completed without having sought to obtain any economic or 
other special advantage. Our disinterestedness, the restrained 
behaviour of our troops and the influence of two men in 
particular, Lord Inverchapel and Mr. MacKereth, have strongly 
impressed the Indonesian leaders and intellectuals... The 
Indonesian peasant has of course been subject to intensive 
anti-British propaganda put out by the Indonesian machine... on 
the other hand the British plantation companies were known as 
good employers andftheir return would be generally welcome.'
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However, the paper continued, Britain was not popular with the Dutch who 
rumoured that the British had downed Indonesia in order to benefit 
Malaya's tin and rubber industries. At the same time, the Dutch were 
clinging to their monopolistic commercial practices, fearing economic 
penetration and domination particularly by the Americans.(3)
Britain's interests in Indonesia, the paper showed, were primarily
commercial: before the war, the British had had a large commercial stake
in the country, prewar investments had been worth £ 25 million. Britain
therefore had a special interest in bringing about stable conditions as
a basis for a speedy economic recovery of Indonesia. So far as
Indonesia's current economic position was concerned, the paper argued:
'It is perhaps not fully realised how much the great material 
resources of Indonesia are in demand today. Export on a pre­
war scale of the products of Indonesia would go far to relieve 
the world of some of its most acute shortages, e.g. sugar, tea, 
vegetable oils and petroleum. At present however the entire 
economic system has run down after four years of enemy 
occupation, followed by 18 months of destructive fighting.'
Despite these problems, the paper sensed considerable commercial as 
well as political opportunities: it argued that the Indonesians were
looking for outside help in the rehabilitation of their country, and 
that they were seeking guidance in formulating a new way of life, 
recognizing their incapability of handling many problems by themselves. 
Though the Dutch were helping in trade and finance, the Indonesian 
leaders were looking elsewhere for advice on constitutional matters, 
social welfare, labour relations, health, local administration etc. They 
were looking neither to Russia nor to the United States for this help, 
but had instead shown 'a marked inclination to take us as a model and
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have told our representatives thjfat they would prefer to turn to us. '
The paper continued:
'It is clear that we have a remarkable opportunity in Indonesia 
to further British influence. It is perhaps a unique 
opportunity in the world today since nowhere else do we find 
an area comparable in natural resources and population which 
is embarking on a new independent existence, which is eager to 
accept help and guidance from outside and which at the moment 
is looking to Britain to provide these things... It is our 
interest to maintain the present Indonesian leaders in power 
since they can mould Indonesia in the way which we should want 
to see it go. The main object of our diplomacy should therefore 
be to show the Indonesians at all times that we have their 
interests at heart and to guide the present leaders in the 
right direction.'
In the economic sector as well, the paper recommended increasing British 
involvement in Indonesia. British plantation companies should be backed 
in their efforts to regain their estates. Furthermore, having done much 
for the restoration of peaceful conditions, Britain should make every 
effort to provide the physical means of rehabilitation, i.e. by 
providing consumer goods in order to increase the flow of raw materials 
and by assisting financially.
The paper then turned to South-East Asia as a whole where Britain 
should seek to extend her cultural influence. The nascent nationalisms 
following the Japanese occupation were looking round for a model, and 
although such models were being provided by Russia and the United 
States, Britain appeared to find much favour, particularly among the 
Indonesians. Having been cut off from British influence, the inhabitants 
of South-East Asia were now clamouring for renewed contacts with Britain 
and for instructions in English. Steps were therefore taken through the 
agency of the British Council to revive the teaching of the English
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language and the British way of life. Moreover, the Colonial Office was 
considering the establishment of a university in Malaya which would 
offer facilities to students from surrounding countries to study British 
ideas and methods. The scope for such activities was the greatest in
Thailand and Indonesia - in Indochina it was the French, and in the
Philippines the Americans who were dominant.(4)
Last but not least, the paper explained, British influence in 
South-East Asia depended on the rehabilitation of Malaya, and on Britain 
offering the colony's inhabitants the help and advice they needed in 
developing their lives on modern lines. Britain's stock in Malaya was 
still high, and her attitude towards nationalist hopes in India, Egypt 
and elsewhere had gained her trust and respect. Nevertheless, this had 
been lessened by British handling of the constitutional question and by 
the handling of the Sarawak situation. Everything therefore depended on 
successful negotiations with the Malays and Chinese on the new 
constitution. Furthermore, Britain should replace the old generation of 
colonial administrators with younger men with a broader outlook. What 
was done in Malaya, the FO paper postulated, was of course closely 
watched by neighbouring territories.(5)
In conclusion, the paper re-emphasized the opportunities that were
now existing for Britain:
'All the Colonial territories of South East Asia look forward 
to~ a future of greater self-government or total independence.
At the same time they are looking to other countries for help, 
guidance and example*.
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Despite the existence of communist parties, there was little evidence
yet of any determined Soviet intervention - though this loomed in the
background. Meanwhile, the peoples of South-East Asia were still
disposed to look to Britain and the USA. The paper recommended that:
'Ve ought to grasp the opportunity which this tendency gives 
us, firstly by promoting rehabilitation by every practical 
means, and secondly by offering them the advice and help they 
need in developing their lives on modern lines.'
Lord Killearn's organisation should play a prominent role in Britain's
South-East Asian policies:
'The office of the Special Commissioner in South East Asia 
provides a valuable means of centralising efforts on these 
lines. Already, the Special Commissioner has built up a system 
of co-operation with other British authorities in the area and 
beyond.'
Killearn had already taken steps towards regional collaboration by
holding monthly food liaison conferences. Regional conferences on
nutrition and fisheries had also been held, and there was no doubt that
by beginning on a technical plane the value of regional collaboration
had been demonstrated:
'As confidence grows it should be possible to progress towards 
regional collaboration in political matters also. Our aim 
should be to develop Singapore as a centre for the radiation of 
British influence, and for this special purpose technical and 
other experts might be attached to the Special Commissioner's 
office, where they will be available for consultation by 
neighbouring countries.' (6)
The two papers outlined a new British approach to South-East Asia. 
Rather than feeling threatened by the recent wave of nationalist 
successes, the paper's authors proposed exploiting the opportunities
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that the new political situation offered. Britain's record in Asia was 
better than that of the Dutch. In expectation of Indonesian 
independence, she should thus concentrate on dealing with the Indonesian 
nationalists, in order to increase her economic and political influence 
in the country. In Indochina, British plans were not as ambitious. It 
was recognized that France would remain the dominant power. However, 
London should urge the French to find a settlement with the Vietnamese 
nationalists in order to create stable conditions in the country, even 
if this eventually included a French withdrawal from the north.
One of the papers' main suggestions was that Britain's declining 
power in India and China could be compensated through an extension of 
British influence in South-East Asia. The Special Commission would play 
a key role in this. While the first paper suggested the creation of a 
regional system in South-East Asia with its centre in Singapore to 
further British interests, the second paper explained that the core of 
such a system already existed in the shape of Killearn's organisation, 
and that the Special Commission should soon attempt to progress from 
technical towards politicaycooperation.
However, the two papers failed to define what exactly such a 
regional system would entail. As Edward Lambert minuted at the Foreign 
Office on 27 January, Britain still had to decide who to collaborate 
with:
'Besides F.I.C., Indonesia, Burma, Malaya and Ceylon, are we 
going to invite Australia, India and the U.S.A.? Ve want to 
associate Australia as closely as possible with all that we do 
in S.E.A. India, too, will have to assume her fair share of
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responsibility in the area and U.S. representation at any major 
conference may, I suppose, be taken for granted.*(7)
Dening subsequently took the opportunity to comment on the issue.
The food crisis, he explained, was by no means over. The situation
therefore required a continuation of the Special Commissioner's
functions, particularly in order to avoid cut throat competition if and
when there was a resort to private buying. The Special Commissioner had
also established the principle of consultation and coordination which
the Foreign Office hoped would be extended to other fields. Indeed,
'... with our imminent withdrawal from India and Burma, South- 
East Asia becomes of even greater significance as a strategic 
link between the United Kingdom, Africa and Australia. Though 
it is not believed that our influence will entirely disappear 
from India and Burma, its focus will be centred in South-East 
Asia, and geographically the centre is Singapore. It may well 
be that the closer contacts of the U.K. with India and Burma 
will be maintained through some organisation such as that of 
the Special Commissioner in Singapore, in view of the great 
distance from the U.K.*
Dening stressed that any coordination between British territories
such as Ceylon, India and Burma would have to fall to the Special
Commissioner, since the Malayan Governor-General's responsibilities were
restricted to the colonial field. Bor should a colonial appointee be in
charge of cooperation with foreign territories, as this was bound to
raise suspicions against British intentions:
'Ve must not appear to be ganging up with Western Powers 
against Eastern peoples striving for independence. Rather 
should our aim be to contrive a general partnership between 
independent or about-to-be independent Eastern peoples and the 
Western powers who by their past experience are best able to 
give them help and, in our case, to some extent protection.
Owing to political conditions in the N.E.I. and Indo-China, this 
process of consultation and cooperation with these areas must 
be a gradual one. But here again it could hardly be carried out 
by any colonial authority, since this would give rise to
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distrust and suspicion. It should be a function of the Special 
Commissioner to feel his way towards eventual cooperation on 
the lines indicated as conditions allow'. (8)
Dening also proposed giving the Special Commissioner additional 
responsibilities in the cultural sector. The Defence Ministry had 
recently indicated its intention to withdraw 'white troops' east of 
India and Burma except where it was necessary to build up local 
formations. In this case, Britain would no longer be able to influence 
South-East Asia through the display of armed strength, but would have to 
rely on the impact of cultural and information organisations on the 
local populations, bodies that should fall under the auspices of the 
Special Commissioner. Dening attached particular importance to the 
establishment of a powerful broadcasting organisation such as the 'Voice 
of Britain'; at the moment, he acknowledged, the only competitors were 
the Americans, to whose competition there was no objection, but one day 
the Russians might come up with a powerful station in Eastern Siberia: 
by that time, a British station ought to have established its own 
audience.(9)
Dening's recommendations were discussed during a departmental
meeting on 8 February attended by the Foreign Secretary. Bevin agreed
with Dening's appreciation of South-East Asia, stating:
'Ve should consolidate our position in South-East Asia as soon 
as possible, and before the attention of the world was focussed 
in that direction, which would happen when the Japanese Peace 
Treaty came up for consideration, possibly at the end of 1947 
or early in 1948.'
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Bevin also agreed to maintain an organisation in charge of food 
allocations until at least the middle or end of 1948, and he promised to 
discuss with the Ministry of Food the desirability of extending the 
I.E.F.C. Rice Committee beyond 1947. When Dening drew attention to 
Colonial Office plans for the reorganisation of Malaya and Singapore 
under one governor, and the possible abolition of the Governor General's 
office, Bevin promised to discuss with the Colonial Secretary the
question of the division of responsibility between Killearn and colonial 
officials. By implication, this meant pressing for an increase of 
Killearn's coordinating functions. Bevin was also keen on the expansion
'TNof Britain's 'cultural' acitivities in South-East Asia through the 
British Council or broadcasts by the 'Voice of Britain'.(10)
The Foreign Office's stock-taking papers and the subsequent 
departmental discussions constituted a highlight in the development of 
Britain's policy of regional cooperation. The Special Commission had 
firmly moved into the centre of the department's regional plans. 
Killearn had started with regional cooperation on the technical level, 
and it was hoped that his organisation would provide the nucleus for a 
larger British led regional organisation. As in 1945 and 1946, the 
ultimate aim was to create a regional system or organisation in order to
However, there were also significant changes: contrary to previous
regional concepts, great attention was given to cooperation with the 
nationalist movements in South-East Asia. The Foreign Office was aware 
of its prestige with the Indonesian nationalists and hoped to exploit 
the opportunities that this might provide after the country's
consolidate and extend Britain's influence in South-East Asia.
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Independence. Britain was less ambitious in Indochina, though the French 
would have to be encouraged to compromise with the Viet Kinh in order to 
create stable political conditions.
A further difference was the enlarged geographical scope of a 
regional system, which was to include India, Burma and Ceylon. In fact, 
a main aim behind the proposed regional scheme was for London to 
maintain close links with the three countries after their Independence. 
Though Britain would eventually withdraw from the subcontinent, the 
Foreign Office was confident that London's prestige resulting from its 
progressive attitude towards Asian nationalism would allow Britain to 
use the proposed Singapore-based organisation in order to maintain a 
high degree of indirect influence in South-East as well as South Asia.
7.2 THE LIMITS OF ANGLO-FRENCH COOPERATION
However, while the Foreign Office's redefined regional policies 
constituted a break with the traditional concept of colonial cooperation 
in South-East Asia, they did not imply the complete exclusion of France 
and the Netherlands from Britain's plans. So long as these two powers 
were present in South-East Asia they too would have to be part of any 
regional system. This applied particularly to France, whose chances of 
survival as a colonial power in South-East Asia the Foreign Office rated 
higher than those of the Netherlands.
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In the middle of February the Foreign Office endorsed the 
conclusions reached by MacDonald and the Colonial Office in the previous 
month. It was decided that collaboration with the French should be 
limited to economic and technical subjects, leaving out political 
matters for the time being. This corresponded with existing Anglo-French 
collaboration in Africa. Furthermore, any collaboration with the French 
authorities in Indochina should form part of a regional system rather 
than being conducted on a bilateral basis. Questions like health which 
were calling for a regional treatment and could best be tackled by 
regional technical conferences that included the French. Finally, Anglo- 
French collaboration in South-East Asia would best be organised locally, 
i.e. by Killearn and Macdonald, rather than by the British Colonial 
Office and the Ministry of France Overseas.(11)
As Gordon Vhitteridge from South-East Asia Department subsequently
pointed out in a departmental minute, the Colonial Office's
recommendations fitted in with the plans for regional collaboration that
Bevin had approved in principle during the meeting on 8 February. Thus:
'Ho particular action as regards the French seems called for.
They send representatives to the Liaison Officers Conference 
and have been invited to, but have not always attended, other 
conferences. As & when further conferences are held, the French 
will be invited to them and the notion of collaboration will 
become more deeply rooted. A visit by Lord Killearn would be 
useful but misfortune has hitherto dogged his attempts to pay 
it...in any case the political situation there makes a visit 
undesirable at present'. (12)
The recommendations were subsequently communicated to Killearn who 
was asked to comment.(13) A reply, written by Michael Vright in 
Killearn's absence, arrived in London two months later on. Having
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consulted MacDonald, Vright agreed with the suggested system of 
technical conferences, for which the forthcoming Social Welfare
the most valuable form of contact, namely (bilateral) exchanges of
visits by officials and experts to discuss points of common interest.
Visits by experts on rice, coal and economic matters were already going
ahead, and there were periodical talks between the Special Commissioner
and the French Consul General in Singapore. In the distant future, it
might also be feasible to attach colonial representatives from Malaya
and Singapore to the British consulate in Saigon. However, Wright
assured that Anglo-French contacts were not going too far:
'It is clearly desirable to promote collaboration with
neighbouring territories in South East Asia, and not least with 
the French who are important to us in Europe and with whom we 
have just signed an alliance. On the other hand we must be 
extremely careful to avoid giving any false impression of a
policy of "South East Asia for Europeans". So long as there is 
no agreement between the French and Asiatics in Indo China we 
must put each foot down warily. The proposals outlined above 
have been worked out with this need for caution in mind, and 
we feel that they take adequate account of it.'(14)
Dening shared Wright's reservations, arguing that Britain should 
avoid giving the impression of a European policy in South-East Asia.(15) 
The French embassy in London should therefore be informed about the 
conclusions reached in London and Singapore. This should be done orally 
rather than in writing; after all, it had never been contemplated to 
'make a splash' about it with the French. His own impression was that 
they were by no means unaware of the considerations which prompted 
Britain to move cautiously in this matter.(16)
Conference However, this was not to preclude
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France's hardline policies towards Vietnamese nationalism and the 
outbreak of war in Indochina had thus stalled efforts towards closer 
Anglo-French relations in South-East Asia. However, since Britain was 
concealing her'’"Jactdll arms embargo on Indochina it did not prevent 
Paris and London from signing a military alliance in Europe (the Dunkirk 
Treaty) on 4 March 1947. Though directed against Germany, the treaty was 
a precursor of an anti-Soviet security arrangement in Western 
Europe.(17) The Anglo-French alliance further improved relations between 
the two countries, drawing Paris closer into the Western camp. This had 
its impact on colonial developments when in September 1947 Bevin told 
the French premier, Paul Ramadier, amongst other things of his hope for 
growing economic cooperation in the colonial field.(18) In December, the 
French officially suggested bilateral talks on economic collaboration in 
West Africa.(19)
However, despite the impending talks on Africa, the Foreign Office
did not see a case for similar cooperation in South-East Asia. In this
part of the world cooperation Britain continued to give precedence to
cooperation with the fledgling Asian states. As Dening minuted in
response to a Colonial Office enquiry :
'The question of regional cooperation in South East Asia (not 
only of course with the French) has been very much in our 
minds, but we have rather steered clear of having anything 
laid on in the way of Anglo-French colonial discussions on 
Africa. This is of course because of the political situation in 
Indo-China. Our colonial territories in particular are nervous 
of any association with the French which might be interpreted 
by the national movements in South East Asia as having 
political significance. That being so, we must, I think, leave 
things strictly as they are for the time being. If the French 
should by any manner of means contrive a satisfactory 
political settlement in Indo-China, things would of course be 
different. I should, however, add that our relations with the 
French in South East Asia are cordial, and Lord Killearn has
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the closest possible contact with the French in Singapore. ...
Until things get better in Indo-China, I think we must aim at 
maintaining the cordiality without committing ourselves to 
anything very specific.'(20)
Thus there were limits to Anglo-French cooperation in South-East Asia.
7.3 THE LIMITS OF ANGLO-DUTCH COOPERATION
Vhile the prospects for France's inclusion in a South-East Asian 
regional system were diminished as a result of the Indochina war, Dutch 
military action in Indonesia in July 1947 virtually disqualified the 
Netherlands from participating in any regional scheme. As has been 
pointed out before, Britain after the war had refused to prevent the 
Indonesian Republic from consolidating its rule in large parts of 
Sumatra and Java. Grasping the full force of Indonesian nationalism, the 
British had instead pressurized the returning Dutch into negotiations 
with the Republicans. In February 1946, Lord Inverchapel had been 
appointed as mediator, succeeded by Lord Killearn in August. During the 
following negotiations, British pressure was vital in bringing about the 
Linggadjati Agreement of November 1946 immediately before the withdrawal 
of the last British forces from the country.(21) Under the agreement, 
ratified in March 1947, the Dutch recognized the Indonesian Republic's 
de facto authority over Sumatra and Java. The Republic in turn consented 
to a federal form of government for the proposed United States of 
Indonesia, which would be established not later than 1 January 1949 and 
which would be an equal partner in a Netherlands Union under the Dutch
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Crown. However, the two sides failed to implement the agreement. A Dutch 
ultimatum on 27 May asked for a recognition of de jure Dutch sovereignty 
in Sumatra and Java until January 1949, also denying the Republic the 
right to conduct her own foreign relations. After an Indonesian refusal 
to meet the ultimatum in full, the Dutch, ignoring the Linggadjatl's 
provision for arbitration by a third party, on 20 July 1947 launched a 
military campaign against the Republic. Within days the Dutch captured 
large parts of Java and Sumatra, failing, however, to destroy the bulk 
of the Indonesian guerrilla forces.(22)
The Dutch police action, as The Hague called it, put London into an 
awkward position. On the one hand, the British saw the aspirations of 
the Indonesian nationalists with sympathy. As the stock-taking papers 
from February 1947 had shown, some officials at the Foreign Office hoped 
to exploit Britain's comparatively good standing with the republicans in 
order to extend British commercial and political influence in Indonesia 
after the end of Dutch rule. On the other hand, Britain had continuing 
obligations to the Dutch as former wartime allies. It was also in 
London's interest to see the Netherlands regain both economic and 
military strength at a time of heightening East-West tensions in Europe. 
After the war, Britain had supplied the Netherlands with military 
equipment worth £ 40 million. Though intended primarily for the defence 
of Western Europe, British arms supplies had been crucial for the 
Netherlands' military build-up in Indonesia: by June 1947 about 90,000 
Dutch troops had been equipped, and in Java some 60 tanks as well 
12,000-14,000 vehicles and a number of surplus aircraft had been 
delivered. (23)
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However, the worsening of relations between the Dutch and the 
Indonesian nationalists after the signing of Linggadjati forced the 
British to rethink their arms policies towards the Netherlands. In May, 
Attlee warned the Cabinet that a Dutch resort to force would have 
serious political and economic consequences. Britain would be criticized 
for having brought in Dutch forces, and an armed conflict was 'bound to 
disturb our own relations with native populations throughout South-East 
Asia'; it would also delay for years food exports from Indonesia needed 
to reduce Britain's dependency on hard-currency-countries. (24) In June, 
Richard Allen pointed out to the Foreign Office that 'we are faced with 
the serious prospect of hostilities in the Netherlands East Indies in 
the near future'.(25) The outbreak of war in Indochina had clearly made 
the British wary of Asian and in particular Indian opinion, and the 
Foreign Office warned The Hague on 16 June that public opinion might 
pressure Britain to cut off the supply of war material in the event of 
the Netherlands resorting to force in Indonesia.(26) The Cabinet 
supported the Foreign Office's line on the following day - thus making a
However, Foreign Office officials were still in the dark about how
and when to implement the Cabinet's policy. At the beginning of July,
Dutch authorities in Indonesia asked for permission to fly locally
bought British ordnance stores from Changi airfield in Singapore to
Sumatra. Killearn asked London for guidance, arguing that:
'In the light of Dutch intentions and of extremely delicate 
position we are in as regards Asiatic opinion by reason of the 
fact that we have already supplied military equipment to the 
Dutch forces and stopped it to the Indonesians, my own view is 
that we should say frankly as each case arises that we are
a principle /decision in favour of an arms embargo. (27)
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unable to furnish or facilitate transport of any further 
military stores from South East Asia for the present. (28)
Killearn's telegram raised once again the 'thorny question of the 
Asiatic reaction to our policy in respect of the Dutch and the French'. 
As John Street minuted, it was well-known that Britain had trained and 
equipped almost all the Dutch troops at present in the N.E.I. 'Vhat is 
not so well-known is our constant pressure on the Dutch not to make 
fools of themselves by resorting to force'. However, he added, 'we 
cannot afford to forget that the Dutch are our allies in Europe'. If the 
Dutch had actually bought the stores concerned, Street thought they 
should be allowed to load them onto their planes.(29) Gordon Vhitteridge 
disagreed, arguing that even such local deliveries were likely to do 
Britain much harm in the eyes of Asians, particularly as no deliveries 
were made to the Indonesians. Stopping local deliveries would annoy the 
Dutch without affecting their ability to wage war; however, if things 
were left as they were it would be difficult to defend Britain's 
actions.(30)
In this particular case, the Foreign Office decided that the Dutch 
could not be stopped from buying or taking away surplus equipment which 
Britain had put on the open market in Singapore. (31) However, the Dutch 
police action on 20 and 21 July upped the stakes by causing a world-wide 
outcry against the Netherlands. India was in the forefront of 
International criticism and the Indian press unanimously condemned the 
Dutch police action. Nehru too was highly critical, using much stronger 
terms than in the previous case of Indochina - unlike the Viet Minh the
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majority of Indonesia's nationalist movement was not communist.(32) He 
insisted in a telegram to London that Britain and the United States put 
pressure on the Dutch to end the conflict. In public, he made it clear 
that he regarded the police action as an affront against the whole of 
Asia.(33)
The Dutch resort to military force was highly unwelcome in London. 
It destroyed the prospects for a return to normalcy in Indonesia and for 
a resumption of British trade with the country in the near future. Most 
seriously, it threatened to poison the political atmosphere in Asia less 
than a month before the transfer of power in India. Despite this, the 
British were forced to take a middle line, in view of their conflicting 
interests in good relations with both India and the Netherlands. Bevin 
told the House of Commons that Britain did not intend to lay the 
problems before the Security Council, but that she was hoping for other 
methods to end the fighting. The Dutch, however, refused 
arbitration.(34) Further British efforts to induce a compromise solution 
failed when the Americans rejected a secret British proposal that London 
and Washington should jointly induce the Netherlands to accept some form 
of arbitral solution to the conflict.(35) At the instigation of 
Australia and India, the Indonesian question was subsequently taken to 
the UN's Security Council, which in the following months repeatedly 
tried to arrange a cease-fire.
Following the Dutch police action and the British failure to find a 
compromise, London was bound by the Cabinet's previous decision to 
implement an arms embargo on Indonesia. However, as the head of the
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Foreign Office, Orme Sargent, pointed out, the question was whether only 
arms deliveries to Java would be affected, or whether supplies to the 
Netherlands would also be affected to which Britain was committed in 
execution of her general policy of building up the Dutch armed forces in 
Holland for the defence of Western Europe. A public announcement that 
Britain would refuse shipping military supplies to the Netherlands was 
'likely to prejudice the readiness of the Dutch to collaborate with us 
in Europe' and would cause deep and lasting resentment by the Dutch. It 
was also 'liable to affect adversely our policy of standardisation since 
the Dutch might be led to adopt non-British types of standards of 
equipment and operational methods.' Sargent therefore suggested making 
the same distinction as in the case of Indochina by announcing the 
stoppage of military supplies to Java only.(36)
The Chiefs of Staff supported Sargent's line during a Defence 
Committee meeting on 23 July, but they failed to convince the Foreign 
Secretary. Bevin stressed that Britain had already offered her good 
offices to the Dutch, if a further approach failed, the provision of 
supplies and facilities in the Far East should stop at once. 
Furthermore, 'if other action proved ineffective, it would be necessary 
to deny military assistance to Metropolitan Holland'.(37) After Bevin 
convinced himself that his effort at mediation had failed, he told a 
staff conference on 28 July that it was now essential for Britain to 
announce her neutrality by declaring that no war materials would be 
supplied either to the Dutch or to the Indonesians. Nevertheless, 
supplies of British war materials to metropolitan Holland and for 
training Dutch forces in Europe could be continued. Bevin's line found
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the support of Attlee(38), and the Foreign Secretary told Parliament on 
30 July that the government had prohibited the supply of war materials
were intended for Indonesia. (39) As has been pointed out before, the 
terms of the arms ban were much harsher than in the case of Indochina. 
The Dutch had to assure in the case of each British delivery that the 
supplied war material was not destined for Indonesia, whereas the French 
were free to do with their deliveries to the mainland as they pleased.
London's decision to impose an arms embargo on Indonesia signified 
the erstwhile end of Britain's plans for colonial cooperation in South- 
East Asia, which had been developed by the Colonial Office during the 
war and which had formed the core of the Foreign Office's plans in 1945. 
Rather than actively supporting the Dutch colonial regime, Britain in 
1947 decided to distance herself from the Netherlands' colonial policies 
in the interests of good relations with India and the other fledgling 
Asian states. However, the problem was that even the new kind of 
Asian/European regional cooperation envisaged by the Foreign Office was 
now unlikely, as the Dutch and the French had become unacceptable 
partners to countries like India. Furthermore, even if Britain had 
wanted to start a regional scheme with only Asian countries, the chances 
were slim: the arms ban failed to convince Asian opinion that Britain 
stood aloof from Dutch policies in South-East Asia; there were 
allegations that Britain was backing the Dutch in the Security Council; 
and Asian leaders continued to attack not just the Dutch and the French 
but the colonial powers per se. Britain could not escape the fact that 
so long as the conflicts in Indonesia and Indochina remained in the
included supplies to metropolitan Holland which
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centre of attention, the prospects for any kind of British sponsored 
regional system in South-East Asia were dim. Things were made worse by 
the fact that the Special Commission, which was in the centre of British 
regional plans, had recently come under threat by a series of unexpected 
international developments. It is these developments that will be 
examined next.
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PART III 
R E G I O N A L  C O M P E T I T I O N
In February 1947 the Foreign Office was still confident of the 
success of its new regional policy. However, only one year later 
prospects for a British-led regional system in South-East Asia were at a 
postwar low. There were a number of reasons for the eclipse of Britain's 
regional policies. Firstly, India, rather than accepting covert British 
leadership, had emerged as a main political competitor in South-East 
Asia. During the Asian Relations Conference in March 1947, she first 
tried to rally the Asian nationalist movements behind her. After the 
Dutch police action in July her Prime Minister, Pandit Jawaharlal Hehru, 
played increasingly on Asian anti-colonial sentiments to etablish 
himself as the moral leader of both South and South-East Asia. A second 
reason was the United Rations' establishment of the Economic Commission 
for Asia and the Far East, ECAFE, which stalled the Special Commission's 
development into a wider regional association. Thirdly, pressure by the 
British Treasury at the time of the 1947 Sterling Crisis forced the 
Foreign Office to scale down its regional operations in Singapore. 
Whitehall also decided to merge the Special Commission with the Malayan 
Governor-General's Office by 1948. The move seriously affected the 
international reputation of Killearn's regional office and eventually 
led to its complete demise. The third part of this study examines all 
three of these parallel developments, beginning with the decision on the 
amalgamation of Killearn's and MacDonald's offices.
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8. THE PLANNED MERGER IN SINGAPORE
The stock-taking papers from the beginning of 1947 demonstrated the 
Foreign Office's faith in the regional work of the Special Commission 
and in the prospects for the organisation's expansion. However, the 
department had underestimated the growing pressure in London for the 
scaling down of Killearn's office. Since the summer of 1946 there had 
been complaints by Conservative HP's and in the British press about the 
Special Commission's rising maintenance costs. At the end of July 1946, 
Kil learns staff had been approx. 200, and his organisation's total 
annual cost had been estimated at £ 150,000.(1) Nine months later, 
however, the Special Commission had turned into an even larger 
bureaucratic machinery with a staff of 500 in March 1947, including a 
host of specialists and administrators.(2) London later on admitted that 
the organisation's total cost from February 1946 to 30 June 1947 
amounted to & 424,300 (3) - more twice of what had been estimated the 
year before.
The Treasury too watched the Special Commission's inflation with 
growing anxiety. Britain was facing an increasing payments deficit (4); 
at the beginning of 1947 the department consequently demanded 
considerable cuts in the budget of Killearn's organisation. To satisfy 
the Treasury, the Foreign Office decided to halt the expansion of the 
Special Commission for the time being. In January 1947, Killearn had 
organised a specialized regional fisheries conference, and the attending 
international delegations had unanimously recommended the establishment 
of an International Fisheries Council in Singapore. Though the
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organisation would eventually be run by the UI's Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO) the conference had asked the Special Commission to 
establish, as a first step, a specialized organisation which would 
follow up the work of the fisheries conference. (5) At the Foreign Office 
F.H.Vatts was inclined to meet Killearn's demand to finance the proposed 
organisation and thus set up an entirely new section in Singapore. 
However, the Treasury had only recently asked the department to try and 
reduce its staff in Singapore, and not to fill existing vacancies.(6) 
The Colonial Office too had 'every sympathy with the underlying 
objective to draw Siam, India, China and Indonesia closer to us, but we 
are disposed to feel that it can be achieved more simply than by setting 
up a Fisheries Council on the ambitious lines proposed.'(7) The Foreign 
Office subsequently told Killearn that despite its many advantages the 
government was unlikely to finance the project. The matter was being 
communicated to the FAO, but it too was short of money. (8) Killearn's 
proposal therefore led to nothing.
However, Britain's worsening financial situation soon induced the 
Treasury to demand significant spending cuts on the Special Commission. 
Killearn had estimated that in the 1947/48 financial year his 
organisation would have to spend £ 121,000 in wages and allowances 
alone. The Treasury wanted this to be reduced to £ 70,000.(9) In March, 
the Foreign Office sent Richard Allen to Singapore to investigate 
possible areas for cut-backs. Allen's subsequent report to the Foreign 
Office began by stressing the Special Commission's achievements. It was 
a focal point for the radiation of British influence throughout South- 
East Asia and it stimulated British authorities in the area to look at
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things from an international rather than purely parochial angle. 
Killearn was also an important member of the South-East Asian Defence 
Committee, and while British troops had been stationed in Indonesia, it 
had been of the greatest value to have someone of his calibre stationed 
in Singapore. In the future Killearn's organisation might even be the 
starting point of a regional organisation in the area: Australia had 
just sponsored a plan for a regional commission, and Admiral d'Argenlieu 
considered that such a commission might have an international 
secretariat at Singapore. The Special Commission had also been 
successful in dealing with the food crisis, though Killearn's staff had 
necessarily been built up in an improvised and extravagant manner, 
employing mainly ex-Army personnel. But now that things were settling 
down, and that a routine had been worked out for dealing with food and 
economic problems, the staff was too big.
Allen strongly believed in the continuation of the Special 
Commission, but saw the best solution in a merger between Killearn's 
organisation and the office of the Malayan Governor-General. MacDonald 
would take over Killearn's functions, while continuing his coordinative 
work in the colonial field. The forthcoming constitutional reforms in 
Malaya during the next year and a half would in any case diminish the 
Governor-General's responsibilities and enable him to take over 
additional duties. Allen saw MacDonald as ideally qualified for the job, 
he was persona grata with the colonial authorities, and his 
distinguished political record meant that he would be welcome to foreign 
authorities in the area. The main advantage of a merger would be the 
avoidance of duplication, and an all-round shrinkage and economy in
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staff - at present, there was the tendency for the Special Commissioner 
to insist that, whenever a new officer was appointed to the Governor- 
General' s staff, he must have someone separate for the same purpose. The 
plan of combining the two posts, Allen added, originated in the Colonial 
Office. MacDonald knew of the scheme and was prepared to accept the new 
post. Killearn, however, was hoping to remain in office until 1949 (not 
least to earn a higher pension after three years of a Grade I salary), 
and was still unaware of the proposal. Despite this, Allen was sure that 
Killearn would accept a merger - perhaps with regret, but also with 
enthusiastic endorsement of his successor as the ideal man for the 
combined post.(10)
Foreign Office officials generally supported Allen's 
recommendations (11), though Dening proposed to await the constitutional 
development of Malaya first, before reconsidering the issue in June. In 
the meantime, the Special Commission's staff could be reduced - Killearn 
had already announced his firm intention of cutting this 'gigantic 
machine' in Singapore by 17 percent.(12) However, Allen pointed out that 
Killearn's proposed reductions would still leave expenditure of 
£ 101,000 for the salaries paid by the Special Commission, while the 
Treasury had set a maximum of £ 70,000. The matter was urgent, and in 
view of the 'ridiculous duplication' in Singapore the Colonial Office 
should perhaps be consulted.(13) In the middle of April, the Treasury 
increased its pressure on the Foreign Office to reduce the costs of the 
Special Commission, and an interdepartmental meeting was scheduled to 
find a solution.(14)
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Representatives from the Foreign Office, Colonial Office and the 
Treasury met on 24 April 1947 to discuss the future of the Special 
Commission. Everyone agreed that the duties performed by the Special 
Commissioner were of the highest importance and should not be 
discontinued. However, after Edward Bridges, the head of the Treasury, 
complained that the proposed reduction was not enough the meeting agreed 
to a merger of the Special Commission with the Malayan Governor- 
General' s office. On the instigation of Sargent and Dening, the meeting 
decided that the actual amalgamation would not materialise before March 
1948, the end of Killearn's provisional appointment. In the meantime 
staff should be reduced and preliminary merging should be undertaken. 
The meeting assured that the amalgamation would not involve an 
abandonment of the policy of coordinating political, economic and 
cultural affairs throughout South-East Asia. The new merged post, it was 
decided, would be offered to Malcolm MacDonald, who would have a small 
'colonial' as well as a 'foreign' staff. (15) Bevin and-the Colonial 
Secretary Arthur Creech-Jones agreed to the proposed merger on 
7 May.(16) Attlee also gave his consent.(17)
From the Treasury's point of view, the decision to merge the 
Special Commission and the Malayan Governor-General's Office was sound. 
It would avoid duplication and it gave London the opportunity to send 
inspectors to Singapore who would examine further fields for spending 
cuts. The Colonial Office was also pleased. Though the department had 
lost some of its earlier prejudices against the Special Commission, the 
merger offered the Colonial Office an opportunity to influence 
international developments in the region. It regarded MacDonald, a
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former politician and now Colonial Office appointee, as a good choice 
for the combined post. The department was also satisfied that any 
successors would be chosen jointly by the Foreign and Colonial 
Secretaries, safeguarding it 'against the replacement of Mr. MacDonald 
by a purely Foreign Office nominee'. In addition, the merger would be a 
useful measure to counter the mounting criticism of the insufficient 
coordination between Britain's colonial administrations in South-East ' 
Asia. As Bourdillon pointed out, there had been much local criticism of 
the extravagance and duplication caused by the present multiplicity of 
government in Malaya. Though the criticism would not die down as long as 
there were separate (colonial) governments in Kuala Lumpur and 
Singapore, the implementation of the merger would do much to allay 
genuine misgivings.(18)
The decision on a merger took Killearn by complete surprise. He had
been unaware of the true reason for Allen's visit and of the subsequent
discussions in London. In the middle of March he had still confidently
noted in his diary:
'It appears that they are all in favour of keeping it tthe 
Special Commission] on, but that we have now got through a 
years work.. . and that it is now opportune to review the scope 
and orbit of our activities... Malcolm said that when he was 
home he had been asked at the Colonial Office what his views 
were as regards the continuation of this commission and he had 
emphatically recorded his view that it would be entirely 
against the public interest to withdraw it for another four or 
five years. He believed that the Colonial Office had duly 
registered what he had said.'(19)
However, a letter from Bevin in June let the cat out of the bag. 
Bevin explained that mainly financial considerations had led to the
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decision of merging the two posts. He also announced that an inspector
would visit Singapore to consider what immediate reductions could be
made, and what the future establishment of the new post would be. He
suggested that eventually there would remain some small 'colonial' and
'diplomatic' staffs with some specialist advisors remaining. (20) The
decision came as a 'shock' to Killearn who expressed the 'gravest doubts
as to the wisdom of combining the work of the two offices'. Though the
food problem was now fairly well canalised through his commission's
machinery, it could always flare up again. So far as diplomacy was
concerned, it was imperative the Special Commission remained an 'F.O.
organisation, under an F.O. man': there were testing and critical years
ahead when Britain would have to consider the nexus of world policy as
well as the 'interplay of foreign policy with the great Southern
Dominions in the area of the Far East and the Pacific'. Furthermore:
'Such position as the Special Commission may have in the eyes 
of neighbouring countries derives from the fact that it
represents the Foreign Office and is not an instrument of 
Colonial policy. The attachment of a F.O. section to the staff 
of a combined organisation is not at all the same thing, and 
never can be.'(21)
MacDonald too doubted whether the time was right for the junction 
of his and Killearn's offices, pointing out that developments in South- 
East Asia over the next few months 'may make it undesirable that the two 
offices should be amalgamated as early as next spring'. He nevertheless 
gratefully accepted the offer to take over the new post.(22) Killearn's 
former deputy, Michael Vright, who had been transferred back to London, 
also expressed his and Killearn's fears 'lest the Foreign Office
interest in, and influence on the affairs of South East Asia should be
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lost as a result of the amalgamation of the posts of Governor-General 
and Special Commissioner in March next year.'(23)
However, the Foreign Office stuck to the decision. Allen told
Wright that the department had
'...no intention of losing tits] grip in that part of the world 
and that, as long as Mr .MacDonald was out there, there seemed 
no real reason for our doing so since he was by no means a 
Colonial Official, but a distinguished politician who could view 
things from the angle of both departments. In any case this 
combined post had been Mr .Dening's original idea when he first 
put forward the proposal in the latter days of South East Asia 
Command'. (24)
Bevin further explained to Killearn that it was in fact not the Special 
Commissioner's office which was to be abolished, but that of the 
Governor-General as at present constituted. Killearn's work was to be 
carried on, and MacDonald was admirably fitted to conduct the dual task 
of colonial and foreign coordination.(25)
Unlike Killearn, the Foreign Office believed that the combined post 
would improve the coordination of British policies in South-East Asia. 
As Allen had suggested to Wright, the merger, in a way, achieved what 
had originally been planned in 1945/46: the appointment of one top
official dealing with foreign and colonial policy in South-East 
Asia.(26) However, the department failed to appreciate the effect of the 
amalgamation on the Foreign Office's regional policies. One of the main 
reasons why the Special Commission had gained credit as an organisation 
providing for international cooperation was the fact that it appeared to 
be working independently from the Colonial Office. The problem with the
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amalgamation was that it linked the international section of the Special
Commission too closely to Britain's colonial authorities in South-East
Asia. A merger between Killearn's and MacDonald's offices was bound to
reduce the Special Commission's reputation as a quasi international
organisation in South-East Asia. Consequently, its chances of developing
into a larger regional organisation acceptable particularly to the new
Asian states were greatly diminished. As Killearn pointed out to the
Foreign Office in September:
'2. Vhen Special Commission was first established there was a 
general assumption in neighbouring foreign areas that it was a 
thinly disguised agent of British National policy. This 
suspicion has been dissipated as a result of over a year's 
working.
3. But when this organisation is amalgamated into a system 
with what cannot avoid being regarded as British colonial 
complex not only will suspicion be revived but it will probably 
be intensified and thus undermine much of our work in 
establishing system of wholehearted regional consultation 
without national bias...this is, in my considered opinion, 
contrary to the best state interest at stake at the present 
time of DGreat increase in rice shortage 2)Political 
instability and uncertainty in this whole area and the Far 
East involving the well being of most of the twelve hundred 
million Asiatic people...'(27)
Vhen London made the decision to amalgamate the Special Commission, 
the Foreign Office was confident that its regional plans could remain 
unimpeded. However, in September the premature leakage of the planned 
merger to the press was to turn Killearn into a 'lame duck'. It also 
greatly diminished the prospects for turning his office into a wider 
regional organisation. As Killearn had argued, the Special Commission's 
economic wing would be unable to maintain its international prestige 
after the merger. The amalgamation, decided on financial grounds, in a
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sense foreshadowed the decline of British power and influence in South- 
East Asia in the years to cone.
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9. INDIAN AND AUSTRA L I A N  REGI O N A L  A M B I T I O N S
9.1 INDIA, THE ASIAN RELATIONS CONFERENCE AND 
INTER-ASIAN COOPERATION
Contrary to London's expectations, the decision to amalgamate 
Killearn's and MacDonald's offices diminished the chances of the Special 
Commission developing into a wider regional organisation. There was, 
however, another more serious flaw in the Foreign Office's calculations. 
The department's regional plans from February assumed that India and 
other fledgling Asian states would willingly accept British regional 
leadership in South and South-East Asia, so long as Britain distanced 
herself from Dutch and French hardline policies. The Foreign Office's 
main fault was that it largely ignored the aspirations of the Indian 
leaders to turn India rather than Britain into the political leader of 
the new Asian states.
Indian interests in South-East Asia were historical. In the pre­
colonial period Indian cultural influence, in the form of hinduism and 
buddhism, extended to Burma, Thailand, Indochina, parts of Malaya and 
Indonesia and even the Philippines. (1) Indian merchants also maintained 
significant trade links with the area. The appearance of the colonial 
powers reduced the cultural contacts between India and South-East Asia. 
However, it increased the economic interdependence between the two 
areas. Under the British, Indian labourers settled in Malaya, and the 
country developed into an important trading entrepot for Indian goods
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and textiles exported to other parts of East and South-East Asia. Burma 
became an almost exclusive market for Indian manufactured textiles and 
consumer goods. In return, British India heavily depended on Burma, 
Indonesia, Malaya, Thailand and Indochina for imports of oil, tin,
rubber, rice and timber. (2) Finally, South-East Asia was of strategic
importance to India. The Japanese invasion of South-East Asia and 
neighbouring Burma during the Second World War reminded Indians that 
South-East Asia was a key for the defence of India against an invader 
from the north-east. Vhen in 1947 India assumed independence, she was 
one of the largest and most populous countries in the world. It seemed
only natural that she would try to establish a maximum of political and
economic influence in neighbouring South-East Asia.
The conduct of India's postwar foreign policy was closely tied to 
her first Prime Minister, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, who believed that 
first and foremost India should avoid any entanglements in European
and the Vest. Shortly after assuming office in the Indian Interim
Government in September 1946, Nehru stated in a broadcast speech:
'Ve propose, as far as possible, to keep away from the power 
politics of groups, aligned against one another, which have led
in the past to world wars and which may again lead to
disasters on an even vaster scale'.
Having established the principle of non-alignment, Nehru indicated that 
there was a second aim in Indian foreign policy, namely for India to 
become the champion of the Asian independence movements and to assume a 
kind of moral leadership in Asia. He also seemed to be thinking of
possible Indian associations with South-East Asia and the Middle East:
power conflict between the Soviet Union
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'Ve are of Asia and the peoples of Asia are nearer and closer 
to us than others. India is so situated that she is the pivot 
of Western, Southern and South-East Asia. In the past her 
culture flowed to all these countries and they came to her in 
many ways. Those contacts are being renewed and the future is 
bound to see a closer union between India and South-East Asia 
on the one side, and Afghanistan, Iran, and the Arab world on 
the other. To the furtherance of that close association of free 
countries we must devote ourselves. India has followed with 
anxious interest the struggle of the Indonesians for freedom 
and to them we send out good wishes.'(3)
Nehru subsequently put his ideas on cooperation with other Asian 
states to the test. In March 1947, he convened the informal Asian 
Relations Conference in New Delhi which was attended by delegates from 
28 Asian countries, some of which were still under colonial rule. During 
the meeting, he denied that India had any desire for Asian leadership. 
However, behind the scenes he proposed creating an inter-Asian 
organisation with a permanent secretariat on Indian soil. Western 
observers suspected Nehru wanted to establish India as the moral if not 
political leader of the Asian independence movements. In the event, 
Indian ambitions failed. The Chinese delegations successfully lobbied 
against an Indian-dominated Asian organisation, while the smaller 
countries of South-East Asia expressed their fear of Indian or Chinese 
domination. Instead, some suggested an exclusively South-East Asian 
grouping. The Middle Eastern countries remained altogether disinterested 
and the six attending Soviet republics also largely refrained.(4) 
Despite the conference's disappointing outcome Nehru was to intensify 
his efforts in the following two years to create for India a leading 
position amongst the states of South-East Asia. Though he refrained from 
launching new regional initiatives until January 1949, he nevertheless 
used the occasion of the Dutch police action in July 1947 to put India
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in the forefront of international opposition to colonial rule in Asia. 
The United Nations served as a welcome platform for his anti-colonial 
rhetoric.(5) Apart from his genuine outrage about Dutch policies, there 
is little doubt that Nehru was using the Indonesian question to further 
India's standing in South-East Asia.
London was slow to grasp Indian aspirations in South-East Asia. 
Though the Foreign Office acknowledged the fact that a South-East Aslan 
regional system had to include the Indians, its plans from February 1947 
underestimated Nehru's desire for South-East Asian leadership. So far as 
the Asian Relations Conference was concerned, the British were initially 
apprehensive: the India Office regarded the conference's announcement in 
September 1946 as a sign of the Indian Interim Government's expansive 
tendencies in foreign affairs, and the Foreign Office complained about 
Soviet participation.(6) However, when the conference failed to produce 
a permanent Asian Organisation, London lost interest in the issue. It 
was only after India's continuing agitation on behalf of the Indonesian 
Republic that the Foreign Office was beginning to take Indian ambitions 
in South-East Asia into account.
London also underestimated some of the conference's side-effects. 
For the Asian Relations Conference encouraged a series of international 
initiatives for regional cooperation, most of which excluded the 
colonial powers. Weeks after the meeting in New Delhi, the Burmese 
leader, Aung San, called for a 'South-East Asia Economic Union' 
consisting of Burma, Indonesia, Thailand, Indochina and Malaya.(7) In 
June, the French proposed a 'Pan South East Asian Union' during Franco-
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Thai negotiations in Washington on the Indochinese territories annexed 
by Bangkok.(8) Though neither proposals ever took off, a group of 
intellectuals from Thailand, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Indonesia, Burma 
and Malaya officially founded a 'South Bast Asia League' on 8 September 
1947. The league's manifesto spoke critically of South-East Asia's 
foreign domination and subjugation, postulating that the days of 
colonialism were past. It also claimed that there was an increasing 
sentiment among the subjected peoples of South-East Asia to 'join in an 
effort toward a regional development of common interests' as had been 
expressed during the Asian Relations Conference and in Rangoon with the
late Aung San (Aung San had been assassinated on 19 July 1947). The
league's primary aim was described as the achievement of unity among the 
various peoples of South-East Asia, leading to a 'Federation of South- 
East Asia'. (9) As in the case of the Asian Relations Conference, the
Foreign Office initially paid little attention to such proposals. It
failed to appreciate that its own idea of European-Asian cooperation in 
South-East Asia was being superseded by proposals for exclusively Asian 
alignments, and that the prospects for Britain's regional plans were 
worsening given the mood of Asian nationalists.
9.2 AUSTRALIAN REGIONAL INITIATIVES
While London showed little concern about Asian regional 
initiatives in 1947, it took Australian proposals more seriously. Ever 
since the Canberra Agreement between Australia and Few Zealand in 1944 
(see chapter on the 1946 Prime Ministers' Meeting) Australia had shown a
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much more active interest in South, South-East and East Asia - areas
colloquially referred to as 'The Hear North'.(10) Australian interest in
a South-East Asian Regional Commission during the 1946 Prime Ministers
Conference was a further sign that Canberra - at a time when the
political situation in Europe's Asian colonies was in a state of flux -
was aiming for a greater say in the region. Attlee's announcement on 20 
«
February 1947 on the transfer of power in India encouraged the
Australian Foreign Minister, Dr.Herbert V. Evatt, to take Australian
interests in South-East Asia (in which he included India) one step
further. On 26 February 1947 he stated in the Australian House of
Representatives in Canberra that Australia was interested in
strengthened relations with the new India. He claimed his country was
directly concerned with the recent trends and developments towards
political autonomy in both India and Indonesia:
'Just so far as the peoples of South East Asia cease to be
dependent upon the decisions of European Governments, so far
do Australia's interests in the councils of South East Asia
increase. Ve must work for a harmonious association of
democratic states in the South East Asia area, and see in the 
development of their political maturity (an) opportunity for
greatly increased political, cultural and commercial co­
operation'.
Turning to India, Evatt expressed his hope that the country would 
develop on democratic lines and remain within the Commonwealth, and that
she would contribute to the welfare and security of the nations that
were neighbouring on the Indian Ocean. Australia could help solve 
India's industrial and agricultural problems and would 'welcome an
opportunity to discuss frankly with the Government of India matters of 
common concern'. Closer cooperation between India and Australia could 
also benefit other countries in the region:
-  208 -
'The time has now arrived when there should be formed in South 
East Asia and the Vestem Pacific an appropriate regional 
instrumentality, concerning itself with the interest of all the 
peoples of this area. It should include the representatives of 
the peoples and Governments directly interested in the 
problems of the South East Asia area. Geographically contiguous 
the peoples of South East Asia and our own peoples have many 
important interests in common. The proposed regional 
instrumentality will at least facilitate the free and rapid 
interchange of basic information concerning the problems of 
administration, education, health, agriculture, commerce and 
cultural relations. As in the case of the South Pacific, an 
appropriate plan for regional co-operation designed to promote 
the well-being of the people of the Vestern Pacific and South 
East Asia should be put into operation'. (11)
Evatt subsequently followed up his proposals for a 'regional 
instrumentality' in South-East Asia and the Vest Pacific, announcing on 
5 March that Australia intended to invite some 13 countries, including 
India, Burma, Thailand, Malaya, Indonesia, the Philippines, Britain, the 
United States, France and the Netherlands to a conference to discuss 
defence, trade and cultural relations in the Indian Ocean and in the 
South-Vest Pacific.(12)
While Evatt's first speech was primarily a manifestation of 
Australia's growing interest in South and South-East Asia in expectation 
of Indian independence, his subsequent idea of a regional 
instrumentality was clearly inspired by the forthcoming Asian Relations 
Conference, Australia had not been invited to the all-Asian meeting, and 
Evatt feared being left out of Asian regional developments; hence his 
proposal for an Australian-sponsored international conference on South 
and South-East Asia. However, the British were not too pleased about 
Evatt's conference proposal, which potentially interfered with their own
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plans and which constituted a veiled challenge to Britain's lead on 
South-East Asian regional developments.
Initially, British officials in London and Singapore were aware 
only of Evatt's first speech on India and a regional instrumentality in 
South-East Asia. At the Colonial Office, Ian Vatt saw Evatt's initiative 
as inspired by the CSouth-Vest) Pacific Commission and the Caribbean 
Commission. These were both blocks of colonial territories administered 
by 'responsible and advanced sovereign states' who would find it 
relatively easy to collaborate in promoting the economic and social 
progress of their non-self-governing peoples. However, such conditions 
did not exist in South-East Asia. There were now three colonial powers 
in the area:
'a) the Dutch, whose empire is ceasing to exist; b) the French, 
whose Empire is already much reduced; and c) ourselves, whose 
Asiatic interests are undergoing an extraordinarily rapid 
change and whose position is bound to be affected by events in 
the French and Dutch territories'. _
Vatt suspected that Evatt probably wanted to involve India and Burma in 
such cooperation - in fact, he thought that they could not be ignored. 
Vatt feared that a South-East Asian commission on the lines of the 
already existing ones would mean that the commission's Conference, (i.e. 
the auxiliary body to the commission created to give the indigenous 
population the opportunity to participate in the organisation's work) 
would 'tend to become far and away the biggest thing connected with the 
Commission'. This would allow countries like India and the Philippines 
'to stimulate in our colonies that brand of nationalism which we do not 
want to go out of our way to encourage' . Furthermore, there already
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existed Killearn's organisation which extended British influence through 
economic encouragement and guidance. Such guidance could be extended to 
a wider range of subjects. There was also the proposal to set up the 
UN's Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East, ECAFE (see the 
following chapter) which would cover India, the Philippines, Malaya and 
Indonesia. Both ECAFE and the Special Commission would surely provide 
adequate opportunity for economic collaboration.(13)
The Colonial Office, ever fearful of outside interference in the
European colonies, was thus disinclined towards further regional
experiments. Lord Killearn, on the other hand, who was planning to visit
Australia and who had been Invited by Evatt to discuss regional
cooperation, initially described the Australian initiative as
encouraging. However, he also urged caution, doubting that content and
timing of Evatt's proposals were suitable. Unlike the Colonial Office,
the Special Commissioner did not seem to fear the inclusion, but the
exclusion of Asian nationalists from a regional organisation:
'Ve must in my view be very careful to avoid giving the 
impression that our policy is that of South East Asia for the 
Europeans or, indeed for the white race. Yet if we were to 
proceed with proposals for a Regional Association before 
political agreement has been reached in the Netherlands East 
Indies and French Indo-China two of the principal territories 
in South East Asia would be represented by European 
administrations whereas they ought to be represented by 
administrations of Europeans and Asiatics in partnership.'
Added to this was the question of whether Burma, Ceylon, India and China 
wouldn't have to be included, and what about U.S. and Soviet 
participation? Furthermore, if Evatt had the South Pacific or Anglo- 
Caribbean Commissions as precedents in mind, these organisations were
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colonial organisations, whereas South-East Asia varied greatly in its 
state of political development. Finally, other proposals for regional 
association were being mooted, there was for example the suggestion to 
set up ECAFE, which might unnecessarily invite Russia to take an 
interest and perhaps make difficulties for Britain in an area which at 
the moment was relatively free from Russian interference. There was also 
the Indian government which was sponsoring conferences on economic, 
social and other problems in Asia, while both India and China were 
playing for leadership throughout the Far East. In view of these 
unresolved issues, Killearn recommended to wait until the situation in 
Indonesia and Indochina had become clearer, admitting though that it 
might become impossible to postpone some form of regional association 
much longer, and that something on the lines of Evatt's proposals 
presented fewer disadvantages than others.(14)
Evatt's proposals for a regional instrumentality in South-East 
Asia inspired an Interdepartmental meeting on 20 March. Richard Allen, 
Just back from Singapore, apparently used the meeting to propose the 
conversion of the Special Commission into a proper regional 
commission.(15) However, Allen failed to convince J.S.Bennet^rfrom the 
Colonial Office who maintained that he had to study any proposal for a 
new form of regional organisation very carefully before submitting it to 
a higher authority. Bennett also saw a good deal of force in Killearn's 
points against a regional commission pattern - particularly until more 
was known about ECAFE. The Dominions Office supported his view. For the 
time being, Killearn should only hold preliminary talks on the subject 
with Evatt.(16) As Allen subsequently pointed out to Sargent, the
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meeting had been inconclusive since there were still 'so many vague and 
imponderable factors'.(17)
Undeterred by the meeting's outcome, Allen subsequently drafted a 
telegram instructing Killearn to explain to Evatt the working of the 
Liaison Officers' Meetings and to offer putting the meetings on an 
international footing, either by having an elected chairman from any of 
the territories represented or by arranging a rotating chairmanship. 
This way, Australia would be able to play a leading role in these 
gatherings.(18) Allen's proposals would have significantly changed the 
nature of Killearn's organisation and would have been a first step from 
a British-led quasi-international body to a truly inter-governmental 
commission. It seems that Allen aimed at de-coupling the Liaison
Officer's Meetings from the Special Commission in time before the 
organisation's proposed merger with the Governor-General's Office which 
he had recommended to Whitehall only a few days before.
However, Allen's proposals to 'internationalize' the Liaison
Officers' Meetings failed to convince Orme Sargent who argued against an 
elected or rotating chairmanship on the grounds that no other chairman 
would be of Killearn's stature. Killearn should therefore confine
himself to listening to what Evatt had to say and explain the details of 
the Special Commission in turn. Talks on this question had to be held on 
a government to government basis, and Evatt should not think that 
Killearn was enpowered to speak for the whole government, particularly 
as this would offend the UK High Commissioner in Australia. Sargent had
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therefore drafted a new telegram which would be used as the basis for 
further interdepartmental consultations. (19)
Before a reply was sent out to the Special Commissioner, news 
reached London of Evatt's invitation from 5 March to hold an 
international conference on South-East Asia and the South-West Pacific. 
London was now beginning to sense Canberra's underlying challenge to 
Britain's regional lead. Sir David Monteath of the India Office regarded 
Evatt's latest proposal as a 'counterblast' to the Asian Relations 
Conference. Together, India and Australia had the capacity of exercising 
the greatest influence in the Indian and South-East Asian area, but 
however natural it seemed that Australia should take a particular 
interest or even seek to play a leading role in this part of the world, 
Australian policy should be developed in concert with Britain, 
especially since the future of India was uncertain. It was British 
policy to steer Jndia and Burma into a relationship in which they would 
cooperate with Britain and Australia, either within the Commonwealth or 
as an ally. Evatt should therefore be told that Australia's interest in 
the area was obvious, but that the precise formulation of a scheme for 
regional association would be premature before India's constitutional 
problem was resolved and her position in relation to the Commonwealth 
was established. For Australia to try and impose a regional organisation 
with herself in the lead would be as little acceptable to the Asian 
countries concerned as similar attempts by the European powers.(20) 
Monteath added in a second letter that there existed different spheres 
of collaboration, i.e. economic, social and strategic, which would not 
always coincide. Security cooperation for example would in the case of
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Britain, Australia and probably India extend to areas outside of South- 
East Asia, 'for any security system within that area would be of little 
use unless it is linked with a system stretching westwards from India to 
cover the Middle East.'(21)
Killearn received his instructions on 8 April, four days before
his departure for Australia and New Zealand. The Foreign Office's
telegram agreed with Killearn's comments and advised him to find out
what kind of instrumentality Evatt had in mind, to explain the work of
the Special Commission and to express the desire for closer
collaboration with Australia within his organisation. At the same time,
Killearn should emphasize that he was not speaking for the colonial
governments or the Ministry of Defence. Furthermore, he should explain
to Evatt the need to avoid giving the impression of developing a white
man's policy for South-East Asia. So far as cooperation with India was
concerned, time was needed for the situation to clarify, as also in the
case of Indonesia and Indochina:
'Any attempt to present them with a cut-and-dried policy of
United Kingdom or Australian manufacture would be likely to
frustrate our main object of securing the wholehearted and 
friendly cooperation of India and Burma, whether they remain in 
the Commonwealth or not.'(22)
Killearn met Evatt in Canberra on 17 April where he explained the 
Special Commission's functions and the regional work of the monthly food 
liaison meetings. Vhen Killearn later on enquired what precisely Evatt 
had in mind with his proposed regional instrumentality, he got 'very 
little new from him, maybe owing to his having gathered from my remarks 
at lunch that the Special Commission was in practice covering the ground
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which he had in mind, to some considerable extent'. According to
Killearn, Evatt appreciated his warning to proceed with caution, to
await how ECAFE was going to work, and to avoid any impression of
wanting to create a 'white man's' organisation. Evatt also agreed that 
the timing of new initiatives would have to await the clarification of 
the situation in Indo-China. At the same time, Killearn stressed that 
everyone in Singapore wanted to see Australia more closely associated 
with British activities, and that there were great commercial and trade 
opportunities for Australia in South-East Asia.(23)
Killearn's talks in Canberra gave the Foreign Office the 
impression that Evatt had not been informed on the extent of regional 
collaboration already achieved by the Special Commission.(24) As Allen 
minuted:
'Dr Evatt seems to have discovered that most of the
"instrumentality" after which he hankers (under Australian 
leadership) already exists under the aegis of the Special 
Commissioner and U.K. leadership. He may not greatly care for 
this but on the other hand it may be difficult for him not to 
accept this situation with a good grace.'
Allen also pointed out that Hew Zealand opposed Australian designs to 
play a greater role in Asia.(25) Few Zealand's Secretary for External 
Affairs, McIntosh, had informed Britain of recent talks with Evatt and 
J.V.Burton, the head of Australia's External Affairs Department. 
According to the Few Zealander, Evatt hoped that countries like India, 
Burma, Malaya and Indonesia, which were steadily moving* towards self- 
government and independence, could be induced to turn to Australia for 
guidance, help and leadership which they would prefer not to seek from
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the Vest. He saw this as the basis of Evatt's policy of 'currying favour 
with Nationalists in these countries'. At the same time, the Australians 
seemed to have given little thought to what might be on the agenda of 
their proposed South-East Asian regional conference. McIntosh had 
replied that his country feared that supporting the 'resurgent 
Nationalist Eastern peoples would result in New Zealand (and Australia) 
becoming tiny white islands in a large coloured sea', and that 
Australian help would not be returned with gratitude. New Zealand 
opposed water-tight regional arrangements and preferred wider
organisations such as the United Nations.(26)
Killearn's talks in Australia and the report by McIntosh gave 
London the impression that the Australian proposals were only half-
baked. Evatt had been unaware of the Special Commission's regional work, 
despite the fact that the Australian Commissioner in Singapore had been 
working closely with Killearn ever since the latter's arrival in South- 
East Asia. Vhen Killearn stopped over in Canberra on 13 June during his 
return trip from New Zealand, Evatt no longer mentioned his regional 
plans.(27) He was increasingly preoccupied with the forthcoming
Commonwealth Conference in Canberra, that was scheduled for 26 August. 
The meeting had been arranged to prepare a common Commonwealth line on 
the question of a Japanese peace treaty, another sphere of Anglo- 
Australian disagreements.(28) Since Evatt was to chair the meeting, it 
seems that his desire for an international conference in Australia which 
would deal with Asian issues was at least partly fulfilled, and that he 
therefore dropped his plans for a South-East Asian conference. (The
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Foreign Office records of the Canberra conference include no references 
to regional cooperation in South-East Asia.)
Despite the failure of Evatt's South-East Asian initiative, he had
made it clear that Canberra was demanding a greater say in the affairs
of South and South-East Asia. Britain was watching this increasingly
independent line in Australia's foreign policy with some concern.
According to a Foreign Office minute from 21 May:
'[Evatt's] present policy is to keep in with the present 
nationalist movements...with the idea that Australia might be 
able to take over leadership from the present European 
occupying powers. He would in fact like to be in on the ground 
floor. New Zealand on the other hand would prefer to stick to 
the United Nations and British Commonwealth, and to much wider 
* regional arrangements'. (29)
However, as Dening pointed out:
'Ve must not lose sight of the consideration that Australia may 
not always be Dr.Evatt. Vhile Dr.Evatt dominates Australia's 
foreign policy, I think it can be said that the broad aim is to 
put Australia in the foreground of the picture wherever it can 
be managed, I don't think he really judges any prior grouping 
by what area it covers, but by how far Australia can 
predominate in it. New Zealand inclines ... to the view that in 
a grouping such as that contemplated in Dr .Evatt's S.E.A. 
instrumentality, Australia and N.Z. would risk becoming small 
white islands in a coloured sea.'(30)
In the following months and years, Canberra continued seeking a 
more active involvement in South-East Asia. Like Nehru, the Australians 
used the Dutch police action in July 1947 to woo the Asian nationalist 
movements, by sharply condemning the Dutch offensive and by taking 
(together with India) the Indonesian problem to the Security Council. 
The Indonesian Republic subsequently nominated Australia as its member
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of the UN's Good Offices Committee (the Netherlands nominated Belgium 
and both sides picked the United States as third member). However, there 
were limits to Australia's influence amongst the new Asian states. 
Asians resented Australia's traditional ‘White Australia' policy, which 
severely limited Asian immigration into the country. In June 1948, for 
example, an Australian good-will mission to South-East Asia was facing 
embarrassing criticism in Malaya of the recent expulsion of a number of 
Malayan seamen from Australia.(31)
Despite this, Canberra remained alert to any opportunities for 
furthering its influence in South-East Asia. In September 1947, London 
confidentially informed Australia, New Zealand and South Africa of the 
planned amalgamation in Singapore. Though the British maintained that 
the Special Commission's international activities would continue 
unimpaired(32), Canberra spotted an opening. J.V.Burton, Secretary of 
the Australian Department of External Affairs, soon enquired about the 
exact reasons for the merger. Canberra was concerned lest there was a 
diminution of the Special Commissioner's work and of the 'co-operation 
and goodwill' which he had built up over the past 18 months between 
British as well as neighbouring foreign countries. Burton tentatively 
suggested that the Special Commissioner's organisation should continue 
separately as a joint British-Australian responsibility. The Australian 
Minister in China, Professor Copland, might be a suitable candidate for 
the Special Commissioner's post.(33)
London viewed Canberra's suggestion with great suspicion. At the 
Colonial Office Bourdillon pointed out that Burton had previously been
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reported as having anti-British feelings, 'which would probably accord 
with his desire to see the Australian interest in South-East Asia 
strengthened'. The Foreign, Colonial and Commonwealth Relations Offices 
agreed and decided to send Canberra a polite refusal.(34) Though London 
managed to block Burton's proposals, the episode proved that other 
countries interpreted the planned amalgamation as a weakening in 
Britain's South-East Asian policies, it also showed that London's 
regional competitors were eager to step in. The Foreign Office must have 
been wondering whether the decision to merge Killearn's and MacDonald's 
offices had been such a good idea after all.
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lO, RE G I O N A L  RIVALS; ECAFE AND THE 
S P E C I A L  C O M M I S S I O N
10,1 THE UN AND REGIONAL COOPERATION
As we have seen, London was in 1947 facing Indian and Australian 
competition in South-East Asia's regional game. After only little 
forewarning, the United Nations Organisation too declared its interest 
in Asian regional developments. As a result of pressure primarily by 
China and India, the United Nations' Economic and Social Council 
(ECOSOC) decided on 19 March 1947 to establish the Economic Commission 
for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE), covering South, South-East, and East 
Asia. ECAFE constituted the most serious threat so far to the Special 
Commission's and ^sd thereby Britain's lead in organising regional 
cooperation on the 'technical level'. Unlike the Special Commission, 
which was regarded as a British rather than/international organisation, 
ECAFE derived instant legitimacy as an intergovernmental body from its 
UN background. Furthermore, since ECAFE was given only advisory 
functions without a clearly defined economic task, it wasn't long before 
the new commission demanded for itself some of the coordinating 
functions successfully performed by the Special Commission.
Before examining the rivalry between ECAFE and the Special 
Commission in 1947, the former's background has to be highlighted. Plans 
for ECAFE dated back to a proposal by Britain, the United States and 
Poland in 1946 to establish an Economic Commission for Europe (ECE) in
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order to meet the challenge of war devastation. (The Polish socialist 
and peasant parties were keen on maintaining economic strings with the 
Vest). ECE was intended to bring together existing European economic 
bodies, such as the Emergency Economic Committee for Europe, the 
European Coal Organisation and the European Central Inland Organisation. 
It would also continue the work of the United Nations Relief and 
Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA), which the United States had 
stopped funding because it was seen as propping up anti-American 
governments in Eastern Europe.(1)
Vhen the question of ECE was considered by the Second Committee of
the UN's General Assembly at the end of 1946, the Asian members of the
UN, particularly China and India, made it clear that they would only
support the proposed commission for Europe if a similar organisation was
established in Asia. The Asian demand was backed by the Latin American
countries. Though most European countries doubted whether there was a
need for an economic commission in Asia, they bowed to Asian demands in
order not to forestall the creation of ECE. Consequently, the UN's
General Assembly recommended unanimously on 11 December 1946 that:
'In order to give effective aid to countries devastated by war, 
the Economic and Social Council at its next session give 
prompt and favourable consideration to the establishment of an 
Economic Commission for Europe, and an Economic Commission 
for Asia and the Far East'.(2)
The General Assembly's recommendation constituted a diplomatic 
victory for India and China. It meant that the United States and the 
European countries recognized in principle that Asia's reconstruction 
needs were equal to those of Europe.(3) However, the General Assembly's
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recommendations weren't sufficient to decide on the new commissions' 
establishment. First, the questions of ECE and ECAFE had to be referred 
to the UN's Economic and Social Council (ECOSQC) which would have the 
final say. At ECOSOC, special working groups were therefore established 
to discuss the proposed commissions.
Though Britain had supported the General Assembly's recommendation 
on ECE and ECAFE, she still maintained serious doubts about the latter. 
London argued that, unlike in Europe, there existed no international 
organisations in Asia which an economic commission could bring together. 
Nor was the degree of economic solidarity in Asia as high as in Europe. 
Furthermore, none of Britain's Asian territories were looking for 
concrete UN assistance in their reconstruction problems.(4) The Colonial 
Office was particularly unenthusiastic about ECAFE and it suggested 
postponing the question to a later ECOSOC session.(5) However, the first 
meeting of the ECOSOC Working Group on ECAFE revealed that both China 
and India insisted on the commission's Immediate establishment. They 
were supported by the Netherlands, the Philippines and the Soviet 
Union.(6) In view of the strong support for ECAFE, the Foreign Office 
instructed its representative at ECOSOC, J.P.Stent, not to oppose the 
Chinese proposal but to ensure that the council would have a free hand 
in determining the commission's composition and organisation.(7)
However, the Foreign Office line failed to take into account the 
views of British officials in Singapore. For reasons of neglect, Lord 
Killearn wasn't told about the UN's negotiations on ECAFE before 21 
February, more than two months after the General Assembly had passed its
-  224 -
recommendation. A telegram from London belatedly explained that the 
Foreign Office was hoping to delay the question to a later ECOSOC 
session, but that the Chinese chairman of the ECAFE Working Party 
insisted that if an economic commission was established in Europe there 
would have to be a similar commission for Asia or at least a field 
mission which would then turn into a proper Asian commission. The Indian 
delegate too was lobbying for ECAFE, and he made it clear that the 
'question of Asiatic prestige was involved'. For the time being, Stent 
had been instructed 'not to oppose any reasonable suggestion put forward 
by the Chinese, but to leave the functions of any Far Eastern Economic 
Commission as a matter for decision by the Economic and Social Council'. 
In case ECAFE was set up, London enquired whether Killearn knew of any 
useful jobs for the proposed commission.(8)
Killearn was taken by complete surprise, and after consultation 
with MacDonald recommended blocking any proposals for the establishment 
of ECAFE. He argued that in the existing political situation such an 
international body might easily have dangerous results, and that 
ECOSOC's lack of funds would disappoint and disillusion hopes for loans 
and other forms of assistance. It was also in Killearn's experience that
the staff required for such an organisation could not be provided by the
territories concerned. Furthermore, the Special Commission's Liaison 
Officer's Meetings were themselves trying to extend their scope and 
could be geared over a much wider economic field. The IEFC had already 
accepted the meetings as its main instrument in South-East Asia, and had 
put this on a constitutional basis by establising a sub-committee on
rice in Singapore. Killearn therefore wondered whether ECOSOC could be
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to operate through his Liaison Officers' Meetings - on the
same lines as the IEFC. If, on the other hand, the establishment of
ECAFE was unavoidable, Killearn suggested the commission might deal with
areas such as industrialisation, taxation, customs duties and forestry
research. His own organisation already covered foodstuffs, coal, and the
regulation of food production and had held specialised regional
conferences on nutrition and health; a social welfare conference was
furthermore under consideration. Killearn therefore proposed that a
small preparatory field mission should be appointed 'with an eye on the
possibility that it might recommend that a more permanent body was
unnecessary'. Finally, Killearn repeated his misgivings about the ECAFE
project which was
'...revealing (as ft does once again) consistent determination 
of India and China (either separately or together) generally to 
oust us from leadership in this area. Both politically and 
strategically that seems to me highly undesirable. It also 
presumably means bringing Russia into the affairs of South 
East Asia.'(9)
Killearn's telegram was communicated to the Foreign Office and to
the British delegation at the United Rations. From Hew York, J.P.Stent
argued that Killearn had not been kept fully informed of the fact that
the General Assembly's resolution made a strong demand for ECAFE
inevitable. British opposition to the plan would have had awkward
political consequences and would at best have received the support of
Australia, Hew Zealand and the United States. It was currently proposed
that ECAFE should act as a coordinating body on all economic subjects:
'It would normally take over all the unofficial conferences 
which Lord Killearn has been holding on matters other than 
food, and it is for consideration whether it should take over
f'
pursuaded
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his functions in respect of food and particularly of 
allocations of rice'.
Stent added that this would not happen until the commission was fully 
established. A preparatory field mission, on the other hand* would be 
strongly opposed 'for the very reason that Lord Killearn favours it, 
namely that it might recommend that an Economic Commission is 
unnecessary'.(10)
Taken to their logical conclusion, Stent's arguments implied the 
abolition of the Special Commission in the foreseeable future. At a time 
when the Foreign Office was still harbouring ambitious plans for the 
expansion of Killearn's organisation, Stent's telegram didn't go down 
well in London. The Foreign Office told Stent two days later on that it 
had 'serious doubts as to the useful and practical work E.C.A.F.E. could 
do' and that it had 'no desire to see it set up'. Stent should therefore 
ensure that ECOSOC would only despatch a field mission, which would 
report back later on. Failing this, he should make sure that the 
commission's main functions were confined to fact-finding.(11)
By the time that the Foreign Office's objections reached New York, 
however, the ECAFE Working Group had already completed its report to 
ECOSOC, recommending the immediate establishment of ECAFE. Stent, who 
had supported the decision, refused to take the blame, complaining to 
London that his conflicting instructions could have been avoided had the 
South-East Asian authorities been informed earlier on. Killearn's 
opposition to ECAFE had so clearly been based on misapprehensions, it
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had not occured to the British delegation that his views could be
A
endorsed by the British government. The first suggestion that London
shared Killearn's views had reached Stent too late for him to act
accordingly in the Working Group.
'If, as a result of this sequence of events, I am found to have 
committed H.M.G. to a course of action which they do not wholly 
approve, I hope at least that I may be personally acquitted of 
exceeding instructions which I did not receive in time to make 
use of them.'(12)
The Foreign Office subsequently admitted that some of its instructions 
to Stent had not been sufficiently explicit.(13)
It was, however, too late for Britain to prevent the new 
organisation. After unsuccessful calls by the United States to delay a 
decision, ECOSOC on 19 March 1947 unanimously approved the establishment 
of ECAFE, following its earlier decision in favour of ECE.(14) The new 
commission was instructed to:
1) Initiate and participate in measures for facilitating concerted 
action for the economic reconstruction of Asia and the Far East, for 
raising the level of economic activity . . . and for maintaining and 
strengthening the economic relations of these areas both among 
themselves and with other countries of the world.
2) Make or sponsor...investigations and studies of economic and 
technological problems and development within...Asia and the Far East, 
and
3) Undertake or sponsor the collection, evaluation and dissemination 
of... economic, technological and statistical information. (15)
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Furthermore, ECAFE was directed to act within the UN framework, subject 
to the general supervision of ECOSOC, and to take no action in respect 
to any country without the agreement of the government of that country. 
ECAFE was thus created mainly because of Asian prestige considerations 
within the UN. According to Lalita Prasad Singh, a leading historian on 
ECAFE, the establishment of ECAFE was in a sense a '.concrete recognition 
by the world organization of the political renaissance of Asia'.(16)
ECAFE's terms of reference covered vast parts of the Asian 
continent. By definition, Asia and the Far East included in the first 
instance British North Borneo, Brunei and Sarawak, the Malayan Union and 
Singapore, Hong Kong, Burma and Ceylon, the Indochinese Federation, the 
Netherlands East Indies (Indonesia), India, China, the Philippine 
Republic and Thailand. Only four of these countries and territories were 
also full members of the commission, namely India, China, the 
Philippines and Thailand. To this were added the region's three colonial 
powers, Britain, France and the Netherlands, as well as the United
States, Australia and the Soviet Union. (By 1981 ECAFE's name had been
r\0
changed to Echini c and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) 
with a membership of 35 countries) ECAFE's organisational structure 
crystallized in the months and years after its foundation. It consisted 
of a commission with its committees, sub-committees and specialized 
conferences, and of a secretariat. The commission was ECAFE's main 
policy-making body. It included representatives from each of ECAFE's 
member-countries, initially meeting twice and later on once every year. 
Decisions were being made by simple majority vote. ECAFE's permanent 
secretariat, on the other hand, was both a research institute and a
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service agency for the commission and its subsidiary bodies. It was also 
an integral part of the UN's secretariat. ECAFE's Executive Secretary 
was the head of the secretariat, engaging also in diplomatic activities 
on behalf of the commission.(17)
During its first years, ECAFE's limitations began to show. The 
organisation had no clearly defined powers and was still looking for 
concrete economic tasks. Rather than dealing with the imminent problem 
of postwar relief, such as the Special Commission was doing, ECAFE's 
functions were of an advisory nature on medium and long term economic 
reconstruction and development, and the commission occupied itself with 
research and the collection of economic data and information. Secondly, 
ECAFE lacked sufficient funds to finance large-scale development 
programmes, and hopes by countries like China that the commission could 
serve as a clearing house for international aid were soon dashed by the 
United States.(18) Vhile ECAFE's economic impact was limited, it did 
assume some political importance: after all, the organisation had been 
created not to fulfil specific economic purposes but for reasons of 
prestige affecting Aslan members of the UR. India soon used ECAFE as a 
welcome platform for the propagation of Asian independence. The 
commission's initial meetings were largely preoccupied with the 
controversial issue of the Indonesian Republic's associate membership, 
suggested by India and opposed by the Retherlands, Britain and the 
United States. At the same time, ECAFE sessions were increasingly being 
dominated by Cold War rhetoric between the Soviet Union and the Western 
powers.
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Soon after ECAFE's creation, the Foreign Office was beginning to
sense ECAFE's potential political importance, and it decided to change
its line from delaying the new commission to actively supporting it
in order to guide ECAFE along pro-British lines. (19) London's change of
mind was inspired by Killearn who told the Foreign Office on the day
before ECOSOC's vote on ECAFE that it would now be important for Britain
to take a leading part in ECAFE, and that a reference to the Special
Commission would have to be included in ECAFE's terms of reference to
safeguard Killearn's organisation against interference by the new
commission. (20) Killearn continued to maintain reservations about ECAFE,
not least because it included Soviet membership. However, the decision
to set up ECAFE had been taken, and there was no going back on it:
'How we can best turn E.C.A.F.E to advantage will no doubt 
emerge more clearly as time goes on. But I should certainly 
favour His Majesty's Government taking a leading part in it. I 
should also welcome from the outset close and friendly contact 
between this mission and E.C.A.F.E.'
At the same time, there was presumably no intention that the 
establishment of ECAFE should signal 'for cessation of effort by 
individual territories to promote objects at which they and E.C.A.F.E. 
are in common aiming. '(21) In other words: the creation of ECAFE mustn't 
lead to the end of the Special Commission's regional work.
The Foreign Office soon adopted Killearn's line of pragmatic 
support for ECAFE. However, its change of policy did not remain 
unchallenged by other departments in London. On 15 April a working party 
on ECAFE appointed by the International Organisation Committee, Far 
East, met for the first time. H.A.F. Rumbold from the India Office
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argued that India and China would soon come to realise the limits of 
ECAFE's powers, and that they might be willing to let it die a natural 
death. It just did not appear to him that ECAFE was capable of
performing a useful coordinating function. However, Dening pointed out 
that it was in keeping with London's UN policy to support the commission 
and that Britain's presence helped control Russian influence. Stent, who 
had returned from New York, added that if ECAFE had not been set up 
India would probably have tried to establish 'something of the kind' as 
the outcome of the Asian Relations Conference. He believed that such a 
body outside of the UN would be to Britain's disadvantage: instead,
ECAFE was Britain's opportunity to guide Far Eastern developments along 
practical lines. The Foreign Office didn't convince the Colonial Office 
representative, J.S.Bennett, who expressed his department's fears lest 
the Indians and the Chinese used the commission merely as a political 
body to chase the Europeans out of the Far East. Dening countered that 
the Asian Relations Conference had shown that Asian unity was not very 
strong.
In the end, the Foreign Office's line prevailed: the Working Party
agreed that Britain should attempt to 'guide the commission along
practical lines', but that the British delegation to the first ECAFE 
session in Shanghai should consult Whitehall before agreeing to any
expansion of the commission's activities. <22) Britain's new line was 
summarized in a brief for the British delegation to ECAFE. The paper 
pointed out that despite initial reservations London had now decided to
welcome the creation of ECAFE, in order not to openly oj^ppose Asian
wishes. Britain endeavoured to keep ECAFE's constitution on 'sound
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lines', ensuring also that the commission confined itself to practical 
tasks which would not interfere with Britain's own reconstruction 
efforts in Asia.(23)
However, the Foreign Office had gravely underestimated the 
difficulty of bringing ECAFE into line with its plans for the future of 
the Special Commission. In April, Stent had stated at the UN that 
Killearn's organisation would be glad to cooperate with ECAFE and that 
it would continue to function until the need for it was no longer felt, 
'i.e. until the Commission shows itself capable of doing the job equally 
well'. (24) This was in fact more than the Foreign Office intended to 
give away; despite London's decision to merge Killearn's and MacDonald's 
organisations it intended to maintain and possibly even extend the 
Special Commission's international section. During ECAFE's first session 
in Shanghai in July, the British representative, Sir Andrew Clow, after 
welcoming ECAFE, therefore stressed that the Special Commission had 
already gained experience in South-East Asia. To avoid repetition or an 
overlapping of the commissions' work he suggested the two organisations 
coordinated their efforts.(25)
To London's surprise, Clow's initiative was unsuccessful. A 
reference to 'specialised and other agencies' contained in a final 
resolution tabled by Britain was defeated by the votes of the Asian 
countries as well as the United States and the Soviet Union, after Clow 
had stated that he had specifically the Special Commissioner's 
organisation in mind.(26) A few weeks later representatives from ECAFE's 
member countries met again in New York during a meeting of the
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commission's Committee of the Whole. Apparently realising that a further 
attempt to establish an official working relationship between ECAFE and 
the Special Commission was doomed to fail, Britain refrained from 
launching a further initiative in that direction. Delegates were in any 
way preoccupied with the contentious issue of the associate membership 
of non-UN territories in ECAFE. (27)
Contrary to the Foreign Office's expectations, the Shanghai meeting 
revealed that the majority of ECAFE's member countries had no intention 
of linking the UN's Far Eastern organisation to the Special Commission. 
Instead, it now looked as though ECAFE was trying to push Killearn's
organisation to the side and perhaps assume some of its existing
functions. The Special Commission might have been popular at a lower 
level, i.e. with the international authorities sending their officers to 
attend the food meetings. In the United Nations, however, Britain's
organisation in Singapore was regarded with the greatest suspicion.
Should it ever have come to a showdown between Britain's and the UN's 
regional organisations in Asia, the Foreign Office must have been aware 
that the latter would undoubtedly have maintained the upper hand. Though 
ECAFE still lacked clear tasks and functions, its UN set-up gave it 
greater legitimacy as a truly intergovernmental organisation, The 
Special Commission might have performed some useful coordinating work in 
the field of food distribution, but as it was funded and run by London 
and was therefore unable to shake off the stigma of British imperialism.
The muddle at the Foreign Office prior to ECAFE's creation was thus 
beginning to show its negative effects on British interests. Had
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Killearn been consulted immediately after the General Assembly's
resolution in December, and had the Special Commission's requirements 
subsequently been taken into account, Stent could have been instructed 
to make the inclusion of Killearn's organisation in ECAFE's terms of 
reference conditional for Britain's consent to the new commission. In 
this way, competition between the two organisations could have been 
avoided, and the Special Commission might have received the UN's
sanctioning at a time when Killearn's regional work was still crucial in
avoiding famine in South-East Asia. However, the Foreign Office had 
missed its opportunity. Faced with the prospect of ECAFE trying to 
assume the Special Commission's functions, London now had to decide
whether to try and salvage its budding regional organisation in 
Singapore or whether to give political priority to ECAFE.
10,2 LONDON'S RE-APPRAISAL OF ECAFE
ECAFE's first official session in July 1947 convinced a growing 
number of British officials that the new UN commission was there to 
stay. However, the Foreign Office was divided about the role that ECAFE 
should play in its regional strategy. On the one hand, there was the 
feeling that Britain could only influence ECAFE's direction if she 
showed unreserved support for the commission. On the other hand, there 
was the danger that this might erode the Special Commission's leading 
position in the field of South-East Asian regional cooperation. In view 
of ECAFE's refusal to cooperate with the Special Commission, the 
question was in fact whether to sacrifice the Special Commission for the
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sake of regional cooperation through the United Nations, or whether to 
continue pressing for an international working relationship between the 
two organisations.
The debate on how further to proceed on the two rival commissions 
flared up in May 1947 when Killearn's office brought a memorandum 
dealing with regional cooperation to the attention of the Foreign 
Office. The paper was written by B.Binns, finance director in Burma, who 
had recently met Killearn in Singapore. Binns argued that ECAFE was 
completely misconceived, and that prior to a Far Eastern regional 
organisation including India, China and possibly Japan and Russia, the 
organisation of the weaker countries of South-East Asia was vital. Asia 
as a whole was not an economic unit, while conditions for regional 
cooperation were much more favourable in South-East Asia: Burma,
Thailand and Indochina were the region's rice and teak exporting 
centres. Furthermore, Burma, Thailand and Ceylon shared the same 
religion. Malaya was the geographical link - from there it was an easy 
step to Indonesia, Australia and Melanesia. Regional arrangements of all 
kinds would indeed be a natural development in South-East Asia; 
Australia, New Zealand and Ceylon would ultimately be brought in while 
Singapore would be the regional centre. Binns believed that Killearn's 
organisation was ideally suited for the purpose of organising regional 
cooperation in South-East Asia - it was centrally located and already 
had considerable ^ffect in bringing together the South-East Asian 
countries for specific purposes; international cooperation was a 
delicate plant, especially in an area where recently aroused nationalism 
was an important factor:
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'Any obvious attempt on the part of [the] British, Dutch, 
Chinese, Indians or anybody else to "organize'' the smaller 
countries of S.E.Asia will meet with opposition as violent as 
that which met Japan in her attempts at [a] "co-prosperity 
sphere". The policy should, I am sure, be to assist these 
countries to drift imperceptably into a natural association. 
British influence generally and Lord Killearn's organisation 
especially are well suited to encourage and assist such a 
movement so far as Burma is concerned.'(28)
Binns's paper was read with 'great interest' at the Foreign
Office(29), though most officials disagreed with his opposition to
ECAFE. I.F.S. Vincent minuted that Japan and India in the long run had
to cover the area's industrial requirements and that the individual
countries would presumably find greater protection in a UK organisation
on which the European powers were represented than from a temporary body
formulating agreements on a limited number of 'emergency' economic
problems. ECAFE also gave equal representation to the European powers
which would be lacking if the countries connected with the Special
Commission decided on nationalistic reasons to break up that
organisation. Vincent added that ECAFE was in any way no bar to
continued consultation between the South-East Asian countries
themselves.(30) J.F.Ford agreed: South-East Asia was not economically
complementary, and sealing it off economically from the rest of Asia
would be a 'strange economic plan indeed'. The region was a potential
supplier of rice, iron ore, rubber and oil to Japan, China and a lesser
extent India, while Japan and to an increasing extent China and India
would supply consumer goods:
'The gradual absorption of smaller regional groups into a 
larger organisation such as ECAFE would seem the best way to 
attain the ideal of regional co-operation without its attended 
danger of concentrated and exclusive trade patterns.'(31)
The Foreign Office's comments revealed the department's shift in
thinking on regional cooperation since the February policy papers.
Officials were no longer fixed on the Special Commission's central role
in South-East Asian regional cooperation, but seemed to accept the fact
that ECAFE could be equally useful. After the experience of the first
ECAFE session in Shanghai, J.P.Stent went even further and suggested
dropping the Special Commission's international functions at the time of
the merger. As a draft paper by the International Organisations
Committee (but apparently written by Stent) pointed out in September,
the 'forthcoming reorganisation of the Special Commissioner's Office in
Singapore' would make it 'inevitable that some of the co-ordinating
functions of the Special Commission should be handed over to
E.C.A.F.E.'. The functions of the merged post would presumably be
confined to coordinating the requirements of British territories as well
as of territories directly concerning them:
'Such other functions as the collection of economic statistics, 
conferences on economic and related matters, etc. should 
presumably be taken over progressively by E.C.A.F.E.'(32)
Clow, Britain's representative during the Shanghai session, 
disagreed. His views were known to be 'diametrically opposed' to those 
of Stent. Clow had little confidence in the new UN commission, which he 
thought was set up merely for reasons of prestige, and would inevitably 
be a useless body.(33)
London's conflicting priorities between ECAFE and the Special 
Commission were discussed by the ECAFE Working Party in October. Kenneth 
Christophas from South-East Asia Department emphasized that the
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functions of Killearn's organisation, Including the international ones, 
would continue under the new post, and that the Special Commission would 
be glad to exchange observers with ECAFE. Killearn's organisation should 
therefore not be wound up until ECAFE had emerged from the embryo stage, 
which would not be for at least another 18 months. Stent objected. In 
Shanghai the Asian delegates had not raised a single voice in defence of 
Killearn's organisation, regarding it as purely temporary, and assuming 
that its functions would be taken over by ECAFE. He therefore wondered 
how Britain could continue to support indefinitely 'a regional 
commission within a regional commission' where the larger was a United 
Nations body and the smaller was not: 'The work which E.C.A.F.E. ought 
to do', he pointed out, 'was precisely the work (with the addition of 
matters concerning India and China) which Lord Killearn's organisation 
was doing'. However, Christophas's view prevailed, and the Working Party 
decided that the Special Commissioner's activities would not be 
curtailed until ECAFE had given proof of its ability to take them over. 
Realising that this might be difficult to maintain at the next ECAFE 
meeting, the Working Party also considered asking individual ECAFE 
members to support the Special Commission's continuing existence until 
ECAFE was a going concern. It was also decided that if any statements on 
this matter were to be made at the next session, this should be done by 
ECAFE's secretariat.(34)
The decision was a further nail in the coffin of the Foreign 
Office's regional policy from February 1947. On the one hand, the 
Working Party refused to abolish the Special Commission's regional 
activities and insisted on establishing a working relationship between
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ECAFE and Singapore. On the other hand, it implied that unless ECAFE 
turned out to be a failure it would be allowed gradually to absorb the 
Special Commission's coordinating functions. The decision contradicted 
the Foreign Office's ambitious plans for the expansion of Killearn's 
regional work to the economic, political and eventually defence levels. 
Whether or not this was fully realised by British officials, London had 
effectively given up its long-term regional plans attached to the 
Special Commission. At the same time, there was no prospect of 
developing ECAFE instead of Killearn's organisation as the basis for a 
British led regional system in South-East Asia. Firstly, ECAFE's 
geographical scope was much larger than that originally envisaged by 
Foreign Office planners: it included China, which was still regarded as 
an area of primarily American influence. Furthermore, ECAFE's Soviet 
membership made successful political cooperation highly unlikely. It 
certainly ruled out regional defence cooperation. Despite this, the 
question was no_longer if, but when Britain's regional activities in 
Singapore would be transferred to the UK.
For the time being, however, London insisted on maintaining the 
Special Commission's international section. In October, the Foreign 
Office started preparing the ground for the establishment of formal 
relations between ECAFE and the Special Commission. London asked member 
countries like Thailand, France and the Netherlands to oppose as 
premature any resolutions tabled at the next ECAFE meeting in December 
which demanded an immediate transfer of responsibilities from the 
Special Commission to ECAFE.(35) Furthermore, London asked ECAFE's 
secretariat to make a statement at the commission's next session on
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relations with the Special Commission. <36) The secretariat agreed, and 
ECAFE*s Executive Secretary, Dr.P.S.Lokanathan, subsequently visited 
Singapore for talks with the Special Commissioner.
Lord Killearn, despite his new line of pragmatic support for ECAFE, 
initially resisted any notion that the Special Commission might 
eventually transfer some of its economic responsibilities to ECAFE.(37) 
However, the impending amalgamation seemed to disillusion the Special 
Commissioner about the prospects of turning his organisation into a 
regional commission in South-East Asia. When Lokanathan arrived in 
Singapore on 10 November, Killearn assured him of his cooperation. He 
even came round to the view that sooner or later the Special 
Commission's functions would have to be taken over by some form of UN 
regional organisation(38), though ECAFE would first have to show that it 
functioned efficiently. Killearn and Lokanathan subsequently agreed on a 
draft statement on relations between ECAFE and the Special Commission.
Killearn stuck to his new attitude towards ECAFE, telling the
Foreign Office that the Special Commission's international section would
in the long run have to recognize UN authority, whether in the shape of
ECAFE or in some other manifestation. He saw this as being within
British interests:
'It is all the more important that we should establish our 
leadership in such organs of the United Nations as are 
concerned with this area in order that the real lead which we 
have secured in regional organisation may not be lost'. (39)
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As a result of the Foreign Office's initiative, ECAFE's second session 
in Baguio (Philippines) in November/December 1947 turned out to be much 
more successful for Britain than the Shanghai meeting. Firstly, the 
conference gave full membership to Pakistan and Few Zealand, the latter 
being a staunch British ally on the commission. Britain also secured the 
associate membership of Burma, Ceylon, Malaya, British Borneo (incl. 
Singapore) and of Hong Kong. (40) The conference's results on the 
Special Commission were equally successful from the British point of 
view. Lokanathan tabled the paper previously agreed with Killearn and 
recommended the establishment of a 'satisfactory working relationship' 
with the Special Commission. The latter would keep ECAFE informed of its 
activities and it would be open for both organisations to put forward 
regional economic problems which the other organisation could deal with 
more appropriately. Each organisation would be informed in advance of 
any economic conferences the other might hold. In the long run, it was 
perhaps desirable that some of the Special Commission's functions should 
eventually be assumed by ECAFE though this depended on ECAFE's ability 
to provide the necessary organisation. To begin with, a survey of the 
Special Commission's work was required before possibly transferring some 
of its functions to ECAFE. In the meantime, the two organisations would 
exchange liaison officers and documentation on their respective 
responsibilities. (41)
The secretariat's paper was opposed only by the Soviet delegate who 
argued that the Special Commission was not inter-governmental. The 
British delegate, Christofas, replied that 15 countries participated in 
its meetings, and the Soviet delegate was further told that no voting
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had ever been necessary. The Dutch delegate subsequently paid a tribute 
to Killearn's organisation and emphasized that any transfer of 
responsibilities should be gradual - a point queried only by the 
Philippines. In the end, the secretariat's recommendations were adopted 
by seven votes against those of the Soviet Union and the Philippines. 
The United States abstained, arguing that liaison should be maintained 
through the British delegation and not through special officers.(42)
As Stent subsequently reported to the Foreign Office, Britain had 
achieved her objective of obtaining 'formal recognition for the 
organisation of the Special Commissioner in South-East Asia as an 
international economic body', laying the foundation of a 'rational 
scheme of co-operation between Killearn's organisation and E.C.A.F.E'. 
Britain had also achieved her objective on membership and had gained the 
approbation of India, China and the United States for the 'liberal 
spirit displayed by His Majesty's Government'.(43)
However, London had to pay a price for its success at Baguio. By 
promoting the secretariat's paper on ECAFE and the Special Commission, 
she officially accepted that sooner or later ECAFE was likely to assume 
at least some of the Special Commission's functions. This concession 
confirmed the shift in London's long term policy of regional cooperation 
in South-East Asia that had taken place over the last eight months. The 
Foreign Office's aim of cooperating with the new Asian states on a 
multilateral regional basis remained the same. However, it no longer 
seemed to believe that it would be practicable to promote the Special 
Commission's international section as a nucleus around which further
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long term regional cooperation could be organised. The Foreign Office
had cone to realize that the Asian countries such as India, Pakistan,
China, the Philippines (and soon Burma) found ECAFE more acceptable as
the organiser of such regional cooperation. Britain would therefore play
along with ECAFE, and even scale down its own regional plans - despite
her reservations about ECAFE's Soviet membership. As V. N. Hugh-Jones
subsequently minuted at the Foreign Office:
'However limited its tECAFE's] activities (it is only an 
advisory body) it does seem to have been taken fairly 
seriously by member Governments in the region particularly the 
Philippines. As it concerns itself more and more with limited 
but definite technical problems as we hope it will, and 
gradually sheds the halo of the "1st Parliament of the Far 
East", that interest will doubtless flag. But if E.C.A.F.E. is 
built up on sound practical lines (and the foundations, though 
still very weak, are certainly sounder than we expected them to 
be after the 1st Session of the Commission last July), then, 
the economic problems being so much more vast in the Far East 
than they are in Europe, it may, even when its limited 
functions are fully appreciated, loom much larger in Far 
Eastern minds than E.C.E. does in ours'.(44)
However, while taking ECAFE increasingly seriously, the Foreign
Office didn't want to abandon its regional office in Singapore
altogether. Other UIT agencies, such as the Food and Agriculture
Organisation (FAO) were showing increasing interest in South-East Asia.
Killearn was told that ideally the Special Commission's economic
department would continue in association with ECAFE, enabling Britain at
the same time to guide the UK's commission along lines acceptable to
British interests:
'In general we do not feel the time has yet come for the main 
functions of your economic organisation to be transferred to 
any other body. In particular, ECAFE's functions are primarily 
advisory whereas yours are more operational. It remains to be 
seen what shape FAO's regional work will take. Much also
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depends on the sites decided for ECAFE and for FAO's regional 
office'.
Killearn was further instructed to maintain his rice, coal and edible 
oils activities, to continue with the Liaison Officers' Meetings and to 
retain the Special Commission's adviser services to British and non- 
British territories. But he was to drop his monthly economic bulletin 
and leave statistics entirely to ECAFE, in order to prevent the feeling 
that Britain was unwilling to surrender anything at all. So far as 
further specialized conferences were concerned (a statistics conference 
in January had not been attended by the United States because the State 
Department claimed that such a meeting should have been organised by the 
FAO) he was advised first to consult the Foreign Office and the relevant 
specialized agencies before planning any new meetings. Concerning the 
future site of ECAFE, the Foreign Office would put its view to 
Lokanathan when he passed through London.(45)
However, the impending merger between Killearn's and MacDonald's 
offices further complicated matters. Killearn had already pointed out in 
October that after the amalgamation, ECAFE was unlikely to accept two 
representatives from the Malayan Governor-General's Office, one speaking 
for the British territories and the other representing MacDonald's 
organisation in Singapore.(46) As Killearn further stressed in February, 
if the Special Commissioner's economic organisation was to be 
represented at ECAFE's third session (i.e. after the merger), it would 
first have to be established that the organisation still existed.(47) 
The Foreign Office agreed that this was a problem and it suggested to
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Killearn that the next Liaison Officers' Meeting should send a note to
Lokanathan informing him that the Special Commission was changing its
name. The liaison officers should also ratify the nomination of an
observer from the Special Commission's at ECAFE.(48) Killearn objected
to such a course of action:
'The crux of the difficulty is that the monthly liaison 
officers' meeting has hitherto been concerned with purely 
practical questions of supply and allied questions. It has 
never dealt with political issues such as this one, and it has 
no constitution. In fact the only documents that gave it some 
sort of international recognition are ... paper no 36. submitted 
to E.C.A.F.E.'s second session and the ensuing resolution. In 
these circumstances the liaison officers would hardly be ready 
to agree on a formal note of this kind without definite 
instructions from their Governments.'
Instead, Killearn suggested a note be sent directly to ECAFE's 
secretariat explaining that although the Special Commissioner's 
organisation was to be taken over by MacDonald, it would not change its 
character or functions. If however the Foreign Office insisted that the 
liaison officers should send a note- to ECAFE, London should directly 
approach the governments of France, the Metherlands, Ceylon, Burma and 
Thailand to ask them to instruct their liaison officers accordingly.(49)
In the event, London approached ECAFE's secretariat directly. One 
of Lokanathan's assistants, Dr Fong, had already carried out a 
preliminary survey which showed that the Special Commission's Economic 
department was divided into two parts: the Liaison Officers' Meetings
and the Economic Department. As Christophas minuted at the Foreign 
Office, it was now hoped that a statement on the composition of the 
Economic Department as well as on the forthcoming merger could be 
included in the final survey.
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'Unless we can show that the Economic Department is not to 
serve Mr .MacDonald in both his capacities, it will be felt 
(even if erroneously) that a change has taken place in the 
Economic Organisation which was the Special Commissioner's. Ve 
encountered difficulty enough in persuading the second session 
of E.C.A.F.E. to accept the Special Commissioner's Organisation 
as an International body and this decision was again 
questioned by the U.S.S.R. in the Economic and Social Council a 
week or so ago. Ve would therefore be giv#n^ hostage to 
Providence if we did not make our case as fool-proof as 
possible for the third session of E.C.A.F.E.'(50)
During subsequent talks with Lokanathan in London the Foreign Office 
consequently insisted that the Special Commission's international 
section would continue unimpaired.(51)
Lokanathan showed himself highly cooperative with the British. A 
survey of the Special Commission drafted by his secretariat emphasized 
that the Special Commissioner's Economic Department was continuing as 
the Economic Department of the Commissioner General's Economic
Organisation. The survey also mentioned the Singapore organisation's
food and coal activities, its collection of statistics and holding of
specialized conferences, and its staff of experts who were advising the 
Liaison Officers' Meetings. The survey also explained the relationship 
with ECAFE:
'Save possibly in the collection and dissemination of
statistics and in the organising of regional conferences there 
is no risk of duplication as between E.C.A.F.E. and the Special 
Commissioner's (now the Commissioner General's) Economic 
Organisation. Other functions of the organisation are either 
executive or ones which the organisation is particularly well 
equipped to perform with its highly specialised advisory staff.
In neither case do these functions duplicate E.C.A.F.E.'s much 
wider co-ordinating ones to which they are complementary'.
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When ECAFE was in a position to do so, the survey continued, it would 
take over the Special Commission's statistical work. Finally, it was 
recommended to maintain the existing working relationship between the 
two organisations - there would continue to be an exchange of laison 
officers and an exchange of the 'fullest documentation on their 
respective activities'. Both organisations would also continue to be 
represented at important meetings convened by the other.(52)
Lokanathan presented the survey of the Special Commission during 
ECAFE's third session in June 1948. The Soviet Union opposed his 
recommendations, describing the Special Commission as a purely British 
organisation that was ensuring domination in the field of shipping. 
However, the majority of ECAFE members, including the United States, 
endorsed the survey's recommendations on a working relationship between 
the two organisations. The fact that the Special Commission had 
previously been merged with the Governor-General's office, proved to be 
no problem after a British observer from the Commission-General 
explained that the change of title had not affected the commission's 
functions.(53) However, in one point the British failed: Lokanathan’s 
survey did not recognise the Special Commission's Economic Department as 
an inter-governmental organisation, and when the Soviet delegate asked 
whether the organisation was British or inter-governmental, the British 
delegate, Sir Andrew Clow, was evasive. It showed that the Foreign 
Office had never succeeded in throwing off the Special Commission's 
image as a British institution.
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10.3 THE END OF THE SPECIAL COMMISSION
Paradoxically, Singapore succeeded in establishing a working 
relationship with ECAFE at a time when the fortunes of the Special 
Commission were at an all-time low. Despite Killearn's repeated
criticism, Bevin and Attlee had refused to cancel or postpone the
merger, and in December Sir David Monteath had been sent to Singapore
to make recommendations on a new set-up.(54) Killearn was becoming 
increasingly embittered about the way the Foreign Office had treated 
him. He refused the governorship of Eastern Bengal as compensation for 
the Singapore post and criticized his department whenever highranking 
British officials or politicians (such as Lord Addison and Hector 
McNeil) were visiting Singapore.(55) Because of Killearn's alleged 
'propaganda' against the proposed combined post, London decided to 
recall him in March rather than letting him stay on until after 
MacDonald had taken over in May.(56) The decision further poisoned
Foreign Office:
'After sweating blood for you for 44 years it would have been 
much pleasanter to quit your Service with less feeling of 
having been scurvily treated. I know full well just how the 
Department (and possibly you yourself) feel towards me: I
believe that to be largely based on perversion of the facts. 
But in any case it couldn't leave me colder than it does. But 
it is sad - very sad - to leave a Service one has worked for 
nearly half a century, feeling as I now do about your 
office'. (57)
Sargent replied:
'I am sorry you feel so badly about having to come away in 
March, but I can assure you that you entirely misrepresent our 
feelings towards you in the Department. The Service I can 
assure you takes a very personal pride in you and we all
relations rf«±afc± London and Killearn who complained to the
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recognize how distinguished your long official life has been 
and in particular what a fine job you have done in Singapore.
But it does fall to all of us to retire sooner or later, and 
for a variety of reasons it seemed undesirable that you should 
overlap with MacDonald until June. (58)
Six weeks after Killearn's departure, the Special Commission and 
the Malayan Governor-General's office were merged. On 1 May 1948 Malcolm 
MacDonald was officially appointed Comissioner-General of the United 
Kingdom in South-East Asia. He was given two deputies, one for his 
colonial and one for his foreign affairs staff.(59) Linked to the 
foreign affairs side of the Commissioner-General's office was the former 
economic section of the Special Commission, now restyled 'The Economic 
Department of the Commissi oner-General' s Organisation'. It had a 
'Director of Economic Activities' who reported to the Commissioner- 
General through the foreign service deputy. In addition, there was a 
separate 'Economic and Financial Adviser' to the Commissioner-General 
who could consult the Director of Economic Activities.(60) The former's 
appointment was apparently arranged to keep the Colonial Office's finger 
in the Foreign Office's economic pie in Singapore.
Though the Commissioner-General's organisation continued the 
coordinating work of the Special Commission, his regional activities 
never again featured as prominently in the Foreign Office's South-East 
Asian policies as they had under Killearn. For one, MacDonald lacked 
Killearn's interest in expanding his economic organisation into a wider 
regional organisation. Though the new Commissioner-General in 1949 
became one of Britain's main protagonists of regional cooperation in 
South-East Asia, he was thinking of a completely new approach, starting
-  250 -
with an international conference rather than aiming to expand 
Singapore's regional activities bit by bit. His reluctance to involve 
his economic organisation in a regional scheme for South-East Asia is 
understandable. Firstly, the organisation was too closely linked to 
Britain's colonial administration in Singapore to be competing with 
ECAFE. Secondly, a lapse occurred in Singapore's regional activities 
after Killearn's early departure: soon after assuming office, MacDonald 
was preoccupied with the Malayan Emergency, as he temporarily had to 
take over for the Malayan High Commissioner, Edward Gent, who died in an 
aircrash over London on 2 July 1948. (Gent's successor, Henry Gurney, 
arrived in September). Thirdly, the Liaison Officers' Meetings were 
slowly running out of things to do because of the improving rice 
situation. In 1949, the international rice allocation system was 
dissolved (by the FAO), and in November 1949 the last of the Liaison 
Officers' Meetings met in Singapore, though the Commissioner-General's 
economic department continued.(61)
At the same time, the alternative of using ECAFE for the promotion 
of Britain's regional policies never developed either. At the end of 
1948, Britain suggested Singapore as the base for the permanent 
headquarters of ECAFE's secretariat when it became evident that the 
organisation would have to leave Shanghai due to the deteriorating
situation in China. However, Singapore failed to provide adequate
fU.
accomodation and the members of the secretariat disliked the idea of
A.
remaining in a colony. Eventually, Bangkok was chosen instead.(62) 
Afterwards, Britain increasingly lost interest in the organisation.
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Summing up, the reasons for the Special Commission's decline must 
first and foremost be attributed to Britain's dwindling financial 
resources and her decision, on financial grounds, in favour of a merger 
in Singapore. Connecting Britain's regional activities in South-East 
Asia to the colonial authorities in Malaya seriously reduced the 
prospects for turning the Singapore office into a wider regional 
organisation. Secondly, there was the growing competition by countries 
like India and Australia who were challenging Britain's dominant 
position in the area and who were themselves vying for the leadership of 
a South-East Asian grouping or organisation. Thirdly, there was the UN 
which in the shape of ECAFE was providing a credible alternative to the 
Special Commission. When the rice situation improved, Britain's economic 
organisation in Singapore finally lost its main raison d'etre. The 
Special Commission had been successful in dealing with the distribution 
of food during the South-East Asian rice crisis. However, Britain had 
been prevented from extending Singapore's regional work from technical 
to political and defence cooperation. The Foreign Office's ambitious 
political plans connected to the Special Commission had failed.
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11. WE S T E R N  UNION AND S O U T H - E A S T  ASIA
British regional policies in South-East Asia were in considerable 
disarray at the beginning of 1948. Lord Killearn was about to leave his 
post, and ECAFE was intent on assuming the Special Commission's 
coordinating functions. Furthermore, Australia and India had taken the
initiative on regional cooperation - independently from Britain - and
the Asian Relations Conference had fuelled demands by smaller Asian 
countries for exclusively Asian cooperation. Last / not least, the 
continuing conflicts in Indochina and Indonesia made the creation of a 
joint Asian-European scheme impossible for the time being. Even a 
British regional initiative that excluded France and the Netherlands 
would have been doomed to failure because of the anti-colonial 
atmosphere prevailing in Asia.
While the prospects for regional cooperation between Britain and 
the new Asian states were thus low, there was mounting pressure by
the Foreign Office's Western Department to increase cooperation with the 
other colonial powers instead. As a first step, it demanded revising the 
ban on British arms deliveries to the Dutch forces in Indonesia. Western 
Department based its arguments on two new developments. Firstly, the 
Netherlands and the Indonesian Republic signed the Renville Agreement on 
17 January 1948, providing for a truce between the two parties. (1) 
Though the agreement constituted a humiliating defeat for the
Republic(2) - failing to solve the issue of sovereignty and recognising 
considerable territorial gains made by the Dutch - it satisfied the
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Foreign Office's Dutch experts. They were convinced that the accord 
would take the Indonesian issue away from the world's attention.
In addition to the Renville Agreement, developments towards greater 
Vest European unity instigated a re-appraisal of British regional 
policies in South-East Asia. After secret five-power negotiations Bevin 
on 22 January 1948 announced plans by Britain, France and the Benelux 
countries to forge a military alliance in Western Europe. Two months 
later, on 17 March, the five powers signed the Brussels Pact, promising 
mutual defence against an Regressor. No particular adversary was 
mentioned; however, it was clear that the 'Western Union', as it became 
known, was aimed against the Soviet Union. (3) In addition to its 
military provisions, the Brussels Pact contained clauses on economic, 
social and military collaboration, in line with Bevin's ideas on general 
Vest European cooperation.(4) Inevitably, moves towards greater West 
European unity raised the question whether, or to what degree, 
cooperation between the Vest European powers would extend to colonial 
territories.
The Foreign Office's Western Department believed that the 
forthcoming Vest European alliance required a re-orientation in South- 
East Asia. A few days before Bevin's Western Union speech, it described 
the Renville Agreement as a good opportunity to lift the arms ban in 
Indonesia:
'From the point of view of our plans in Western Europe it is 
important that this obstacle [the embargo] to closer relations 
with Holland should be removed as soon as possible... We and 
the French have now agreed that the three Benelux countries 
should be offered treaties of alliance on the lines of the 
Treaty of Dunkirk, and although I am fully aware of the
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reasons which made the imposition of the ban inevitable in the 
first place, its continuance when we are discussing a treaty of 
alliance with the Dutch will be to say the least anomalous.'(5)
J.E.D. Street, saw some merit in Western Department's arguments,
pointing out that the ban had originally been introduced partly to
satisfy public opinion in Britain and mainly to avoid incidents at
Singapore and elsewhere in Britain's Far Eastern territories. By now,
British public opinion was concerned with 'matters of far greater moment
than Indonesia'.(6) However, Gordon Vhitteridge preferred seeing the ban
maintained until a political, not just a ceasefire agreement was
reached.(7) The head of South East Asia Department, Paul Grey, agreed
that it would be unwise to re-open the question of the ban before the
situation in Indonesia had become clearer. Omens for a final settlement
were still not good. Commenting on a Royal Navy enquiry whether British
ships should be allowed to visit selected ports in the Netherlands East
Indies, Grey argued:
'From the point of view of satisfying feeling in India and 
among the native population in Malaya as well as in South East 
Asia generally, we do not want at this stage to suggest that
we have gone over into the Dutch camp. The Dutch militarists,
among whom I should include the Navy, do not want encouraging 
if a political settlement is to be reached.'(8)
From Batavia, the British consul-general, F.M.Shepherd, gave support to 
Grey; the Royal Navy should refrain from visits which would be
interpreted as gestures of sympathy towards the Dutch as distinct from
the Republic - at least so long as the embargo was in force.(9)
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Five days after Vestern Department's initiative, Bevin announced
plans for a five power alliance in Vestern Europe on the precedent of
the Dunkirk (defence) Treaty between Britain and France. He stressed
that he was concerned not only with Europe as a geographical conception:
'Europe has extended its influence throughout the world, and we 
have to look further afield. In the first place we turn our 
eyes to Africa, where great responsibilities are shared by us 
with South Africa, France, Belgium and Portugal, and equally to 
all overseas territories, especially of South-East Asia, with 
which the Dutch are closely concerned. The organization of 
Vestern Europe must be economically supported. That involves 
the closest possible collaboration with the Commonwealth and 
with overseas territories, not only British but French, Dutch, 
Belgian and Portuguese.'
Bevin added that overseas territories were largely primary producers, 
and that their raw materials, food and resources could be turned to the 
common advantage of the peoples of these territories, of Europe and of 
the world as a whole.(10)
It has recently been argued that Bevin was pursuing the idea of 
'Euro-Africa' between 1947 and 1948. African colonial resources were 
meant to enable Britain to regain the economic lead in Europe that was 
being threatened by the Marshall Plan. There would also be cooperation
between the European colonial powers in Africa, in the first place
between Britain and France, turning the continent into a vital element 
in the eventual creation of a third world grouping under British 
leadership.(11) Hence Bevin*s reference to the resources of the European
colonies in his Vestern Union speech.
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However, it is unclear whether Bevin was referring not only to 
Africa but to South-East Asia as well. Many Asian observers thought so 
and were soon making allegations of a colonial conspiracy in South-East 
Asia. 'Is the Vestern Union also a league of colonial powers to 
perpetuate colonialism?', the Malayan Morning Tribune wrote at the end 
of January. The paper suspected that Bevin's reference to collaboration 
with overseas territories meant that the colonies were to become 
economic appendages of European power politics.(12) Bevin's link between 
European cooperation and colonial resources was highly unwelcome by the 
Foreign Office's South-East Asian experts. Apart from the fact that the 
Foreign Secretary's remarks had increased Asian suspicion of British 
imperial designs, South East Asia Department was concerned lest plans 
for Vestern Union encouraged the Dutch to demand an end to the arms 
embargo.
Paul Grey reviewed the issue of the arms embargo at the beginning 
of January. Arguments against the ban were the continuing complication 
of relations with the Dutch and the 'anomaly' that despite the embargo, 
Britain was proposing to negotiate an alliance with the Netherlands in 
Europe. It was also embarrassing that every Dutch request for supplies 
to the East Indies had to be checked on whether it was covered by the 
ban. He also pointed out that the ban could not prevent the Dutch from 
carrying out their police action and was unlikely to prevent them from 
taking similar action in the future. On the other hand, an argument for 
the embargo's continuation was that the Indonesian republicans were 
dissatisfied with the latest agreement which they felt left them at the 
mercy of the Dutch and that they would 'undoubtedly feel that the
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lifting of the ban was a further nail in the coffin of their
aspirations1. Britain also did not 'wish to alienate nationalist
sentiment in Asia, which it is our own policy to try to meet half way,
by appearing to side with the Dutch'. Public opinion in Britain and
Australia too was critical of the Dutch. Furthermore, lifting the ban
before the success of political talks would remove a factor deterring
the Dutch from further military action, and there would undoubtedly be
criticism from the UN if the embargo was ended before the Security
Council's Committee of Good Offices had reviewed the whole situation.
Grey therefore recommended maintaining the ban - at least until the UN
committee's report had been considered by the Security Council. There
was always the danger that the new agreement would fail to lead to a
settlement and that public opinion would blame the Dutch if there was
renewed fighting:
'Ve should make ourselves look ridiculous if, having lifted the 
ban, we were to reimpose it again, and we might in such 
circumstances find ourselves pressed to support even more 
drastic action at the Security Council'.(13)
Dening agreed. His 'own instinct' was to do nothing for the present, 
particularly as the Australian attitude to Indonesia had to be
considered. Orme Sargent, Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign
Office, also agreed: no initiative was to be taken before the matter was 
raised by the Dutch. (14)
In March, the Treasury proposed lifting the embargo. There was 
progress in the UN's mediating efforts in Indonesia: though the Dutch 
representative had failed to defend his government adequately against
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the charge of continuing to treat Republican interests unfairly, the
Security Council had approved the report of the Good Offices Committee;
furthermore, the signing of the Brussels Treaty was imminent. At the
Foreign Office, Grey personally wanted to see the embargo
maintained.(15) However, if it was decided to lift the ban then now was
the moment to do so. As he explained to Bevin:
'It has been apparent for some time that the Dutch would like 
to interpret our Vestern Union policy as an indication that we 
are willing to abandon our opposition to their Indonesian 
policy. In South East [Asia! generally, and particularly among 
the Indonesians, there has been a corresponding fear that our 
policy in that part of the world has changed. The Secretary of 
State's references to the development of colonial territories 
have been falsely interpreted as a sign that we have abandoned 
our sympathies for the coloured people and that we wish to see 
colonial territories used to bolster up the European 
economy...It is possible that the Dutch may make a specific 
point of the ban on the supply of arms for the Netherlands 
East Indies ... its removal would certainly be convenient for 
us, as its continuation complicates the military supply 
position as regards the Netherlands, But, before lifting the 
ban now, we should have to think seriously of the political 
consequences on opinion in the Security Council as well as in 
Malaya, India and South East Asia generally.'(16)
Dening supported Grey's line - if the Dutch would ask whether 
Britain was prepared to come out openly in support of their policy, the 
answer had to be no: 'Ve have never at any time taken sides in the
Indonesian dispute, nor do we propose to do so now'. Britain's official 
concern with the dispute was only as a member of the Security Council, 
'and we must hope that the Dutch will take no action which would make it 
difficult or impossible for us to support them in the Security Council. 
The French have not asked us for open support of their policy in Indo- 
China, and I would not expect them to do so. ' (17) Shepherd similarly 
advised from Batavia that a lifting of the ban would be seen in
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Indonesia as a 'political endorsement of Dutch conduct of negotiations 
with the Republic'. It would also be implying that Britain would not 
object to the resumption of military action in the case of breakdown of 
political negotiations. Politically, it would amount to taking definite 
sides at the moment when political discussions were about to begin, and 
it would strengthen the hands of the Dutch military commanders and thus 
tend to prejudice a reasonable and fair settlement.(18) Killearn too saw 
the moment for the lifting of the ban as ill chosen, as it would be 
interpreted as support for the Dutch. Furthermore, if Britain offered 
military supplies to the Dutch, would not she also 'logically be bound 
to offer them to the Indonesians and would not Cthe) Dutch take a poor 
view of that?'(19)
Two days before the signing of the Brussels Treaty, on 15 March
1948, the Dutch ambassador in London, Baron Bentinek, told Dening that
Vestern Union ought to make Britain and the ITetherlands see eye to eye
in South-East Asia, and that the British embargo should be lifted.
Bentinck also mentioned the issue of regional security and the British
Defence Committee in Singapore. Dening replied that Britain was not yet
in a position to consider regional security, particularly where non-
British territories were concerned; one of the reasons was that he did
not know what the Americans had in mind. Dening subsequently explained
in a Foreign Office minute:
'I feel that we must resist the suggestion that, because of 
Vestern Union, the policy of the United Kingdom is bound to 
coincide with that of the Dutch or the French in South East 
Asia. That is not to say that we may not some day hope to 
secure regional collaboration in that area too, but we have 
enough troubles of our own at present without becoming 
involved in those of the K.E.I. or French Indo-China.'(20)
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However, the Foreign Office had underestimated the strength of 
Dutch feelings on the embargo. The Netherlands increasingly resented the 
fact that despite the new five-power alliance in Europe the British arms 
embargo remained in force. On 1 April, the Dutch ambassador told I. 
Kir^kpatrick that a member of the Dutch upper house had argued with some 
force that it was quite wrong that an arms embargo should continue to 
exist between the two parties. Bentinck, under instruction from his 
government, therefore asked that Britain should consider lifting the 
embargo as soon as possible. (21) Initially, Grey was not convinced by 
the Dutch initiative, warning that the Indonesian cause was warmly 
espoused by India and other countries in South-East Asia. They would 
regard the raising of the embargo as a direct consequence of the Vestern 
Union and a confirmation of their suspicions that Britain had reverted 
to 'colonialism' and had lost all interest in Asia except for what 
Britain could get out of the territories for her own purposes. Britain 
should only agree to lift the ban if the Dutch reduced their troops in 
Indonesia.(22)
Once again, London found itself in the dilemma of having to choose 
between its interest in Asian or in European cooperation. Grey explained 
the problem to Killearn's deputy in Singapore, P.S.Serivener: Indonesia, 
he argued, had become a test case. Not that India or Burma were really 
passionately devoted to Indonesian independence, that devotion was very 
theoretical. However, they were watching Britain closely 'to see how far 
we would carry our profession of interest in the Indonesian people and 
Cthey] were alert for any signs that we would be willing to sacrifice 
what we professed to believe in'. The difficulty remained that:
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'Ve have to associate more closely with the European powers 
than ever before. Ve have, at the same time, to undertake a 
complete reconstruction of our relations with the East. And we 
have to do the latter in the face of a growing nationalism and 
a struggle for dominance by forces which would seek to divorce 
the East from the Vest altogether.'(23)
Despite this, Grey eventually advised that there should be a
limited relaxation of the arms ban in private on material urgently
needed by the Dutch. The British ambassador in the Fetherlands had just
confirmed how strongly all political parties in Holland (except for the
communists) felt about the embargo.(24) Dening still objected to the
lifting of the ban as premature, but agreed that Britain should offer
relaxing the ban on non-lethal equipment. (25) Sargent went even further
and suggested publicly withdrawing the embargo:
'A great deal of water has flown under the bridges since it 
[the embargo] was imposed and I cannot believe that its 
cancellation would arouse much criticism here. As for criticism 
in South East Asia, we might meet this by getting the Dutch 
Government in return for the cancellation to state equally 
publicly that any war material which they buy from the United 
Kingdom is for the defence of Metropolitan Holland and nothing 
else.'(26)
Surprisingly, Bevin refused to abandon the embargo, despite the
fact that it had been his speech on Vestern Union which had sent the
ball rolling in the first place. He seemed to be primarily concerned
about criticism in the House of Commons, arguing that:
'Sargent oversimplifies the matter. Delightful in a country 
where there is no political opinion and no watchful eye on
Ministers and their policy. The sympathy of a large number of 
the House is with the Indonesians and therefore of, the Cabinet 
too. I cannot meet the request'. (27)
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The Dutch Foreign Minister told Bevin during a subsequent meeting 
in Paris that the Brussels Treaty made the Indonesian embargo an 
anomaly. Bevin replied that lifting the ban might lead to reactions in 
Australia and India which could be very unfortunate from the point of 
view of the Dutch government. Britain already had considerable 
difficulties with India on the Kashmir question and the raising of the 
embargo was in any case not really needed by the Dutch for practical 
purposes; it would be better to let sleeping dogs lie. (28) However, the 
Dutch were insistent and the Dutch ambassador asked Bevin a few days 
later whether he would agree to a statement by the Dutch government on 
the line that it had reason to believe that Britain would take into 
favourable consideration Dutch representations regarding equipment for 
Dutch troops in the Netherlands East Indies. Bevin refused, but hinted 
that Britain might consider helping out with the supply of uniforms and 
transport - as long as Singapore stockpiles allowed.(29)
The Hague took Bevin's remarks as an indication that he was 
softening his line on the embargo. The Netherlands' Foreign Minister 
subsequently told the Dutch parliament that talks with Britain on the 
arms ban had been resumed, and that he expected them to be favourable. 
Since the announcement attracted no attention in Britain, London decided 
not to comment on it. (30) In June, the Dutch ambassador changed tactics, 
telling Grey that the Netherlands were reluctant to agree to any further 
assurances that equipment ordered from Britain would not go to their 
South-East Asian territories. Grey replied that a lifting of the embargo 
was out of the question, but suggested that Britain might be more
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forthcoming on 'non-lethal' equipment, i.e. equipment other than 
weapons, ammunition or armoured fighting vehicles of any kind.(31)
By June 1948, Britain was thus indicating a relaxation of the 
Indonesian arms embargo. However, London was resisting suggestions that 
Vestern Union should lead to increasing cooperation with either the 
Dutch or the French in South-East Asia. At the beginning of April, the 
French Consul-General in Singapore, Guibaut, had told Scrivener that the 
five Vestern Union countries should work out a common colonial policy at 
the government level. Scrivener had agreed, and he subsequently told 
London that five power cooperation provided by the Brussels Treaty 
should be reproduced overseas, 'including the area containing Indochina, 
Indonesia, Malaya and the other British territories in South-East Asia'. 
Much had already been achieved in the technical sphere, but there was a 
lack of political cooperation, whether it concerned differing outlooks 
and actions on South-East Asian nationalism, 'or as regards the vital 
problem of resistance to the pressure, actual and potential, of 
Communism (which more than any other single factor impelled the 
metropolitan Governments to reach agreement).' Scrivener was hoping for 
a broad policy statement which would 'show our adversaries that our 
solidarity extends beyond the confines of Europe', though he realised 
that the attitude of the local populations might be difficult.(32)
The Foreign Office disliked the idea of a policy statement by the
colonial powers. As Christophas argued, Britain had
'...consistently pursued a more liberal policy in South-East 
Asia than either of the other two Metropolitan powers 
concerned. There is great danger that, if our alliance with the 
other Vestern Powers in Europe were to be correspondingly
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reflected in our behaviour in the East, we should lose the 
sympathy of the Asiatic peoples by whom "Colonialism" and 
"Imperialism" are considered a far greater menace than
Communism... In general our policy has in the past been to 
avoid close collaboration on the Colonial level with the Dutch 
and French authorities in the Metherlands East Indies and 
French Indo China respectively but to maintain co-operation 
through the less metropolitan medium of the Special
Commissioner's organisation. As long as the Foreign Office side 
of the Commissioner-General's organisation remains in
existence, there would seem to be virtue in maintaining such a 
policy'. (33)
Dening too recommended to 'hasten slowly' in South-East Asia and to 
persist to collaborate in technical matters until the participants had 
become so accustomed to cooperating that higher flights could then be 
essayed.(34)
During a lunch meeting on 26 April between staff from the French 
embassy and members of the Foreign Office (including MacDonald who was 
in London for consultations), LeRoy followed up Gibaut's proposal. The 
French diplomat was keen on governmental discussions on South-East Asia, 
pointing out that France's [diplomatic and colonial) organisation was 
not as decentralized as was Britain's, and that Paris therefore tended 
to take little account of what was going on under the Special 
Commissioner's aegis. MacDonald replied that he welcomed local 
collaboration; however, Vestern Union had made the peoples of South-East 
Asia very suspicious of the motives of the Vestern colonial powers. It 
was therefore desirable not to give colour to these suspicions by 
embarking on formal intergovernmental consultations. The French embassy 
staff, according to a Foreign Office minute, took the points but did not 
seem entirely satisfied.(35)
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In June 1948 Michael Vright summed up Britain's continuing regional
strategy in a Foreign Office minute. The Special Commission's aim had
been to promote regional cooperation by starting with economic and
social subjects, then working upwards to political matters as
circumstances permitted. At the same time, it was felt that political
collaboration ought not to be confined to the three colonial powers 'but
should be on the basis of Europeans and Asiatics working together'.
However, so long as the questions of Indochina and the Metherlands East
Indies remained unsettled it was difficult to initiate political
cooperation except on a predominantly European basis. Vestern Union
complicated the matter and made it 'still more difficult to get away
from the pattern of purely European collaboration in the area, which it
is desirable to avoid'. Vright objected to the proposed policy statement
by the metropolitan powers. For the time being, Britain had to be
content with the policy of promoting cooperation on technical matters.
At the same time, Singapore should be encouraged to take any opportunity
for further cooperation on the technical level, and to 'keep on the look
out for possible openings however modest for political collaboration
also'. Vright conluded:
'If only the Dutch would make further progress in Indonesia, 
the whole problem would become easier. The longer matters 
drift the greater becomes the risk that communistic tendencies, 
as in Burma, will become accentuated.'(36)
The Vestern Union episode demonstrated that despite the decline of 
Britain's regional organisation in Singapore and the prevailing anti­
colonial climate in Asia, London remained committed to the idea of 
regional cooperation primarily with the new Asian states. It had also
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not yet given up all hope that Britain’s regional activities in
Singapore might be the starting point for wider regional cooperation.
London therefore resisted any notion that Vestern Union cooperation
extended to South-East Asia, and it thwarted French attempts at open
colonial cooperation in South-East Asia. As Grey argued in July:
'Western Union was taken by many Dutchmen as an indication
that we would be willing to revise our Indonesian policy. It
was hoped that the union would result in a co-ordinated policy 
by the Colonial powers. Unfortunately, and for the same reason, 
Vestern Union was greeted with the greatest suspicion in Asia,- 
and attempts were immediately made by the Russians, as well as 
by extreme local nationalists, to persuade the Asiatic peoples 
that we had reversed our policy of increased freedom for 
Asiatic peoples. Indonesia in particular is regarded as a test 
case throughout the area. The Indian Government, among others, 
are known to feel very strongly on the subject and to suspect 
our policy. Australian views are, of course, well-known and are 
based on an extreme interpretation of maintaining the goodwill 
of Asia.'
Grey concluded:
'It is obvious to us (though not necessarily so to the Dutch) 
that unless a settlement of the Indonesian problem is soon 
achieved, there will be a serious deterioration of the situation 
in the Eetherlands East Indies with grave consequences to the 
stability of South East Asia, which is already threatened by 
the virtual state of war in Indo-China, and by the disturbances 
in Malaya and Burma. It is equally obvious to us that we 
cannot afford to give further material to our critics in that 
area by agreeing to any form of Anglo-Dutch collaboration in 
South East Asia so long as the Indonesian problem remains in 
its present state. Finally, any collaboration in South East
Asia must be between all the countries which have interests in
the area - i.e. it must include the countries in the area as
well as the colonial powers concerned. Australia will also be 
interested. It was the object of the Killearn Mission to
initiate such collaboration starting with economic questions, 
over which political feelings did not run high.'(37)
Both Vright's and Grey's comments spelled out that Vestern Union 
would not oblige Britain into colonial cooperation in South-East Asia,
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but that she was still hoping for a regional system which included 
colonial and independent Asian countries. More than anything, Bevin's 
insistence on maintaining the arms ban until there was a settlement 
satisfactory to the Republic brought home Britain's opposition to 
exclusive colonial alignments in South-East Asia. Paradoxically, it had 
been Bevin who in January had raised hopes for Vestern Union cooperation 
in Asia in the first place. At the same time, the Foreign Office knew 
that unless there was some kind of solution to the Indonesian problem, 
the short term prospects for regional cooperation would remain dim.
However, new developments in South-East Asia soon led to a change 
of Britain's regional strategy. On 18 June 1948, one day after Vright's 
comments, the British colonial authorities in Malaya declared a state of 
emergency there. It followed an increasing number of communist guerilla 
attacks on British-owned rubber plantations and mining enterprises as 
well as police outposts. The emergency coincided with heightening 
tensions in Europe where the Soviet Union began blockading the Vestern 
sectors of Berlin on 24 June. The British soon suspected Moscow to be 
behind the Malayan insurrection as well. From the British point of view, 
the emergency marked the extension of the Cold Var to South-East Asia. 
As will be seen in the last part of this thesis, regional cooperation 
would soon become a key element in British efforts to contain communism 
in Asia.(38)
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PART IV 
C O M M U N I S M
The communist insurrection in Malaya was at the beginning of a new 
phase in South-East Asia's postwar history. From the British point of 
view, communism, not nationalism, now constituted the overriding problem 
of the day. The Malayan emergency followed the outbreak of communist 
guerrilla warfare in Burma in March 1948, which seriously destabilized 
the country throughout the year.(1) In Indonesia too, communists were to 
make a bid for power, though their attempt in September 1948 to gain 
control of the Indonesian Republic was squashed by troops loyal to the 
moderate government of Mohammed Hatta. (2) Towards the end of the year, a 
number of decisive victories by the Chinese communists against the 
nationalists in China added to London’s worries. It was feared that 
China, once it had fallen under communist control, would encourage the 
communist movements in South-East Asia to intensify their struggle. 
Indochina was seen as the prime target of Chinese agitation where the 
communist dominated Viet Minh was already beginning to push the French 
into the defensive. A communist take-over in China was expected to have 
a detrimental ^ffect also on the declining state of affairs in Burma, 
and there was the possibility that Thailand might bend in the wind and 
switch over into the communist camp, as she had given in to Japanese 
pressure in 1941.
So far as the British were concerned, the communist insurrections 
in South-East Asia together with the communist advances in China marked
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the beginning of the Cold War in Asia.(3) They interpreted them as part 
of a Moscow-inspired campaign to assume control of the region. South- 
East Asia was soon taking on a global importance in the conflict between 
the Soviet Union and the Vest, and anti-communist policies in the region 
acquired increasing priority. The perceived communist onslaught in 
South-East Asia led to the revival of Britain's flagging policy of 
regional cooperation, which was to become one of London's prime 
strategies for containing communism. The idea was to organise an anti­
communist front in the region, initially on a Commonwealth basis, and 
later on including other countries as well. British plans also involved 
the United States: London hoped that Washington would provide loans and 
financial aid to give the incentive for participation in a regional 
arrangement, and to stabilize the South and South-East Asian economies. 
After intensive diplomatic activities within the Commonwealth, and 
considerable lobbying efforts in Washington, London defined its regional 
policies in a comprehensive policy paper on South-East Asia in the 
summer of 1949. The paper was the highlight in the Foreign Office's 
regional planning efforts since 1945. It was endorsed by the Cabinet in 
October 1949 and paved the way for the Colombo Conference and the 
Colombo Plan. The paper is the finishing point of this thesis.
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12. L ON DON'S SEARCH FOR AN A N T I - C O M M O N  I ST 
ST R A T E G Y  IN S O U T H - E A S T  ASIA
12.1 BRITISH PERCEPTIONS OF COMMUNISM IN ASIA
Since the 1950's, historians have been arguing whether the outbreak 
of communist insurrections in South-East Asia was orchestrated by the 
Soviet Union. One line of argument suggests that Moscow used the 
Calcutta Youth Conference, which was attended by communist delegations 
from South-East Asia, as well as the immediately following Congress of 
the Indian Communist Party, to instruct the attending communist 
delegates to initiate armed uprisings in their respective countries. The 
Soviet Union's aim is regarded as having been to destabilize the Vest 
European economies by depriving them of vital raw materials from South- 
East Asia.(1) However, while there is little doubt that the meeting 
encouraged the subsequent outbreak of communist insurrection, Ruth 
T.McVey's convincing study of the Calcutta Conference has called into 
question whether it was Moscow that gave the orders for armed revolt.(2) 
The general historical consensus is now that while there is no concrete 
evidence that Moscow used the conference to order the South-East Asian 
uprisings, the meeting did serve as a forum for the advocacy of the 
Soviet Union's two-camp thesis propagated by Zhdanov during the founding
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meeting of the Cominform in 1947, and that it quickened the pace of 
revolutionary movements in Asia.(3)
What matters in the context of this study, however, is that at the
time London came to the conclusion that Moscow was behind the communist
uprisings in South-East Asia. In 1947, the head of Britain's Security
Intelligence, Far East, had warned of growing communist strength in
South-East Asia, arguing that most of the local communist parties,
though temporarily out of touch or disorganised, were bound to be
directly or indirectly controlled by the Soviet Union. (4) One year
later, the communist campaign of violence in Malaya increased British
suspicion of Soviet designs in the region. As Paul Grey told Bevin in
the middle of July:
'There is no direct evidence of co-ordination by Russia of
communist activities throughout South East Asia, though it is
strongly suspected. When the Cominform was set up last
September, there must have existed in Moscow some plan for
Asia as well as Europe. The Cominform manifesto declares quite 
clearly that it is the task of communism to combat imperialism
not only in Europe but also in South East Asia.'
Grey added that the Calcutta Youth Conference had 'provided a means of 
co-ordinating communist activities in all the South East Asia countries, 
and probably of relaying the latest ideas from Moscow'.(5)
After the beginning of the communist revolt in Indonesia, the
Foreign Office's suspicion grew even further, Grey stressing on 29 
September that direct evidence of the Russian connection was still
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remarkably small; however, ‘circumstantial evidence strongly suggests
Russian inspiration and guidance in the recent series of communist 
outbreaks in South East East Asia, of which the latest example is the 
sudden Communist revolt in the Republican-held territory in Java'.(6) 
The same opinion was expressed in a Foreign Office memorandum prior to
the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference in mid-October, which
stressed that:
'In general, the pattern seems to be one of attempting to
overthrow established government and to create economic chaos.
Though there is no concrete evidence of direction from Moscow, 
nevertheless the pattern suggests that communists in South 
East Asia are following the Moscow line,(7)
One month later the Foreign Office had largely made up its mind as 
to who was behind the South-East Asian insurrections. London told the 
Commissioner-General's office in Singapore that the communist 
developments in South-East Asia were of concern not only because they 
presented an immediate problem in the defence of Britain's vital 
interests, but also because they 'fit into the general strategy of the
Kremlin in the cold war against us' . The paper suspected that after a
tightening of Moscow's control during the Calcutta Conference the 
Kremlin's 'grand strategists' decided that the world international
situation required a more active campaign of open violence and
disruption in most of South-East Asia. Hence, 'the result of the 
Calcutta Conference was that violence directly organised by the 
Communists broke out throughout South East Asia'.(8)
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P. S. Scrivener, at the Commissioner-General1s office, was less 
convinced. At the end of lovember he sent a letter to the American 
consulate-general in Singapore, stressing that the 'evidence for the 
integration of terrorist activities in Malaya with a Communist schedule 
of uprisings elsewhere in South-East Asia rests only to a small extent 
on documents discovered here'.(9) Despite this lack of concrete 
evidence, London's doubts about Moscow's central role had been removed 
by December: the Joint Intelligence Committee of the Chiefs of Staff
argued that after the inauguration of the Cominform there had been a 
re-orientation of communist policy in India, Burma and Malaya, and that 
ideological guidance had been reinforced by personal contacts 
established during the Calcutta Conference, to which a large Russian 
delegation was sent. As a result, the communist parties from the three 
countries had all decided to embark on a course of militant opposition, 
encouraged also by the increasingly influential Chinese Communist Party. 
The strategic plan was initially to forge a militant communist front in 
the Far East, aiming to aggravate the conflict between Imperialism and 
the oppressed colonial people, as a step towards total communist 
control. The revolts in Burma, Malaya and Indonesia all fitted into this 
pattern.(10)
12.2 THE COLONIAL POWERS AND ANT I-COMMUNI ST 
COOPERATION IN SOUTH-EAST ASIA
The perceived Moscow-inspired communist onslaught on South-East 
Asia revived the issue of regional cooperation at Whitehall. While
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London was determined to suppress the communist Insurgency in Malaya by 
military means, (11) it also realised that some form of anti-communist 
coordination with neighbouring territories might be required, for 
example on the intelligence level. The question was, however, whether 
there should also be some kind of diplomatic initiative, and to what 
degree France and the Netherlands should be allowed to become involved. 
The Foreign Office had so far rejected the idea that the Brussels Treaty 
should lead to an increase in open colonial cooperation in South-East 
Asia. It refused to change this line simply because of the Malayan 
emergency. In the middle of July, the Foreign Office warned Bevin, who 
was about to leave for a Brussels Treaty meeting in The Hague, that he 
might be questioned about the spread of communism in South-East Asia. 
The department advised against any public announcements on a common 
anti-communist policy by the colonial powers, as there was the danger 
that this might mistakenly be construed as anti-national1st rather than 
anti-communist. However, exchanges of information about communist 
activities in the respective colonies would be advantageous so long as 
they were given no publicity.(12)
During the subsequent Brussels Treaty meeting in The Hague the 
issue of specifically anti-communist cooperation does not seem to have 
been raised. However, the Dutch Prime Minister, Louis Beel, used the 
opportunity and proposed a joint study of the role of overseas 
territories in the development of the ideas embodied in the Brussels 
Treaty. His proposal in fact implied the extension of Western Union 
cooperation to South-East Asia. Bevin was reluctant to discuss the Dutch 
proposal, but failed to thwart it altogether; the issue was consequently
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referred to the council's next meeting in October.(13) By the autumn, 
London would therefore have to make up its mind officially on whether it 
wanted to step up colonial cooperation as a result of the communist 
insurections.
British Foreign Office officials in Singapore were unaware of the 
Dutch initiative. However, they too saw some merit in increasing 
cooperation with the French and the Dutch, particularly at the 
intelligence level. As MacDonald told London at the end of July 1948, 
fresh signs of communist activities gave the issue of cooperation in 
South-East Asia greater importance and urgency. There were strong 
movements towards the extreme left in Burma, there was further communist 
progress in China as well as a communist inspired outbreak of terrorism 
in Malaya. In Thailand, a Soviet League had been established. MacDonald 
believed that these events might reduce to some extent the prejudices of 
the local peoples against Western cooperation, and a framework of such 
collaboration should therefore be studied if not erected. He saw three 
possible forms of cooperation:
1) A more generous exchange of security intelligence;
2) the association, in some form, of the local Dutch and French 
representatives with the activities of the British Defence Co-ordination 
Committee; and
3) confidential discussions between the three governments to ascertain 
what measures of agreement already existed between them, whether it 
could be increased, and whether it could be reduced to a formula 
calculated to discourage the Russians without provoking the Asians.
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MacDonald added that a discreet 'education campaign* could be launched 
in the South-East Asian territories which would argue that if these 
countries wished to stand on their own feet they had to be safe from 
aggression in the process, and that protection could only be supplied by 
the great democratic powers and their associates. It would perhaps be 
possible to use some kind of ballon d'essai to estimate the real depth 
of Asian opinion regarding Western collaboration in South-East Asia.(14)
At the Foreign Office, Dening was not particularly pleased that the
issue of colonial cooperation had come up again. In an extensive draft
reply to MacDonald, he argued that the Russians were out to rouse Asian 
*
opinon against the Vest, and that one therefore had to be careful not to
offer them a weapon by entering into open colonial collaboration in
South-East Asia. Western Union complicated the issue, as it was not yet
known what exactly Britain's obligations were under the Brussels Treaty:
'However that may be, we do not wish to alienate the Asiatic 
races of South East Asia by an overt association in this area 
with France and the Netherlands so close as to appear 
exclusive.'
Though Dening saw possibilities for the exchange of information on 
how to combat communism, he objected to an alignment of the Dutch and 
French with the British Defence Coordination Committee, or to 
confidential (high-level) discussions. Politically, strategically and 
economically, the aim had to be to get all the peoples of the area to 
work together, and not just the Western powers. This was impossible 
unless and until the Indochina and Indonesia issues had been resolved, 
as Britain would be unable to carry Pakistan, India, Ceylon and Burma 
with her so long as these issues remained a problem:
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'Practically speaking therefore, we see insuperable objections 
for the present to associating the Western Union in any way 
publicly with South East Asia, although we appreciate that it 
may prove difficult to sustain these objections in the light of 
the Brussels Treaty. On the other hand, we see advantage in 
economic collaboration to the extent that it is not exclusive 
to the Western Powers, and we also see advantage in the 
exchange of information with the French and the Dutch, on a 
secret basis, about communist activities and methods of 
combating them, always provided that this is without risk to 
the security of our own information.'(15)
Dening further emphasized in a note for the Foreign Office that it
would be disastrous to publicize any extension of Western Union to
South-East Asia, though he welcomed any suggestions as to how the pill
could be sweetened for France and the Metherlands.(16) Christofas agreed
with Dening's line, minuting that:
'We have consistently opposed any integration with the French 
and the Dutch in the Far East on the Colonial level and 
insisted that instead all our collaboration should be through 
the medium of what was the Special Commission and is now the 
Foreign Office side of the Commission-General, where such 
collaboration is not restricted to the metropolitan powers but 
includes all the territories of the area. Developments in the 
third session of ECAFE, where an overwhelming majority 
displayed pro-Indonesian and anti-Dutch sympathies, should 
serve as a warning to us of the dangers of appearing anti­
nationalist in the eyes of the Asian peoples'.(17)
Dening's draft letter was subsequently circulated at Whitehall. As 
a result, the interdepartmental debate on regional cooperation flared up 
again. The Commonwealth Relations Office (formerly Dominions Office) 
agreed with the Foreign Office: Australia's and New Zealand's reactions 
to signs that Britain was underwriting measures taken by the French in 
Indochina and the Dutch in Indonesia could well be unfavourable; the 
same could be said of India, Pakistan and Ceylon.(18) However, other 
departments tended to favour MacDonald's ideas. The Defence Ministry,
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for example, 'attached rather more weight than CDening] to the arguments 
in favour of three-power co-operation in the Far East in the struggle 
against Communism'. It realised there had to be a cautious approach to 
the problem, but hoped that in view of the possible strategic advantages 
the risks would be acceptable.(19)
The Colonial Office was divided over the issue. Its Eastern 
Department regarded Dening's draft reply as too negative, arguing that 
the communist emergency required closer collaboration with the Dutch and 
the French. Holding rigidly aloof from the Dutch would merely isolate 
Britain from her friends in the area while not necessarily increasing 
her 'popularity with the races of South East Asia'.(20) Galsworthy from 
the Colonial Office's International Relations Department, on the other 
hand, had misgivings about open cooperation with the French and the 
Dutch at the present tine (21), though he agreed that it was undesirable 
to urge MacDonald to go slower than he thought safe. After 'exhaustive 
discussions' between Galsworthy and Eastern Department, J.M.Martin sent 
a letter to the Foreign Office hoping to turn the 'red light which 
Mr.Dening was proposing to flash to Mr.MacDonald not into green, but 
into Amber'.(22) The Colonial Office's letter agreed that the effect of 
cooperation with the French and the Dutch on the local peoples had to be 
the main criterion, and that public opinion in Britain|i also had to be 
taken into consideration. However, the Colonial Office wanted to avoid 
going any slower than MacDonald and other local officials thought to be 
safe. Furthermore, the whole situation in South-East Asia had been 
transformed by the open communist offensive during the last few months. 
Consequently:
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'[The danger] that by collaborating with other powers in action 
against the Communists we may appear to be engaged in a 
European crusade for the suppression of nationalism in South- 
East Asia ... is in any case less real to-day than it was.
Morevover, good relations with the Dutch in South-East Asia are 
of considerable importance to us in view of the geographical 
propinquity between Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies'.
The Colonial Office agreed that there were insuperable objections to 
associating Western Union publicly with South-East Asia. However, just 
like there was technical as well as some political cooperation with the 
French on colonial matters in Africa, a number of conferences with 
France and the Netherlands could be arranged on technical subjects in 
South-East Asia. These conferences would not be exclusive: other states 
would attend, and representatives from the local populations could be 
invited. No formal machinery should be established, leaving it to the 
conferences to recommend, a possible perpetuation of its work. The
Colonial Office realised, though, that ECAFE was a complicating factor
and that there was the danger that the Dutch and French might insist on 
extending cooperation to political matters as well. (23) The letter 
revealed that the Foreign Office had never fully convinced the Colonial 
Office of its modified regional strategy in South-East Asia, which ruled 
out exclusive colonial cooperation.
However, a Meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers, scheduled for 
mid-October, allowed the Foreign Office to force the issue, as the
conference would provide an ideal opportunity for discussing both 
communism and regional cooperation. During an interdepartmental meeting 
on 29 September Dening recalled that the Special Commissioner's 
organisation had empirically built up regional collaboration on economic
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matters, and that its monthly Liaison Officers' Meetings were regularly
attended by representatives from fifteen countries. The economic
emergency which had brought these meetings into being was now rapidly 
passing, but it seemed a pity to let them die, particularly since ECAFE
was unlikely ever to prove effective since the Soviet Union was one of
its members and would seek to make mischief in it. Dening suggested 
that, similar to the existing cooperation through the Liaison Officers' 
Meetings, anti-communist collaboration should be built up empirically by 
liaison between the C.I.D.'s, police and security services of all the 
countries of the area, colonial and Asian alike.
The representative of the Commonwealth Relations Office, MacLennan, 
supported the idea, but Martin from the Colonial Office doubted whether 
security cooperation with the Asian powers could be as close as with the 
Dutch. In Africa, there were two degrees of cooperation with Britain: 
France and Belgium formed an inner circle, while the other powers 
concerned (Liberia, Ethiopia and South Africa) constituted an outer 
circle. The meeting agreed that, while security cooperation in South- 
East Asia would best be achieved through direct contacts between the 
agencies concerned, (there was already some cooperation between the 
police in Malaya and India), the Commissioner-General could coordinate 
two degrees of collaboration. One official suggested that the 
Commonwealth Prime Ministers should be lined up as an outer circle. 
Recognizing, however, that it would be difficult to persuade them to 
collaborate in something as vague as anti-communist activity, the 
meeting decided that Bevin should use the Commonwealth conference to 
stress the communist menace in South-East Asia.(24)
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The interdepartmental meeting thus recommended a two-pronged 
approach to cooperation in South-East Asia. Britain, France and the 
Netherlands on the inside would cooperate primarily at the security 
level, while there would be a second circle of Commonwealth countries 
working together at the political level. Since cooperation between the 
colonial powers would be kept secret, it would not offend Asian opinion. 
However, a few days before the beginning of the Commonwealth Prime 
Ministers Conference, Ernest Bevin cane up with a much grander idea: as 
Dening pointed out in a departmental minute, the Foreign Secretary was 
thinking of 'a kind of 0.E.E.C. for Asia'.(25)
12,3 AN OEEC FOR ASIA?
Bevin* s idea of an Asian OEEC hit a raw nerve at the Foreign 
Office. The European OEEC was an intergovernmental organisation with a 
comparatively high degree of autonomy in decision-making. If an Asian 
equivalent was established on similar lines, Britain would have been 
unable to influence the organisation in the way that it had directed the 
Special Commission. Not surprisingly, Dening warned not to broach the 
idea with the Commonwealth Prime Ministers without very careful study in 
advance. He saw 'real danger that if such an organisation were set up, 
either India or Australia would try to assume the leadership, and in 
either case the results might not be very happy for the United 
Kingdom'.(26) A.L.Scott added that China would also try to assume the 
leadership within such a scheme. In his opinion, the special interests
-  287 -
of Asian countries already received adequate attention through 
ECAFE.(27)
Apart from the political pitfalls of an Asian OEEC, the Foreign 
Office regarded the economic implications of the suggested organisation 
as equally serious for Britain. In Europe, the OEEC had been created as 
a result of Marshall aid provided by the United States. An Asian OEEC 
would require similar aid packages, aid that Britain was unwilling and 
unable to provide because of her precarious financial situation. The 
only alternative source of aid or loans would have been the United 
States, which was already financing the Marshall Plan in Europe. 
However, there were no signs that Washington was prepared to provide 
large scale aid for the countries of South and South-East Asia, 
particularly after the failure of her aid programme for the Chinese 
nationalists. (See chapter on Anglo-American talks on South-East Asia).
Moreover, the British were reluctant to encourage American
interests. Malaya, the antipodeans and the new dominions were all part 
of the Sterling Area, which helped strengthen the pound as well as 
Britain's trade balance. The Sterling Area of the late 1940's dated back 
to 1939 and provided for the pooling and rationing of the Empire's and 
the Commonwealth's hard currency reserves (with Canada, a dollar area, 
as the main exception). Under its provisions, Britain bought all the 
hard currency reserves from the Sterling Area countries and credited 
them with sterling balances. The effect was that colonies like Malaya, 
whose rubber and tin exports to the United States were the single
financial involvement in an area of primarily British economic
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biggest dollar earners of the Sterling Area, were unable to buy American 
goods but had to rely on imports from Britain. The only problem was that 
Britain's economy was unable to provide the goods required. Dollar 
earning parts of the Sterling Area (such as Malaya or the Gold Coast) 
consequently ran up large sterling balances, while Britain (and other 
dollar deficit countries such as India) used the dollars to finance the 
import of goods from the United States.(28) As one historian has argued, 
the whole deal was rough on the dollar surplus countries because the 
others were only too ready to spend the surplus.(29)
Another feature of the Sterling Area was that it allowed the 
members of the Commonwealth to protect themselves against excessive 
dollar imports and instead foster trade within the Commonwealth and 
Empire.(30) Mot surprisingly, the Americans objected to such 
discrimination. However, American efforts to brake up the Sterling Area 
through the convertibility of sterling in 1947 had ended in complete 
disaster and had had to be aborted. The Foreign Office's economic 
experts consequently feared that Bevin's idea of an Asian OEEC might be 
a new way of undermining the Sterling Area. In particular, it might put 
an end to the triangular trade pattern between Malaya, Britain and the 
United States. As J.F.Turner from the Foreign Office’s Economic 
Relations Department commented, it was Britain's policy to support ECAFE 
and to emphasize the reliance on local resources and private investment. 
However:
'If the implications of the present proposal are that Asia 
should receive assistance, either in the form in which Marshall 
aid is being given to Europe, or in the form of a 
comprehensive government loan from sources outside Asia, the 
consequences must be economically undesirable. The U.K. is not 
in a position to provide such aid itself, from its own
-  289 -
resolurces, & aid from any other source must necessarily mean 
the establishment of an economic bloc in Asia, cutting right 
across the operation of the Sterling Area including the 
principal dollar & other foreign currency contributors to the 
Sterling Area pool.'
Turner concluded that if on the other hand no such assistance was
forthcoming, it would be impossible to claim that such an organisation
would economically have anything to contribute which ECAFE did
notalready do.(31) Another official commented:
'Anything like an Asiatic O.E.E.C. would at the present time be 
most undesirable. Our role in ECAFE, and that of the other 
Commonwealth members, permits us to exercise fully the limited 
degree of influence on the economic development of the area 
which can be experienced without involving us in commitments 
which we cannot afford.'(32)
Christophas agreed that Britain would be unable to finance an Asian
OEEC, as it would encourage the Asian powers to press still more for
some form of Marshall aid for Asia, for which they had already appealed
during the last two sessions of ECAFE. It would also entail a
duplication of efforts with the United Mations. He went on to suggest a
form of regional cooperation which Britain in effect would have been
able to control:
'Perhaps what the Secretary of State really had in mind was a 
medium for regional collaboration on a wider than purely 
economic field on the lines suggested by Mr .Dening in his 
original brief for the Secretary of State's reviews of South 
East Asia for the Commonwealth Prime Ministers. This
visualises the creation of some forum similar perhaps to that 
of the Commissioner-General's Monthly Liaison Officers 
meetings but (confined generally to S.E.Asia) empowered to deal 
not with economic or technical matters but with measures to 
combat Communism and, building empirically, perhaps with other 
political matters in due course'.
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Christophas concluded that if the Prime Ministers agreed such 
cooperation could be built up around the Commissioner-General’s existing 
organisation. It would give new stimulus at a time when the
organisation's 'economic raison d'etre' was rapidly ceasing to exist,
and would 'encourage the countries of S.E.Asia to continue to look to 
the United Kingdom for spiritual leadership'.(33) The Foreign Office 
thus objected to an Asian OEEC partly because of its likely autonomous 
status and partly because of Britain's inability to provide large-scale 
loans and aid. The department also feared that American involvement 
would be detrimental to British economic interests in the region. 
Instead, officials recommended sticking with ECAFE, or alternatively 
using the former Special Commission to expand Britain's regional 
activities.
Bevin, however, lacked faith in both ECAFE and the former Special 
Commission, and he was determined to launch a new regional initiative at 
the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Meeting. It was only after a top-level 
meeting with officials from the Foreign and Colonial Offices that he 
agreed to compromise. The meeting dropped the idea of an Asian OEEC, but 
it suggested instead that government ministers of Britain, India, 
Pakistan, Ceylon, Australia and Mew Zealand should meet at regular 
intervals to discuss matters of mutual interest (such as South-East 
Asia). Dening subsequently explained that 'the idea as now developing is 
political rather than economic, with the basic fear of communism and of 
Russia as the driving force', though it was another matter whether it 
would work or not.(34) Bevin was briefed accordingly that he should
suggest at the beginning of the Commonwealth conference that South-East
-  291 -
Asia's problems were of sufficient importance to demand some form of 
regional collaboration between the members of the Commonwealth 
concerned. He should therefore propose periodic meetings of interested 
Commonwealth members, say at six-monthly intervals, the first of which 
would take place in Singapore.(35)
The Foreign Secretary's brief constituted the first 
interdepartmental agreement on regional cooperation since the 1946 
Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Meeting. It also marked the beginning of a 
new phase in London's regional policy. Against the wishes of some 
Foreign Office officials, Britain's new line no longer centred on 
developing the Special Commission's international organisation as the 
nucleus for a regional system in South-East Asia. Firstly, the functions 
of the Liaison Officers' Meetings were dwindling, while ECAFE was 
establishing itself as a viable regional alternative. Furthermore, 
London had come to realise that the new Commissioner-General's 
international section was too obviously dominated by Britain, and that 
its chances of being accepted by the Asian countries as the centre of a 
larger regional organisation in South-East Asia were slim. Instead, 
London decided that a Commonwealth approach offered the best chance of 
regaining the initiative on regional cooperation. Britain was the 
dominant power inside the Commonwealth and London was optimistic that it 
could play a leading role at the suggested regional conferences. It also 
hoped that it could use the communist bogey to mould the Asian countries 
into a regional grouping under British leadership. However, the 
Commonwealth approach also implied that France and the Netherlands, 
despite their central position in South-East Asia, would at least
-  292 -
initially be excluded from a regional understanding in South-East Asia. 
Though this did not rule out cooperation at the intelligence level, the 
earlier Dutch proposal for Western Union cooperation in South-East Asia 
would therefore have to be rejected once and for all.
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13. REGIONAL COOPERATION AND REGIONAL CONTAINMENT
13,1 THE 1948 COMMONWEALTH PRIME MINISTERS' MEETING
The Meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers in October 1948 
provided London with an opportunity to regain the initiative on regional 
cooperation in South-East Asia, using the anti-communist theme as a 
means of re-establishing British diplomatic leadership. Throughout the 
meeting, the British stressed the communist menace in both Europe and 
Asia. During one of the initial sessions of the conference, on 12 
Oc^tober, Bevin suggested that the Commonwealth countries interested in 
South-East Asia should hold regular consultations to put the political 
and economic life of the region's countries, which were threatened by 
communism, on a firm footing. He had not worked out detailed proposals 
and was not suggesting elaborate machinery, but hoped that an 
understanding particularly with the new dominions could be worked out. 
Bevin's proposals met with a favourable response, Evatt endorsing the 
idea of Commonwealth consultation on South-East Asia. Nehru replied that 
India was vitally interested in South-East Asia and that regional 
understanding between India, Britain, Australia and New Zealand was 
desirable.(1)
A few days later, Attlee repeated Bevin's suggestion of regional 
discussions between Commonwealth countries. Economic developments in 
South-East Asia might be discussed by representatives from Britain, 
Australia, New Zealand, India, Pakistan and Ceylon.(2) On the following
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day, Nehru stressed that regional arrangements were desirable but must 
not conflict with the principles of the United Nations. He had hitherto 
resisted proposals from other Asian countries for the formation of an 
Asian union, but there would be increasing pressure as the regional idea 
grew inside Europe. The Pakistani Prime Minister, Liaqat All Khan, was 
more forthcoming, stating that the Commonwealth should give a lead to 
the countries struggling against communism by drawing up a plan for 
strengthening the countries of the Commonwealth, the Middle East and 
South-East Asia by methods similar to those which were being applied in 
Western Europe. Bevin replied that regional associations could form a 
basis for confidence in the UN. He did not have precise plans in South- 
East Asia, but was convinced of the necessity for consultation and 
association. He agreed with Nehru that it was wise to associate Burma 
with such consultation, but believed it to be difficult to save the 
country from communism, as Britain had already done everything short of 
military intervention. (3)
On the whole, London was satisfied with the Prime Ministers' 
Meeting. As Machtig from the Commonwealth Relations Office pointed out, 
the conference's outstanding feature was the large measure of support 
given to the policy of offering firm resistance to 'Soviet totalitarian 
pressure', be it in the form of external aggression or communist 
infiltration.(4) The Foreign Office was particularly pleased that advice 
by Nehru on combatting communism provided 'valuable confirmation of our 
own thinking on this matter, coming as it does from a man with such 
experience of leftist thinking in Asia'.(5)
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However, so far as South-East Asia was concerned, the results of 
the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Meeting were inconclusive. As Dening 
pointed out, the conference discussions on anti-communist cooperation in 
South-East Asia had only 'touched the fringe of the subject'.(6) On the 
one hand, Bevin's proposal for periodic meetings of Commonwealth 
countries interested in South-East Asia had initially met with a 
favourable response. On the other hand, the problem was that his 
proposals for South-East Asian conferences seemed to have been 
superseded in the minds of many delegates by the proposal for general 
Commonwealth meetings on foreign affairs. (7) It had been suggested at 
the end of the conference that in the future Prime Ministers' Meetings 
should take place as often as practicable, and that in the intervals 
there would be ministerial meetings on foreign affairs either once or 
twice a year. The first such meeting had been contemplated for May 1949 
in Ceylon. It was therefore unclear whether or not the Commonwealth 
Prime Ministers still favoured a special conference on South-East Asia.
Despite this confusion, the Foreign Office remained committed to 
the idea of Commonwealth cooperation as a basis for regional cooperation 
in South-East Asia. As Grey minuted, the Foreign Office had always 
favoured regional political collaboration in South-East Asia as an 
'object towards which we should work', indeed 'the idea in establishing 
the organisation in Singapore was that economic collaboration should 
eventually produce political collaboration.' A Commonwealth conference 
therefore might well lead to such a development. (8) Dening too was 
hopeful, arguing that Mehru seemed willing to agree at least to a 
certain amount of collaboration - provided it was covert and not overt.
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As a first step, closer contacts with the police and security services 
should be established. Dening also supported a follow-up to the Prime 
Ministers' Meeting, and if a [separate! regional conference was arranged 
the matter should be carried further, possibly bringing in other non- 
British territories as well.(9)
13,2 LONDON'S FINAL REJECTION OF WESTERN UNION 
COOPERATION IN SOUTH-EAST ASIA
The Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Meeting thus encouraged London to 
foster regional cooperation through the Commonwealth. It was hoped that 
in the long run countries like Burma, Thailand, France and the 
Netherlands would also be included. However, London also decided that 
the Commonwealth approach was incompatible with a separate scheme of 
colonial cooperation. During an interdepartmental meeting on 20 October 
Dening stressed that the Asian populations would be strongly prejudiced 
against political cooperation with the Brussels Treaty powers in the Far 
East. MacDonald, who had attended the Prime Ministers' Meeting, now 
supported Dening's line. The meeting therefore agreed that Bevin should 
explain to Western Union members that Britain opposed open political 
cooperation in South-East Asia but was prepared to collaborate covertly. 
Furthermore, if the Dutch raised the issue of economic cooperation in 
overseas territories, Bevin should point at a recent decision by the 
Western Union's finance ministers to set up an OEEC Colonial Development 
Committee which covered this aspect.(10)
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A meeting of the Brussels Treaty consultative council in Paris on 
25 October provided the opportunity for Britain to clarify her line. 
Prior to the meeting, Bevin was briefed that friction caused by Dutch 
and, to a lesser extent, French colonial policies made immediate 
Commonwealth cooperation in South-East Asia difficult, and that he 
should oppose any Anglo-Dutch-French consultation regarding South-East 
Asia. The only exception was collaboration ‘behind the scenes'. There 
was 'already effective co-operation in Singapore with the Dutch and 
French as regards the activities of Communists, arms smuggling, 
contraband and so on'.<11)
During the Paris meeting, the Dutch, as expected, raised their 
proposal from July 1948 to study Western Union cooperation in colonial 
territories. The Dutch Foreign Minister, Dirk Stikker, stressed that not 
only the Netherlands, but also France and Britain were in trouble in 
South-East Asia. However, Bevin was unforthcoming. The Commonwealth 
Prime Ministers' Meeting had shown that Australia and India were 
unfavourable to the situation in South-East Asia, and that discussions 
in the Permanent Commission of the Brussels Treaty powers (which would 
have to be mentioned in the public communique) would encourage 
nationalist feeling in South-East Asia and give the communists a good 
propaganda weapon. Any consultations should take place through the 
'normal diplomatic channels'.
The other Western Union powers were equally disinclined to become 
entangled in the Netherlands' Indonesian problems. The Belgian Foreign 
Minister, Henri Spaak, stressed that it was inconsistent for the Dutch
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to argue in the Security Council that Indonesia was an internal affair 
and no threat to peace while taking the view in the consultative council 
that the matter was of international concern and a threat to peace. The 
French Foreign Minister, Robert Schuman, also believed that discussing 
Indonesia, perhaps on the grounds that it threatened the Netherlands' 
financial stability, would be stretching the treaty to mean rather more 
than it actually said. The meeting therefore decided that any 
discussions on Indonesia should be mentioned in the communique only 
after other international issues such as Palestine, Spain or the Italian 
colonies. (12) As Christofas commented a few days later on at the 
Foreign Office:
'This satisfactorily disposes of Dutch attempts to extend the
scope of the Brussels Treaty to Overseas Territories.'(13)
In addition to his opposition to Western Union collaboration in
South-East Asia, Bevin also refused to make further concessions on the
Indonesian arms embargo. On 19 July, Bevin had told the Dutch Prime^ 
Louis Beel, that the arms ban could not be lifted before the 
introduction of constitutional reforms had been introduced in Indonesia; 
however, this did not preclude 'special arrangements being made for the
supply from Singapore or elsewhere of a few spare parts or uniforms
required by the Dutch in Indonesia'.(14) In August, London had confirmed 
to The Hague that subject to availability Britain 'would in future 
supply orders for what we consider to be non-lethal equipment (including 
spares) without requiring any guarantee that it would not be forwarded 
to the Netherlands East Indies' . (15) However, this was as far as Bevin 
was prepared to go. In October, the Dutch proposed that the British
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would no longer ask for specific undertakings but would assume that the 
Netherlands would not order any lethal material for Indonesia. Bevin 
objected - against the advice of the Foreign Office.(16) The Foreign 
Secretary saw the proposal as a subterfuge that could not be defended in 
the House of Commons (17), and which would mean the end of the 
embargo. (18) Bevin explained to his officials that there was the 
possibility of a second police action in Indonesia, in which case he 
would be questioned closely about the embargo. The matter should be left 
as it was, though Grey was instructed to help the Dutch as much as he 
could administratively. (19)
The decision of the Brussels Treaty's Consultative Council against
special Western Union talks on Indonesia, as well as Bevin's maintenance
of the arms embargo, removed a potential obstacle in the way of
Commonwealth cooperation in South-East Asia. As Grey wrote to British
diplomatic representatives in South-East Asia in November,_ it was in the
Foreign Office's mind to take the initiative, when the time seemed ripe,
in proposing a special regional conference on South-East Asia which
would preferably meet in Singapore. The department intended to:
'...keep the initiative in South-East Asia which we took when we 
established the Special Commissioner's Organisation. But 
secondly we should like at some stage to bring in non- 
Commonwealth countries. It was always intended that the 
economic collaboration initiated at Singapore should develop 
into a wider political collaboration. '(20)
At the end of November, British officials based in South-East Asia 
discussed London's conference plans during a meeting in Singapore 
organised by MacDonald. The meeting concluded that a lot was to be said
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for the calling of an early regional conference on the lines suggested 
by the Foreign Office, but that it would be better to delay the 
proposal. As MacDonald pointed out to London, the proposal to hold a 
larger Commonwealth conference in Ceylon in April or May was holding the 
field, and Commonwealth countries would probably be upset by an earlier 
regional Commonwealth conference in Singapore which, might cover much of 
the same ground. It was also thought that countries like Thailand and 
Burma would be reluctant to attend such a conference. They probably 
wanted to avoid 'ganging up against the Russians and Communists' while 
'lining up with "Imperialists"', though possible American participation 
would make things easier for non-Commonwealth countries to attend. 
Furthermore, the Indonesian problem remained a stumbling bloc. According 
to MacDonald:
'The Indonesian situation is so vital to developments in South 
East Asia generally that a conference without representatives 
of Indonesia would be like a performance of "Hamlet" in the 
absence of one of the important characters, if not the Prince 
of Denmark himself'.
The problem was whether Dutch, Indonesian or delegates from both sides
would attend the conference:
'In fact we think an attempt to hold such a [conference] prior 
to settling of Indonesian question will result in great 
controversy between us, the Dutch, the Indians and Indonesians.
The reactions of such a controversy in South East Asia would 
be very bad'.
MacDonald added that to a lesser extent the same applied to Indochina. 
However, if the larger Commonwealth meeting in Ceylon would not come 
off, a Commonwealth conference in Singapore should be considered at an 
early date. If at the same time the Indonesian question was settled, the
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conference could be extended to include other countries as well, 
although this would require careful consideration.(21)
After MacDonald's meeting of British officials in South-East Asia, 
the implications of London's new regional policy became fully apparent. 
The idea of using the former Special Commission to organise further 
regional cooperation had been dropped in favour of informal Commonwealth 
conferences on South-East Asia which might include some countries from 
outside the Commonwealth as well. The driving force behind the meetings 
would be the fear of communism in South and South-East Asia. Britain, 
still the dominant power in the Commonwealth, would be in the best 
position to organise regional action. The Commonwealth framework would 
also allow her to control her main regional rivals, India and Australia, 
by giving them a say in South-East Asian regionalism without 
challenging London's regional lead.
However, a number of problems remained. A 'technical' problem was 
how to align the proposals for regular Commonwealth meetings on foreign 
affairs with the proposal for special Commonwealth meetings on South- 
East Asia. In the long run, there was the more serious problem of 
integrating the Dutch and the French into a Commonwealth scheme in 
South-East Asia. Indonesia and Indochina were an essential geographical 
and political part of South-East Asia, and regional cooperation, whether 
on the security, economic or political levels, would eventually have to 
include the two territories. Indeed, confining cooperation to the 
Commonwealth meant that mainly countries from the South-East Asian 
periphery would be included. Britain simply could not escape the fact
-  303 -
that so long as France and the Hetherlands failed to find a settlement 
with the respective nationalist movements, the two powers were unlikely 
to be accepted as regional partners by the new Asian states. A further 
question was whether Burma and Thailand could be convinced to 
participate in future Commonwealth conferences. Burma feared both 
British and Indian domination, while Thailand was reluctant to commit 
herself to any grouping without securing considerable gains in return, 
such as financial or military aid. Finally, Britain had to make up her 
mind about the kind of cooperation she wanted, Vould collaboration be 
confined to the police and intelligence levels or would defence be 
included, and what exactly did political cooperation entail? 
Economically, the problem was that the South and South-East Asian 
countries were bound to demand loans or financial aid from Britain to 
raise their populations' standard of living. Without such aid, an 
agreement on regional cooperation under British leadership was highly 
unlikely.
Britain's new regional plans were thus full of uncertainties. 
However, events in China were to force London's hand. After steady 
advances in the Chinese civil war, Chinese communist forces had in 
September started their final all-out offensive against the 
nationalists; by 1 November the Kuomintang army in Manchuaria had 
collapsed. One month later the offensive against Peking was launched, 
resulting in the city's surrender at the end of January. (22) It now 
looked certain that at least the northern parts of China would 
permanently fall into communist hands. As a result, London was becoming 
increasingly worried about the impact of the Chinese developments on the
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territories further south. Regional cooperation would soon become a key 
British strategy for containing communism in South and South-East Asia.
13.3 THE CABINET PAPER ON CHINA
London took the communist successes in China extremely seriously. 
Apart from their negative implications for British trade in the country, 
it was feared that the collapse of the Kuomintang regime in parts if not 
the whole of China would have serious repercussions in South-East Asia. 
A Cabinet paper from 9 December, drafted by the Foreign Office, alerted 
ministers to the communist advances.(23) Chiang Kai-shek, the leader of 
the nationalist Kuomintang forces, had virtually lost control of the 
area north of the river Yangtze. In the long run, it was highly possible 
that the communists would take over the whole of China. Apart from 
considering the significance of the communist advance for British and 
American interests in China, the Cabinet paper examined the likely 
effects on adjacent territories. So long as the communists controlled 
only the north of China, the effects on Malaya and Singapore would be 
limited. However, should the whole of China fall, Malaya would be in 
grave danger. 'Militant communism* would in such a case be very close to 
Malaya's frontier - only Thailand and French Indochina would remain as 
buffers. Inside Malaya, the morale of the Malayan communists would 
improve, there might be increased communist infiltration from China, and 
even relatively small successes of the Malayan communists would have 
considerable repercussions among the traditionally passive Chinese 
community.
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Other parts of South-East Asia would also be adversely affected. 
Further communist successes in the north of China would stimulate 
communist movements throughout the region, and if all of China was 
overrun, contacts between Chinese communists and the communists in 
Indochina and Thailand would be greatly facilitated. Furthermore, Burma 
was likely to be infiltrated because of her partly undefined border with 
China and because of the Burmese government's lack of effective control 
over the country. There was also the danger that communism would seep 
over into India and the eastern part of Pakistan. Things would be 
particularly difficult in Indochina where 'the failure of the French 
Government to take effective measures to seek a solution has resulted in 
an alliance between the Rationalist and Communist elements'. Communist 
Chinese reinforcements for the Viet Minh might make the situation in the 
north untenable for the French in the north, strengthen the Communist 
position in the whole of Indochina and increase the threat to other 
parts of South-East Asia. In Indonesia, on the other hand, early 
reactions to a total communist victory in China were unlikely - largely 
because of the recently failed attempt at power by the Indonesian 
communists. However, if the Dutch failed to reach a political settlement 
in the country and resorted to military action, an alliance between 
Indonesian nationalists and communists might be created resulting in a 
long period of disorder with serious consequences for the whole of 
South-East Asia. Thailand as well had a strong communist element which 
might get out of hand because of developments in China. In southern 
Thailand in particular there was the danger that local communists would 
combine with Malayan communists.
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The paper expected that the communist domination of China would 
also have indirect but 'none the less formidable' consequences in India 
and Pakistan. The strengthening of communism in Burma, Tibet, Hepal and 
Bhutan after a communist take-over in China would threaten to encircle 
India and Pakistan strategically and politically. At the same time, 
India's attitude of neutrality between communist states and the Western 
powers would probably be strengthened. The situation on the subcontinent 
was further complicated by the conflict between India and Pakistan over 
Kashmir. So long as this dispute existed, there was the danger that 
Pakistan, who was potentially anti-communist, might seek Russian support 
against India.
From the economic point of view, the greatest danger was that
communist disturbances in Burma, Thailand and Indochina, who were the
area's main rice producers, would lead to a significant decrease in the
production of rice. This would have the greatest repercussions in
Britain's colonial territories and in the Asian Commonwealth countries:
'A decrease in rice consumption will provide fertile ground for 
Communist agitation. This - together with general disturbances 
in other South-East Asia industries - would cause further 
disruption of the economy of the area with consequent adverse 
effects on the production of such vital commodities as rubber, 
tin, edible oils, &c., which are of such importance to world 
economic recovery.'
Having painted the gloomiest of pictures, the Cabinet paper made 
recommendations for possible British counter-action. In China, Britain 
should maintain de facto relations with the communists to safeguard 
existing trading interests and to keep a 'foot in the door'.(24) In 
South-East Asia, the problem was that the Americans were apparently not
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prepared to accept any responsibility or to take any action to maintain
the position of friendly powers there. The powers geographically
situated in the region therefore had to take their own measures to 'meet
the Communist menace'. Britain would have to make strenuous efforts to
clear up the situation in Malaya, while in the region as a whole the
measures of the different governments had to be coordinated. However:
'Burma, for example, would find difficulty in associating with 
French Indo-China and Indonesia, while the French and the 
Dutch might be equally reluctant to have such an association. 
Moreover, the Commonwealth countries primarily concerned, i.e. 
Australia, Hew Zealand, India and Pakistan, which all have a 
vital interest in the peace and prosperity of South-East Asia, 
would, on present showing be unwilling to join in any 
activities involving support of the French and Dutch 
Governments in this area. It may, therefore, be that the United 
Kingdom is in the best position to act as the co-ordinating 
factor, though it would be necessary to consider the political 
consequences very carefully at each stage.'
The paper concluded that it might be to Britain's advantage if she 
addressed all the interested powers, setting forth her view on the 
problems likely to arise as a result of the communist successes in 
China, in order to consult on the best method of dealing with the 
situation. The United States should be kept informed and their support 
sought. The paper also suggested stepping up intelligence and police 
cooperation, so far as political considerations permitted, and 
conducting a study of the economic consequences of communist domination 
of China for the whole area. In addition, the Chiefs of Staff had 
already been asked to consider the possibility of coordinating military 
measures within the Afghanistan to Pacific region to meet with any 
possible strategic threats.(25)
-~1
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13,4 BRITAIN'S THREE-PRONGED INITIATIVE
The Cabinet endorsed the paper’s recommendations on 13 December
1948.(26) The decision was a major landmark in the development of
British regional policies in South-East Asia. Though the Cabinet fell
short of proposing a regional association in South-East Asia, London was
now committed to try and coordinate international action against the
further spread of communism in South-East Asia. However, what exactly
such action entailed still had to be worked out by British officials. On
10 December, MacDonald, who was probably still unaware of the Cabinet
paper, told London what he thought should be done. He stressed that:
'The mounting Communist victories in China considerably alter 
the situation and prospects in South East Asia...From the point 
of view of our position in South East Asia, the further north 
the Communists can be effectively held, the better.'
The communist advance, Macdonald further argued, constituted a most 
formidable threat to all countries further south. Though South-East Asia 
would only be a minor theatre of operations should a 'hot war' ever 
break out
'... we must accept that South-East Asia is now a major theatre 
in the "cold war", and will continue so throughout this period.
The Communist friends of Russia, with such help as Russia 
deems it advisable to K'ive> will push as far as they can by 
propaganda, agitation and subversive activities...'
Britain could only counter this through a diplomatic and political 
offensive and had to do 'everything that lies in our and the American 
power to strengthen the forces opposed to the Communists inside the 
Asian populations.' In Malaya, for example, the establishment of a
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Central Information Bureau was required, while in Indonesia the FO's 
energetic policy of influencing both the Dutch and Indonesians towards a 
compromise settlement had to be maintained. Thailand, from where 
MacDonald had just returned, also required action. The country was in a 
weak position and would be 'dangerously exposed to the Communist threat 
from outside and inside' as a result of the developments in China. As a 
sign of goodwill Britain should therefore waive & 1 million worth of war 
reparations claims and send some military equipment for use against 
bandits in southern Thailand. Furthermore, the Americans would have to 
be convinced to do whatever they could in terms of economic and military 
aid. In addition, both Britain and the United States had to examine the 
position with a view to formulating a joint programme for adequate 
economic and military support. There should also be talks in Singapore 
between the British and Thai military authorities - if the Americans 
were ready to join in these talks, all the better. Washington would in 
any case have to be taken into Britain's confidence.
MacDonald then turned to Indochina which from the military point of 
view was 'of course of great importance to our position in South East 
Asia'. Unfortunately there seemed 'little chance of a complete political 
agreement between the French and even moderate elements in Indo-China'. 
Despite this, MacDonald recommended discreetly adopting the course of 
cooperation with France, by discussing strategic questions with the 
local French military chief, and by arranging secret joint planning 
discussions. At the same time, diplomatic action in Paris should 
encourage the French to reach an agreement with the anti-communists in 
their colony, although he was not optimistic that such an initiative
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would be successful. Finally, there was the problem of Burma whose 
government was weak and where the situation was confused. HacDonald 
found it difficult to know what more could be done before he had visited 
the country, believing, however, that India might be able to help by 
showing military strength, or perhaps by giving some form of support to 
the Burmese government. (27)
MacDonald thus recommended international action to deal with the 
three South-East Asian countries closest to China and therefore most 
likely to be affected by the communist victories. In Burma, Britain 
would seek Indian support to stabilise the situation, while in 
Indochina, Britain would embark on secret military talks with the 
French. In Thailand, the Americans had to be brought in to strengthen 
the country economically and militarily. There would also be staff talks 
between the Thai and British military. As MacDonald explained in a 
follow-up telegram, Prince Chumbot had recently told him that the Thais 
were in some ways cowardly and never put up a firm resistance to an 
enemy unless they felt sure it would be effective. This, the Prince 
asserted, was the reason why the Thais had not resisted Japan: they 
wished to resist but knew that their foreign friends would give them no 
support. The same would happen with the communists unless the Bangkok 
government saw practical evidence that Britain was granting help.(28)
The British ambassador in Thailand, Thompson, strongly endorsed 
MacDonald's proposals, arguing from Bangkok that the
'...frontiers of Malaya are on the Mekong and (...) if we desire
to establish a bastion against communism in this area, we must
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be ready to give very substantial help to Siam. Ve must, 
moreover, work in conjunction with the United States.'
American assistance to Thailand was so far meagre, and encroached upon
or competed with British interests.
'It is high time that the Americans realised that our influence
in this country and indeed throughout the Far East is 
beneficial to them and that they agreed to work with, and not 
against us. Since the end of the war they have suffered here, 
in particular, from a growing sense of frustration and 
irritation because they have not succeeded in ousting British 
influence either political or economic and supplanting it with 
their own. This Anglo-American rivalry, which derives primarily 
from American disappointment over our commercial come-back, 
must go if we are to make a good job of strengthening this
country. If the United States will not work with us, it should
at least be guaranteed that they will not work against our 
interests.'
Thompson further argued that Anglo-American help had to be generous and
had to include paying for the equipment and training of the Thai Army
and Air Force. In Thai eyes the threat was primarily Chinese rather than
communist, but Thailand would not come down irretrievably on the Western
side unless the Anglo-Americans were prepared to act instead of talking.
In 1941, Britain had offered Thailand no help apart from Churchill
urging Pibul to uphold the cause of democracy.
'Having as little hope of successfully resisting Japan as 
Denmark had of standing against Hitler, Pibul followed a policy 
which enabled the country outwardly to maintain its 
independence and spared its people much suffering, gambling in 
the process on an eventual Allied victory. How a new danger 
threatens and Siam could scarcely be blamed if in the absence 
of any resolute Anglo-American action, they sought to conjure 
it by again employing methods which both in the recent and 
distant past have proved successful.'(29)
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The Foreign Office welcomed MacDonald's proposal for secret staff
talks with France on Indochina. However, it refused to contemplate
Indian intervention in Burma. As A.M.Palliser commented:
'Before India can exert any really effective anti-Communist 
influence in South East Asia ... she needs a satisfactory 
settlement of the Kashmir issue, which at present seems 
improbable though not impossible. Until then, she is likely to 
take action which would be, in effect, an invasion of Burma...'
There had been many indications that India would be ready to play a
leading role in South-East Asia, but in helping Burma she would
presumably encounter the same obstacles as Britain:
'The Burmese Government will gladly accept arms and money but 
not advice about how to use them. Direct Indian military 
intervention in Burma...would be just as unpopular as direct 
British intervention. Pandit Nehru might, however, have more 
influence with the present Burmese government than any 
European could hope to exert and he might be ready to use it 
if Burmese rice exports looked like stopping,'
So far as Thailand was concerned, A.M.Palliser was reluctant to involve 
the Americans in military talks with the Thais, as 'our enemies might 
make fruitful propaganda out of an "Anglo-American colonial policy" 
towards Siam.' The Americans should, however, be taken into Britain's 
confidence*.(30) In a further comment, this time on Thompson's telegram, 
Palliser admitted that the Thais were using Anglo-American rivalry to 
play one country off against the other and that it would obviously be 
preferable to persuade the Americans to take an interest in this part of 
the world. He was, however, not convinced of the need for aid to 
Thailand. The country had enough foreign exchange to meet her 
rehabilitation and defence requirements and he foresaw the danger that
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Western pounds and dollars would go the the way of U.S. aid to 
China.(31)
As the Thai example demonstrated, the Foreign Office was still far 
from agreeing on what exact action would be required to prevent the
advance of communism in South-East Asia. Should there be military 
intervention by either Britain or India in troublespots like Burma, and 
was financial aid required to keep the Thais in the pro-Western camp? 
Despite this lack of coherence, London decided to get the ball rolling. 
It decided on three separate diplomatic initiatives towards anti­
communist collaboration in South-East Asia. The first concerned the 
Commonwealth. At the end of December, short versions of the Cabinet
paper on China were sent to all Commonwealth countries and to Thailand. 
This was in line with the policy of pursuing Commonwealth cooperation as 
the basis for a wider regional scheme in South-East Asia.
Britain's second initiative aimed at convincing the United States 
with her overwhelming financial power to support British policies in 
South-East Asia, despite earlier fears that American involvement might 
cut across the Sterling Area. Shocked by the developments in China, 
London believed that only the Americans could stem the communist tide in 
Asia. Just as they had come to the rescue in Western Europe by providing
Marshall aid, they now had to make a commitment to South-East Asia. The
problem was, however, that Washington had shown little inclination to 
become involved in the problems of the colonial powers in South-East 
Asia. As Thompson told London on 18 December, the American ambassador in 
Bangkok, Stanton, supported his views on Anglo-American consultation and
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agreement, but Stanton also feared that little could be expected from
the United States. Vashlngton felt it had so much on its hands in Europe
that there was little it could do out in South-East Asia.(32) Despite
such discouraging reports, London decided to go ahead with its
diplomatic offensive suggested in the Cabinet paper. As Grey explained
in a Foreign Office memorandum, Britain had hitherto been dealing rather
piecemeal with furnishing support against communism in countries like
Afghanistan, Burma and Thailand. The United States regarded this as
fritting away British resources in the East despite the overriding
claims of the Vest. Grey added:
'Vhat we need is a full-scale review with the United States of 
the possibilities of action in South East Asia, militarily, 
political and economic. It will be remembered that we tried, 
and failed, to have discussions when Mr. Dening went to 
Vashington via India, Australia and Canada this summer. One 
difficulty was the Australian antagonism to American policy; 
another, and equally important, obstacle was that the 
Commonwealth Relations Office then refused to let us discuss 
how India, Pakistan and Ceylon fitted into the picture...The 
Americans also were not quite ready for the talks.'(33)
On 20 December the Foreign Office instructed its embassy in Vashington 
to approach the Americans on the issue of communism in Asia as a whole. 
A summary of the Cabinet paper on China was given to the State 
Department on 5 January as a basis for bilateral discussions.(34)
The Foreign Office's third initiative aimed at stepping up 
collaboration with France. As MacDonald had argued, Indochina was in the 
frontline in the fight against communism. It was expected that the 
activities of the communist Viet Minh would increase once Mao's troops 
had reached the northern border of Vietnam. Furthermore, there was hope
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in London that the French would find some kind of agreement with the 
former Vietnamese emperor, Bao Dai, in order to bring the non-communist 
Vietnamese nationalists onto their side. The French had been pursuing 
the 'Bao Dai solution' to their political image problem in Asia since 
the end of 1947, and the British were hoping that an eventual agreement 
between the two sides would make French participation in a regional 
scheme acceptable to India. In November 1948, Denlng had visited Paris 
where he had stressed the need of an understanding with the (non­
communist) Vietnamese nationalists. The French had agreed that there 
would have to be concessions to Vietnamese nationalist feelings. (35) 
This further encouraged London to pursue a more active policy on 
Indochina. On 21. December, Dening returned to Paris for further talks. 
His comments now centred on the communist threat to the region, and on 
the need for intelligence cooperation as well as high-level talks.(36) A 
few days later, London sent Paris a summary of its paper on China.(37)
In the following months, there followed a series of Anglo-French 
consultations on South-East Asia. During these meetings, London pursued 
three objectives. Firstly, it tried to encourage the French to come to 
an agreement with Bao Dai which would entail real concessions. Though 
the British never submitted concrete proposals on how to deal with Bao 
Dai, they made it clear that they desired settlements in Indochina which 
would enable regional discussions to take place with India on the issue 
of communism.(38) By implication, this meant taking a step towards 
nationalist self-government in Vietnam. A second British objective was 
to improve cooperation on the police, intelligence and propaganda 
levels. Bevin was particularly enthusiastic about this, and he suggested
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to the French Foreign Minister, Robert Schuman, in January that the 
British, French and Dutch should pool their information work, possibly 
in Singapore where Britain already had a powerful broadcasting 
station.(39) Most of the Foreign Office and Colonial Office files 
dealing with intelligence and security cooperation in South-East Asia 
are not yet available. However, it seems that in this field considerable 
progress was subsequently made between the local French and British 
authorities.(40)
The Foreign Office's third objective was to leave Paris in no doubt 
that Anglo-French cooperation would not take precedence over 
collaboration between Britain and the independent Asian countries - 
despite Bevin's enthusiasm about pooling Western efforts in the region. 
In February, the French reply to the British paper on China welcomed 
regional cooperation. However, it left the impression that Anglo-French 
cooperation would be in the centre and that the United States and 
independent Asian countries would merely be associated with efforts by 
London and Paris.(41) Coinciding with this, the French consul in 
Singapore, Gibaut, suggested to MacDonald that a 'colonial charter' be 
drawn up between Britain, France and the Hetherlands with a set of 
economic and political principles. Possibly, some Asian countries could 
be associated.(42) In response, Dening made it clear to MacDonald that a 
colonial charter was a non-starter. Only after settlements had been 
found in Indonesia and Indochina was there a possibility of associating 
the Dutch and French not only with Britain but with Asian countries as 
well.(43)
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While the prospects for France's inclusion in a regional scheme 
sponsored by Britain were thus temporarily improving, the opposite was 
the case with the Netherlands. This was so because of the different 
political circumstances in the Dutch colony. The Indonesian nationalist 
movement, unlike the Viet Minh in Indochina, was relatively free of 
communists. In October 1948, the republican government under Mohammed 
Hatta had managed to crush an insurgency by the Indonesian Communist 
Party. The event proved to both Britain and the United States that the 
Indonesian Republic was not a communist spearhead, as the Dutch were 
suggesting, but should indeed be regarded as a bulwark against 
communism. (44) From the British point of view, the danger was that open 
support for the Dutch position in Indonesia might drive the nationalists 
into the camp of the communists. A further reason for British reluctance 
to include the Dutch in their regional plans was that international 
interest remained far greater for Indonesia than for Indochina. So long 
as no settlement was in sight, the Dutch could not be associated with a 
regional scheme that also involved India.
The moment of truth came when the Dutch launched a second police 
action on 19 December with the aim of liquidating the Republic. Within 
two weeks, most of the Indonesian leaders, including Hatta and Sukarno, 
were arrested, and most of the republican cities in Java and Sumatra 
were occupied by Dutch troops.(45) The move instantly resulted in a 
world-wide outcry against the Netherlands. While the Security Council 
called for a cease-fire and the release of the republican leaders, India 
was amongst the most outspoken in condemning the Dutch. Flights by the 
Dutch airline KLM over Indian territory were suspended and the departure
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of the first Indian ambassador to The Hague was postponed 
’indefinitely'. There were demonstrations at the docks in Bombay, where 
a Dutch ship was being unloaded, and in front of the city's Dutch 
consulate. The Indian national Congress assured the Indonesian Republic 
of its complete sympathy. (46)
In Britain too, public opinion was critical of the Dutch 
intervention. Though London refused to back a Soviet demand for a Dutch 
troop withdrawal(47), it nevertheless put diplomatic pressure on The 
Hague to cease the fighting. Bevin also gave instructions to discontinue 
the recent relaxations in the arms embargo (48), and he told the Dutch 
ambassador in London on 29 December that the Netherlands had not paid 
sufficient attention to the international position which their action 
had created, and that they should pay regard to international 
developments in South-East Asia. The whole situation had changed with 
the granting of independence to India, Pakistan and Ceylon and the 
enormous advance made in Malaya; the Dutch should have kept in step with 
this general progress. Bevin suggested the Dutch call a conference of 
all parties in Indonesia, including the Republicans, and that they
'...offer their scheme of an interim Government together with a .
firm date for a transfer of power, adding that if progress was
made the date might be advanced'.
India and Pakistan might then adopt a constructive attitude. Nehru and 
Liaqat Ali Khan were 'both well aware of the dangers of Slav expansion 
in South East Asia, especially since Russian territory was near their 
frontiers'. If the Dutch handled this problem right, they could make 
friends in Asia instead of antagonists. It was Britain's policy to
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'...make friends in South East Asia for many years to come, and 
to maintain our trade and our economic position there. It might 
be possible to hold at no distant date a South East Asia 
conference, including India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Australia, Hew 
Zealand and the Western European powers concerned. But the 
Dutch must show, in any declarations they make, that they 
appreciate nationalist sentiment in South East Asia and intend 
to follow a forward looking policy. If they did this, we would
use what influence we could with Asiatic countries to help
them.'(49)
However, news subsequently reached London that Nehru was planning a 
conference of mainly Asian countries which would condemn the Dutch 
action in Indonesia. As a result the Foreign Office dropped its 
suggestion of including the Dutch in a future regional conference. All 
telegrams reporting Bevin's talk with the Dutch ambassador to the 
Commonwealth were cancelled, since countries like Australia would 
'conclude that we had been outwitted by the Indians'.(50) The prospect 
of an anti-Dutch Asian conference made the Netherlands' participation in 
a Joint Asian-European scheme virtually unthinkable in the short term. 
Until the transfer of power in Indonesia one year later on, the 
Netherlands in fact ceased to feature in London's regional strategy.
To sum up, London was by the end of 1948 considering three levels 
of cooperation on South-East Asia. Firstly, Britain remained committed
to the idea of cooperation through the Commonwealth as the basis for a
larger regional scheme. One of the immediate issues that the 
Commonwealth and particularly India might have to deal with was the 
deteriorating situation in Burma. Secondly, Britain was hoping to secure 
the material and political support of the United States in order to 
stabilize South-East Asia. Initially, cooperation would centre on
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Thailand where the Americans had established an economic foothold after 
the war. Joint Anglo-American action would prevent the Thai government 
from siding with the Chinese and enable it to suppress possible 
communist resistance movements. Finally, Britain decided to embark on 
separate talks with France. The aim was to increase security and 
intelligence cooperation in South-East Asia in order to strengthen the 
anti-communist campaigns in both Indochina and Malaya. London also hoped 
to induce the French into granting concessions to the non-Communist 
nationalists in Indochina. This would boost a nationalist alternative to 
the Viet Minh and it might turn France into an acceptable partner in a 
European/Asian scheme of cooperation in South-East Asia. The 
Netherlands, on the other hand, had missed the bus. After the second 
Dutch police action Britain privately recommended a Dutch withdrawal 
from Indonesia.
Britain, in line with the Cabinet paper on China, soon stepped up 
diplomatic pressure towards regional cooperation in South-East Asia. As 
Dening reflected four months later on, the Cabinet paper was originally 
designed to give the impetus which would induce the South-East Asian
territories as well as the United States and the Commonwealth to
consider concerted action to resist Russian expansion and communist
tactics in South-East Asia.(51) However, while the short-term goal may 
have been the creation of an anti-communist bloc in South-East Asia, 
London's diplomatic efforts also fitted in with its long-term policy of 
creating a regional scheme that would guarantee Britain lasting
political, economic and military influence in South-East Asia. In May 
1948, the prospects for a British-led regional scheme had been dim given
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the previous decline of the Special Commission, the anti-European 
atmosphere in India and the appearance of regional competitors in the 
form of India, Australia and the United Nations. At the end of 1948, 
none of these problems had disappeared. However, the Cold War now 
dominated British thinking on South-East Asia, Against the odds, London 
was determined to press ahead with its regional plans. After years of 
planning by the Foreign Office's South-East Asian experts, regional 
cooperation was turning into one of Britain's main strategies for 
containing communism in South-East Asia.
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14, FROM PLAN N I N G  TO DIPLOMACY, J A NUARY - APRIL 
1949
14,1 THE DELHI CONFERENCE ON INDONESIA
After years of interdepartmental planning and debating, the British 
decided to renew their efforts towards regional cooperation in South-East 
Asia. The idea of expanding the Special Commission's regional work, 
originally devised in 1946, had failed once and for all. 1949 was the year 
to try out a new strategy. Instead of organising regional cooperation from 
the grassroots upwards, London now opted for high-level talks. The 
situation in South-East Asia urgently needed solutions. The aim was to stem 
the communist tide through an anti-communist front: regional cooperation as 
a means of regional containment. At the same time, the perceived threat of 
communist domination would be used to implement the Foreign Office's long­
term aim and mould the area's diverse countries into a regional system that 
was led by Britain.
However, the problems that would have to be overcome were 
considerable. After despatching shortened versions of the Cabinet's paper 
on China to the United States, the Commonwealth countries, France as well 
as Thailand, London was hoping for quick and forthcoming responses to its 
proposals for anti-communist coordination in Asia. However, only France and 
Thailand were receptive. The United States, charged with traditional anti­
colonial sentiments, was reluctant to be seen as propping up the European 
colonial regimes in South-East Asia. The American Congress, having recently
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decided to spend large sums on the economic recovery of Western Europe, was
%
also in no mood to allocate large amounts of dollars to the new Asian 
countries - particularly after the failure of American aid policies in 
China. The Asian Commonwealth countries for their part, though demanding 
Western economic aid, wanted to avoid being associated with any pro-Western 
or anti-communist bloc in Asia. Further obstacles to the British initiative 
were created by the ambitions of Britain's regional competitors, namely 
India, Australia as well as the Philippines. As will be seen, the three 
countries were promoting their own regional arrangements, and were once 
more threatening Britain's lead on regional cooperation.
Of all the regional proposals emanating in 1949, London took Indian 
initiatives the most seriously. Unlike Britain, which used the anti­
communist theme to further her regional aims, India continued her anti­
colonial rhetoric and deliberately excluded the Western powers (apart from 
Australia and Bew Zealand) from her regional initiatives. As in 1947, 
India's aim was to rally behind her the new Asian states and the 
independence movements in South and South-East Asia. The second Dutch 
police action in December 1948 provided ffehru with an ideal opportunity to 
re-assert his regional stance. Between 20 and 23 January 1949 fifteen 
countries attended the Delhi Conference on Indonesia to discuss ways and 
means to come to the help of Indonesia. Of the Western countries only 
Australia was represented, New Zealand sending an observer. (The conference 
was attended by Afghanistan, Australia, Burma, Ceylon, China, Egypt, 
Ethiopia, Iraq, Lebanon, Bepal, Pakistan, the Philippines, Saudi-Arabia, 
Syria and Yemen. Thailand and New Zealand sent observers). During the 
meeting Nehru demanded independence for Indonesia and the eventual
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elimination of colonialism. In one of its final resolutions, the conference 
demanded the complete transfer of power from the Netherlands to the 
Indonesian Republic by 1 January 1950 following a transitional period 
starting in March 1949. The conference thus added to the international 
pressure on the Netherlands brought about by the UN, the United States and 
Britain. As it was, the Dutch began negotiations with the Republic in 
April, leading to the Round Table Conference at The Hague in August, the 
Dutch-Indonesian Agreements in November, and the transfer of sovereignty to 
the republican government on 29 December 1949. (1)
Apart from its impact on the Indonesian crisis, the conference was of
considerable significance for regional cooperation in Asia. At the
instigation of India, the third conference resolution recommended that:
'Participating Governments should consult among themselves in 
order to explore ways and means of establishing suitable 
machinery, having regard to the areas concerned, of promoting 
consultation and co-operation within the framework of the United 
Nations'. (2)
Immediately after the conference, the Indians organised a 'private' meeting 
to discuss detailed steps towards the third resolution's implementation. 
The meeting was attended by representives from most of the participant 
countries of the conference - with the exception of Burma, the Philippines, 
Australia and New Zealand, who, the Indians officially stated, were unable 
to attend as they had already left. However, according to the Australian 
High Commissioner in India, Gollan, the meeting was specially postponed 
until the Australians and New Zealanders had departed.(3)
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During this informal meeting, it was proposed that all the countries 
concerned should collect and collate information of mutual importance and 
exchange information from time to time, furthermore that they should 
collaborate on matters of common policy on all occasions, e.g. in the UN, 
and take steps to improve cultural.relations. It was further proposed that 
once replies to these proposals had been received, a meeting should take 
place in Delhi to confirm plans for a suggested organisation, and that 
there should be periodical meetings in Delhi by the ambassadors concerned. 
Finally, it was proposed that if certain countries were not prepared to 
take part in the organisation, the remaining countries should not be 
prevented from carrying out the proposals. The Indians subsequently 
communicated a copy of the meeting's minutes to the Australians, indicating 
that there might be two (regional) groups, one Middle Eastern and one 
South-East Asian. Gollan passed on his information to London, telling the 
British that it was his impression that India intended to be the leader of 
both these groupings.(4)
From the outset, London had disliked Nehru's conference plans which 
excluded Britain and blackened the prospects for a pro-Vestern conference 
on South-East Asia. However, the British soon realised that there was 
little they could do about the Delhi Conference apart from encouraging 
Australia to take a moderating stance. The conference's outcome further 
depressed British officials. Commenting on the informal Indian-sponsored 
get-together at the end of the meeting, the British High Commissioner in 
India, Archibald Nye, argued that 'whether we like it or not, this 
organisation would get going and would remain in being'. But all was not 
lost, and Nye advised his Australian colleague that the membership of
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Australia and New Zealand [in an Asian organisation] would have a 
stabilizing effect. (5) The Commonwealth Relations Office agreed that there 
might be an advantage if Australia and New Zealand were associated with any 
organisation that would develop out of the Delhi conference's third 
resolution. (6)
From Singapore, MacDonald agreed that the movement towards Asian 
cooperation had probably come to stay, and he recommended maintaining an 
understanding and reasonably sympathetic attitude towards gatherings of 
Asian governments. Putting too much of a brake on the movement might turn 
it into a hostile mood towards Britain rather than stop it, whereas by 
giving it sympathetic support Britain would help to lead it along paths of 
moderation and cooperation with the Vest. Australian and New Zealand 
participation would be of advantage, and it was desirable that Britain 
would also join. This could be done through the participation in Nehru's 
planned conference of Malaya and British Borneo, who would be represented 
by MacDonald as well as local Malayan and Chinese leaders.(7)
The Foreign Office showed less sympathy for Nehru's latest regional 
initiative, which clearly conflicted with its own plans. By the beginning 
of March, India, Pakistan and Ceylon had indicated general agreement with 
the British analysis of the situation in East and South-East Asia, but had 
refrained from suggestions for stepping up Commonwealth collaboration. The 
Foreign Office suspected that the cautious replies were partly a result of 
the Delhi Conference's anti-colonial undertone. It also wondered whether 
the three countries fully appreciated the 'true nature of threat arising
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from Communist conquest of China' . Only if they grasped the situation would
India, Pakistan and Ceylon be ready to
...consider maximum possible degree of co-operation, starting with 
the organised exchange of intelligence and police liaison... Ve 
realise that this matter requires a most cautious approach and 
that any form of collaboration with us in South-East Asia may be 
unpalatable not only because of our own colonial position but 
also because it might be thought to involve collaboration with 
other Western Union powers, particularly the Dutch.(8)
On the other hand, there were signs that the Asian countries were beginning
to regard the Soviet Union as a potential threat. Moscow had earlier on
condemned the Delhi Conference. London hoped that the Soviet move would now
backfire, and it stressed that the:
...recent outspoken criticism of Mew Delhi conference may result 
in hardening of attitude against Soviet and open more eyes to the 
indivisibility of Communist menace and the urgency of resisting 
its encroachments.(9)
Despite this, the Foreign Office was becoming increasingly concerned
about the lack of international action against communism in Asia. In
January, the Chinese communists had occupied Tientsin and Peking, and had
cleared the way to the Yangtse river which divides the northern and
southern halves of China. The leader of the Kuomintang forces, Chiang Kai-
shek, had (temporarily) declared his retirement, and in February the
nationalist headquarters had been moved from Nanking to Canton in the south
of the country. At the beginning of March, the Chiefs of Staff told the
Cabinet that the spread of communism in southern China would lead to
further unrest in South-East Asia. Furthermore:
'Should the Russians establish bases in Southern China, the threat 
to South East Asia and to our sea communications might become 
serious. If Communism successfully spreads into the Indian sub­
continent, our whole position in South East Asia would become 
untenable...until all countries interested in the area have agreed
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on a policy for the Far East, the only military consultative and 
information organisation which is likely to be effective is the 
exchange of intelligence information on Communist activities and 
the exchange of police information.'
Bevin consequently suggested that Britain should continue her international
initiative from December and examine, together with the powers that had
been approached in December, any possible economic measures in defence of
British interests mentioned in the Cabinet paper on China. Authority should
also be given to establish international liaison between police and
intelligence organisations in the area.(10) The Cabinet endorsed the
suggested consultative measures. (11) Despite the Delhi conference and the
disappointing replies from the Asian Commonwealth countries, London thus
remained committed to its regional plans. In the following weeks, proposals
%
by some of the 'men on the spot' further crystallized British ideas on
regional cooperation.
14.2 A MARSHALL PLAN FOR SOUTH-EAST ASIA?
Coinciding with the Cabinet's decision in March to step up Britain's 
coordinating efforts, the British, American, Australian and Indian 
ambassadors in China were holding informal talks on the implications of the 
communist victories. The four officials subsequently sent a joint
memorandum to their respective governments, known as the Nanking Proposals, 
which suggested an internationally coordinated aid plan for South-East 
Asia. The paper was to have a considerable impact in both London and
Washington. The Nanking Proposals, which expressed only private views,
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argued that the communist victories in China had changed the pace of events 
in South-East Asia where there existed a revolutionary situation. (The 
authors apparently included the subcontinent in their definition of South- 
East Asia.) Independence had failed to solve the problem of transforming 
typically oriental societies based on starvation economies into modern 
communities organised on principles of social justice and economic freedom. 
The new states now had to compress into a short period of time the whole 
process of European evolution and adopt the technology of the mid-twentieth 
century, despite the fact that they were still living in the pre-industrial 
revolution era, and while their minds were swept by new and destructive 
ideas. Unless this situation was brought under control and guided into 
proper channels the communists with their easy solution of 'Land to the 
Tiller' and 'Power to the Worker' would step in and take charge. In South-
East Asia the communist solution had an immense appeal, and there lacked an
anti-communist element furnished elsewhere in the world by the middle 
classes. 'What then is the alternative?', the four ambassadors went on to 
ask:
'The ultimate solution seems clear: a confederation of South-east 
Asia with a planned and integrated economy, creating out of the
small units in this region a viable state following a progressive
economic and social policy'.
However, countries like Indochina and Burma, which were struggling for or 
had recently acquired independence, would be unlikely to consider anything 
which might limit their independence. The paper therefore suggested as a 
short-term solution a permanent consultative council of the states of this 
area. As a first step Indonesia and Indochina would have to acquire 
political freedom while a new constitutional set-up in Malaya would have to 
enable the country to participate as well. The council would then work out
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common policies and provide for an integrated economy capable of resisting 
the pressure of communist economic doctrines. The council would have before 
it a realistic economic and social programme dealing with special problems 
such as the liquidation of unproductive landowning systems, the 
reorganisation of agriculture with the help of modern technology, the 
increase of industrial employment and the area's economic integration to 
avoid wasteful inter-regional competition. The programme would also provide 
for large-scale medical and sanitary facilities and for a common system of 
education as a background for democratic development.
As a first step, the paper suggested a survey be conducted prior to 
the settlements in Indonesia and Indochina which would 'formulate the 
principles on which the New Society in South-east Asia should be 
fashioned'. The survey could be conducted by a small committee of four or 
five high-level political and economic thinkers from the countries directly 
interested: Britain, the United States, Australia and India. The paper
stressed that the programme's success depended on Western aid. A second 
advisory committee should therefore be established consisjting of 
representatives from Britain, the United States, Australia, India as well 
as France and the Netherlands whose continuing economic interests in South- 
East Asia were believed to be considerable. The advisory committee would be 
responsible for determining amounts and procurement of assistance.(12) In 
an accompanying letter to the Foreign Office the British ambassador, 
Stevenson, explained that the second advisory committee might be criticized 
as an 'Imperialist Syndicate'; an alternative was to entrust the advisory 
functions to the United States of America on the understanding that the 
other interested Powers would within their capacity make experts and other
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forms of assistance available. Stevenson's letter indicated that he 
regarded the United States as the principal source of assistance to South- 
East Asia. (13)
The Fanking proposals showed distinct similarities to the Marshall aid 
programme in Europe. As in Europe, American funds would be used to develop 
the economies and social infrastructures of South-East Asia in order to 
provide prosperity and democracy, and, first and foremost, to keep the 
region firmly within the pro-Western camp. However, while in Europe aid was 
distributed through the OEEC, the Fanking proposals envisaged a two council 
system that would give the European powers and the United States a decisive 
say in the economic development of Asia, at the same tire safeguarding 
Western economic interests and investments. It is of course doubtful 
whether the proposals could ever have been implemented, not least because 
countries like Burma or Indonesia would have objected to Western economic 
supervision. However, the Fanking proposals were important for two reasons. 
They argued firstly that anti-communist cooperation could only be 
successful if it entailed financial and other forms of aid from the West to 
South-East Asia; and secondly that the bulk of this aid could only be 
provided by the United States.
The Foreign Office, which five months before had rejected Bevin's 
suggestions for an Asian OEEC, now agreed that American aid was required to 
stabilize the situation. Confirming the recent shift in British thinking, 
Dening told the Commonwealth Relations Office^ that if the Asian countries 
showed a disposition to create a united front against Russian expansion,
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'we should hope that the Americans would be disposed to offer material help 
when and where it is required'.(14)
In Singapore, MacDonald was thinking on similar lines as his
colleagues in China. At the end of March he told the Foreign Office of a
further deterioration in the political situation in South and South-East
Asia. In addition to the communist successes in China, the Burmese
government was unable to restore law and order in its own country. There
was also the possibility of collaboration between the free Thais and the
communists in Thailand as well as a dangerous deterioration of the
situation in Indonesia. The only good signs were the French agreement with
Bao Dai in Indochina, Phibun's survival in the first round of the struggle
against the communists in Bangkok, and the defeat of the communist attempt
to cause wide-spread trouble in India. On balance, however, he felt the
situation was developing for the worse:
'Ve should not leave these various situations in different 
countries to be dealt with in isolation from each other, tackling 
each as it occurs according to the resources at our command in 
each particular place at each particular moment. Ve should regard 
South East Asia as a whole, and devise a coherent policy for 
dealing with it over the whole region. There is evidence that our 
Communist enemies view the region as one whole and more or less 
plan their campaign on a theatre-wide basis. Ve shall not defeat 
them unless we do likewise, and do it in conjunction with all the 
friendly governments both within and without the region who are 
concerned.
MacDonald saw the communist campaign in South-East Asia as part of a 
global offensive. For the time being, European cooperative action and 
American and Canadian help, culminating in the Atlantic Pact, appeared to 
have held communism along the iron curtain, but it was probably because of 
frustration in the Vest that the planners of international communist
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strategy had given more attention to the East where economic- and social
conditions in some Asian countries provided the communists with a good
field for propaganda and other activities. Unless counter action was firm,
areas like Burma and Indonesia might be lost as a prelude to losing a large
part of the rest. Such counter-action had to be collective:
The analogy of what has been done in Western Europe is quite a 
good one. Ve need Asian equivalents of the Marshall Plan and the 
Atlantic Pact. Ve appreciate that in many respects they would 
have to be very different from the arrangements in Europe, but in 
general they should offer the Asian Government and peoples 
economic, political, and, if necessary, military aid in their 
resistance to Communism. The policy should aim at giving the 
Asian countries as far as possible: a) political stability, b) 
economic progress, c) military security, and d) a continuing 
organisation for inter-government consultation and planning for 
the carrying out of the over-all plan'.
To devise such a plan, all the governments concerned in the region should 
be invited to cooperate, including Australia, Mew Zealand and the United 
States. The latter was particularly important as no adequate military and 
economic plan was possible without large measures of American help. 
However, since it would be difficult for the moment to contemplate 
constructive discussions which included both India and the Netherlands, and 
since the United States were not ready to participate, a conference of 
Britain, Pakistan, India, Ceylon, Australia and New Zealand should be held 
as soon as possible to discuss among other things the situation in South- 
East Asia. It now seemed that the forthcoming Prime Ministers' Conference 
might not be discussing South-East Asia at all, and MacDonald warned that 
if a Commonwealth conference in the near future was not going to examine 
the South-East Asian situation, the effect throughout the region would be 
serious.(15)
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MacDonald's letter was a further indication of Britain's growing 
concern about the situation in South-East Asia. It also showed how 
Britain's European strategies were influencing her plans for anti-communist 
action in Asia. As in Europe, the affected countries (starting with the 
Commonwealth) would have to get together and demonstrate their willingness 
to cooperate. The Americans would then have to come in to provide aid to 
stabilize the region economically. The only problem was that British
efforts to organise a united Commonwealth appr^o^h to South-East Asia had
£
still not born^any fruit. Moreover, as will be seen next, the Americans had 
given no indication that they were prepared to help out financially.
14.3 AMERICAN RELUCTANCE TOWARDS SOUTH-EAST ASIA
Before examining the American reaction to the British initiative from 
December 1948, the background to American policies in South-East Asia has 
to be given. Prior to 1949, Washington had been extremely reluctant to 
become involved in the region. Though the United States was politically 
involved in Indonesia through her membership of the Good Office's 
Commission, she generally accepted Britain as the politically dominant 
power in the region. At the same time, Washington refused any significant 
financial contributions to the rehabilitation of the South-East Asian 
colonies. In the spring of 1948, Dening was sent on a tour of Australia, 
New Zealand, Canada and the United States to organise five-power talks on 
the Far East. Dening failed in his aim, partly because of American- 
Austral ian antagonism over the future of Japan.(16) However, another reason 
was that 1948 was a presidential election year in the United States, and
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thus full of political uncertainties. As the American Under-Secretary of 
State, Robert Lovett, pointed out, there were fears in Washington of' an 
economic recession which would bring about pressure for cuts in American
i
commitments abroad; a new adminstration might even revert to isolationism.
A
If in these circumstances Congress received an inkling that the State 
Department was about to hold five-power talks on the Far East, there would 
be an immediate adverse reaction. When Dening referred to the lack of an 
American aid plan in Asia, the State Department's director of Far Eastern 
affairs, Walton Butterworth, stressed that Washington had no intention of 
sponsoring a Far Eastern Marshall Plan.(17)
The 'Dening Mission' made it clear that American support in South-East 
Asia would not be forthcoming for the time being. The United States was 
traditionally anti-colonial in her outlook, and any notion that the 
Washington administration intended to prop up the European colonial regimes 
in South-East Asia could have damaged Truman's electoral prospects. Apart 
from that, there was a general feeling that Congress had reached its limits 
by providing Marshall aid to Western Europe. An aid programme for South- 
East Asia would have had little chance^ of success. At the end of 1948, the 
apparent failure of American policies in China added to Washington's 
reluctance towards South-East Asia. Despite the fact that the United States 
had since 1945 contributed more than two billion dollars of aid to 
nationalist China(18), the collapse of the Kuomintang regime was now only a 
matter of time. Washington feared that American dollars for other parts of 
Asia might equally go down the drain.
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To London, the only sign that the Americans might be contemplating a 
more active involvement in South-East Asia was the fourth point in Harry 
Truman's inaugural address as re-elected President on 20 January 1949, in 
which he stressed the United States' intention to foster capital investment 
and technical assistance to the underdeveloped world.(19) However, if the 
British were hoping that Point Four was a prelude to an American aid 
programme in Asia they would soon be disillusioned. Vhen the State 
Department received a shortened version of the Cabinet paper on China it 
was reported to be 'keen to discuss the whole problem' with the 
British. (20) At the same time, it refused to make any premature 
commitments, and was highly concerned about the publicity that the British 
were giving to their consultations with Washington. Following a Reuters 
report that British and American officials were discussing a plan to 
contain communism in South-East Asia, the Thai ambassador in Washington had 
assured the American Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, that Bangkok too was 
willing to cooperate. There were however limits to what Thailand could do 
on her own, and the diplomat wondered whether the Americans could help 
recover Thai gold that was retained in Tokyo. As Butterworth subsequently 
explained to H. A.Graves from the British embassy in Washington on 5 
February, he welcomed every move to get other countries interested in the 
problem; however, he wondered whether it was opportune to let them know at 
this early stage that Britain and the United States were devising a plan to 
contain communism. He feared that 'we should whet appetites before his 
Government had decided whether it could, or should supply any iron 
rations.' If countries like Thailand got the impression they could hold out 
their hands, it would be difficult to persuade his superiors to go along 
without tremendous caution.(21)
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Dening, alarmed by the American rebuke, assured Graves that London was
careful not to commit the United States, particularly as it did not know
what American policy was. Equally:
'The habit of oriental countries of asking what we or the United 
States will do for them without making any serious effort to do 
anything for themselves is by now so familiar...there is no reason 
why either we or the United States should respond to Siamese 
blackmail, or indeed blackmail from anyone else.'
The first task, Dening added, was for the Asian countries to take the 
communist menace seriously. If they could be induced to frame a policy of 
their own to resist communism, it might emerge that there were certain gaps 
in their defences which required outside assistance to be filled. However, 
it would be
'...fatal for Asiatic countries to be allowed to cherish the belief 
that they can sit still and do nothing and leave it to us and the 
United States to defend them. Our own resources are in any event 
too limited to make this a practical proposition, and I imagine 
that the United States would be equally reluctant to be committed 
to any considerable extent over so vast an area. I should think 
therefore that both the Americans and we are firmly wedded to 
the principle of self-help in the first place.'
Dening hoped that this British policy would be developed in common with the 
United States. He realised, however, that it would be a long-term project; 
it would also be difficult for the Asian countries to put their houses in 
order and to induce them to adopt a common front: 'My own personal view is 
that it is diplomacy rather than dollars which will be required for some 
time to come'.(22)
After further talks with the State Department, Graves reported to the 
Foreign Office that the Americans appeared reluctant to embark on any sort
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of economic assistance plan for Thailand. He therefore suggested that
Britain's aim should be to get the American government 'to help us press 
the orientals to build up their own front against communism'. If this had 
the 'convenient sequel that America should become economically involved in 
South East Asia so much the better, but we should encourage the United 
States authorities to act politically first'.(23)
On 23 February, Graves again met with State Department officials,
including Butterworth and the chief of the Division of South-east Asian 
Affairs, Charles Reed. Graves repeated some of the points made by Dening, 
particularly that the Foreign Office did not envisage an anti-communist 
movement in terms of US dollars; it was only hoping for American 
cooperation in terms of moral support of the British thesis that the Asian 
countries must set their houses in order and must evolve a policy of their 
own in the struggle against communism. Anglo-American cooperation was
merely to fill the gaps while the greatest emphasis was to be put on self- 
help. (24) Graves subsequently enquired what American policy was. 
Butterworth replied that American policy was well defined. In Korea, the 
United States intended to put Rhee's government on a solid basis, and she 
would extend the occupation in Japan so that the country would not fall 
prey to communism. In China, the US would test any successor administration 
to see if it gave signs of good faith. In the Philippines, the United 
States were already available for defensive purposes, while they stood by 
the UJT resolution in Indonesia. Graves then mentioned that Butterworth had 
not touched on the continental territories which were in line of the
communist march, and he asked whether there was not 'some urgency about 
measures which would take into important consideration the danger to South
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East Asia'. Butterworth's response was 'lukewarm', and Graves had the 
impression that the United States was neither prepared to accept any 
responsibility for South-East Asia nor to act to maintain the position of 
friendly powers in the area.
However, after Butterworth had left the meeting, Reed stayed on and 
suggested to Graves tackling the Indochina problem jointly: 'That was the
area where the flow could, and ought to be stemmed. He thought we could do 
something together with the French in Paris'. United States policy 'ought 
to consider remedial measures at any rate in IndoChina, if not in other 
parts of South East Asia'. The initiative was shortlived; Butterworth soon 
got wind of Reed's suggestion and told Graves to forget that any such
proposal had been hinted at. Reed's statement did not represent State 
Department views and would not be Included in the eventual reply to the 
British paper.(25) Graves subsequently told London that talks with 
Butterworth were gowing slowly, and he doubted that any written analysis 
given to Britain would contain suggestions for a grand plan.(26)
14,4 WASHINGTON'S POLICY REVIEW
Despite such indications of an American rift over South-East Asia, the
British failed to detect that there was in fact growing pressure within the
State Department to assume a more active role in the region. After the
initial shock of China, some American officials were in fact becoming 
increasingly concerned about the prospects of communist advances in South- 
East Asia. As American historians have recently pointed out, Washington was
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in 1949 becoming aware of South-East Asia's importance for the economic 
recovery of Europe: exports of tin and rubber from Malaya to the United 
States, for example, provided Britain with the dollars that were crucial 
for the success of her economy, an economy that continued to stagnate 
despite the provision of Marshall aid. South-East Asia also had potential 
importance as an outlet for Japanese manufactured goods, and as a source of 
raw materials for Japan, at a time when the United States was moving 
towards the re-establishment of Japanese commercial and industrial 
power.(27) American officials were therefore beginning to regard the 
stability of South-East Asia as linked to the success of American policies 
in Europe and the Far East.
Another strand of opinion favoured greater American involvement in 
South-East Asia for different reasons. In January 1949, Charlton Ogburn Jr. 
of the State Department's South-East Asian Division was inspired by the 
Delhi Conference. Contrary to the State Department, which feared the 
meeting might encourage the formation of an anti-Western Asian bloc, 
Ogburn suggested supporting Asian unity as a means of stopping the spread 
of communism in South and South-East Asia. He reflected that at the end of 
the war American prestige had stood high as a champion of independence in 
Asia. However, this prestige had 'declined since then nearly to the 
vanishing point'. In China, American policy had failed, after supporting an 
unpopular, dictatorial and corrupt regime. Washington had also failed to 
oppose the French war against the Vietnamese and, while castigating the 
Dutch, had provided financial backing for the Metherland's campaign in 
Indonesia. As a result, India was regarding the Americans as the heirs of 
British imperialism. However, communist success in China had exposed the
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whole of South-East Asia to a grave peril; and if the communists managed to 
assume control of the nationalist movements in Indonesia this could result 
in the communist conquest of the whole of East Asia, leaving Australia in a 
most precarious situation. Ogburn therefore proposed that Washington should 
encourage the formation of a southern or non-communist Asian bloc. It was 
immaterial that such a bloc would initially be anti-Western: the French and 
Dutch were likely to lose control of Vietnam and Indonesia and would 
thereby remove the source of friction between Asia and the West. An anti- 
Western bloc could then develop into a common Asian front against communist 
aggression. (28)
Ogburn's paper was anti-Dutch and anti-French in its outlook, and it
neglected the role that Britain might be playing in anti-communist
arrangements in South and South-East Asia. However, it opened the State
Department's eyes to the possibility of using regional cooperation in Asia
as a means of containing communism. One month later, the American
ambassador in China, Leighton Stuart, provided Washington with an analysis
that came close to British ideas for regional cooperation. He argued that
communism in Asia could not be stopped by military force or economic aid
alone. What was needed to contain 'Soviet expansion-through-Communism' were
convincingly dramatized ideas. Unlike Ogburn, Stuart was thinking of a
united Asian/European scheme in South-East Asia. He proposed that the
'...UK, France, Netherlands should be invited to unite with US in 
federation to assist restoration complete independence to peoples 
of eastern and southeastern Asia; to protect them in process from 
more subtle form of imperialism through high [highly3 organized 
minorities of their own people linked to international Communism.
India, Philippines and other countries in area might be included. 
Concerning Indonesia and Indochina it might be argued they will 
also sooner or later be engulfed and that it is to interest of 
democratic solidarity as well as of Netherlands and France that 
they be liberated graciously rather than grudgingly and as total
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loss. UK might make unequivocal declarations as to Hong Kong and 
Malaya when certain specific conditions will permit, until which 
time a protectorate is to be maintained.'
If his plan was favoured, Stuart added, the fullest and most alluring 
publicity ought to be given. 'Lesson of China, as I interpret it, is that 
inspiring, high-principled, generously conceived, forward-looking policies 
will be infinitely more effective in Asia now and cost far less than any of 
the traditional methods'.(29)
Stuart gave a copy of his memorandum to his British colleague, 
Stevenson.(30) At the time, the two diplomats were holding informal 
discussions together with the Dutch ambassador in China: all three
officials favoured Bevin's (subsequently abandoned) idea, which he had 
expressed to the Dutch on 29 December, that there should be an economic 
conference fostering friendly relations in South-East Asia.(31) A few weeks 
later, Stuart followed up his memorandum with the Hanking Proposals, 
drafted jointly with the British, Australian and Indian ambassadors. As has 
been pointed out, the paper came close to proposing a kind of anti­
communist Marshall Plan for South and South-East Asia, directed by the 
Western powers and India and financed largely by the United States.
Proposals by officials like Ogburn and Stuart had a considerable 
impact in Washington. Together with the British paper on China, they 
inspired the State Department's Policy Planning Staff to draft a paper, PPS 
51, which attempted to re-define American policies in Asia - including 
Washington's stance on regional cooperation. The paper stated that it was 
America's objective to contain and reduce 'Kremlin influence' in South-East
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Asia through multilateral cooperation primarily with the British 
Commonwealth countries and the Philippines. As a first step, the United 
States should in conjunction with the British set forth to the Dutch and 
French their interpretation of the situation (the paper argued that a 
sovereign Indonesian state was required to satisfy the militant nationalism
there; however, recommendations on Indochina had to await the outcome of
0
the prposed multilateral consultations). This should be followed by prompt 
discussions with the British, Indians, Pakistanis, Filippinos and 
Australians on a cooperative approach to South-East Asia. Initially, an 
area organisation had to be discouraged - there should be parallel or joint 
action instead. To minimize the suggestion of American imperialist 
intervention, the Indians, Filippinos and other Asian states should take 
the public lead in political matters. America's role should be to offer 
discreet support and guidance. Furthermore, the United States should seek 
vigorously to develop the economic interdependence between raw material 
supplying South-East Asia and Japan, Western Europe and India as suppliers 
of finished goods - with due recognition of South-East Asian aspirations 
for the diversification of its economies. To achieve this, every effort 
should be made to initiate and expand programs of technical assistance 
through bilateral arrangements and international agencies. Last but not 
least, 'efforts should also be made to supplement conservatively private 
investment, with Governmental assistance'.(32) The PPS paper did not 
express official American policy. It would in fact take until July before 
it was circulated to the National Security Council as NSC 51. However, it 
indicated the growing conviction in Washington that American aid was 
required to contain the spread of communism in South-East Asia.
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Despite this, Washington refused to let on to London that it was
reviewing its South-East Asian policies. As a result, the British
maintained their diplomatic offensive. In the middle of March, the
Cabinet's latest analysis of the communist threat to South-East Asia, and
its recommendation for joint economic measures as well as greater
intelligence cooperation in South-East Asia were communicated to
Washington.(33) The Foreign Office was also planning for Bevin to discuss
South-East Asia during his forthcoming visit to Washington. A brief was
therefore prepared which outlined the department's current regional policy,
and which was intended to be left with the Americans. The brief argued that
while Russia's threat to South-East Asia was unlikely to be a military one,
the conditions in the region were
'...favourable for the spread of Communism, and if the general 
impression prevails in South East Asia that the Western Powers 
are both unwilling and unable to assist in resisting Russian 
pressure the psychological effect may be that local resistance is 
weakened, with the result that the process of undermining the 
systems of Government in that region will succeed to the extent 
that eventually the whole of South East Asia will fall a victim 
to the Communist advance and thus come under Russian domination 
without any military effort on the part of Russia.'
The will of South-East Asian territories to resist communism therefore had 
to be stiffened: no vast resources were required, initially it was a
question of political and economic efforts rather than of large-scale 
outright aid. The alternative was the abandonment of the whole position. If 
the Asian governments made an effort to stabilize the position, the Western 
powers might make limited contributions through technical assistance and 
advice, and by the provision of capital goods and arms. To avoid
suggestions that Britain or the United States were seeking to dominate the 
situation, the fully sovereign governments of South-East Asia had to take
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the initiative - an intiative hopefully prompted by Britain. At the same
time, self-interest should provide the inspiration for the new unity needed
to resist Russian expansion. If a common front could be built up from
Afghanistan to Indochina inclusive, it should be possible to contain the
Russian advance southwards. A stable South-East Asia might also eventually
influence the situation in China and make it possible to redress the
situation there. The paper concluded:
'While the strategic necessities of Europe and the Middle East are 
greater and should have priority, the requirements of South East 
Asia, though in a different category, are of vital importance. Ve 
should therefore, parallel with our efforts in Europe and the 
Middle East, do our utmost to encourage a spirit of co-operation 
and self-reliance in South East Asia with a view to the creation 
of a common front against Russian expansion in that area'. (34)
Dening explained to the Colonial and Commonwealth Relations Offices 
that it would take months, if not years for the policy to crystallize in 
the manner suggested in the brief. If, however, Asian countries showed a 
disposition to create a united front against Russian expansion, 'we should 
hope that the Americans would be disposed to offer material help when and 
where it is required'. (35) Dening advised Bevin that he could hand a copy 
of the brief to Acheson, though he should emphasize that it represented a 
personal view which had not been considered by his ministerial colleagues. 
Dening further explained that the Foreign Office had so far failed to make 
progress with the Americans in its discussions arising out of the Cabinet 
paper on China from December 1948. His strong impression was that the 
Americans had not yet developed any policy in this part of the world, and 
that they were reluctant to become involved in any commitments. Bevin's 
talks were intended to be an initial step to enlist American support in
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principle for the policy the Foreign Office hoped to pursue. It would be 
premature to ask for material support, since the Americans would want to be 
firmly convinced that the principle of self-help was firmly established 
before they considered an outlay of dollars.(36)
During his visit to Washington, Bevin had only little time to discuss 
Far Eastern topics. Issues such as the Atlantic Pact or Germany were taking 
precedence.(37) However, Bevin raised the issue of South-East Asia during a 
meeting with Acheson on 2 April, arguing that Russia had an opening in the 
region since 60 percent of the population were Muslims. Britain could 
exercise influence through Pakistan but was hoping for American help. So 
far as Indonesia, Burma and Malaya were concerned Bevin was looking for a 
'sort of Southeast Asia conference arrangement in which the US, UK, 
Australia, and Mew Zealand could cooperate for economic and political 
purposes, as distinct from a military understanding or pact for this area 
which should not be considered now' . The only American comment on this was 
made by Jacob Beam, Acting Special Assistant in the Office of German and 
Austrian Affairs, who interposed that the U.S. might like to set up a kind 
of Caribbean Commission for South-East Asia. At the end of the meeting, 
Bevin left his brief on South-East Asia with the State Department.(38)
On the whole, the Americans gave no indication that they might be 
considering a more forthcoming attitude towards cooperation with the 
British in South-East Asia, apart from generally agreeing that a spirit of 
cooperation should be encouraged. Graves feared that it would be difficult 
to bring the Americans in on South-East Asia: 'They have burnt their
fingers so badly in China that they are at present in a very cautious
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mood'.(39) Even more disappointing than Bevin's talks with Acheson was the 
American response to the British paper on China from December 1948. The 
American reply, arriving in London at the end of March, described the 
British memorandum as a thoughtful, detailed and well-reasoned analysis. 
However, it maintained that the British could have laid greater emphasis on
r
the growing strength of nationalism and its long-term incompatibility with 
communism. Furthermore, so far as the British demand for a strengthening of 
police and intelligence forces in each territory was concerned, attention 
was called to the repressive nature of these services. Most importantly, 
the paper stated that 'a word of caution is desirable regarding dependence 
upon American material aid in approaching the problems of South Asia'. 
Since 1937, the United States had given vast amounts of American financial, 
economic and military aid to China; the defeats of the Chinese government 
armies during the campaigns of 1948 thus were not caused by a lack of 
ammunition but could rather 'be attributed to extremely bad leadership and 
to other morale destroying factors which led to a complete loss of the 
will-to-fight'. In China, American efforts to use aid in order to induce 
effective measures of self-help had failed. They were evidence 'of the 
impossibility of substituting external aid for self-help and of the 
weakness of external aid as inducement to evoke measures of self-help'.(40)
The British were extremely disappointed by the American reply. As
Graves pointed out to the Foreign Office, the weakness of the American
paper was that it contained several isolated comments which had not been
developed into any general conclusion. (41) R.A.Hibbert at the Foreign
Office's South-East Asia Department was even more disconcerted:
•The U.S. is petrified by the failure of its policy in China + it 
is quite clear from this memorandum that no general aid will be
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forthcoming for S.E.Asia from America - not even aid in 
individual cases such as that of Siam. A general solution of the 
short-term problems is therefore impossible.'
The United States were hanging back from the attempt to create a cordon 
against communism in South-East Asia, and the region therefore had to 
remain an area of piecemeal defence and overall uncertainty. (42)
Despite this, the Foreign Office wouldn't give up hope. As R.H.Scott
commented at the end of April, the American response contained no new
statement of policy, but confirmed what London already knew.
'The important thing about the Memorandum - mixture of defeatism 
and pious advice that it is - is that the State Department has 
been induced to consider these problems and to formulate a 
statement of policy which we can use as a basis of argument. I 
am all for steadily pegging away at the Americans, on the 
principle of the steady drip wearing away the stone.'(43)
For the time being, however, there was little more the British could do 
about the Americans. As a result, the emphasis of Britain's regional 
diplomacy was shifting back to the Commonwealth countries.
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15. C O M M O N W E A L T H  COOPERATION, APRIL - MAY 1949
15.1 FRANCE'S EXCLUSION FROM BRITISH REGIONAL PLANS
The American response to the Cabinet paper on China dampened British 
hopes for anti-communist collaboration in South-East Asia. Further 
discouraging news came from France. On 8 March the French President, 
Vincent Auriol had come to an agreement with the former Vietnamese emperor 
Bao Dai: France committed herself to Vietnamese independence, though
without a timetable for the transfer of power. In the meantime, Bao Dai
would become head of state in Vietnam, which included Cochin-China, Annam 
and Tonkin. However, the French retained responsibility for foreign affairs 
and defence as well as a number of political privileges; Vietnam together 
with Laos and Cambodia would form part of the French Union, which was under
the control and direction of France.(1) The Alysee agreement, as it became
known, in fact provided for little more than the establishment of a French 
puppet regime in Vietnam to placate international opinion. From the outset, 
the British had little hope that it would result in the settlement required 
for France's inclusion in a regional scheme involving India. As a Foreign 
Office memorandum pointed out on 24 March, neither India nor Australia 
would regard the Bao Dai agreement as giving true independence to Indochina 
so long as it secured so many privileges for France. The problem was, 
however, that the French 'would not take kindly to any pressure or 
suggestion from us to make a more liberal offer of independence to Viet 
Mam'. Britain could only hope that if the new agreement failed the French 
would see for themselves the urgent necessity for the future of the whole
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of South-East Asia of granting something more than just token independence 
which they appeared to ha£ bestowed under the new agreement.(2)
In the following months, the British refused to commit themselves to 
the Bao Dai agreement, despite the fact that Washington gave it iis support 
in June.(3) Britain feared offending the Commonwealth and jeopardizing the 
chances of her regional initiative. The Indian attitude was crucial. Nehru 
had no wish to see communism established in Indochina but consistently 
argued that the French had to grant real independence and had to come to 
terms with Ho Chi Minh as the real leader of Indochinese nationalism. (4) 
The upshot of the international controversy over Bao Dai was that Britain 
saw herself unable to include France in her regional plans. As will be
seen, a departmental meeting in May finally decided in favour of a 
Commonwealth approach to regional cooperation. The hope was also expressed 
that France and the Netherlands might disappear as colonial powers in 
South-East Asia. (See chapter 15.5)
However, at the end of the year British policies became more
forthcoming towards the French in Indochina. After Mao Tse-tung had 
declared the People's Republic of China and his troops had reached the
borders of Tonkin, London decided to put its full weight behind the Bao Dai 
agreement as the only solution to the Indochinese problem. In September
1949, MacDonald had stressed that recognition should be withheld from Bao 
Dai until after Asian countries had given their support. Four months later, 
during the Colombo conference, the Commissioner-General lobbied for Bao 
Dai's recognition. Nehru refused.(5) Despite this, Britain recognised the 
State of Vietnam under Bao Dai, along with the Kingdoms of Cambodia and
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Laos, on 2 February 1950, the day the French Assembly finally ratified the 
Bao Dai agreement. However, the Asian Commonwealth countries refused to 
follow suit.(6) Indochina thus remained a problem that required separate 
treatment outside of the regional framework envisaged by Britain.
15,2 THE FAILURE OF NEHRU'S REGIONAL PLANS
Despite the disappointing news emanating from Paris and Vashington in 
the early spring of 1949, London was encouraged by information from the 
British high commissioner in Delhi at the end of March that Nehru's
proposals for an Asian regional organisation had failed to convince the 
smaller states of South and South-East Asia.(7) The failure of the Indian 
plans were partly due to a general political mistrust of India in Asia. 
Since independence, Indian prestige had suffered greatly because of her
military intervention in Kashmir and the continuing conflict with Pakistan 
over the disputed province. Another reason for the lukewarm attitude of the 
Asian countries was the Soviet Union's earlier condemnation of the Delhi 
Conference. As Dening explained to the Foreign Office's new permanent
under-secretary, Sir William Strang, Nehru apparently wanted to 'take the 
lead in building up a "united Asia front" on lines which may not be 
entirely dissimilar from our own views on the subject', however, the
response had not been very eager. The Indian Prime Minister had cast his 
net too wide, and India was not much loved in Asia, Pakistan and Ceylon 
were afraid of India, and though Takin Nu in Burma personally liked Nehru, 
there was fear and dislike of India in this country too. Thailand as well 
was afraid of being overlaid. Dening doubted whether Indian aspirations to
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take the lead in establishing a united Asian front would succeed, he
whether the country had the necessary know-how, judgement and tact to carry
the scheme to a successful conclusion.(8) The apparent failure of Nehru's
aspirations greatly encouraged the Foreign Office's aim that Britain should
seek the regional leadership. According to Dening:
'Ve are the obvious people to take the initiative in this matter,
and if we play the hand skilfully, there is no reason why we
should not succeed where India is likely to fail. But we must
take the initiative soon. Ve really cannot wait until a conference 
of Commonwealth Foreign Ministers in Ceylon in 1950. And on the 
whole we should probably be wise not to confine any initial 
meeting, if there is one, to the Commonwealth alone.'(9)
15.3 PROPOSALS FOR A PACIFIC PACT
Apart from the failure of Nehru's initiative, another factor induced 
the British to step up their diplomatic activities in South-East Asia. 
Since February, there had been growing press speculation in Australia and 
the Philippines about a Pacific defence pact. The idea of a Pacific pact 
was inspired by talks between the Brussels Treaty powers and the United 
States on a North Atlantic Defence Treaty (NATO), which was officially 
announced on 18 March and signed on 4 April 1949. It was suggested that a 
similar defence arrangement was needed in the South-East Asian/Pacific area 
to safeguard the region against a communist onslaught from China. On 14 
March, the Australian Minister for Defence, Dedman, was reported as stating 
that 'discussions were taking place for the conclusion of a Pacific 
Regional Defence Pact embracing non-British as well as British 
countries'. (10) Six days later, the President of the Philippines, Elpidio 
Quirino, followed up the Australian statement by proposing a Pacific pact
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somewhere along the lines of the planned North Atlantic Agreement.(11) 
Despite American and British refutations, Quirino was to continue pursuing 
his idea throughout the year.(12)
London principally favoured the idea of a defence arrangement in the 
Pacific/South-East Asian area; indeed, international defence cooperation 
had for years been one of its long-term goals in the region. It was also 
pleased about Australia's growing concern about South-East Asian security. 
While Canberra had in August 1948 made it clear that it was not prepared to 
send troops to Malaya(13), the Australians had in the following month 
proposed that they would assume responsibility for defence planning in the 
area including Indonesia, Malaya and Borneo. Despite Foreign Office fears 
that Britain's influence in South-East Asia would be 'finally extinguished' 
if it became known that she would surrender her position to Australia in a 
future war(14), London had agreed in November that Australia should assume 
the initiative in peacetime for defence planning in the area. (15) The 
decision had paved the way for the secret ANZAM agreement which coordinated 
trilateral defence planning in the Australian, New Zealand and Malayan 
area.(16) Under the agreement, a British military planning team was to be 
sent to Australia and New Zealand in the summer of 1949. In September 1949, 
a New Zealand flight of Dakota aircraft was stationed at Singapore, and in 
June 1950 RAAF aircraft arrived in Malaya,(17)
Despite its planning agreement with the antipodeans, London regarded a 
Pacific pact as premature. Firstly, India was known to oppose power blocs, 
and was unlikely to join in an anti-communist defence grouping only shortly 
after the failure of her own regional initiative. Excessive speculation
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about a Pacific pact was indeed likely to frighten Nehru off London's more
limited plans for economic or political cooperation. The Americans too
might be prevented from participating in regional cooperation if they knew 
that it entailed defence. Immediately after Quirino's proposal in March, 
Acheson made it clear that the United States was not ready to consider a 
Pacific pact. Furthermore, American diplomats in London told the Foreign 
Office that a Pacific defence pact would open the United States to the 
accusation that they were underwriting British, French and Dutch colonial 
policies in the region: this was something the American peoples were
certainly opposed to. Dening got the point, assuring the Americans that the 
whole thing was a 'pipe dream' of Australian politicians and newspaper men; 
he added, however, that some other type of pact was possible, for example 
to combat communism in the Far East.(18) London was aware that continuing 
speculation about a Pacific pact at this moment in time would have a 
counter-productive effect on Britain's regional plans. It also threatened 
to shift the regional initiative away from London to Canberra or Manila. To 
correct this trend, Britain clearly had to renew its diplomatic efforts on 
South-East Asian cooperation. The Foreign Office hoped that a forthcoming 
Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Meeting in London might provide the
opportunity.
15.4 THE COMMONWEALTH PRIME MINISTERS' MEETING IN 
APRIL 1949
The Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Meeting at the end of April 1949 had 
been arranged at short notice because of India's intention, declared in
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December 1948, to remain in the Commonwealth but as a republic.(19) Since 
India's constitutional position took, precedence, the originally planned 
meeting of Commonwealth Foreign Ministers in Ceylon, which would probably 
have had South-East Asia on the agenda, had had to be postponed. However, 
though the Prime Ministers would meet for only a short period of time, and 
would be preoccupied with the Indian question, Dening suggested 'to have 
something on paper* lest the South-East Asian issue came up too. 
Furthermore, MacDonald and Stevenson were expecting responses to their 
ideas. First, the Colonial and the Commonwealth Relations Offices had to be 
brought into the discussions.(20) Indeed, MacDonald was becoming 
increasingly impatient and announced his intention to visit London in May. 
He warned that the situation in the Far East was bound to deteriorate 
unless something could be done on a sufficiently broad scale to check the 
process. His visit might help sort out Britain's ideas; he would then 
return to Singapore to summon a conference of British diplomatic and 
administrative representatives in South-East Asia to carry the planning a 
step further.(21)
Dening subsequently told the Colonial and Commonwealth Relations 
Offices that his department was considering whether the South-East Asian 
question should be carried further. There had been much press speculation 
about regional arrangements and the matter might come up at the forthcoming 
Prime Ministers' Meeting. Dening believed that a great deal depended on 
Nehru, who had just tried unsuccessfully to establish the principle of a 
regional grouping which included the Middle East, Australia and New Zealand 
as well as South-East Asia.
'If India is successful in building up a united front in South
East Asia, we may find such a front is hostile to the United
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Kingdom, to the United States and to Vestern interests in
general. If India is unsuccessful then there will be no front, 
which will also be disadvantageous to Vestern interests, because 
without a united front Communism may be expected to make good 
headway in the region.'
So far, existing disputes had overshadowed the considerable community of 
interests in South-East Asia. Dening believed that only Britain had the
experience and ability to knit the region together. However, to be 
successful Nehru had to be convinced that the Vest had a material 
contribution to make to the welfare of South-East Asia, that a close
association with the Vest was in the interest of a South-East Asian front, 
and that the colonial Powers in the region should not entirely abandon
their position. Even if India's aim was the overlordship of Asia, the
Indian leaders might accept that they had need of the Vest. Economic
cooperation might initially be more fruitful than political cooperation, 
though Britain had to be careful not to transgress upon ECAFE's activities. 
Furthermore, the Americans would probably require concrete evidence that 
some degree of political and economic stability could be attained on the
principle of self-help before they showed readiness to play a part. At the
same time, there were two in a sense contradictory trends which needed 
correcting: one was the feeling that Europe and America were preoccupied
with their own selfish interests to the detriment of South-East Asia; the 
other was that the Atlantic Pact would somehow involve South-East Asia in a 
war of European creation. The question now was whether Bevin's brief for 
Vashington should first be sent to the Commonwealth countries and secondly 
to all the other countries in the region. Another question was whether a 
Commonwealth meeting on foreign affairs would fit the bill, or whether it
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should be a regional conference including foreign countries, as Nehru 
seemed to contemplate. (22)
In a subsequent letter to Stevenson in China, Dening explained that he
was not in a position to give very much of a reply to the four ambassadors'
joint proposals (the Nanking proposals). It was, however, clear to him that
many minds were thinking on similar lines all over the world, except
perhaps in America where there appeared to be little evidence that any
serious thinking was being done about Asian problems. Akey question was how
India would develop in her relations with the South-East Asian countries:
'No association of powers in South East Asia will work unless 
India is prepared to work wholeheartedly. At present Pandit
Nehru's much publicised attitude towards colonialism and his 
failure to invite the United Kingdom to his recent Asian
conference on Indonesia suggest that, unless we are very careful, 
a conflict of view will arise between East and Vest, which would 
wreck the whole proceedings. In this connexion, the Dutch police 
action in Indonesia last December has thrown a very large 
spanner into the works, and we can hope for very little progress 
until the Indonesian problem is settled.'
There was the additional problem of growing friction between Pakistan and 
Afghanistan over the north-west frontier, the unsettled Kashmir dispute, 
the chaotic state of Burma, the uneasy political situation in Thailand, the 
difficulties in finding a solution in Indochina, the Indonesian question 
and finally Britain's troubles in Malaya. 'It is not easy, with all these
present troubles, to get the territories of the region to appreciate the
greater danger and to take the wider view'. However, if Britain could prove 
to the "East that it could not do without the Vest, whether it liked it or 
not, this might open the way to closer collaboration. A further problem was 
that the United States, having burnt their fingers in China, were not
disposed to underwrite South-East Asia economically in the same way that 
they had underwritten Europe.(23)
Upon his return from Vashington, Bevin was told by Dening that: :
'Our attempts to build up a united front against Communism 
through the medium of our estimate on China ... have not brought 
any marked response, and most of the Governments we approached, 
though more or less interested, have shown no tendency to 
appreciate the full extent of the menace'.
At the same time, Nehru had the idea that his regional conference might
develop into a regional organisation - not a bad thing if Britain was
involved. However, the net was cast too wide and there was the danger that
an Asian regional organisation would develop anti-European tendencies. A
further disquieting feature was Nehru's tendency to harp on the theme of
colonialism and racial discrimination, both of which were harmful to
cooperation with the Vest. Dening concluded that the situation might get
out of hand if it was allowed to drift until a meeting of Commonwealth
Foreign Ministers in Ceylon in 1950, and he suggested an approach be made
during the Prime Ministers' Conference.
'If we can achieve a degree of regional co-operation in which the 
United Kingdom is a full partner, then the time may come when we 
can convince Pandit Nehru that South East Asia has need of the 
Vest and that India should maintain a close association, not only 
with us but also with other powers including the Dutch and the 
French. But clearly the stage has not yet been reached where we 
can expect him readily to accept this thesis.'(24)
Annexed to Dening*s brief was a memorandum entitled 'South Asia' 
(dealing also with South-East Asia) which was drafted by the Foreign 
Office. The paper had been approved by the Permanent Under-Secretary's 
Committee, a high-level official Planning Committee recently established by
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Attlee and similar to George Kennan's Policy Planning Staff in Washington,
and it was for use during the Prime Ministers* Meeting. If possible, it
could be distributed to the participating delegations. Like the recent
brief for Bevin*s Vashington talks, the memorandum dwelt on the alleged
communist menace in South and South-East Asia:
'The writings of Lenin and Stalin make it clear that the Russians 
aim ultimately at world hegemony. The initial steps taken by 
Russia since the end of the war in Eastern Europe and in Eastern 
Asia show the development of this pattern. Militarily, the 
greatest threat is towards Europe and the Middle East, but 
politically the threat is world-wide, and the Communist fifth 
column is everywhere. In South Asia the problem, as we see it, is 
for political and economic stability to be restored to the whole 
area before Communism can succeed in so undermining the whole 
position that existing forms of government are liquidated and the 
peoples of South Asia are brought into the Soviet orbit. Given 
conditions of instability and divided counsels, the Stalinist 
technique can be successful without an actual military threat 
from Russia...the need of South Asia territories is not so much 
primarily to build up military strength against the threat of 
armed Russian aggression, as to establish conditions of stability 
which will defeat the Stalinist techniques.
Political stability, the paper added, involved good neighbourliness, and it
was hoped that differences between the South Asian territories would be
settled in order to establish solidarity in the region:
'Though the ultimate aim of political solidarity in South Asia 
will take time to achieve, a great deal can be done meanwhile in 
the economic field. In economic development there is a need for 
co-operation between South Asian territories and other 
Commonwealth countries, in particular the United Kingdom,
Australia and Mew Zealand. The United States and other countries
can also eventually make their contribution...Economic co­
operation may in fact prove to be the first step towards 
political co-operation, so that in the process of time a degree of
unity will be achieved in South Asia which will render it immune
from Russian attempts to undermine the position and to dominate 
the area. The first step as we see it in this process will be to 
develop the practice of co-operation on a basis of equality and 
mutual aid. It remains to be seen whether at a later stage some 
more formal association of interested powers will prove 
practicable or desirable. (25)
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In short, the Foreign Office was suggesting anti-conununist unity in
South and South-East Asia, offering the Asian countries economic benefits 
in return. Though initially such benefits would be derived from mutual aid, 
the paper hinted that in the long run American aid might be forthcoming as 
well. Bevin approved the paper and passed it on to Attlee. An accompanying 
minute explained the urgency of the situation in view of Nehru's criticism 
that the world tended to focus its attention on the Vest at the expense of 
Asia:
'If we wait too long, we may find ourselves no longer able to 
influence the situation, since a tendency is already developing on 
the part of Pandit Nehru to issue invitiations to conferences
without asking the United Kingdom.
V
Bevin therefore recommended taking the intiative during the Prime 
Ministers' Meeting, approaching the problem from the economic angle, as the 
Vest had a good deal to offer to the East in this field. This might lead to 
some kind of regional conference, perhaps including countries from outside 
the Commonwealth as well. If Britain participated in such a conference the 
event might lead to economic cooperation which later on might possibly lead 
to 'some kind of security arrangement'.(26)
The Commonwealth Relations Office generally supported the Foreign 
Office line. Garner agreed that 'we need to give evidence of a more active 
interest in South-East Asia and that if we wait too long we may find 
ourselves no longer able to influence the situation'.(27) He also agreed 
that 'it is the United Kingdom alone which has the experience and ability 
to knit the South-East Asia region together', and that India's attitude was
crucial because of Nehru's efforts of rallying the East through attacks on
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the colonial powers. At the same time, Garner stressed that there were no 
prospects for a pact modelled on the Atlantic Pact, which was favoured by 
Australia, since Mehru opposed power blocs. Furthermore, there was at 
present no chance of the essential participation of the United States. 
Britain's object was therefore to strengthen the various governments 
against communism attacking them from the inside. However, Garner suggested 
avoiding elaborate machinery, to safeguard Britain's leading role (against 
India): 'Let us be warned by the experience of E.C.A.F.E. : it is not only 
Russia's membership which has caused trouble in that Organisation'. Britain 
already had the machinery in MacDonald's organisation in Singapore, and 
there were many ways in which she could use her influence to establish the 
cooperation needed to resist communism, for example by offering mediating 
services, encouraging rice production and export, by lending technical 
personnel, training police and military forces. Each item could be tackled 
separately. In a purely practical approach of this sort lay the best hope 
of securing practical cooperation from India in those items in which she 
could make a positive contribution.
Finally, Garner warned not to raise false hopes. In the absence of a 
Marshall Plan or indications of an American contribution, apart from what 
might be forthcoming under Truman's Point Four, economic cooperation was 
likely to be mainly a British contribution, either in the form of finance 
or consumer goods. Many items were scarce at the time and British resources 
strained, indeed Britain was trying to divert dollar earning exports from 
India and Pakistan to Canada and the United States for dollar earning 
purposes. The Commonwealth Relations Office therefore poposed that a 
working Party of the Official Far Eastern Committee should assess what
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contributions Britain could make. A conference of only Commonwealth 
countries could then be held in Colombo (Ceylon) in order to avoid 
controversy over the participation of other colonial powers. The conference 
might prove to Eehru and others that Britain had a contribution to make in 
overcoming the problems of the area.(28) The Commonwealth Relations Office 
thus suggested starting regional cooperation on a purely Commonwealth
basis, avoiding elaborate machinery which might have enabled India to steal
the show. Initially, an economic survey had to be conducted to avoid
financial commitments which Britain could not afford.
The Colonial Office, however, feared that Foreign Office plans might
jeopardize the development of British colonies elsewhere. As J.J.Paskin 
pointed out, the achievement of social progress based on economic 
development in the undeveloped countries of South-East Asia was a slow and 
laborious process, and it was illusory to expect too much in a short time 
in the way of creating an atmosphere unfavourable to the growth of 
communism. Even if there was the prospect of something like Marshall aid 
for the countries of South-East Asia, large quantities of the required 
material and technical staff would probably have to be diverted from other 
colonial development schemes. There was also the danger that the butter 
would be too thinly spread to rule out the achievement of rapid results. 
Paskin felt that the best contribution towards checking communism in South- 
East Asia was to set Malaya once again firmly on the road to social and 
economic progress, creating a 'bastion of contentment' in South-East Asia 
which would also influence other countries. The Colonial Office was 
currently negotiating with the Treasury substantial grants to Malaya, and 
it would be 'short of calamity' to jeopardize this programme by diverting
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scarce material and personnel to the development of foreign countries in
the area. The department was also concerned about stimulating India to take
the regional initiative. The South-East Asian countries were looking to
Britain as the country which had the greatest influence in the area, and
di
any impression that Britan was surrendering her political leadership in 
the region to India would have a deplorable political effect on Malaya. 
However, despite its objections the Colonial Office seemed to accept that 
the whole issue had to be raised at the Prime Ministers' Conference, as 
Paskin's letter finally pointed out that in discussing regional cooperation 
with the Commonwealth Prime Ministers, the Caribbean Commission should not 
serve as a model. <29) Nevertheless, the two departments' responses to the 
Foreign Office made it clear that Britain's possible financial 
contributions had to be studied carefully before London could publicly
launch proposals for regional cooperation.
In the event, the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Meeting from 24 to 27 
April 1949 was almost exclusively preoccupied with the question of India's 
position in the Commonwealth. The participating Prime Ministers unanimously 
recommended to the King that an Indian republic should remain in the
Commonwealth which would accept him as its head.(30) Though the meeting 
gave Attlee no time to raise the issue of South-East Asian regional
cooperation, Nehru indicated in the course of the conference that until the 
Dutch and French faced the facts and granted independence to their
respective South-East Asian colonies, nothing much could be done in Asia 
about wider cooperation with the colonial powers.(31) His remarks 
strengthened London's conviction that any regional initiative had to 
exclude the other colonial powers.
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While the British failed to use the Prime Ministers' Meeting for the 
launch of a new regional initiative, the conference nevertheless increased 
the level of Commonwealth consultation on Burma. After a further 
deterioration of Burma's internal situation due to the fighting between 
government troops and the Karens, Burma had in December and January 
secretly asked Britain for financial aid as well as arms. London had used 
the opportunity to bring in the Commonwealth, and had encouraged Nehru to
the attending British, Indian, Pakistani and Ceylonese delegates had failed 
to agree on financial aid and had instead offered Commonwealth mediation in 
the Karen dispute, an offer refused by the Burmese Prime Minister, Thakin 
Nu, at the beginning of March.(32) During the Prime Ministers' Meeting in 
April, however, Britain, India, Pakistan and Ceylon decided that they would 
do what they could to meet Burmese requests for arms and military 
equipment. It was furthermore proposed to establish an informal committee 
consisting of the four countries' ambassadors in Rangoon to consider 
financial asistance to the country. (33) Though the Burmese initially
dragged their feet about the proposed committee, a Commonwealth loan of 350 
million rupees was to be negotiated by the end of December. (34) From the 
British point of view, the four-power initiative was important primarily 
because of its educational effect on the participating countries, as it 
constituted the first example of Commonwealth cooperation on South-East 
Asia.
organise a Commonwealth meeting in on the issue of Burma. However
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15,5 INTERDEPARTMENTAL AGREEMENT, MAY 1949
Vhile the Commonwealth Prime Ministers were meeting in London, further 
communist advances in China made the issue of anti-communist collaboration 
in Asia increasingly urgent. On 23 April, communist forces captured 
Nanking, the former headquarters of the Kuomintang government; one month 
later Shanghai fell. The nationalist retreat south of the Yangtse river 
brought the moment much closer when communist forces would reach the border , 
with Indochina and Burma, an event which in British eyes would lead to a 
considerable increase in communist activities throughout South-East Asia. 
Under the impression of the continuing nationalist defeats in China, and 
encouraged by the Commonwealth talks on Burma, London started a number of 
economic studies in preparation of any later regional initiatives. In 
addition, the whole issue of anti-communist cooperation was discussed with 
MacDonald who was visiting London at the end of May. His visit paved the 
way for a comprehensive review of British regional strategies to be 
followed by a Commonwealth conference on South-East Asia.
Prior to his visit, MacDonald and the British Commanders-in-Chief in 
South-East Asia were becoming increasingly impatient about Britain’s 
apparent lack of initiative in Asia. At the beginning of May, the British 
Defence Co-ordination Committee in the Far East urged diplomatic, economic 
and military action to form a 'containing ring' against further communist 
penetration. The ring had to be formed by the coordinated action of 
countries including India, Burma, Thailand, Indochina and Indonesia.(35) 
Alarmed by the men on the spot, the Foreign Office warned Bevin that events 
were now moving rapidly in South-East Asia. It therefore suggested
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organising a meeting of British officials in South-East Asia to discuss the 
situation. The meeting could be attended by Commonwealth observers and 
should be followed by a Foreign Ministers' Conference in Ceylon. (36)
MacDonald arrived in London on 18 May. After talks with Bevin, an 
interdepartmental meeting was arranged on 24 May attended by MacDonald, 
Archibald Mye (the British High Commissioner in India) as well as
representatives from the Foreign, Colonial and Commonwealth Relations 
Offices. To begin with, Dening argued that 'the object of regional co­
operation would be the building of a common front against Russia', though 
this did not necessarily require the formation of a defence pact. The 
problem was, however, that nothing could be done without India who was in 
no mood to cooperate in the establishment of a common front in Asia. 
MacDonald saw the situation in more dramatic terms: the communists had
conquered the whole of China and could probably seize large parts of 
Indochina within in the next six months; Thailand would be unable to
resist, while the possibilities of communist domination of Burma were well 
known. If these three countries were to fall, Malaya and India would be
exposed to a direct Communist threat. MacDonald added:
'If, however, we could devise a political, economic and defence 
policy which could convince the peoples of South East Asia of our 
and their ability to resist Communism, we would be able to hold a 
line north of Pakistan, Burma, Indo China, Hong Kong and the 
Philippines. Our policy should be one in which all the peoples of 
the area could share, just as the peoples of Vestern Europe and 
the Atlantic Area were sharing the benefits of co-operation in 
the Vest'.
MacDonald agreed, however, not to hold a regional conference immediately, 
but to test the ideas formulated in London during a conference of British 
representatives in Delhi or Singapore first.
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Dening then explained that the Americans were still holding aloof from
South-East Asian problems. It seemed they would be content to let Britain
go ahead with her plans for regional cooperation and wait to see if they
worked before offering assistance:
'Co-operation in Vestern Europe would never have been achieved 
without British initiative and the same could probably be said of 
South East Asia where there would be no co-operation unless the 
United Kingdom discreetly took the lead, although in South East 
Asia there would be no American aid to assist the process'.
The discussion then turned to India. According to Hye, India's 
attitude towards regional cooperation would be influenced by her opposition 
to colonialism, and by her aim of avoiding adherence to any of the world's 
power blocs and of steering a middle course to become a third force in 
Asia. It would therefore be difficult to ask Kehru to join a regional 
conference whose chief purpose was the effective building of an anti­
communist front. India had already made it clear that she would not 
cooperate strategically, and it was unlikely that she would cooperate 
politically. However, she might agree to collaborate economically in order 
to overcome her serious economic problems. Nye later on added:
'Pandit Nehru's realisation that India needed the help of European 
industry was encouraging and suggested that regional 
collaboration could be made attractive to India by using the 
economic bait.'
MacDonald agreed that India could not be expected to participate in a 
conference with the French and the Dutch, but asked why Britain shouldn't 
hold a conference limited to Commonwealth powers at which India played a 
leading part. India's cooperation in giving aid to Burma was a good omen, 
and while cooperation was developed within the Commonwealth in South-East
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Asia, the Dutch and the French might disappear from the scene as colonial 
powers and so facilitate a wider conference. Dening then proposed a 
Commonwealth conference in Colombo which for climatic reasons would have to 
be held in January or February 1950. Britain could offer technicians apart 
from capital, and if some concrete plan could be put forward after the 
conference it might be possible to interest the Americans as well. However,
Paskin from the Colonial Office warned of the 'insatiable appetites' of
India and the Colonial Empire; there was only a 'limited amount of
assistance available from United Kingdom sources and the Colonial Office 
would find it difficult to agree that colonial development should be at the 
expense of assistance elsewhere, particularly to India'. Dening blocked 
Paskin's objections by stating that the economic studies and country 
surveys now in progress should not be prejudiced. Eventually, the meeting 
decided that:
'Efforts should be made to hold a Commonwealth Conference in 
Ceylon in January or February of 1950. A paper should be prepared 
for Ministers outlining the position as seen by officials and
recommending a policy’.(37)
Thus, Whitehall officials had finally decided on a Commonwealth
conference in preparation of regional cooperation in South and South-East 
Asia. The underlying aim of the British initiative was to build up an anti­
communist front; however, it would be disguised as an economic plan 
involving financial and technical aid on a basis of self-interest and
mutual help. The beginning would be made on a Commonwealth basis, but in 
the long run other Asian countries such as Burma and Thailand would be 
brought in. At the same time, London dropped any remining hopes of
involving the French or the Dutch in its regional plans. Indonesia and
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parts of Indochina would only be included after the departure of their 
colonial masters. However, a number of problems remained. First and 
foremost, Britain had only little capital to spare for South and South-East 
Asian development. The Americans therefore had to be brought in if the 
envisaged regional policy was to be a success. A further problem was India 
who insisted on maintaining an independent foreign policy in Asia and who 
was opposed to any anti-communist al^^nents. Yet her support for British 
regional plans was believed to be essential not least because of the 
headway that Nehru had made on regional developments during the Delhi 
Conference.
15.6 CONTINUING SPECULATION ABOUT A PACIFIC PACT
Both Indian and American reluctance to become involved in a South-East
Asian arrangement was partly due to the fear of being dragged into unwanted
defence commitments. Before submitting a more comprehensive paper on
regional cooperation to the Cabinet, the Foreign Office therefore tried to
suppress the continuing speculation about a Pacific Pact. The Australian
Prime Minister, Chiefley, had on 15 May drawn public attention to a Pacific
pact by stating that planning between Australia, New Zealand and Britain
for the Pacific area was proceeding parallel with corresponding planning
for the Atlantic area. However, in the following days London and Washington
apparently dampened Canberra's hopes for a Pacific defence treaty. On 18
May, Acheson publicly reiterated American opposition to a Pacific pact:
'While it is true that there are serious dangers to world peace 
existing in the situation in Asia, it is also true, as Prime 
Minister Nehru of India stated to the press the other day, that a 
Pacific defence pact could not take shape until present internal
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conflicts in Asia were resolved. He was quoted as going on to say 
that the time was not ripe for a pact corresponding to the North 
Atlantic Treaty, owing to these conflicts. Nehru's view appears to 
be an objective appraisal of the actual, practical possibilities 
at the present time. (38)
Anglo-American discouragement induced the Australian Defence
Minister to tell the (Australian) House of Representatives that it was
impossible to get other nations on the Pacific littoral to join in a
Pacific pact. The best that could be done for the present was to integrate
Australian defence plans with those of Britain and Hew Zealand.(39) 
However, New Zealand's Prime Minister, Peter Fraser, was more persistent 
than his Australian colleague. He told Attlee on 19 May of his incr^^ing 
concern over the communist successes in creating or exploiting chaos and 
strife in the South-East Asian area. He further suggested that some form of 
Pacific pact was needed, and that Bevin might pay a visit to the Pacific to 
discuss the whole issue.(40) Bevin sympathized with Fraser's anxiety, but 
told the Foreign Office that likely American reactions made it necessary to 
proceed with caution. He particularly didn't want to complicate matters 
before the Atlantic pact had been ratified. (41) Fraser was therefore sent a 
polite refusal: Bevin was unable to leave Europe and Britain was reluctant 
to take the initiative on a Pacific Pact in view of Acheson's recent 
statement. However, Britain was anxious to press on with her defence
arrangement with Australia and New Zealand, and she was looking forward 
towards the results of the planning permission which would be going out in 
the summer.(42)
In the following months, London continued to quell speculation about 
defence cooperation in the Pacific, advising its diplomatic representatives
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abroad to discourage talk of a Pacific Pact. (43) Vhen in July a British 
military planning mission was sent to Australia and New Zealand to discuss 
common defence planning, London refused to let the delegation discuss the 
question of a Pacific pact, as had been demanded by the New Zealand Chiefs 
of Staff. (44) Britain was clearly concerned that talks about regional 
defence arrangements might put both India and the United States off her 
South-East Asian plans. A Pacific or South-East Asian pact would have to 
follow regional cooperation in the economic and political sphere.
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16. THE FINAL STAGES OF R E G I O N A L  PLAN N I N G
16,1 ECONOMIC SURVEYS
The interdepartmental meeting on 24 May 1949 gave the Foreign 
Office the green light to carry its South-East Asian plans one step 
further and prepare a regional initiative to be launched at the next 
Commonwealth conference. In July and August the department drafted two 
comprehensive papers dealing with regional cooperation and British 
policies in South-East Asia and the Far East. They were circulated as 
PUSC(32) and PUSCC53) to the recently created Permanent Under­
secretary's Committee, an interdepartmental planning committee that had 
been formed under the Foreign Office's new Permanent Under-Secretary, 
Sir William Strang, and which functioned in a manner similar to George 
Kennan's Policy Planning Committee in the United States.(1) At the end 
of November, the two papers were combined into a Cabinet paper. The PUSC 
papers marked the culmination of four years of regional planning by the 
Foreign Office. One of their main authors was Esler Dening, the same 
official who had inspired the regional debate while at SEAC in 1945, and 
who since then had been the Foreign Office's most important protagonist 
concerning regional cooperation in South-East Asia.
Prior to the PUSC papers on regional cooperation, two economic 
studies on South and South-East Asia were conducted as a basis for a 
more comprehensive study. The first one, prepared by a 'Working Party on 
Food Supplies and Communism' appointed by the Economic Policy Committee,
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concentrated on the likely effects of communism on South and South-East 
Asian rice supplies. It argued that the
extension of the control of a communist government 
throughout China will bring organised Communism to the 
northern borders of the countries of South East Asia, three of 
which, French Indo-China, Siam and Burma, constitute the major 
rice exporting region of the world.
The impact of this was expected to be serious. The rice production 
of the three countries was already much lower than before the war: 
160,000 tons in Indochina compared to a prewar production of 1,3 million 
tons. Thailand now with 800,000 tons had reached about 60 percent of its 
prewar exports; however, its Chinese-controlled trade might be affected 
should communists try to influence the country's Chinese minority. 
Burma, the paper argued, was threatened not so much by communist
domination, but by a complete breakdown of law and order leading to a
cessation of exports. If her exports were cut off 'the result would be 
extremely serious for Malaya, North Borneo, Hong-Kong, Ceylon and
India' . In Malaya, a breakdown of Thai and Burmese rice exports would
'predispose the urban populations to active participation in disorder', 
while in Ceylon and India any failure of supplies would result in 
disturbances and provide 'fruitful soil for Communist agitation'. 
Furthermore, supplies of wheat would only reluctantly be accepted as a 
substitute; they also affected the Sterling Area's dollar reserves. It 
was
'... broadly true to say that rice deficits had to be made good 
ton for ton with wheat flour. As supplies for these countries, 
very largely of sterling wheat, necessarily reduce the quantity 
that might otherwise be available to the United Kingdom, the 
total effect is a substantial drain direct and indirect on the 
dollar resources of the sterling area.'(2)
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The study seemed to confirm the Foreign Office's fear that 
communist troubles in the rice producing countries would affect the 
subcontinent and Malaya through the backdoor. In a second economic 
study, a working party of the Official Far Eastern Committee set out to 
consider means to encourage conditions which would 'prevent Communism 
from finding a fertile soil' in South, South-East and East Asia, 
particularly as the area was now the 'front line in the fight against 
Communism where fighting is actually taking place'.(3) As an early draft 
of the study explained, the area under consideration (Afghanistan, 
British North Borneo, Brunei, Burma, Ceylon, China, Hong Kong, India, 
Indo-China, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Malaya, Nepal, Pakistan, The 
Philippines, Sarawak, Thailand and Tibet), had more than half of the 
world's population, was economically behind and rice eating, while there 
was malnutrition and illiteracy. There was also a widespread lack of 
responsibility by the privileged for the underprivileged, creating 
conditions favourable for the spread of communism among the latter.
Before examining possible means of assistance, the study stressed 
the area's economic importance. Before the war, trade with the area had 
made up 9.5 % of British exports and 6.5 % of British imports. Though 
this had been reduced after the war, Britain was vitally dependent on 
Malayan dollar earnings, worth £ 60 mio in 1948. Despite this, Britain 
could not be expected to provide large-scale capital investment to 
assist the area, though considerable investment might still be made by 
sources such as the International Bank. It was, however, essential to 
offer training to the people from the countries concerned, as they might 
otherwise use similar facilities in the Soviet orbit. The single most
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significant factor was the food situation: if the control of rice 
supplies fell to the communists 'the disruptive political and economic 
consequences in Asia are likely to be serious'. The urgent short-term 
problem therefore seemed to be to assist Burma, Thailand and Indochina 
to increase their exports, and to stimulate the production of rice, 
wheat and grain in deficit areas. In the next five years, the aim should 
be to develop the economic potential of the area, recognising the need 
for improved communications and encouraging industries. Above all, the 
agricultural production had to be increased. Any Western assistance 
should be directed towards improving the production of valuable primary 
products for the West. In the long term, the problem was to raise the 
general standard of living through a greater degree of 
industrialisation.(4) The study made it clear that Britain was unable to 
provide large-scale aid to South-East Asia. The Official Far Eastern 
Committee, stressing that the Americans had given no indication that 
they were prepared to provide financial or material assistance, 
therefore agreed that the International Bank could be regarded as one of 
the main instruments of assistance.(5)
16,2 THE P.U.S.C. PAPERS ON REGIONAL COOPERATION
Whitehall's economic studies enabled the Foreign Office to draft 
two comprehensive papers on regional cooperation in South and South-East 
Asia. At the end of July, the department submitted a first paper, PUSC
(32), entitled 'The United Kingdom in South-East Asia and the Far East*. 
It argued that unless Britain used her particular position in Asia to
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bring about closer cooperation between East and Vest, there was a 'very
real danger that the whole of Asia will become the servant of the
Kremlin.' Economically, Britain depended on the area for imports of
rubber, tea and jute, while the Sterling Area's dollar pool derived
substantial earnings from Malaya. In the long run, a combination of
Western technology and Eastern manpower might be welded into a
formidable partnership. However, there were currently considerable
political difficulties in Asia, where 'Nationalism is rampant to-day
from Afghanistan to the China Sea':
'South-East Asia and the Far East are new in the sense that 
nationhood has only recently impinged upon the local 
consciousness. Ve are faced, therefore, with an intense 
nationalism which is prickly in its international 
relationships.'
It was indeed 'unfortunate that the countries of South-East Asia should 
be passing through this stage of their development at a time when the 
Soviet Union was seeking to obtain domination over the whole Eurasian 
continent'. The political immaturity of these countries and their
economic distress made them particularly susceptible to communist 
tactics; a particular problem was the presence of large Chinese 
communities in South-East Asia who were potential agents for China. 
Despite this, China was unlikely to be able to dominate the area since 
the unpopularity of the Chinese settlers might encourage resistance to 
the spread of communist doctrines propagated from China. Nor would India 
be able to dominate the area politically, as her expansionist aims were 
feared:
'It is, therefore, fair to say that from the Persian Gulf to the 
China Sea there is no single Power capable of dominating the 
region nor any combination of Powers which by its united 
strength could successfully resist Russian expansion. Nor is
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there at present any one Asiatic Power capable of bringing 
about unity and co-operation throughout the region. The dangers 
of the situation are thus manifest and manifold*.
Britain, the paper further argued, could not dominate the region either. 
However:
'We can and should use our influence to weld the area into some 
degree of regional co-operation.'
Politically, Britain's chief advantage was that it had been the most 
successful of the Western Powers in coming to terms with the new 
nationalist spirit in Asia. The Dutch and French on the other hand were 
still in conflict with the nationalist movements in Indonesia and 
Indochina. Britain also enjoyed the moral prestige of a victory in the 
Second World War, moderated, however, by the memory of earlier defeats 
at the hand of the Japanese. She also had considerable economic 
influence in the area, and the value of her trade with South-East Asia 
and the Far East was second only to that of the United States. However, 
the United States lacked Britain's prestige and historical connections, 
and was reluctant to play a leading part in South-East Asia after the 
failure of her policy in China. The paper saw great opportunities for 
Britain: Asia's nationalist governments desired to push through
programmes of economic development and industrialisation; with expanding 
production Britain would be able to assist increasingly in meeting needs 
for capital goods, particularly since most Asian countries had more 
sterling than dollars at their disposal. All this placed Britain in a 
favourable position for helping to plan and coordinate economic 
development. Despite this, the area's full development could only be
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brought about with American assistance. While Britain should give the 
lead she should also 'encourage the Americans to supplement our 
efforts'.
Militarily, British means were equally limited. Britain could not 
afford military commitments of a size enabling her to offer effective 
resistance against a full-scale attack. Her peace-time commitments 
should rather be for the purpose of maintaining internal security in 
Britain's own territories. In the long run, it would be for the 'Asian 
countries themselves to preserve their national integrity' . Summing up, 
the paper stressed that Britain's imperialist past was by no means 
forgotten, and that there was suspicion that she was seeking to re­
establish her domination by more subtle means. Despite this, there was 
no other power capable of undertaking the formidable task of trying to 
link South-East Asia with the Vest and to create some kind of regional 
association which would be capable of effective resistance against 
communism and Russian expansion. The paper therefore suggested turning 
regional cooperation into official British policy:
The aim of the United Kingdom should be to build up some sort 
of regional association in South-East Asia in partnership with 
the association of the Atlantic Powers. Not only are we in the 
best position to interest the United States in active 
participation in maintaining the stability of the area, but our 
relation with the Commonwealth provides a means of influencing 
and co-ordinating the policies not only of the Asiatic 
Dominions, but of Australia and New Zealand, whose strategic 
interest in the area is, in fact, equal to our own. The 
immediate object of a wider association of the Vest, including 
the Pacific members of the Commonwealth and the South-East 
Asian countries, would be to preserve the spread of communism 
and to resist Russian expansion: its long-term object would be 
to create a system of friendly partnership between East and 
Vest and to improve economic and social conditions in South- 
East Asia and the Far East.'(6)
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PUSC (32) thus proposed a two-pronged approach to South-East Asia. 
Britain should endeavour to create a common pro-Vestern front to contain 
the further spread of communism. This would be in line with Britain's 
long-term aim of establishing a regional system which provided for the 
area's economic development and allowed a maximum of British political 
and economic influence.
However, a host of problems still had to be overcome to achieve 
this policy. A second paper, PUSC (53) from 20 August 1949, was entitled 
'Regional Co-operation in South-East Asia and the Far East'. It examined 
the problems involved in implementing the recommendations of the first 
PUSC paper. On the whole, the paper presented a picture of disunity in 
Asia. The relationship between the Asian countries and the Vest had been 
bedevilled by the historical legacy from the struggle between emerging 
nationalism and the European colonial powers. French and Dutch policies 
in particular had created the danger of driving nationalist elements 
into the arms of the communists and of discrediting the Vest, including 
Britain, with the Asian nationalist movements. There were also
continuing inter-Asian conflicts: the Afghan-Pakistani and Kashmir
disputes, the chaotic state of Burma, Thailand's comparative 
isolationism and the disturbed state of Indonesia and Indochina were all 
factors contributing to the general lack of cooperation in the area. 
India was the only country physically capable of acting as a leader of 
South-East Asia, but the Asian countries appeared to 'fear and mistrust
domination by one of their own number as much as they disliked European
domination'. Another problem was the United States, who was holding 
aloof from South-East Asia, but without whose participation no final
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regional system of collaboration could hope to exist in the long run.
Only the success of Britain's (regional) efforts was likely to encourage
the Americans to come in at a later stage. Examining some of these
issues in detail, the paper stressed that:
India is the key to the whole problem of South-East Asian 
regional co-operation. Without India we can achieve little, but 
India is at present in no mood to co-operate in any joint move 
to establish an anti-Communist front in South-East Asia and 
the Far East'.
India and most other South-East Asian countries mistrusted the Vest,
based on the legacy of imperialism, and desired to remain clear of 
entanglements with the Great Power blocs. They also failed to realise 
that the Soviet threat was world-wide and they were disinclined to
believe that the Chinese communists were willing to follow Moscow and 
would threaten Asian national governments. India also believed in her 
destiny as the leader of the Asian peoples. To counteract this, Britain 
firstly had to strive to dissolve suspicions against her colonial 
policies, secondly convince the nations of South-East Asia that any 
position between the power blocs was illusory and that a front against 
communism was in their interest jj^ , and thirdly convince India that
'unless she is prepared to play a more positive role, there may be no 
Asia left for her to lead' . To achieve this, concrete help of a
technical, financial and economic nature would be of the greatest 
influence. There now were encouraging signs that 'Communist expansion, 
just as it served to bring about greater cohesion of the Vest, is 
bringing the leaders of the countries of Asia to a more realistic frame 
of mind with regard to regional co-operation in the face of common
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danger.' The paper further argued that the Commonwealth was a potential
binding force in South and South-East Asia:
’Having agreed that it is for Great Britain to play a major (if 
unobtrusive) part in organising South-East Asia for regional 
political, economic and military co-operation, there is much to 
be said for using a Commonwealth rather than a purely United 
Kingdom approach to achieve our aims. Hot only will India be 
less suspicious that she is being used as a pawn in a 
European-Moscow chess match, but her aspirations to be a 
leading member of the team can largely be satisified without- 
a) causing undue offence to Pakistan and Ceylon (since the 
United Kingdom, Australia and Hew Zealand will all be playing, 
too), b) Frightening other countries in the area that Asian 
regional collaboration is not another name for Greater India or 
Mahabharat.'
The suggestion to hold a Commonwealth Conference in Ceylon in 1950 
remained in abeyance. Further communist successes in China and 
increasing communist disturbances in India as well as a successful 
launching of independent regimes in Indonesia and Indochina would do 
much in the meantime to bring India to the conference table in a 
realistic frame of mind. Furthermore, Burma, where the political 
situation was 'thoroughly unstable', was a 'useful field for the 
exercise of a policy of Commonwealth co-operation, and success here 
would create an encouraging precedent for a joint approach to other 
South-East Asian problems'.
Turning towards individual countries, the paper stated that 
Thailand, unlike her neighbours, was peaceful and prosperous. However,
unless the Thais were 'satisfied that they will receive material support
they may in the end follow the line of least resistance, as they did
with Japan in 1941, and come to terms with Communist China, thus
contributing to their own downfall'. Indochina and Indonesia were
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equally problematic. Though important food sources to the whole of 
South-East Asia, the unsettled conditions brought about by the struggle 
between the nationalists and the French and Dutch had prevented the two 
territories from providing appreciable amounts to deficit areas. It was 
'unfortunate' that Indochina, where the French said another nine months 
were needed to set the country on its feet again, would be more directly 
threatened than any other South-East Asian territory should China fall 
under communist control. For the time being, the presence of French 
troops and the retention of French bases, 'should act as a reasonably 
effective counter to infiltration or direct aggression from China, 
although here, again, charges of imperialism may be the price to be paid 
for greater security'.
The paper then turned to Malaya which was of 'utmost importance 
strategically and economically to the United Kingdom and is the major 
dollar earner of the sterling area'. An assurance that Britain was not 
prepared to abandon the area and was taking active steps to safeguard it 
from external aggression might do much to encourage the local Chinese to 
believe that reinsurance with a Communist China was not an absolute 
necessity. So far as the Philippines were concerned, the paper doubted 
whether the country could bring 'positive strength' to any Asian union. 
However, she could 'nevertheless serve as a link in a system embracing 
South-East Asia and the Far East and Pacific areas.' Finally, the paper 
stated that 'any indication that we were prepared even to comtemplate 
withdrawal from Hong Kong in the face of Chinese Communist pressure 
would have far-reaching effects on the general position in Asia', as 
Asian peoples would interpret any British weakening as the beginning of
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a general retreat. 'From an economic point of view such a development 
would be a disaster for us, while politically and militarily the 
consequences would be equally grave.1
Summing up the situation, the paper stressed that South-East Asia 
would not allow the same degree of political cooperation as in Europe. 
Kor was the United States prepared to play the same part or produce the 
same material incentives to greater unity. For the time being, the 
colonial powers remained suspect and there were many local jealousies 
and rivalries: any thought of a South-East Asian Pact could therefore be 
ruled out for the time being. However, Britain could try to prepare the 
ground for greater regional political cooperation in the future. She had 
to aim to prove that imperialism and racial superiority were dead; use 
her influence to bring about the settlement of national rivalries in the 
area; discreetly promote greater Commonwealth solidarity in the area; 
keep the United States informed and try to get her assistance; and 
emphasize in her propaganda the menace that Soviet communism presented 
to nationalism. The difficulty remained, however, that Britain would be 
unable to satisfy Asian demands for large amounts of material 
assistance.
The paper subsequently turned to China, where the communists were 
likely to assume complete power. The strongly pro-Soviet policy of the 
Chinese Communist Party constituted a serious threat to Western 
interests inside the country, as well as to South-East Asia. Though 
keeping a (commercial) 'foot in the door' in the country, the paper 
argued that it was of cardinal importance for Britain to encourage an
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'effective anti-Communist front' in South-East Asia. While China was 
unlikely to embark on any adventures against her neighbours for quite 
some time, there was the obvious danger that she would give active 
support to the communists in Burma, Indochina and to the 'Freedom 
Movement' in Thailand, and that local Chinese communities in South-East 
Asia would be used as powerful communist fifth columns, 'corroding from 
within and ultimately, if circumstances are favourable, seizing power'. 
Burma, Thailand and Indochina were most open to direct aggression by the 
Chinese communists, while all other countries in South-East Asia were 
extremely vulnerable to communist disruption and subversion from within. 
As Britain could not provide appreciable military support in the event 
of wide-spread communist guerilla activities or in case of a world war, 
she would have to persuade the South-East Asian countries that their 
ultimate military salvation lay in their own hands. She would also have 
to be ready to provide technical advice, military missions if welcome 
and arms to the greatest extent possible. It might also be necessary to 
try and convince the Americans of the need for arms now, if the 
programme in the economic and political fields was to have any chance of 
success. Finally, Britain would have to attempt to obtain a nucleus of 
strategic cooperation with the Asian Commonwealth countries, Australia 
and New Zealand before any wider regional defence system itself was 
practicable. This cooperation would have to be entirely in the field of 
planning and exchange of views, since Britain was unable to increase the 
present flow of arms.
Having ruled out defence cooperation for the time being, the paper
£
proposed starting regional cooperation in the.conomic sector:
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'Political differences between the countries of South-East Asia 
and the Far East and their unwillingness and inability to 
collaborate military, leave economic collaboration as the only 
form of greater unity which the countries of the area are 
likely to accept at present. But the habit of collaboration is 
a catching one and the settlement of economic difficulties, of 
common consultation and effort, may well lead to greater 
political and military cohesion. In promoting greater economic 
collaboration, the Vest does not labour under the same handicap 
of suspicion of imperialism or selfish exploitation as it would 
were it to try to promote political or military unity. Regional 
collaboration in the economic field, if achieved, may well lead 
not only to a better understanding between the countries of 
Asia themselves, but also between East and Vest, It is 
therefore at present the only possible line to pursue in the 
direction of our long-term objective of political and military, 
as well as economic, co-operation throughout the region in 
partnership with the Vest.' (7)
The two PUSC papers offered the most detailed and precise 
definition of British regional plans in South-East Asia since the 
Colonial Office's paper on 'International Aspects of Colonial Policy' in
1944. The papers' authors suggested establishing, under British 
leadership, a regional organisation which provided for cooperation 
primarily in the economic field, and which would help develop the South 
and South-East Asian economies. The Commonwealth would provide the 
initial platform from which a regional initiative would be launched. The 
underlying aim of regional cooperation was the containment of communism 
in Asia: economic cooperation, together with Vestern aid, would help
stabilize the countries most threatened by the communist successes in 
China, namely Burma and Thailand. Sooner or later, Indochina as well 
might be included, though it was not clear whether this would be under 
French or nationalist rule. The countries on the subcontinent too would 
benefit. Apart from safeguarding their food supplies from the rice 
producing countries in the north of South-East Asia, Britain's regional
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plan would prevent the growth of communism by slowly raising their 
populations' standards of living. Aid and economic cooperation would 
also place them firmly in the Vestern camp and prevent them from siding 
with the Soviet Union or communist China. In the long run, once economic 
cooperation had been established, collaboration could be extended to the 
political and military spheres.
If the proposed regional scheme was successful, Britain would
greatly benefit. Though she could not hope to dominate the region,
regional cooperation would nevertheless provide her with a maximum
degree of political influence in the area. It would also help to
safeguard the position of the dollar-earning colony of Malaya, and might
one day provide for a regional defence system to protect the colony
against a potential attack from the outside. At the same time, regional
cooperation would help to develop the region's economies in concert with
the Vest, providing Britain with new markets and securing the flow of
raw materials to Europe. Last but not least, a regional system would
guarantee Britain's long-term survival as a Far Eastern power. Though
Si
never directly expressed, the papers' authors seemd to be thinking ahead
A
to the time after Malaya's eventual independence.
However, the difficulties that had to be overcome in organising 
regional cooperation were manyfold. There was the problem of associating 
India with London's plans, and of convincing her that she would not be 
entering into an anti-communist bloc in Asia. A further problem was that 
the whole area was dominated by national rivalries. The Commonwealth 
approach to regional cooperation undoubtedly promised to be the best way
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to overcome these difficulties. However, the papers failed to provide a 
satisfactory solution to the recurring problem of aligning France and 
Indochina with the new Asian states. A more immediate problem was 
Britain's lack of financial resources. Only the United States could 
finance a regional economic development scheme in South-East Asia. Yet 
the Americans had not given any signs that they were contemplating a 
more active involvement in the region. Thus, for regional cooperation to 
succeed, British diplomats would have to step up efforts to involve 
Washington in their South-East Asian plans.
16.3 ANGLO-AMERICAN NEGOTIATIONS, JULY-NOVEMBER 
1 949
The PUSC papers left the Foreign Office with the major problem of
trying to secure American financial support for their South-East Asian
scheme. In July, (^^ge F.Kennan, head of Washington's Policy Planning
Staff, visited London. Though assuring the British that a full survey of
the situation in the Far East was forthcoming, Kennan emphasized
Washington's refusal to join any pact like the North Atlantic Pact with
South East Asia. He also made it clear that the main task of resisting
communism in South-East Asia had to fall to the Commonwealth. Kennan's
visit offered London little hope that American attitudes towards South-
East Asia were changing, and a Foreign Office memorandum lamented:
'The general impression left by Mr .Kennan's comments on South 
East Asia was that the Americans expected the United Kingdom 
to take the lead in this region. They will welcome frank 
discussions with us, but will not readily be persuaded to enter 
into any commitments. They will certainly not enter into 
military commitments, and we shall probably have difficulty in
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persuading them to give economic help. Mr .Kennan said the 
military threat to South East Asia from Russia was negligible, 
and South East Asia countries must learn in the event of war 
they must be capable of defending themselves.'(8)
However, British officials' hopes were raised again in August, 
after Washington's publication of a White Paper on China which aimed to 
explain the failure of American postwar policies in China. MacDonald was 
encouraged by Acheson's covering note to President Truman which
'contains a statement of policy about South East Asia which seems to 
mark, or at least to foreshadow a considerable change in the American 
attitude to this part of the world'.(9) Dening doubted whether there had 
been a change of attitude. However, he and Bevin would discuss South- 
East Asia and the Far East during forthcoming talks in Washington.(10)
In September, talks were held in Washington beween Bevin and
u
Acheson, and between Dening and members of the State Department dealing
with a range of East and South-East Asian topics. Dening's aim prior to
the talks was to sell the idea of an economic approach to South-East
Asia, based on the two PUSC papers. (11) On 12 September Dening told the
Americans that the British wanted to discuss ways and means of defending
South-East Asia, i.e. the area stretching from Afghanistan to Indochina
and including the Philippines, against communism. In his opinion, the
first step needed to meet the communist threat was
'... to develop the economies of the countries of the area to a 
degree of strength equal if not superior to Communist pressure.
Mr .Dening said that his Government believed if such a program 
was successful even in preserving the present standard of
living in Southeast Asia that area could be successfully
orientated toward the West.'
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Dening added that the cost could not be met completely from local
resources, but that Vestern economic aid would hopefully build up the
habit of cooperation with the Vest. Butterworth from the State
Department generally agreed that there should be greater political and
economic cooperation; however, he also stressed that it would be
difficult to extend financial and economic assistance until the area's
political difficulties were approaching a solution. Vhen the discussion
turned to ECAFE, Butterworth stressed the United States had been
'... obliged to discourage the members of ECAFE in their efforts 
to lay the foundations of the Marshall Plan for Asia, not only 
because a Marshall Plan for Asia was in itself impractical but 
because we felt that the Asiatics should make increased efforts 
to solve their own economic problems ... public financing of 
practical projects should be done through the Export-Import 
Bank and the Vorld Bank.'(12)
Dening subsequently informed Bevin that the Americans were unduly 
cautious about an economic approach to a regional understanding, and 
that Butterworth^seemed to put too much faith in the ability of India
and the Philippines to bring about regional cooperation. Bevin should
therefore repeat in his talks with Acheson that an economic approach was 
the best means of bringing about political cohesion. If the Asian 
countries developed the habit of cooperating with each other and with 
the Vest in the economic field it would be easier to also secure their 
political and strategic cooperation, something both Britain and the 
United States wanted. (13) On the following day, Acheson stressed that it 
would be important to encourage the Asian countries to take the lead in 
the area and that it would be helpful if the Philippines and India could 
get together. Bevin, however, urged caution in encouraging India to take 
a lead, since the smaller countries feared Indian domination.(14)
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In a first assessment of the Anglo-American consultations, Dening
felt that talks had gone much better than expected, particularly on
China and Japan. However, he did not get far with the State Department
on the question of the economic approach to South-East Asia. The State
Department felt that Congress had just reached the limits in voting
fresh funds for aid anywhere, and it therefore did not want to encourage
British hopes that dollars might be forthcoming to South-East Asia other
than through banks or private investment:
'Politically, the Americans seem to think that the Asiatics
should get together on their own initiative. I tried to point 
out that if they are left to their own devices little cohesion 
is likely to result in view of existing disputes and
suspicions. If we did not make much progress on the regional 
approach, we at any rate discovered a community of thought on 
the individual problems such as Indonesia, Indo-China, Kashmir 
etc. I am afraid I detected a distinct, tendency to use the 
Philippines as a stalking horse in South East Asia, while
choosing to ignore the fact that this horse is not only weak-
kneed but internally unsound.'(15)
However, during subsequent Anglo-American talks with the French 
Foreign Secretary, Robert Schuman, Acheson gave a first hint that aid 
might be forthcoming to a South-East Asian country. Both Bevin and 
Acheson urged the French to ratify the Bao Dai agreement, and Acheson 
hinted that it would be easier for the American administration to give 
assistance to local nationalist governments than to the British or the 
French. If the nationalists agreed to arrangements for guaranteeing 
private investment overseas and for the provision of American 
technicliians, it would make it easier for Washington to take a more 
positive line.(16)
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Acheson's remarks raised the Foreign Office's spirits. In his final 
evaluation of the Washington talks, Dening told MacDonald that the 
Americans were now showing a much keener interest in South-East Asia 
than during Bevin's last visit in March, and that they greatly desired 
to see the economic surveys now being prepared by Britain. They seemed 
to realise that South-East Asia could not be left to its own devices and 
that US aid was necessary. However, the State Department did not believe 
it possible to persuade Congress to vote further sums for South-East 
Asia at a time when Washington had difficulties in pushing through 
Marshall as well as military aid for Europe. Any financial aid for 
South-East Asia would have to be found from sources already available to 
the Administration. 75 million dollars originally intended for 
nationalist China should now be placed at Truman's disposal for use 
anywhere in the Far East. Further aid would have to be found either by 
the International Bank or the Import and Export Bank, which only 
financed commercial propositions. On the whole, the Washington talks had 
gone some way in convincing the Administration of the need for aid, and 
time was required for the administration to convince Congress of the 
necessity of further appropriations. (17)
18.4 THE P.U.S.C. PAPERS GO TO THE CABINET
The Washington talks in September encouraged the Foreign Office to 
submit the two PUSC papers to the Cabinet. On 27 October, a member of 
the Cabinet pointed out that 'it should not be impracticable to maintain 
the political influence of the United Kingdom in South-East Asia while
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arranging for the United States to provide much of the capital 
investment that was required' . The Americans' unfortunate experience in 
China had made them more receptive to suggestions for collaboration with 
Britain on Asian affairs, 'on the basis that the United Kingdom provided 
experience and the United^ States provided finance'. The Cabinet 
approved the combined paper.(18)
British officials in South-East Asia welcomed the decision. Dening 
was sent to Singapore to explain London's policy to a conference of 
British officials that was meeting in Bukit Serene under the guise of 
MacDonald. The conference agreed that Britain should encourage the 
ultimate creation of a regional pact or association for economic, 
political and if necessary military cooperation, in order to prevent the 
spread of communism in South and South-East Asia. It also agreed that 
the present situation would not permit such an association, and that the 
initial approach should be to encourage economic cooperation. The 
conference also welcomed London's plan to hold a Commonwealth conference 
in Ceylon which would discuss South-East Asia. In addition, however, 
immediate anti-communist action was required in Burma, Indochina and 
Thailand, for example by giving the latter sufficient material support 
and encouragement.(19)
A few weeks later, first concrete evidence of a change in American 
policy was forthcoming: in return for letting the Americans see the
second of the PUSC papers on South-East Asia, the British were handed a 
copy of FSC 51. The paper had first been circulated in Washington as PPS 
51 eight months before, and it suggested both multilateral cooperation
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and American aid to South-East Asia. As R. F. Hoyer-Millar from the 
British embassy in Washington told the Foreign Office, PPS 51 had now 
been initialled by the President, thus becoming official policy. He 
added that both papers underlined the necessity for the United States 
and Britain jointly to encourage the South-East Asian countries to 
reduce the effects of communism in the region. He consequently saw 
grounds for optimism, though he disliked the American paper's reference 
to South-East Asia as a market and supplier of raw materials for Japan; 
Britain would have to be 'vigilant over the extent to which the 
Americans seek to expose South-East Asia to Japanese penetration'.(20) 
However, the Foreign Office was on the whole satisfied with PPS 51. 
Though the Americans tended to use the Philippines as a 'stalking-horse' 
in South-East Asia(21), the main point was that 'American thinking, by 
and large, is on the same lines as our own'.(22)
Indeed, in the following months Washington was to move even closer 
to a commitment to South-East Asia, in the wake of Mao Tse-tung's 
proclamation of the People's Republic of China on 1 October, and the 
Kuomintang government's move to Taiwan on 9 December. On 30 December, 
Truman endorsed a final Policy Planning Staff paper, BSC 48/2, which 
recommended that Washington should be prepared to provide political, 
economic and military assistance to supplement the efforts of other 
governments in resisting communism in Asia. As a matter of urgency, 75 
million dollars were programmed for the area.(23)
The United States' growing commitment to South-East Asia was due to 
a number of factors. The American historian A.J.Rotter has recently
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attributed it to Washington's growing concern about South-East Asia as a 
market for European and Japanese manufactured goods, as well as a source 
of raw materials whose export into dollar areas allowed Britain to 
finance her trade with the United States and would thus enable the
British economy to serve as a motor for Western Europe's economic 
recovery.(24) While this thesis does not attempt to examine the motives 
behind American policies in South-East Asia in greater detail, one 
observation should nevertheless be added. American ideas embodied for 
example in PPS 51 were largely influenced by British plans for anti­
communist regional cooperation, first laid out in the Cabinet paper on
China in December 1948 and repeated throughout the following year. 
Undoubtedly, the growing American concern and subsequent commitment to 
South-East Asia was to a large degree the result of the intensive 
lobbying by British diplomats throughout 1949, who were trying to
involve Washington in their regional strategies.
In return, Washington's growing interest in South-East Asia at the 
end of 1949 induced London to try and implement its regional plans. In 
January 1950, Bevin personally attended the Commonwealth Meeting on 
Foreign Affairs in Colombo, despite his failing health. During the 
conference, the British encouraged Australia and Ceylon to take the lead 
in promoting regional cooperation. The result was the establishment of a 
consultative committee in order to examine methods of coordinating 
development activities in South and South-East Asia. This was later on 
followed by the Colombo Plan, an 'aggregate of bilateral arrangements 
involving foreign aid for the development of South and South-East 
Asia'.(25) The Colombo Plan eventually included 23 Asian and Western
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countries from both inside and outside the Commonwealth, facilitating 
economic assistance to the non-communist countries of South and South- 
East Asia.
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CONCLUSION
The Cabinet's endorsement of regional cooperation as official 
British policy was a clear indication of the region's growing importance 
to Britain since the time of the Japanese surrender. Strategically, the 
war had demonstrated South-East Asia's significance for the defence of 
Australia and India against an invasion from the north. Economically, 
the region had become increasingly valuable. Apart from producing 
foodstuffs and raw materials for Western Europe, South-East Asia was the 
rice bowl of Asia and thus vital for the economic and political 
stability of the subcontinent. In addition, Malayan rubber and tin were 
Britain's single most important dollar earners, essential for the 
financing of her trade deficit with the United States. Politically too, 
the region had altogether taken on a new significance. Since the 
transfer of power in India, the centre of British influence in the 
eastern part of Asia had shifted from Delhi to Singapore and Malaya, and 
Britain's foothold there ensured her survival as a major Far Eastern 
power. The Malayan emergency, together with the troubles in Burma and 
the attempted communist revolt in Indonesia, had further increased 
South-East Asia's importance. London was convinced that the Soviet Union 
was behind the regional insurrections, and it saw the communist 
uprisings as part of a global conflict between the Vest and an 
international communist movement^. After the communist victories in 
China, South-East Asia was believed to be in the front line of the Cold 
War; it was an area where vital Western interests were at stake and 
which had to be defended. The Cabinet therefore agreed on a course
-  404 -
similar to the one previously pursued in Europe, namely that of anti­
communist cooperation through economic and later on defence
collaboration.
The Cabinet's decision also meant that after years of 
interdepartmental debate the Foreign Office had finally overcome the 
Colonial Office's opposition and had turned its long-prepared plans for 
regional cooperation into official British policy. This confirmed the 
Foreign Office's growing influence on British decision-making in the 
region. Whereas the last Cabinet paper dealing with regional cooperation 
in South-East Asia had in 1944 been drafted by the Colonial Office, it 
was now the Foreign Office that was calling the shots on international 
issues affecting the region.
The Cold War had provided the Foreign Office with an ideal 
opportunity for submitting its regional policies to the Cabinet. The 
prospects had never been better. In 1945, British efforts to create a 
regional commission on the basis of SEAC would probably have failed as 
too obvious an attempt to establish Britain as the dominant power in the 
region. Two years later, the idea of establishing a Singapore-based 
regional system including India and Burma was equally doomed by the new 
Asian states' suspicion of British imperialist ambitions. However, the 
communist threat allowed the Foreign Office to revive regional 
cooperation as a means of involving the United States in South-East 
Asia, and of rallying the Asian countries against communism. While the 
new Asian states could not be bullied into a regional alignment, London 
was confident of their participation in a regional scheme in return for
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the promise of economic gains and protection against communist 
subversion.
Many parallels existed between the regional plans from 1945 and
1949. Most importantly, the Foreign Office's long-term aim had remained 
the creation of a regional system in South-East Asia providing for the 
maximum of British influence. Similarities also existed between the 
planned roles of economic cooperation at both times. In 1946, the rice 
crisis had provided an opportunity for Lord Killearn to organise regular 
regional meetings. It was hoped that technical and economic cooperation 
would be the basis for political and defence collaboration. The logic 
behind the 1949 plans was basically the same as that behind earlier 
policies: economic cooperation, though on a much larger scale and
coupled with Western aid, would be the prelude to the formation of a 
pro-Western bloc in South and South-East Asia.
However, in most other ways the 1949 strategy differed from that of
1945. First and foremost, the short-term aim of the new regional policy 
was to contain communism. In the immediate postwar period, in contrast, 
the most pressing issues were the threat of famine and the task of 
reconstruction. Secondly, the concepts underlying the Foreign Office's 
new policy were different to those of 1945 and 1946. The postwar plans 
had been based on the principle of cooperation through an international 
colonial commission which would also allow interested outside powers a 
limited say in South-East Asia. By 1949, London's political priorities 
in South and South-East Asia had completely changed. It hoped to 
organise cooperation between Britain and the independent Asian states,
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providing the basis for future understanding between Asia and the Vest. 
At the same time, French and Dutch participation was now virtually ruled 
out: Britain's sister colonial powers in Asia had become a political
liability because of their hardline colonial policies. For over two 
years, the new Asian states had been voicing their opposition to Dutch 
and French colonialism, and it was unlikely that Sehru would be inclined 
to cooperate with Paris and The Hague in a joint regional scheme.
The imminent Dutch exit by the end of 1949 made the eventual 
inclusion of an independent Indonesia in South-East Asian regionalism 
much more likely. Indochina, on the other hand, continued to be a 
problem, as there were few prospects for a satisfactory settlement 
between the French and moderate Vietnamese nationalists. Yet the country 
was also the one most threatened by a communist take-over because of her 
proximity to China and the Viet Minh's communist allegiance. London 
dropped some of its recent reluctance on cooperation with Paris by 
recognising France's puppet state, the State of Vietnam, in February
1950. However, it also realised that there was little hope of including 
Indochina in its planned regional scheme. Britain could only hope that 
London's (and Washington's) increasing efforts to bolster the French 
position in Indochina would not interfere with the Colombo conference's 
future initiative.
A third difference lay in the enlarged geographical scope of the 
regional scheme envisaged in 1949. It was no longer confined to Malaya, 
Thailand, Indochina, Indonesia and perhaps Burma, but included also 
Afghanistan, the whole of the subcontinent and the Philippines. This
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enlargement was due to two factors. The Foreign Office wanted to include 
all the countries east of Iran and south of Japan potentially 
threatened, internally or externally, by communist aggression. This had 
the advantage that it included the whole of the Asian Commonwealth, 
which would function as the motor for further developments towards 
regional cooperation. It also included the Philippines, which (despite 
her distracting proposals for a Pacific pact) would help to involve the 
United States. The new plans also acknowledged India's appearance as an 
independent player on the world stage. During the Asian Relations 
Conference in 1947 and the Delhi Conference two years later on India had 
displayed the ambition of becoming a major political power in Asia and 
of assuming the moral and political leadership of the combined South and 
South-East Asian region. London had come to terms with Indian 
aspirations, and had concluded that no regional plan would be successful 
unless Delhi could be involved. The British also hoped to use South-East 
Asian regionalism in order to exert a maximum of influence on India.
Fourthly, the role of the United States in the 1949 plans was 
contrary to that envisaged four years before. In 1945, the Colonial 
Office's fears that a regional commission would allow the United States 
to interfere in the affairs of the European colonies was one of the main 
points against regional cooperation. By 1949, however, Washington's 
involvement in South-East Asia was believed to be vital for the success 
of Britain's regional plans. Only the United States had the financial 
resources to stabilize the regional economies, and only she could 
provide the material incentives for the countries of the region to put 
aside their differences and join in a regional plan or organisation.
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Just as Britain and the United States were cooperating against the 
spread of communism in Europe, they would have to organise joint action 
in South-East Asia.
Finally, the Foreign Office's new regional policy took into account 
the relative decline of British power in South-East Asia since 1945. 
Immediately after the war, Britain was still ruling over the whole of 
the subcontinent. For a brief period, SEAC was also controlling most 
foreign territories in South-East Asia; despite the many problems of 
postwar administration, Britain had temporarily maintained de facto 
hegemony in the region. By 1949, in contrast, Britain had lost her
Indian empire, and she had considerably reduced her military presence in 
the region. She no longer had the manpower of the Indian Army as a
reserve, and she was pinned down by the guerilla war in Malaya. In the
event of a new world war, Britain would have been unable to spare
considerable numbers of troops for South-East Asia, London also realised 
that its weak financial position prevented it from providing large-scale 
military aid to anti-communist countries in peace-time. In the long 
term, the security of South-East Asia would therefore have to depend on 
the countries of the region themselves.
The PUSC papers stated clearly that Britain had to rule out any 
hope of dominating the region. Mot least, it was realised that Asian 
suspicions of British imperialist designs were far too great to have 
allowed this. However, at the same time the paper's Foreign Office 
authors believed they had spotted an opportunity to maintain and extend 
Britain's indirect influence in the region. Britain's prestige stood
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high because of her recent policies in India, and she maintained good 
relations with virtually all the countries of the region, including the 
colonial powers, the Commonwealth (where she was still the dominant 
force) and the other independent countries in the region. She was also 
the United States' principal ally in the world. In addition, Britain had 
through Lord Killearn's Special Commission gained first-hand experience 
of South-East Asia's economic problems. She was also fully aware of the 
political differences within South and South-East Asia. London therefore 
concluded that Britain, more than any other country, was in a good 
position to organise regional cooperation. British diplomacy, rather 
than military or economic power, would be the main tool in achieving 
South-East Asian cooperation. Britain would use American dollars as the 
incentive for regional unity. At the same time, she would discreetly 
guide the development of the whole region along pro-British lines.
The Foreign^ Office's regional plans aimed at halting Britain's 
decline as a Far Eastern power following the withdrawal from India. They 
were an inspired attempt to maintain a maximum degree of British 
influence in South and South-East Asia with a minimum degree of 
expenditure or military commitments. In the short term, British 
diplomacy would help unite the South and South-East Asian countries 
against communism. In the long run, the Foreign Office aimed at 
establishing an international organisation in South and South-East Asia 
which would provide the framework for a lasting British involvement in 
the area. It must be suspected that the Foreign Office was thinking 
ahead to the period after the completion of decolonisation, and that it
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was trying to lay the foundations for a strong British role in post­
colonial Asia.
Inspired it may have been, yet its success was only partial. The 
result of British diplomatic efforts, the Colombo Plan, though anti­
communist in its outlook, failed to provide the basis for a regional 
defence organisation. Its impact on Asian economic developments was 
equally moderate. At the same time, Britain would find out the hard way 
that it was far more difficult to guide United States' policies along 
pro-British lines than originally imagined. The creation of the A5ZUS 
pact in 1951, which excluded Britain, and the crisis over Indochina in 
.1954 were proof of this. Britain also failed to gain the degree of 
influence on Indian foreign policy that she had been hoping for. 
However, given the previous failure to convert the Special Commission 
into a regional commission and given the numerous conflicts that 
dominated South and South-East Asia, the creation of the Colombo Plan in 
1950 was a major achievement attributable largely to British diplomacy 
in the two previous years.
-  411 -
B I B L I O G R A P H Y  
I , PRIMARY MATERIAL
A, UNPUBLISHED
(i) Official Documents
(a) Documents held at the Public Record Office, Kew, London:
FO 371, 800: Foreign Office Documents
CO 273, 537, 968: Colonial Office Documents
CAB 21, 65, 66, 79, 81, 87, 128, 129, 133, 134: Cabinet meetings,
memoranda, committees and miscellaneous papers
DO 35: Dominions Office Documents
DEFE 4, 5: Chiefs of Staff Documents
VO 203: War Office Documents
PREM 8: Prime Minister's Documents
(b) Documents held at the India Office Library and Records, London:
10 142: India Office Papers
L/P+S/12: India Office Papers
(c) Documents held at the Rational Archives, Washington:
Selected State Department Papers
(d) Documents held at the British Library of Political and Economic 
Science, Depository, Egham:
Selected United Rations Documents
(ii) Private Papers
<7\
(a) Killearn Diaries, St.Anthony's College, Oxford
(b) Malcolm MacDonald Papers, Durham University
(c) Mountbatten Papers, Southampton University
-  412 -
B. PUBLISHED
(i) Official Documents:
APPADORAI, A., ed. Select Documents on India1s Foreign Policy and 
Delations, 1947-1972, Volume I, Delhi 1982
BUTLER, ROHAN, AITD PELLY, M. E. eds., Documents on British Policy 
Overseas, Series I, Vol.I, 1945, The Conference at Potsdam July - August
1945,
FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, U.S. State Department,
Washington D.C.
HANSARD, Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, London HMSO 1943-49
MANSERGH, NICHOLAS, ed. , Documents and Speeches on British Commonwealth
Affairs, 1931-1952, Vol.2, London 1953
MANSERGH, NICHOLAS, INDIA - The Transfer of Power, 1942-47,
London HMSO 1970-83
PORTER, A.N. and STOCKVELL, A.J. eds., British Imperial Policy and 
Decolonization, 1938-64, Vols.l and 2, London 1987 and 1989
TINKER, HUGH, BURMA - The Struggle for Independence 
London HMSO 1983-84
(ii) Diaries, Memoirs:
ZIEGLER, PHILIP, ed. , Personal Diary of Admiral the Lord Louis 
Mountbatten, 1943-1946, London 1988
COOPER, DUFF, Old Men Forget, London 1954
11 . LATER WORKS
A, ARTICLES
ALDRICH, RICHARD, 'Imperial Rivalry: British and American Intelligence 
in Asia, 1942-46', in Intelligence and National Security, Vol.3, No.l, 
January 1988
BRANDS, H.V., 'India and Pakistan in American Strategic Planning, 
1947-54: The Commonwealth as Collaborator', in Journal of Imperial and 
Commonwealth History, Vol.15, No.l, October 1986
-  413 -
DARVIN, JOHN, 'British Decolonisation since 1945: A Pattern or a 
Puzzle?, in Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Vol.12, No.2, 
January 1984
DOBBS, CHARLES M. , 'The Pact that never was: The Pacific Pact of 1949', 
in Journal of Northeast Asian Studies, Vol.3, Ho.4, Vinter 1984
EDVARDS, P.G., 'On Assessing H.V.Evatt', in Historical Studies 
(Australia), Vol.21, Ho.83, October 1981
FIELDHOUSE, D.K., 'The Labour Governments and the Empire-Commonwealth,
1945-51', in Ritchie Ovendale, The Foreign Policy of the British Labour 
Governments, 1945-1951, Leicester 1984
GUPTA, P.S., 'Imperialism and the Labour government', in Jay Vinter, 
ed. , The Working Class in Modern British History, Cambridge 1983
GRIFFITHS, A.D., Britain, the United States and French Indochina
1946-1954, unpublished University of Manchester thesis, March 1984
HINDS, ALLISTER E., 'Sterling and Imperial Policy, 1945-1951', in 
Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Vol.15, No.2, January 1987
HOLLAND, R.F., 'The Imperial Factor in British Strategies from Attlee to 
Macmillan', in Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Vol.12,
No.2, January 1984
JEFFREY, ROBIN, 'INDIA: Independence and the rich peasant', in Robin 
Jeffrey ed., Asia - the Winning of Indepence, London 1987 (paperback)
KENT, JOHN, 'Anglo-French Colonial Co-operation, 1939-49', in Journal of 
Imperial and Commonwealth History, Vol. 17, No.l, October 1988
KENT, JOHN, 'Bevin's Imperialism and the Idea of Euro-Africa,1945-49', 
in M.Dockrill and John V. Young, British Foreign Policy, 1945-56, London 
1989
LAFEBER VALTER, 'Roosevelt, Churchill, and Indochina: 1942-45', in The 
American Historical Review, Vol. 80, No. 5, December 1975
MARR, DAVID, 'VIETNAM: Harnessing the whirlwind', in Robin Jeffrey,
Asia - The Winning of Independence, London 1987 (paperback)
MARSOT, ALAIN-GARARD, 'The Crucial Year: Indochina 1946', in Journal of 
Contemporary History, Vol.19, No.2, 1984
McVEY, RUTH T., 'The Calcutta Conference and the Southeast Asian 
Uprisings', Cornell University paper, Ithaca 1958
NISH, Ian, ed., 'The East Asian Crisis, 1945-1951, the Problem of China, 
Korea and Japan', papers by Roger Dingman, Chihiro Hosoya and Ian Nish, 
London School of Economics 1982
-  414 -
NISH, IAN ed., '1945 in South-East Asia’, Parts 1 and 2, papers by Louis 
Allen, Judith A. Stowe, Thanatphong Smitabhindu, Masaya Shiraishi and 
Ian Nish, London School of Economics 1985
MOORE, R.J., 'Mountbatten, India and the Commonwealth', Journal of 
Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, Vol.14, No.l, March 1981
OLVER, A.S.B., 'The Special Commission in South-East Asia', in Pacific 
Affairs, Vol.21, No.3, September 1948
REMME, TILMAN, 'Britain, the 1947 Asian Relations Conference, and 
regional co-operation in South-East Asia', in T.Gorst, L.Johnman &
V.S.Lucas, Postwar Britain, 1945-64, Themes and Perspectives, London 
1989
ROBERTS, FRANK K., 'Ernest Bevin as Foreign Secretary', in Ritchie 
Ovendale, The Foreign Policy of British Labour Governments, 1945-51, 
Leicester 1984
ROTTER, ANDREW J. , 'The Triangular Route to Vietnam: The United States, 
Great Britain, and Southeast Asia, 1945-1950', in International History 
Review, Vol. 6, No. 3, August 1984
SARDESAI, D.R., 'Indian and Southeast Asia', in B.R.Nanda ed., Indian 
Foreign Policy - The Nehru Years, Delhi 1976
SBREGA, JOHN S. '"First catch your hare": Anglo-American Perspectives on 
Indochina during the Second World War', in Journal of Southeast Asian
Studies, Vol.14, No.l, March 1983
SCHAAF, C.HART, 'The United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the 
Far East', in International Organisation, Vol.7, No.4, November 1953
SINGH, ANITA INDER, 'Keeping India in the Commonwealth, British 
Political and Military Aims, 1947-49', in Journal of Contemporary 
History, Vol.20, No.3, July 1985
SINGH, ANITA INDER, 'Post-Imperial British Attitudes to India - The 
Military aspect, 1947-51', in Round Table, No.296, October 1985
STOCKWELL, A.J., 'Colonial Planning during World War II: The Case of
Malaya', Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Vol.2, No.3, May 
1974
STOCKWELL, A.J., 'Insurgency and Decolonisation during the Malayan 
Emergency', in Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, Vol.25, 
No.l, March 1987
STOCKWELL, A.J., 'Counterinsurgency and colonial defence', in T.Gorst, 
L.Johnman & W.S.Lucas, Postwar Britain, 1945-64, Themes and Perspectives 
London 1989
-  415 -
TARLIHG, NICHOLAS, ’Lord Mountbatten and the Return of Civil Government 
to Burma'# in Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth Studies, Vol.11,
Ho.2, January 1983
TARLIHG, HICHOLAS, 'The United Kingdom and the Origins of the Colombo 
Plan', in Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, Vol.24,
Ho.l, March 1986
TARLIHG, HICHOLAS, "'Some Rather Hebulous Capacity": Lord Killearn's 
Appointment in Southeast Asia', in Modern Asian Studies, Vol.20, Part 3, 
July 1986
THOMPSOH, VIRGIHIA, 'Regional Unity in Southern Asia', in Pacific 
Affairs, Vol.21, Ho.2, June 1948
THORHE, CHRISTOPHER, 'Indochina and Anglo-American Relations,
1942-1945', in Pacific Historical Review, Ho. 45, 1976
TOMLIHSOH, B.R., 'Indo-British Relations in the Post-Colonial Era: The 
Sterling Balances negotiations, 1947-49', in Journal of Imperial and 
Commonwealth History, Vol.13, Ho.3, May 1985
T0HHESSOH, STEIH, 'The Longest Wars: Indochina 1945-75', in Journal of 
Peace Research, Vol.22, Ho.l, 1985
TORU, YAHO, 'Who Set the Stage for the Cold War in Southeast Asia?', in
Y. Hagai and A. Iriye, The Origins of the Cold War in Asia, Hew York 1977,
TURHBULL, C. MARY, 'Britain and Vietnam, 1948-1955', in War & Society, 
Vol.6, Ho.2, September 1988
WATT, D.C., 'Britain and the Cold War in the Far East, 1945-58', in
Y. Hagai and A. Iriye, The Origins of the Cold War in Asia, Hew York 1977
WOOD, R.J., 'Economic Co-operation In Asia', in Australian Quarterly, 
Vol.31, Ho.2, June 1959
YQSHIHIKO, TAHIGAVA, 'The Cominform and Southeast Asia', in Y.Hagai and 
A. Iriye, The Origins of the Cold War in Asia, Hew York 1977
B. BOOKS
BALL, V. MACMAHOH, Rationalism & Communism in East Asia, Melbourne 1956
BRIMMEL, J.H., Communism in South East Asia, London 1959
BUCKLEY, ROGER, Occupation Diplomacy - Britain, the United States and 
Japan 1945-1952, Cambridge 1982
BULLOCK, ALAH, Ernest Bevin - Foreign Secretary 1945-1951,
Oxford 1985 (paperback)
BUTVELL, RICHARD, Southeast Asia today - and tomorrow, Hew York 1964
-  416 -
BUTVELL, R. and VANDENBOSCH, A., Southeast Asia among the Vorld Powers, 
Lexington, Kentucky 1957
CADY, JOHN F. , A History of Modern Burma, Ithaca 1958
COLBERT, EVELYN, Southeast Asia in International Politics 1941-1956, 
Ithaca, N.Y., 1977
COLOMBO CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE, The Colombo Plan, London 1950
CORKRAN, HERBERT, Patterns of International Cooperation in the 
Caribbean, 1942-1969, Dallas 1970
DARBY, PHILLIP, British Defence Policy East of Suez, 1947-1968,
London 1973
DARVIN, JOHN, Britain and Decolonisation, Houndmills, Basingstoke, 1988 
(paperback)
DENNIS, PETER, Troubled days of peace -
Mountbatten and South East Asia Command, 1945-46, Manchester 1987 
DEVILLERS, PHILIPPE, Paris - Saigon - Hanoi, Paris 1988 
DUNN, PETER M. , The First Vietnam Var, London 1985
EDMONDS, ROBIN, Setting the Mould - The United States and Britain, 1945- 
1950, Oxford 1986
EHRMAN, JOHN, Grand Strategy, Vol.6, London 1956
ESTERLINE, JOHN AND ESTERLIN, MAE, How the Dominoes fell - Southeast 
Asia in Perspective, Lanham 1986
FRANKEL, JOSEPH, British Foreign Policy, 1945-1973, London 1975
FIFIELD, RUSSELL H., The Diplomacy of Southeast Asia: 1945-1958, Archon 
Books 1968
GARDNER, RICHARD N., Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy in Current Perspective, 
new and expanded edition, New York 1980
HALL, D.G.E., A History of South-East Asia, fourth edition,
Houndmills 1981 (paperback)
HEIMSATH,' C.H. and MANSINGH, S., A Diplomatic History of Modern India, 
Calcutta 1971
HESS, GARY R. , The United States' Emergence as a Southeast Asian Power, 
1940-1950, New York 1987
KIRBY, S. VOODBURN, The War Against Japan, Vol.V, The Surrender of Japan, 
London 1969
- 417-
LAVSON, RUTH C. , International Regional Organizations, Hew York 1962
LEVI, WERNER, Free India in Asia, Minneapolis, Minnesota, 1952
LEVIS, JULIAN, Changing Direction- British Military Planning for Post­
war Strategic defence, 1942-1947, London 1988
LOUIS, WILLIAM ROGER, Imperialism at Bay, 1941-1945. The United States 
and the Dissolution of the British Empire, Oxford 1977
LOUIS, WILLIAM ROGER, The British Empire in the Middle East, 1945-1951, 
Oxford 1985 (paperback edition)
LOWE, PETER, Britain in the Far East: A survey from 1819 to the present, 
Hew York 1981
LOWE, PETER, The Origins of the Korean Var, London 1986
MANSERGH, NICHOLAS, Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs, 1939-1952, 
London 1958
McLANE, CHARLES B. , Soviet Strategies in Southeast Asia - an Exploration 
of Eastern Policy under Lenin and Stalin Princeton, New Jersey 1966
MACLEAR, MICHAEL, The Ten Thousand Day Var, Vietnam: 1945-1975,
New York 1981
McMAHON, ROBERT J., Colonialism and Cold Var, the United States and the 
Struggle for Indonesian Independence, 1945-49, Ithaca 1981
MOORE, R.J., Escape from Empire - The Attlee Government and the 
Indian Problem, Oxford 1983
MORGAN, KENNETH 0., Labour in Power, 1945-1951, Oxford 1985 (paperback)
MOUNTBATTEN, Vice Admiral the Earl Mountbatten of Burma, Post Surrender 
Tasks, Report to the Combined Chiefs of Staff by the Supreme Allied 
Commander, South East Asia, 1943-1945; London 1969
O'BALLANCE, EDGAR, Malaya: The Communist Insurgent Var, 1948-60,
London 1962
O'NEILL, ROBERT, Australia in the Korean Var 1950-53, Volume 1, Strategy 
and Diplomacy, Canberra 1981
OVENDALE, RITCHIE, The English-Speaking Alliance, London 1985
PANDEY, B.N., South and South-east Asia, 1945-1979, London 1980
PEPPER, SUZANNE, Civil Var in China, Berkeley 1978
PLUVIER, JAN, South-East Asia from Colonialism to Independence,
Kuala Lumpur 1974
- 418-
PRITT, D.N. , The Labour Government 1945-51, London 1963
ROSE, SAUL, Britain and South-East Asia, London 1962
ROSEN, S. MCKEE, The Combined Boards of the Second World War,
New York 1951
ROTHWELL, VICTOR, Britain and the Cold War 1941-1947, London 1982
ROTTER, ANDREV J. , The Path to Vietnam - Origins of the American 
Commitment to Southeast Asia, Ithaca 1987
SARDESAI, D.R., Indian Foreign Policy in Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam
1947-1964, Berkeley and Los Angeles 1968
SCHoNBERGER, TONI, Der britische Riickzug as Singapore 1945-1976,
Zurich 1981
SCHOLL-LATOUR, PETER, Der Tod im Peisfeld - Dreifiig Jahre Krieg in 
Indochina, Stuttgart 1979 (paperback)
SHORT, ANTHONY, The Communist Insurrection in Malaya, 1948-1960,
London 1975
SHORT, ANTHONY, The Origins of the Vietnam War, London 1989
SILCOCK, T.H. , The Commonwealth Economy in Southeast Asia, Durham 1959
SINGH, LALITA PRASAD, The Politics of Economic Cooperation in Asia, 
Columbia, Missouri, 1966
STOCKWELL, A.J., British policy and Malay politics during the Malayan 
Union Experiment, 1945-1948, Kuala Lumpur 1979
STRANGE, SUSAN, Sterling and British Policy, London 1971
STRANG, WILLIAM, Home and Abroad, London 1956
TAYLOR, ALASTAIR M. , Indonesian Independence and the United Nations, 
London 1960
THIEN, TON THAT, India and South East Asia, 1947-1960, Geneve 1963
THORNE, CHRISTOPHER, Allies of a Kind - The United States, Britain, and 
the War against Japan, Oxford 1978 (paperback edition)
TINKER, HUGH, The Union of Burma, Fourth Edition, London 1967
T0NNESSON, STEIN, 1946: DSclenchement de la Guerre d*Indochine,
Paris 1987
TRAGER, FRANK N. , Marxism in Southeast Asia, Stanf ord 1959
-  419 -
VARMA, RAVISDRA, Australia and Southeast Asia - The Crystallisation of a 
Relationship, Sew Delhi 1974
WATT, ALAS, The Evolution of Australian Foreign Policy, 1938-1965, 
Cambridge 1967
WIGHTMAS, DAVID, Toward Economic Cooperation in Asia - the United 
Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East, Sew Haven 1963
WYATT, DAVID K., Thailand - A Short History, Sew Haven 1982 (paperback)
YOUSG, JOHS V., Britain, France and the Unity of Europe, 1945-1951, 
Leicester 1984
ZIEGLER, PHILIP, Mountbatten - The Official Biography, Glasgow 1986 
(paperback)
